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ABSTRACT 
The pan­European decline in birth rates and its outcome, below 
replacement fertility, give the impression that there are uniform driving 
forces at play.  Europe, however, is not a homogeneous cultural entity. 
Despite shared history, open borders, and relentless efforts to achieve 
political and economic unity, it remains divided and heterogeneous. 
There is now ample evidence to show that comparable fertility rates are a 
product of widely disparate traditions and modes of conduct.  In light of 
these findings and in a bid to draw on the accomplishments of 
anthropological demography this thesis presents results from two 
ethnographic studies in Athens and London exploring female middle­ 
class attitudes towards having children and experiences of family 
formation.  Through an investigation of similar analytic concepts in each, 
including motherhood, mothering, identity and gendered personhood, it 
reveals a range of differences between how Athenians and Londoners 
approach childbearing.  These variations are not of degree but rather of 
character.  In middle­class Athens, for example, motherhood is essential 
to being a ‘complete’ Greek woman and childlessness is shameful, 
whereas among white, British, middle­class women living in London, 
becoming a mother entails the adoption of guilt and a loss of identity, 
status and independence, while being ‘childfree’ is acceptable.  Key to 
shaping the two groups of informants’ impressions and practices in this 
regard is the socio­economic context in which they live.  In comparison to 
London, childcare facilities in Athens are scarce and the provision of state 
support for families is minimal.  However, middle­class Athenian 
grandparents, unlike their counterparts in London, play a crucial role in 
helping look after their grandchildren.  The print media is another 
important influence on reproduction.  Consequently, this study also 
explores the degree of correspondence between each group of 
informants’ narrative accounts of childbearing with Greek and British 
newspapers’ discourse on the causes of low fertility.
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GLOSSARY 
adiparohi system of housing construction 
adikatastati (f.) irreplaceable 
afendis (m.), afendra (f.) master/mistress of the household 
afksanesthe kai plithynesthe be fruitful and multiply 
afthyparktoi (pl.) self­existent 
aitia (pl.) causes 
allodapoi foreign immigrants 
amvlosi (f), amvloseis (pl.), ektrosi abortion(s) 
anadelfou without siblings 
Anatolitis (m.) Eastern male 
anatrofi upbringing 
andras man 
anesi comfort 
aneksartitoi (pl.) independent 
anthropos human being 
arrostimeni (f.) unhealthy, sick 
astoi (pl.) bourgeois 
astikopoiïsi urbanisation 
atomismos individualism 
demos (m), demoi (pl.) municipality (­ties), borough(s) 
demosioi ypalliloi (pl.) civil servants 
dimiourgia creation, creativity 
dropi shame 
egoïsmos selfishness, pride, self­respect 
epaggelmatiki apokatastasi to settle in a career 
eparhia province 
epikoinonia communication 
erethismata (pl.) incentives 
ethnos nation 
filotimo the love of honour
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filotomarismos the love of one’s own skin 
frontisteria (pl.) tuition centres 
fytozoei (third person singular) to scrape a living 
galouxithi (third person singular) suckling, nursing 
genniseis births 
gennitikotita fertility 
gineka woman 
gomena (f.) lay, steady 
hirafetisi (tis ginekas) (female) emancipation 
hamili gennitikotita low fertility 
ikanopoiïsi satisfaction 
kafeneio coffeehouse 
kerdoskopia profiteering 
koinotita (f.), koinotites (pl.) community (­ties) 
koinoniki pronoia social welfare 
kyria lady 
laïki agora weekly neighbourhood market 
ligoteknoi (pl.) those with ‘few’ children 
malakas wanker 
mamothrefta (pl.) mummy’s boys 
Megali Idea Great Idea 
meson a go­between, a contact 
mitera mother 
mitriko filtro maternal filter 
mitrotita maternity 
nikokirei original Athenian middle­classes 
noikokyra, noikokyres mistress (­es) of the house 
noötropia mentality 
oikogenia family 
oikogeniarhis head of the family, householder 
oikismos prosfygon refugee settlement 
oloklirosi completion
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orama vision 
Panayia the All­Holy 
paragogi production 
patrotita paternity 
polis city 
polykatoikia (f.), polykatoikies (f. pl.) high­rise apartment blocks 
polytekni (f.), polyteknoi (pl.) persons with 4 or more children 
polyteknes oikogeneies large families 
poutanizoun (third person f. plural) to act like whores 
prosopikotita personality 
sholes goneon parenting schools 
skyla bitch 
soma body 
spataloi (pl.) spendthrifts 
spiti home, house 
ta thelo mou my needs, wants 
teknopoiïsi, teknopoiΐa, teknogonia the process of making children 
theosis to achieve likeness with God 
to demografiko the demographic issue 
to oikonomiko the economic problem 
vathis kapitalismos deep capitalism 
yperkatanalotismos hyper­consumption 
yperprostateytikoi (pl.) overprotective 
ypogennitikotita underfertility 
ypogonimotita infertility 
yennovolane (third person plural) to breed
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1 INTRODUCTION 
‘One child does not prevent me from doing the things that I want to do,’ 
explained Anthi, a Greek woman in her late 30s, as she, her mother and I 
sat in the lounge of her typically middle­class, Athenian apartment 
located in the heart of Nea Smyrni.  ‘I mean, it does not take up so much of 
my time; whereas if I had two children my responsibilities would have 
been greater.  Moreover, there is the financial element.  I knew that my 
financial situation would be of a certain level, so that in order for me to be 
able to give to my child the things that I have in mind, I cannot give to 
two, only to one.’  Anthi’s mother, Maria, disagreed.  ‘She could have had 
two.  I think she should have had at least two.’  ‘Did you consider having 
none?’  I asked Anthi.  ‘No, I never did.  That was not what I wanted,’ she 
replied with certainty.  ‘You feel it as a need.  I believe those who say that 
you become complete through your child.  Anyhow, a couple does not 
make up a family.  Family means having a child.’  ‘The truth is,’ Maria 
added, ‘children are a huge responsibility.  It’s a fact: the higher up you 
are socially, the fewer children you have.  Hardly any people with lots of 
money also have many children.  Rarely do you see that.’  ‘Yes, most of 
my friends have one child, not even two,’ Anthi contended. 
Almost exactly a year after my encounter with Anthi and Maria, I 
was sitting with Susan, a white, British 38­year­old mother of two boys, 
aged two and four, who was pregnant with her third child.  I met Susan 
in Pebbles 1 , a playgroup in The Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham in 
London.  ‘I knew I wanted at least two children and always more than 
one.  My husband is one of six and I am one of two.  I always knew I 
didn’t want just one child but I was surprised to find how easy it was to 
stay with one.  I worried that I would not be able to love another as much 
but I don’t know many people who have one.  Maybe some who have 
had them later in life, at 40 or something, and can’t have another but it’s 
either none at all or three usually.  My husband would even like a fourth.’ 
‘Deciding to have children,’ Susan asserted, ‘was not difficult, it was 
more a case of when to have them.’  Susan was unable to rationalise why 
she had not stopped at two children.  She said simply that her two boys 
were ‘very mild mannered’ and that she thought she would be able to 
cope with a third child. Unlike Anthi, Susan had given up her career 
after the birth of her first son and claimed that she did not intend to go 
back.  ‘In the first few months, I was mind numbingly bored.  Your social 
scene goes completely.  There is no you time anymore; me, as a person, 
doesn’t really exist.  It will do, when they grow up, then there’ll be time 
for me but I miss being spontaneous because I have to think of their 
welfare first and then when I do go out I feel guilty leaving them with my 
1 ‘Pebbles’ is a pseudonym. I have changed all the names of places and 
informants to prevent their identification.
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husband.  He assures me it’s not a problem but still it’s my responsibility 
because I look after them.  I don’t know why, that’s just my job, I guess.’ 
These two accounts are typical of those I collected from the two 
different groups of people who participated in this study.  The first by 
Anthi matches the overall picture drawn by the predominantly female, 
middle­class Athenians whom I interviewed in Athens, Greece between 
January and October 2003.  The second by Susan is consistent with the 
views, and partly also the experiences of the white, British informants, 
comprised mainly of women, whom I met between November 2003 and 
August 2004 in London, UK.  Both provide answers to the questions I 
posed in the hope of gaining a deeper understanding of their attitudes 
towards having children and experiences of family­formation.  Although 
their patterns of childbearing are different, each is also illustrative of the 
diversity of pathways towards low fertility, a pan­European 
phenomenon defined by a birth rate of below 2.1 children per woman. 
1.1 The ‘second demographic transition’ 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, following a short ‘baby boom’ 
that peaked in the mid­1960s, many European countries began to 
experience a fertility decline of unprecedented scale and pace.  This trend 
first made its mark in central, eastern and northern Europe in the 1950s 
and 1960s, then in western Europe, including the United Kingdom, in the 
1970s, next in southern European countries, such as Greece, in the 1980s, 
and finally in the countries of the former Soviet Republic in the 1990s 
(Frejka and Ross 2001).  In 2004, the estimated EU­25 average total 
fertility rate was 1.50 children per woman, while among the EU­15 it was 
1.52 children per woman (http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int).  According to 
van de Kaa (1987), these changes amount to a ‘second demographic 
transition’ because they have transpired in conjunction with patterns of 
behaviour different to those allegedly responsible for the ‘first 
demographic transition’, the last phase of which occurred at the turn of 
the twentieth century.  While the first shift towards smaller families was, 
van de Kaa argues, largely due to growing concern for the provision of an 
increasingly costly family and non­productive offspring, the second is the 
result of growing emphasis upon ‘self­fulfilment’ and personal liberties; 
in other words, emancipation from ‘traditional’ forms of behaviour, 
particularly in relation to sex and marriage. 
‘Two key words characterize the norms and attitudes behind the 
first and second demographic transitions, and highlight the contrasts 
between them: altruistic and individualistic,’ van de Kaa contends (1987, 
p.5).  In sum, there is a move from ‘the golden age of marriage to the dawn of 
cohabitation,’ from ‘the era of the king­child with parents to that of the king­ 
pair with child,’ from ‘preventive contraception to self­fulfilling conception’ 
and from ‘uniform to pluralistic families and households’ (van de Kaa 1987,
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p.11).  The ‘second demographic transition’ theory supposes that despite 
considerable variation in the timing and prevalence of this cluster of 
demographic changes, they will gradually gain momentum almost 
everywhere in the ‘developed’ world.  Moreover, once experienced they 
are irreversible. 
Despite the dominance of the ‘second demographic transition’ 
theory in the demographic community, it has not escaped criticism from 
demographers (Coleman 2004).  In addition, recent fertility trends appear 
to challenge some of its central tenets.  As Billari and Kohler (2004) 
recently showed, by the end of the 1990s several of the assumed links 
between low fertility, marriage, the timing of leaving the parental home, 
extra­marital childbearing, and women’s labour force participation had 
been reversed.  For example, in 1975 European countries with a higher 
divorce rate tended to have lower fertility.  By 1999, however, those with 
a higher divorce rate displayed higher fertility.  Similarly, between 1975 
and 1999 the negative correlation between levels of extra­marital 
childbearing and total fertility had become positive, as had the 
relationship between women’s labour force participation and total 
fertility.  The reversal of previously existing associations relates to the 
emergence of ‘lowest­low’ fertility, defined as a birth rate at or below 1.3 
children per woman (Kohler et al. 2002), and manifest in southern, 
central, and eastern Europe. 
Greece is characteristic of countries with exceptionally low fertility 
(1.29 children per woman in 2004), yet also a below average divorce rate, 
a high total female first marriage rate, very low extra­marital 
childbearing, a late pattern of independence from the parental home, a 
moderate level of female labour force participation, a postponement of 
first births and few higher order ones.  In contrast, the United Kingdom 
has a total fertility rate that is above average for European standards (in 
2004, 1.77 children per woman).  Yet compared to Greece it has a high 
divorce rate and low total female first marriage rate, considerable extra­ 
marital childbearing, an early pattern of parental home leaving, a high 
level of female labour force participation, and though also an inclination 
towards the postponement of first births, a better recovery rate at older 
ages (Table 1).
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Table 1.  Selective demographic differences between Greece and the UK 
(Source: Frejka et al. 2001; Iacovou 2001; Eurostat 2004; Berrington 2004; 
Sardon 2004; Council of Europe 2005; www.un.org) 
Greece England and Wales 
Total fertility rate 1.29 (2004) 1.77 (2004) (UK) 
Mean age of women 
at first birth 
27.3 (2002) 26.7 (2002) 
Extra­marital 
childbearing 
3.9% (2002) 40.6% (2002) 
Proportion of 4+ 
births 
5% (1960 birth cohort) 10% (1960 birth 
cohort) 
Total first marriage 
rate for females 
70% (1999) 53% (1999) (UK) 
Total divorce rate 15.7% (1999) 43.5% (2000) 
Age at which 50 per 
cent of young people 
are living away from 
home 
22.9 years (women) 
28.2 years (men) 
21.2 years (women) 
23.5 years (men) (UK) 
Women as % of 
labour force 
37.8% (2000) 44.1% (2000) (UK) 
As Billari and Kohler (2004) assert, therefore, contrary to the ‘second 
demographic transition’ theory’s suggestion, European fertility is 
showing signs of divergence rather than convergence, with considerable 
differences both between and within low and ‘lowest­low’ fertility 
countries.  Yet the reasons behind this diversity remain poorly theorised. 
While demographers have attempted to explain below­replacement 
fertility and its variations (Lesthaeghe 1983; Lesthaeghe and Meekers 
1986; Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988; McDonald 2000; Livi­Bacci 2001; Dalla 
Zuanna 2001, 2004), in general, demography is strong on description but 
weak on explanation (Townsend 1997). According to Greenhalgh (1995), 
demographic transition theories are characteristically ahistorical, 
conflating individual countries’ histories into one grand History divided 
into ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ phases.  ‘The central problematique of 
virtually all demographic theories of fertility change … is clearly 
formulated in terms of modernization theory’s evolutionary view of 
societal development’ (Greenhalgh 1996, p.27).  The basic premise of the 
‘second demographic transition’ theory was, for example, that more 
‘traditional’ and ‘conservative’ European societies, such as Greece, Italy 
and Spain, will gradually follow in the footsteps of more ‘advanced’, 
‘modern’, ‘liberal’ societies, such as the UK.  However, this has already 
proved erroneous since fertility rates in the latter group of countries 
appear to have followed a different trajectory than those in the former 
and are now generally higher than theirs.
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In a review of half a century of research into the determinants of 
fertility, even van de Kaa (1996, p.390) admits that ‘there does not yet 
exist a single “good story”, accepted by all knowledgeable scholars, about 
the setting and conditions necessary and sufficient to generate the central 
action of fertility change.’  Yet one of the major problems with 
demographic explanations of fertility transitions is their assumption that 
they have a common cause (Mason 1997).  Likewise, the trouble with 
theories about the derivation of differences between low and ‘lowest­low’ 
fertility is that they tend to disregard the potentially diverse reasons for 
each.  McDonald’s ‘gender equity’ theory, for instance, postulates that 
exceptionally low birth rates are a product of conflict between the way 
that social institutions, such as the labour market, and private 
institutions, such as the family, treat women with respect to men. 
‘Institutions which deal with women as individuals are more advanced in 
terms of gender equity than institutions which deal with women as 
mothers or members of families’ (McDonald 2000, p.11).  Absent from 
this hypothesis is a reflection of the disparities in gender relations 
between countries with ‘lowest­low’ fertility, as well as among those with 
higher fertility.  Present, on the contrary, is a ‘modernist preoccupation’ 
(Greenhalgh 1995, p.10), as countries with greater ‘gender equity’ are 
deemed more ‘advanced’ than those with less (perhaps with the 
exception of countries such as Germany which has ‘lowest­low’ fertility 
but is considered further ‘advanced’ than countries such as Greece). 
As Anthi and Susan’s accounts illustrate, childbearing involves a 
series of both morally and practically motivated considerations particular 
to the context in which they transpire.  To explore material such as this 
and assess its relevance my research draws on the depth and detail to be 
derived from a small sample.  It thus treats such narratives as illustrative 
rather than representative.  With the wider context of the study and of the 
understanding I attempted to gain, through the extended interviews, of 
other aspects of women’s own lives, such accounts offer a wealth of 
evidence against some of the key assumptions of demographic 
explanations of below­replacement fertility, and point to a set of issues 
that demographers have a tendency to ignore.  Firstly, they reveal the 
hollowness of the claim that what separates low and ‘lowest­low’ fertility 
is the degree to which countries belonging to either group exhibit certain 
characteristics or patterns of behaviour.  Anthi and Susan were both 
equally committed to motherhood but managed their reproductive lives 
in their own distinct ways, given the constraints and opportunities that 
they each had to face in their individual environments, and their values 
regarding mothering.  They also challenge the supposition that very low 
birth rates are an outcome of ‘Mediterranean’ countries’ ‘familism’, in 
other words ‘strong’ as opposed to ‘weak’ family ties (Dalla Zuanna 2001; 
Livi­Bacci 2001).  Both women were keen to have a family but they had 
different views with respect to how many children made a family
19 
‘complete.’  For Anthi at least, a childless couple did not constitute a 
family unit, and while Susan agreed, her sense of family did not involve 
an only child but ‘at least two.’ 
In addition, their narratives question the view that societies with 
‘lowest­low’ fertility are backward in terms of women’s social status 
(McDonald 2000).  Both informants faced difficulties balancing their 
responsibilities at work and at home, and both took on the bulk of 
childcare.  Yet each had to deal with distinctly structured labour markets 
and expectations as to the ‘proper’ way in which to perform their 
multiple tasks.  Finally, Anthi and Susan’s accounts hint at the important 
presence of others in the process of negotiating fertility, and point to 
differences concerning the extent to which third parties are able to have 
an impact upon the course of a woman’s reproductive life.  Maria 
thought her daughter should have a second child but Anthi disagreed 
and stuck to her original plan of having just one, whereas Susan’s 
husband wanted more children than his wife, possibly convincing her to 
have a third. 
1.2 Aims and objectives 
Anthi and Susan’s accounts point to the limitations of demographic 
approaches and the potential of anthropology to capture fully the 
complexity of issues with which people engage in the course of thinking 
about having children and managing their reproductive lives.  However, 
they also hint at the possibility of bridging the gap between anthropology 
and demography.  While both narratives provide an in­depth look at 
some of the concerns that spring from participating in the process of 
family­formation, it is the wider context in which they are set that makes 
them especially interesting.  In other words, Anthi and Susan’s 
perspectives on childbearing acquire special significance when 
considered in light of recent European fertility trends.  Without 
systematic demographic analyses of patterns of behaviour pertaining to 
reproduction, anthropological investigations of attitudes towards and 
experiences of family building would not only fail to establish the 
broader implications of their findings but would also lack focus.  This is 
because they would be missing vital, population­level demographic 
observations essential to the process of elucidating patterns of individual 
or sub­group level fertility behaviour. 
For example, demographic data reveal that ‘lowest­low’ fertility in 
Greece is concurrent with an exceptionally low proportion of extra­ 
marital births.  Being aware of this co­existence, one line of enquiry I 
chose to follow was into Athenian informants’ views on marriage in the 
hope of gaining a deeper understanding of their approaches to 
childbearing.  If the majority of Greek births occur within a marital union 
­ as did those of my informants – then, are beliefs about and experiences
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of marriage indicative of ideas about having children?  Likewise, 
demographic data shows that together with low fertility in the UK, there 
is a growing proportion of childlessness, which is not exclusively due to 
rising levels of involuntary infertility.  As a result, not only did I seek out 
individuals who described themselves as ‘childfree’ but I also invited 
informants to share their opinions on those who ‘chose’ not to have 
children.  Both lines of enquiry were useful in helping me build a more 
comprehensive picture of the values and conditions underlying British 
and Athenian informants’ attitudes towards and experiences of family­ 
formation. 
The excerpts from Anthi and Susan’s interviews encapsulate the 
aims and objectives of this thesis.  Anthropological demography is now a 
recognized inter­disciplinary field (Greenhalgh 1995; Kertzer and Fricke 
1997; Johnson­Hanks 2005).  Yet attempts to study reproduction through 
the perspectives of anthropology with the intention of improving 
understanding of demographic trends in Europe are relatively recent 
(Douglass 2005).  This thesis will add to these latest efforts by presenting 
the findings of a comparative ethnographic study of attitudes and 
approaches to reproduction based in Athens and London.  More 
specifically, it analyses a series of interviews conducted among 
predominantly well­educated Greek and white British women (and to a 
small extent men) between the beginning of 2003 and the end of 2004. 
While each investigation took place independently of the other, the focus 
of both is to understand the constraints and opportunities to childbearing 
perceived and/or experienced by middle­class women in two different, 
low fertility capitals of Europe (see Chapters 4 and 8 for definitions of the 
term ‘middle­class’ in Athens and London respectively). 
In particular, this research seeks to establish the extent to which 
ideas about motherhood and womanhood permeate informants’ 
narratives of the conditions favourable and unfavourable to having 
children, and hence contribute to the production of the specific patterns 
of low fertility in each city.  Central to this thesis are the following 
questions: 
1. To what extent do beliefs about the value of motherhood 
influence Athenians and white middle­class Londoners’ thinking 
about whether or not to have children, the timing of the 
transition to parenthood, and family size? 
2. How do women’s personal experiences prior to becoming 
mothers affect their approaches toward the start of family­ 
formation, and how do their experiences of motherhood impinge 
upon the way they progress from the first to the second and 
subsequent births?
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3. To what degree do local, class­specific understandings of what it 
means to be a woman, have an impact on perceptions of 
motherhood and the process of childbearing? 
4. How compatible or incompatible is being a mother with being a 
woman in middle­class Athens and London, and how is 
reproduction affected by the position and appraisal of 
motherhood relative to definitions of womanhood? 
5. What are the main structural conditions (employment 
opportunities, childcare facilities, and the character of the 
welfare system etc) in each city moulding informants’ ideas 
about and experiences of motherhood and womanhood, and 
ultimately their attitudes and approaches towards reproduction? 
6. How important is the issue of below­replacement fertility in the 
Greek and British popular imagination, and do group­level 
perceptions of this phenomenon affect and equate with how 
individual women evaluate the significance of their own 
childbearing?  If so, in what way do they do so? 
7. What is the print media’s contribution to the low fertility debate, 
and are the causes of low fertility presented by the press 
reflected in informants’ personal narratives of family­formation? 
8. Finally, what can answers to all of the above reveal about 
population­level differences in European low fertility?  Do they 
challenge or complement demographic explanations? 
All of these questions were subject to scrutiny in both field sites.  While I 
concentrated on drawing out the differences between the Athenian and 
London­based accounts, I was also on the lookout for similarities between 
them.  In order to do both, I chose to focus on two comparable middle­ 
class areas of Athens and London where I felt that I had a better chance of 
speaking to native­born Greek and white British well­educated and, in all 
likelihood, professional women of reproductive age; women, that is, who 
have been the driving force behind low fertility in both countries.  After 
making contact with various individuals in each place, I conducted a 
series of open­ended and semi­structured interviews designed to 
generate details of their reproductive lives (see Chapter 2 for details). 
While this study does not purport to reveal the overall causes of 
below­replacement fertility and its variations in Europe, it does 
contribute to the academic debate on the subject.  Although the issues 
faced by London­based and Athenian informants cannot be identical to 
those encountered by other population sub­groups, the theoretical and 
methodological channels employed to identify and assess them are not 
applicable only to them.  The same analytic concepts and research 
methods used to shed light on the family­formation practices of women 
in this study are employable in others elsewhere.  They are also useful in 
challenging some of the existing demographic assumptions about low
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fertility, by drawing attention to discrepancies between demographers’ 
models of reproductive behaviour and informants’ conduct.  For 
example, do women have clear reproductive goals or ‘preferences’ 
(Hakim 2003) in mind when they start the process of family­formation, 
and is a total family size of one or two children indicative of a rise in 
selfishness and individualism, as the ‘second demographic transition’ 
theory suggests?  Using concrete examples, responses to these and other 
queries are obtainable. 
1.3 Key themes 
In order to answer the questions listed above, I use a number of themes. 
The first set encompasses the concepts of gendered personhood, identity 
and the self, all crucial to shaping informants’ understandings of 
themselves as mothers and women.  The next group, ‘structure, agency 
and reproductive decision­making’, intends to shed light on the process 
of negotiating fertility by examining individuals’ perceptions of their 
ability to manage their reproductive lives under structural conditions not 
of their own making, and in contexts where others have vested interests 
in their reproduction.  The third and final collection of key themes 
contains the issues of motherhood and mothering, whose locally­specific 
meanings were vital influences upon women’s experiences of family­ 
formation.  Below, I introduce each set of key themes in more depth. 
1.3.1 Gendered personhood, identity and the self 
The concept of a ‘person’ is socially constructed; it is, as McCall (1990) 
suggests, a ‘public entity’, a collective understanding of the nature of the 
living being.  This is not to be confused, Morris (1994) argues, with the 
human being as a biological species or with notions of self.  All societies 
recognise the human as a generic creature and as a being capable of self­ 
reflection but this is not enough to make her or him into a ‘person’. 
While some social groups, for instance, view members of another clan, 
community or society as ‘human’, they do not always see them as 
‘persons’.  Moreover, among certain groups not all ‘persons’ are human 
beings – they are also spirits or animals.  Different groups or societies, 
therefore, have different ideas about who is and who is not a ‘person’. 
Many of the properties attributable to persons are only meaningful when 
examined in relation to gender and the body.  Persons are neither gender­ 
neutral (Moore 1994) nor independent of bodies (Lambek and Strathern 
1998), though there is no obvious or simple correlation between them. 
Personhood is also not a stable category with permanent features but is 
constantly in the process of transformation and re­evaluation (McCall 
1990).  ‘Persons are constituted, de­constituted, maintained and altered in 
social practices through life and after death.  This process can be 
described as the ongoing attainment of personhood’ (Fowler 2004, p.7).
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Definitions of personhood provide valuable insight into female 
informants’ approaches to childbearing because they are central to the 
construction of meanings and experiences relating to motherhood and 
womanhood.  As Brand (2001) notes, to a certain extent collective and 
public senses of personhood, even if articulated indirectly, contribute to 
individuals’ understandings of what is ‘proper’ behaviour, particularly in 
accordance with their gender.  Both men and women, she argues, must 
perform in a manner appropriate to their gender in order to become full 
persons.  In Bamako, Mali, for instance, women who remain unmarried 
and/or childless fail to qualify as persons.  I ask, therefore, to what extent 
is having a child important to achieving full personhood among middle­ 
class women (and, to a lesser extent, men) in Athens and London.  Given 
the substantial amount of anthropological literature on the subject in 
relation to both Greece and England (see Chapters 7 and 11 respectively), 
how do local perceptions of female personhood affect family size and the 
timing of the transition to motherhood in each field site?  For example, 
how does the English definition of persons as ‘individuals’ (Macfarlane 
1978, 1992 and 1995) influence British women’s views on motherhood 
versus having a career, and is female personhood among urban, middle­ 
class Greek women still largely dependent upon their roles as mothers 
and wives, as Loizos and Papataxiarchis (1991b) claimed it was for rural 
Greek women in the past? 
Human beings also possess a sense of self.  According to Morris 
(1994), the self is a process, a means of organising experience and making 
sense of the world and ourselves.  It involves self­awareness and 
reflective thought and is essentially a psychological concept.  In an 
insightful critique of anthropological uses of the concept of self, Cohen 
(1994) calls for the differentiation between the terms ‘selfhood’ and 
‘personhood’.  While the latter is a socially imposed definition of ‘me’ ­ in 
other words, a description of who ‘I am’ as a social entity ­ the former 
refers to an individual’s consciousness and reflects awareness of one’s 
self.  The notion of the self captures individuals’ capacity as human 
beings to think about their practices and reflect upon their environment. 
In others words, the self is ‘a repository of experience’ whereas 
personhood is only a ‘selective version of me’ that is culturally and 
socially determined, and enforced with varying degrees of success 
(Cohen 1994, p.57 & p.68).  Therefore, while conceptions of personhood 
impinge upon notions of selfhood, individuals can resist externally­ 
imposed definitions of who they are.  This is because they possess agency 
and a sense of self, so that no matter how oppressive the contexts 
individuals find themselves in, they are always able to deliberate upon 
their circumstances and to maintain a critical distance between 
themselves and the collective definitions of themselves as persons.
24 
According to Sokefeld (1999), without recognising the existence of 
the self, there can be no way of understanding identity.  It is due to 
humans’ ability for self­reflection, he argues, that individuals are able to 
‘embrace’ and simultaneously ‘manage’ their diverse identities.  Key to 
the composition of identity are gender, class and personhood (Fowler 
2004).  Each one of us has multiple and conflicting identities that are 
constantly changing and that frequently acquire new meanings in 
different contexts.  Identities are crucial to reproduction because they 
determine the extent to which becoming a parent fits in with other ways 
of being.  In addition, the transition to parenthood leads to the adoption 
of a completely new set of identities that are not accessible to those who 
remain childless.  It also results in the suppression of previously 
dominant identities, an eventuality that may cause new mothers to feel 
unsettled.  How female informants in Athens and London managed their 
various identities in response to different conceptions of personhood, and 
how this process of negotiation affected their approaches to childbearing 
is a key focus of this study. 
1.3.2 Structure, agency and ‘reproductive decision­making’ 
A dominant assumption in the demographic literature is that fertility 
behaviour is the outcome of ‘reproductive decision­making.’  According 
to Carter (1995), demographic accounts of ‘modern’ societies, also 
tellingly referred to as ‘controlled fertility populations,’ perceive 
reproductive agents as ‘active,’ ‘rational,’ unconstrained by ‘culture,’ with 
the ability to exercise ‘choice’ over how many children they want, when 
and how frequently.  ‘Preference theory’ (Hakim 2003) is a recent 
example of an approach to explaining fertility patterns in ‘modern 
societies’ that contains these assumptions.  While ‘preference theory’ 
claims to offer a break from perspectives that envision low fertility as a 
product of homogeneous values and attitudes, it also maintains that 
childbearing is a consequence of ‘women’s choice’ and different ‘lifestyle’ 
decisions or ‘preferences’ (Hakim 2003).  Decision­making models of 
reproductive behaviour, especially those that take rational agents as their 
basic units of analysis, disregard the complex character of decision­ 
making and neglect the non­cognitive processes or unconscious thoughts 
that determine human conduct.  The idea that individuals act only once 
they have carefully contemplated the consequences of their next move 
and that they then ‘choose’ to do whatever is most likely to give them the 
greatest return is open to question. 
Firstly, it is important to distinguish between intentions, desires and 
outcomes.  Fertility preferences do not translate into actual offspring 
(Crosbie 1986), and desires and intentions are not always identical.  A 
woman might say she ‘desires’ four children but only ever intends to 
have two, for example.  Secondly, apparently pre­formulated intentions
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are frequently post­hoc constructions, developed after evaluating existing 
conditions (Johnson­Hanks and Thayer 2005).  Thirdly, as Greenhalgh 
(1995) points out, any decisions that are made in connection with fertility 
are not fixed ­ in other words, ‘once­and­for­all.’  People are not ‘timeless 
strategisers who never change their minds,’ Greenhalgh (1995, p.22) 
argues.  Thinking of them as such leads us to ‘neglect the ambiguity, 
spontaneity, and improvisation, the bungling, changing­of­mind, and 
full­scale about­faces that characterize most peoples’ lives, reproductive 
and otherwise.’  A model of fertility decision­making would have to 
recognise, at least, that opinions formed about family­formation prior to 
conception are sometimes different from those made during pregnancy 
and may even differ from verdicts reached in the post­natal stage 
(Shedlin and Hollerbach 1981). 
Demography’s reluctance to embrace less static approaches to 
childbearing stems from its links with policy­making and, inevitably, its 
use of quantitative methods.  Yet, as Petchesky (1984, p.9) notes, ‘a 
woman does not simply get pregnant and give birth like the flowing of 
tides and seasons.’  Reproduction occurs ‘under the constraint of material 
conditions’ and ‘within a specific network of social relations and social 
arrangements involving herself, her sexual partner(s), her children and 
kin, neighbours, doctors, family planners, birth control providers and 
manufacturers, employers, the church and the state.’  The individuals and 
processes involved in a woman’s reproductive life course are neither easy 
to recognize nor to measure.  Furthermore, their impact upon fertility is 
never unidirectional but rather an outcome of the interplay between 
structure and agency; that is between externally imposed conditions 
(such as family policies, childcare facilities, and a flexible labour market 
suitable for parents) and subjective, sometimes sub­conscious, coping 
strategies.  This exchange is subject to investigation in both Athens and 
London. 
1.3.3 The ‘institution’ of motherhood and ideologies of mothering 
Two major interrelated themes explored in both the Athenian­ and 
London­based studies are motherhood and mothering.  While there is an 
intimate connection between motherhood and mothering, these concepts 
are neither identical nor interchangeable.  Whereas motherhood refers to 
the state or condition of being a mother, mothering is synonymous with 
the act of caring for, nurturing, rearing and protecting someone.  As Silva 
(1996a, p.2) notes, ‘although motherhood is not necessarily derived from 
biology and is a social construction, mothering per se is absolutely 
disconnected from biology.’  Therefore, mothering is a separate aspect of 
different kinds of motherhood, be it by adoption, biological, lone and so 
on (Silva 1996a).  ‘Mothering,’ Silva (1996b, p.12) asserts, ‘can either be 
attached to motherhood, shared between the mother and other persons,
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or done in the place of the mother.  Motherhood is female, mothering 
need not be.’  Motherhood is also an ‘institution’ (Rich 1976) because the 
experience of being a mother is never under the control of women alone 
but subject to rules and regulations, often devised by men.  Shaping 
women’s experiences of motherhood are numerous ‘ideologies of 
mothering’ (Glenn 1994), or conventions about how to mother.  Both the 
institution of motherhood and ideologies of mothering intersect and 
overlap to shape and constrain reproduction. 
Individuals’ experiences of mothering and decisions about childcare 
arrangements are not just a product of circumstances and material 
resources but also of moral considerations.  ‘Ideologies of mothering’ 
(Glenn 1994, p.12) structure how women perform and feel about being 
their children’s carers.  As Rothman (1994, p.139­140) argues, an ‘ideology 
is the way a group looks at the world, the way it organises its thinking 
about the world.  An ideology can let us see things, but it can also blind 
us, close our eyes to our own lived reality, our own experiences, our own 
bodies.’  Within a particular social context, ideologies of mothering affect 
the lives of women belonging to different classes (Duncan 2005) and/or 
ethnic groups (Collins 1994) in diverse ways.  As a result, they also face 
various kinds and levels of resistance, leading to the emergence of 
‘microideologies’ (Uttal 1996).  As Everingham (1994, p.7) notes, children 
do not have ‘objective needs’ that mothers simply learn to recognise and 
manage.  A child’s wants are the result of a ‘process of interpretation and 
judgment carried out by the mother in a particular “mothering” culture’ 
in which she too has certain desires and interests.  As Duncan et al. (2004, 
p.263) suggest, choices over how children should be looked after are 
derivative of socially and geographically varied ‘complex moral and 
emotional processes in assessing both children’s needs, and the mother’s 
own, and the balance between the two.’  In other words, they are subject 
to ‘gendered moral rationalities.’ 
Beliefs about what constitutes ‘proper’ care for children, of course, 
also stem from place­specific government policies (Ball et al. 2004) and 
the social organisation of non­parental educational childcare provision 
(Holloway 1998).  However, as Holloway (1998) argues knowledge and 
use of benefits and services on offer in particular contexts depend on the 
resources available to different groups.  ‘Childcare cultures’ are, 
therefore, constantly in the process of being produced and reproduced, 
leading to the reinforcement of mothering ideologies.  This means that 
parents will not always take advantage of childcare services after making 
careful financial calculations, weighing the economic costs and benefits 
involved in using particular kinds of provision, but will instead make 
decisions with reference to moral and socially negotiated views about 
what behaviour is right and proper’ (Duncan et al. 2004, p. 256). 
According to Duncan et al. (2004), ‘when it comes to dependent children,
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there can be non­negotiable and deeply gendered, moral requirements to 
take responsibility for children’s needs and to place these first.’ 
For a white, middle­class woman living in Europe motherhood can 
be a particularly isolating experience and has been so ever since the 
eighteenth century when the domestic unit ceased to be the site of both 
production and reproduction, and became a ‘haven’ solely for the latter 
(Glenn 1994).  This gave rise to what Chodorow and Contratto (1992) 
describe as ‘the fantasy of the perfect mother’, who is ‘ever­bountiful’, 
‘ever­giving’, and ‘self­sacrificing’ (Bassin, Honey and Kaplan 1994, p.2), 
yet also responsible for how her children and, therefore, humanity turn 
out (Chodorow and Contratto 1992).  This investigation takes account of 
historical and contemporary understandings of motherhood and 
mothering, and seeks to determine their effects on Greek and British 
middle­class women’s approaches to childbearing in Athens and London. 
For example, what do informants consider ‘good’ childcare to be and 
how do such ideas affect the way in which they experience motherhood? 
Is there a consequent effect on their family size aspirations and practices? 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis begins with a detailed description of the methods used to 
undertake fieldwork in Athens and London and the rationale behind 
their employment.  It also explains the reasons for the distinctive 
character (age, gender, stage in family building process and so on) of the 
people I interviewed in each city.  Chapter 3 gives a brief overview of the 
key characteristics of below­replacement fertility in Greece and the 
United Kingdom relative to other members of the European Union.  This 
chapter aims to put the fertility situation of the two countries into 
perspective by assessing the position of each in comparison with the 
other but also within Europe as a whole.  The thesis then divides into two 
parts: the first, concerns itself entirely with Athens and Greek informants’ 
attitudes towards reproduction and their childbearing approaches, while 
the second deals exclusively with London and British informants’ 
narratives.  Each part consists of four, more or less comparable, chapters. 
Chapters 4 and 8, introduce each field setting in detail.  The former 
begins with an historical outline of the Greek capital and its inhabitants 
ever since the formation of Greece as a nation­state.  It proceeds with a 
portrayal of Nea Smyrni, the Athenian municipality in which I ‘situated’ 
myself and conducted the majority of my interviews.  This chapter ends 
with a brief description of the rise and present­day make­up of the Greek, 
largely Athenian, middle­class.  Chapter 8 contains similar information, 
though it is not as historical as Chapter 4, for reasons that I will defend 
therein.  It also includes a section on the National Childbirth Trust that is 
absent from the corresponding chapter in Part 1 simply because an 
equivalent organisation was non­existent in Athens.  Chapters 5 and 9,
28 
focus on ‘popular’ representations of the low fertility issue between 2001 
and 2005 in a select number of Greek and British newspapers 
respectively.  Both chapters centre on the manner in which each country’s 
print media reported on the causes of the national, as opposed to 
international, character of below­replacement fertility, or ‘underfertility’, 
as it is commonly known in Greece.  Unlike Chapter 9, however, which 
concentrates exclusively on press coverage of trends in the UK‘s birth 
rate, Chapter 5 includes informants’ views on ‘underfertility’ in 
conjunction with those of journalists.  This is due to the unparalleled level 
of concern that exists about low fertility in Greece and the extraordinary 
willingness of Athenian informants to discuss it. 
Following analysis of the Greek and British press and popular 
debates on below­replacement fertility, the two parts diverge slightly in 
terms of their arrangement, although both remain firmly focused on 
exploring the themes introduced above via informants’ accounts. 
Chapter 6, examines Athenians’ narratives concerning their experiences 
and perceptions of motherhood, and considers how these influence their 
thinking on family size and affect their approaches to family building. 
The final chapter of Part 1, Chapter 7, takes this analysis one step further 
by looking beyond motherhood at how changes in ideas about female 
personhood have had an impact on Athenian informants’ sense of 
themselves as women, and consequently also on their attitudes towards 
and experiences of reproduction.  All the issues examined in Chapters 6 
and 7 are subject to discussion in relation to British informants in Chapter 
11, following an examination of the ‘pathways to childbearing’ (Chapter 
10), exclusive to Part 2.  The concluding chapter of this thesis brings the 
two parts of the study together to examine the similarities and differences 
between them.  In the process, it provides answers to the central 
questions posed by this research (see Section 1.2). 
While it would have been possible to structure this thesis in a 
number of different ways, I decided that the clearest and most effective 
method of presenting the two studies was to introduce each one 
separately and compare them only at the end.  An alternative strategy 
would have been to analyse both the Athenian and London findings 
concurrently in every chapter by addressing the manner in which each 
related to the key themes and central research questions set out above. 
However, this line of approach would not have been as appropriate as 
the one used, since many of the issues of relevance to Athenians and 
Londoners’ childbearing attitudes and practices were unique only to 
them, as were several of the structural conditions affecting their 
perspectives and experiences of reproduction.  The first reason for not 
pursuing such an alternative arrangement, therefore, relates to the 
incomparability of certain concerns and situations between the two 
groups of informants.  The second reason has to do with the matter of
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context.  Extracting interview excerpts from each study and placing them 
side by side within different chapters would involve having to exclude 
significant amounts of information about the source of their ideas and 
actions.  Consequently, in order to offer a coherent picture of the 
context(s) in which middle­class Athenians and Londoners approached 
the process of family­formation, it was best to analyse their narratives, 
and the conditions in which these developed, separately.
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2 METHODS 
2.1 Introduction 
A comparative ethnographic study of low fertility, embarked on in two 
different urban European settings, both equally familiar to the researcher, 
leads to a distinct set of methodological challenges.  The purpose of this 
chapter is to reveal and discuss the issues encountered during twenty 
months of fieldwork, between January 2003 and August 2004, in Athens 
and London, which I spent listening to white, British and Greek middle­ 
class women’s views about reproduction, and recording their experiences 
of family­formation.  Throughout this chapter, I address the need to forge 
a closer relationship between the anthropology and demography of 
Europe and suggest why and how the exploration of a small number of 
individuals’ approaches to childbearing and opinions about family 
building can make a valuable contribution towards understanding a pan­ 
European yet highly diverse phenomenon, below­replacement fertility.  I 
also explain the purpose of focusing on two locations instead of one; in 
other words, I offer a justification for the comparative nature of this study. 
Thus, I begin with an explanation of the research design, followed by an 
account of the means, or methods, used to put it into effect, and finally a 
description of the process employed to analyse its findings. 
2.2 Ethnography in two places 
The comparative method is quintessential for demography, routinely 
applied to determine idiosyncrasies both between and within 
populations.  For a demographer, however, a comparative ethnographic 
study is likely to seem unsustainable given that the participants from 
each research site, though similar in terms of their age, gender, education 
and professional background, are too few to form a representative sample 
of their respective populations.  Since informants’ views are not 
necessarily widespread, demographers might wonder what lessons these 
individual cases can teach us about childbearing elsewhere in Greece and 
the UK, or concerning the differences between the two countries’ fertility 
profiles.  Anthropologists might also have reservations about the aims of 
a comparative ethnographic study, but not for the same reasons as 
demographers.  For an anthropologist, research of this kind risks de­ 
contextualising human behaviour in search of units of comparison in the 
form of underlying structures or principles of conduct.  An 
anthropologist may also be hesitant about making general statements 
regarding the phenomenon of low fertility in Europe and its cross­ 
cultural variations based on the findings of one or two in­depth but 
small­scale investigations. 
Anthropologists and demographers, therefore, may have difficulties 
recognising the value of a comparative ethnographic study, but on 
different grounds.  This is because they have a distinct understanding of
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what comparison entails.  As Greenhalgh (1997, p.820) argues, ‘methods 
that share formal properties may mean different things in different 
disciplines because of the varying intellectual histories and cultures in 
which the methods are embedded.’  In this sense, the term ‘comparison’ 
does not have the same connotations when employed in the service of 
anthropological research as when utilised in a demographic project. 
‘Methods that share formal properties but that mean different things to 
those using them are in fact different methods’ (Greenhalgh 1997, p.823). 
Misunderstanding or disagreement regarding the make­up and purpose 
of particular methods also occurs within disciplines themselves, owing to 
the development of novel theoretical orientations. 
Given the existence of such a range of approaches both within and 
between disciplines, in order to demonstrate the legitimacy and benefit of 
conducting a comparative ethnographic study it is necessary to clarify the 
meaning of the term ‘comparison’ as used in this context.  To begin with, 
this research does not aim to explain low fertility or its cross­cultural 
variations based on observations of the fertility behaviour of my 
informants.  It also does not intend to uncover underlying principles of 
conduct or structures common to low and ‘lowest­low’ fertility countries. 
Each enquiry has illustrative rather than representative status, and the 
Athenian investigation is entirely independent of the one conducted in 
London, and therefore subject to its own strengths and weaknesses. 
Nevertheless, both studies have a common aim, which is to use a 
combination of conceptual tools and themes (Introduction, Section 1.3) to 
explore how a particular group of people living in two different low 
fertility settings think about and approach the process of childbearing.  It 
is these conceptual tools and themes, which are the units of comparison. 
In essence, the rationale used to design this research is similar to 
that employed in putting together an anthropological edited volume: to 
gather a set of studies, often with very different geographical, historical, 
cultural and social backdrops, in order to shed light on a single 
phenomenon or question.  While every chapter within a collection of this 
kind is autonomous from the other, and a reader may choose to look at 
each one separately, all the chapters fulfil a mutual task.  Either they 
present a unique theoretical vantage point, or set of themes, from which 
to investigate the topic under consideration or they illustrate the diverse 
ways in which the same phenomenon takes shape in different settings; 
oftentimes they do both.  An edited volume, of course, typically includes 
more than just two studies and contains chapters written by multiple 
authors.  Yet its purpose is similar to mine: to suggest a comparative 
framework, in this case a set of themes or analytic concepts, within which 
to pull together highly individual ethnographic accounts.
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This strategy then raises the possibility of making a series of general 
statements about below­replacement fertility.  A long while ago, 
Radcliffe­Brown (1951, p.16) warned that without ‘comparative studies 
anthropology will become only historiography and ethnography.’  In fact, 
it is precisely because of their understanding of cultural specificity and 
cultural diversity that anthropologists can make general observations 
about a broad range of large­scale phenomena.  The problem with 
demographic theories of low fertility is that the variables contained 
within them have been defined prior to use and irrespective of the 
context(s) they are destined to explain.  As a result, their meanings are 
hypothetical not evidence­based.  In addition, demographers tend to 
ignore the ideational or value changes that accompany fertility 
behaviour, preferring to focus on the structural instead because it is more 
easily quantifiable 2 .  Anthropologists, on the contrary, are able to attend 
to both the structural and ideational forces underlying fertility behaviour, 
be it on a smaller­scale.  What they lose in scope, however, they make up 
for with rich data.  Unlike demographers, anthropologists also take 
advantage of the opportunity afforded by fieldwork to acquaint 
themselves with the meanings informants attach to processes such as 
motherhood, marriage or childbearing, and the relationships between 
them. 
For all these reasons, anthropologists can use their knowledge to 
comment on forces underlying trends or events beyond those directly 
observed in their individual field sites.  In addition, they can overturn or 
critique established theories concerning such phenomena.  By illustrating 
how one population sub­group deals with the process of family­ 
formation, and comparing it with another’s approaches, using certain 
anthropologically informed themes, I will show that it is possible to 
discern influences on fertility behaviour that demographers, due to their 
distinct methodological style, have so far been unable or unwilling to 
investigate.  In particular, I will argue that without information about 
women’s perceptions of themselves as gendered persons, without 
awareness of the ideologies that shape their views on mothering, and 
without an understanding of their experiences as mothers, an important 
chain of reasons for low fertility and its idiosyncratic character remains 
hidden. 
2 Lesthaeghe (1983), Lesthaeghe and Meekers (1986), Lesthaeghe and 
Surkyn (1988) and van de Kaa (1987; 2001) are all exceptions because they 
do focus on the relationship between fertility and value or ideational 
changes.  However, their attempts are also unsatisfactory because they 
hold a single set of ideas or values (e.g. post­materialism) responsible for 
the development and persistence of low fertility, and its variations.
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2.3 Anthropological demography ‘at home’ 
Conducting ethnographic research in familiar places involves 
overcoming a series of obstacles, different to those that researchers who 
choose to conduct fieldwork in ‘foreign’ or less familiar settings have to 
surmount.  ‘Native’ anthropologists do not possess the advantage of 
comprehending ‘others’ through difference, since the ‘other’ is akin to the 
‘self’.  This is especially true in cases where the focus of study is not only 
the same ‘society’ or ‘culture’ but also the same ‘social group’, in terms of 
class, education, ethnic background, and so on.  Having been born and 
raised in Athens until the age of eight, at which time I came to live in 
London, I felt equally ‘at home’ in both my chosen field sites and among 
both sets of informants.  While this was advantageous in several ways, it 
was also the root cause of considerable disquiet, particularly given the 
subject matter of my investigations.  For example, I found it difficult, at 
times, to distance myself from those I interviewed when they expressed 
to me their concerns over having children.  After all, the issue had 
crossed my mind also.  Like my educated, middle­class London­based 
informants, I too had career aspirations that I wanted to fulfil before 
starting a family, and I too felt that becoming a mother before my late 20s 
or early 30s would be ‘a waste’ of my education.  Yet my Greek, middle 
class parents had also instilled in me the idea that getting married and 
having a family would be crucial to my future happiness, a thought that 
was equally at the forefront of my Athenian informants’ minds. 
Therefore, frequently, I worried that I was asking questions the answers 
to which were obvious to both my informants and, more disturbingly, to 
myself. 
Despite often feeling this way, there were also moments during my 
time in the field when I felt ‘different’ from the people with whom I 
engaged and a ‘stranger’ to both cities.  As Narayan (1993) argues, the 
term ‘native’ anthropologist or the dichotomy ‘outsider/insider’, 
‘observer/observed’, is not constructive.  Anthropologists, like their 
informants, have multiple identities and backgrounds (education, gender, 
sexual orientation, class, race), including that of ethnographer, and 
cannot possibly possess knowledge of all that goes on within their 
societies.  Globalisation also ensures that communities are neither 
isolated from others nor untouched by power relations but that they are 
constantly in a state of flux (Narayan 1993, p.671­2).  Regardless of my 
best efforts to fit in with my informants, I could not hide the fact that, 
unlike the majority of those whose narratives I gathered, I was 24 years 
old, unmarried and childless.  Spending time in ‘parent and toddler’ 
groups was not my usual pastime, and never had I attended post­natal 
meetings before embarking upon this research.  Most of my informants in 
both Athens and London were mothers in their 30s and 40s, age groups 
with which I had little contact prior to fieldwork.  Secondly, in both cities 
I could not help but give away my ‘semi­native’ status; that is, my dual­
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nationality or ‘halfie’ self (Abu­Lughod 1991).  In London, my ‘foreign’ 
accent and non­English name combined to reveal my Greek identity, 
while in Athens my imperfect vocabulary and, apparently, ‘un­Greek’ 
mannerisms were revealing of my British influences.  Therefore, whether 
I liked it or not, in both cities informants themselves ‘positioned me’ as 
both ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ (Halstead 2001). 
Of course, there were benefits to doing anthropology ‘at home’, 
irrespective of the extent to which I felt, or my informants perceived me 
to be, a ‘native’.  The most convenient aspect of all was that I spoke both 
Greek and English, more or less, fluently, which helped me make contacts 
in each field site quickly despite the limited time I had available in each. 
Speaking both languages well was crucial to understanding and 
translating local terms, and I was careful not to lose sight of their nuances 
in the course of translation.  Moreover, awareness of the impossibility of 
converting certain words or phrases from Greek into English, and vice 
versa, was constructive in the process of identifying ideas and beliefs 
about childbearing specific to each group.  In Greece, for example, below­ 
replacement fertility is widely referred to by the term ‘underfertility’ 
(ypogennitikotita).  In the Greek popular imagination this word is far from 
neutral, since it implies that the country’s birth rate is lower than it 
‘ought’ to be.  Although an ageing population is one of the reasons 
Greeks ‘should’ be having more babies, the main cause of concern 
expressed by the term ‘underfertility’ is over the potential loss of the 
Greek ‘nation’ (ethnos).  Translating ypogennitikotita as ‘low’ or ‘below­ 
replacement’ fertility would not convey the original meaning of the word. 
While such inquisitiveness does not arise only in the minds of ‘native’ 
anthropologists ­ Keesing (1987) asks himself the same question with 
regard to Kwaio expressions ­ a good command of a language or 
languages is an aptitude that takes time to develop. 
2.4 Urban encounters: in search of informants 
There are several complexities involved in conducting fieldwork in urban 
settings.  Endeavouring to develop relations of intimacy and trust with 
strangers is not easy in an environment where inter­personal interactions 
occur in a diversity of venues, where friendships mature behind closed 
doors and where a sense of community does not always develop from 
partaking in local but extra­local activities, including virtual space. 
Therefore, my attempt to make contact with Londoners by taking up 
residence in a street in a central area of the borough in which I conducted 
the second half of my fieldwork, proved futile.  In London, as in Athens, 
privacy was closely guarded, a tendency exacerbated by the nature of my 
research topic.  As Petchesky (1980; 1984) notes, control over the goals 
and methods of reproduction is a highly contested matter, especially 
between men and women.  For that reason, finding persons willing to 
talk about their experiences of family­formation was not straightforward.
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Although only a handful of individuals I got in touch with in each city 
refused to co­operate, many seemed reluctant to meet me a second time. 
I suspect that this disinclination, along with the majority of women’s 
propensity to insist that their husbands were in agreement with them 
over issues pertaining to childbearing, partly, signalled a desire to 
conserve their privacy. 
Nonetheless, it is misguided to suggest that urban, as opposed to 
rural, fieldwork provides anthropologists with a single research 
experience.  Athens and London, like other cities around the world, are 
unique in terms of their histories, design, social, cultural and 
demographic make­up, as well as with regard to their wealth and 
systems of government.  Consequently, the methods employed to 
conduct fieldwork in Athens were not the same as those used in London, 
for they simply could not be.  Athens contains a population of around 
three million, which is less than half of London’s seven million.  The 
latter is also a multi­cultural city, and has been so for many decades, 
whereas Athens has become home to non­Greeks more recently (1990s). 
In London, searching for an area composed of persons with common 
origins or similar backgrounds is unproductive, since there are no neat 
groupings ­ ethnic, religious or otherwise – arranged in orderly 
geographical pockets, anywhere in the capital.  Athens, though 
considerably less ethnically diverse than London, is also not divided into 
districts comprising of individuals bound by class or regional origins. 
However, there are Athenian neighbourhoods whose inhabitants are 
mainly middle­class and Greek Orthodox. 
In searching for informants in each capital city, therefore, it was 
necessary to employ different strategies.  While geographical location 
could not fully serve the purposes of my research in either field site, I 
decided it was important to identify a single area in which to ‘situate’ 
myself in each.  For that reason, I purposely chose one borough in either 
city that consisted of a large proportion of people with characteristics 
matching those I had anticipated (educated, professional women of 
reproductive age).  In Athens, I selected the municipality of Nea Smyrni, 
located just a short distance south of the city centre and home to a 
population of 73,986 inhabitants (ESYE 2001). Nea Smyrni was a suitable 
choice because it was both typically ‘middle­class’ (Hatzatourian 1999) 
and largely Greek (93% of residents were Greek nationals).  In London, I 
opted to concentrate on The Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham, which 
has a population of 165,242 residents (ONS 2001) and is located on the 
western periphery of Inner London.  According to the Census, in 2001 the 
majority of its residents were White (78%), Christian (64%) and British 
(66%).  Hammersmith and Fulham is the fourth smallest of the capital’s 
32 boroughs and since the 1980s has become home to many young, 
affluent, urban professionals, educated to degree level.  Although the
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borough, overall, does not contain many couples with children, this is 
typical of Inner London as a whole.  In fact, Hammersmith and Fulham 
houses some of the best private secondary schools in the capital and has 
plenty of playgroups, nurseries and primary schools.  Therefore, it also 
had plenty of middle­class couples with dependent children. 
After singling out the areas that appeared most likely to contain a 
sufficient pool of potential research participants, the next step was to find 
an effective way of recruiting them.  With few contacts in each place, I 
had decided not to restrict myself to a single age group or family type, 
and I was open to the idea of interviewing both men and women. 
Despite this flexibility, however, my initial efforts to make contacts in 
Athens, where my fieldwork began, were to no avail.  Standing outside 
local schools, asking parents if they were interested in participating in a 
study about ‘underfertility’ was not constructive.  Contacting residents 
from the membership list of a local library also proved unrewarding.  In 
the end, four main sources were responsible for setting the research 
process in motion.  The starting point was a local, privately­run 
playgroup, Lollipop 3 , whose management kindly agreed to allow me to 
conduct interviews on their premises during weekday afternoons.  The 
second source was the Nea Smyrni Parents’ Association, which put me in 
contact with a few of their board members.  Thirdly, I got in touch with 
the Athenian branch of an organisation called the Supreme Confederation of 
Large Families of Greece (A.S.P.E.) who willingly gave out the names of 
some of their associates in Nea Smyrni.  Finally, I arranged to speak to 
friends’ acquaintances. 
All of these initial links triggered a series of encounters with 
individuals not in the original list of contacts (the ‘snowball’ effect), and I 
ended up carrying out 106 interviews (equivalent to 127 informants), the 
length of which ranged from approximately 20 minutes to three hours.  I 
also managed to organise a focus group session after contacting a local 
social club.  The use of the ‘snowball’ method meant that, although Nea 
Smyrni was the primary focus of my Athenian study, I also met with 
residents of neighbouring boroughs such as Kallithea, Paleo Faliro and 
Agios Dimitrios.  In addition, due to the nature of the networks I 
penetrated, the majority of those with whom I spoke were female (90 
women as opposed to 37 men) in their thirties (28%) and forties (29%). 
The largest proportion of Greek informants was in a marital union 
(approximately 76%); though quite a high number was divorced (in the 
region of 13%).  Most were working full­time (56%) and had a university 
degree, or equivalent (55.1%).  Around 50 per cent of my Athenian 
informants had two children, and no less than 34 per cent had one child. 
Given that the bulk of the interviews occurred in Lollipop, most of the 
3 This is a pseudonym.
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parents who participated in the study had children under the age of 
eleven 4 . 
The techniques employed to activate the research process in Athens, 
however, were not suitable for London; though, they did suggest a series 
of strategies with which to experiment.  The profile of Athenians whom I 
encountered also provided a rough sketch of informants to look for in 
London.  Nevertheless, differences in the nature of civil society 5 between 
Athens and London challenged any attempt to utilise identical methods. 
A dynamic civil society is less visible in Greece than it is in the UK, giving 
rise to a distinct set of opportunities and constraints for research.  Key to 
the process of finding informants in London, therefore, was the National 
Childbirth Trust (NCT), a charity organisation, mainly attractive to 
middle­class women, that offers them support during pregnancy, 
childbirth and early parenthood.  Its local branch in Hammersmith and 
Fulham was invaluable to my investigation and put me in touch with 
numerous well­educated, professional, white British women (see Chapter 
8, Section 8.4).  The strength of civil society in London, also guaranteed a 
ready supply of voluntary playgroups.  Whereas in Athens playgroups 
were scarce (I only found evidence of three in Nea Smyrni), Hammersmith 
and Fulham contained numerous playgroups, parent­and­toddler groups 
as well as under­5s centres, a few of which I frequented regularly in 
search of informants.  Finally, I was able to make contact with a series of 
online social clubs catering to the ‘childfree’ (Kidding Aside, No Kidding 
and the British Organisation of Non­Parents), a category notable for its 
absence in Athens. 
Nevertheless, certain techniques were appropriate in both London 
and Athens.  For instance, the ‘snowball’ effect was as valuable in one 
4 Due to the brevity of some interviews in the playgroups, I do not have a 
full set of data on the profile of all my informants.  Therefore, the 
percentages cited here as well as in relation to my London informants, 
only refer to those whose details I did manage to gather. 
5 ‘Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around 
shared interests, purposes and values.  In theory, its institutional forms 
are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, 
the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often 
complex, blurred and negotiated.  Civil society commonly embraces a 
diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree 
of formality, autonomy and power.  Civil societies are often populated by 
organisations such as registered charities, development non­ 
governmental organisations, community groups, women's organisations, 
faith­based organisations, professional associations, trade unions, self­ 
help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and 
advocacy group’ (LSE Centre for Civil Society 2004).
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field site as in the other, leading to the infiltration of a wide range of 
networks, including a few in boroughs close to or bordering 
Hammersmith and Fulham, such as Putney, Chiswick and Ealing. 
Equally helpful in both field sites was the internet.  In the end, via word­ 
of­mouth and organisations belonging to civil society, I managed to carry 
out a total of 79 interviews and 1 focus group in London.  Excluding the 
focus group participants, this means that I spoke to 82 informants, 76 of 
whom were female.  These were mainly in their early and late 30s (56%), 
though some were in their 40s (18%).  The majority were married (80.5%) 
and employed (at least 50% in total), though 43 per cent were 
unemployed.  Most were also educated to university degree level (at least 
65.9%).  An almost equal share had one child and two children 
(approximately 40 per cent), and the majority had children aged five 
years or under (73.1%).  I also spoke to four ‘childfree’ individuals whom 
I contacted via the above­mentioned specialist websites. 
Whilst inconvenient at times, the uniqueness of the experience of 
implementing the research in each field site was also extremely 
insightful.  The kind of changes mandatory to the project’s design in each 
context revealed a great deal about the attitudes of the people whom I 
had chosen to study, and the conditions that structured their experiences 
of family­formation.  For example, the presence of organisations such as 
the NCT, gave white, British, middle­class mothers living in London a lot 
more support than was available to middle­class Greek women in Athens 
during the early years of their children’s lives.  On the other hand, my 
London­based informants did not receive the same degree of assistance 
from family members as the Athenian women I met.  This was evident 
from a difference in the presence of nannies between Lollipop in Nea 
Smyrni and the playgroups I attended in Hammersmith and Fulham. 
While grandparents frequently accompanied their grandchildren to the 
former, nannies were entirely absent.  In London, on the contrary, 
nannies were in abundance whereas grandparents were rarely present. 
As a result, even the use of comparable methods in both field sites 
revealed differences between them. 
Anthropological methods are themselves part of research findings. 
Rather than ignoring the suitability of their tools of investigation to the 
context from which they seek to extract information, anthropologists 
allow themselves to engage with their chosen research location(s) from 
the very beginning of their enquiries, adapting their methodological 
approaches according to the particularities of the field site(s) in question, 
and not the reverse.  For example, by pursuing different leads in Athens 
and London in the course of looking for informants, I stumbled upon the 
‘childfree’ and the polyteknoi (‘families with many children’) respectively, 
neither of which I knew about prior to setting off for the field. 
Subsequently, I discerned that each group was unique to its locale; in
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other words, there were no ‘childfree’ websites or social clubs in existence 
in Athens, just as there were no organisations in favour of the polyteknoi 
in London.  Unexpectedly, then, this discrepancy became an important 
focus of my investigation. 
Likewise, though in both cities I aimed to employ comparable 
techniques for recruiting informants, the distinct childcare arrangements 
on offer in Athens and London, hence accessible to me, made it both 
difficult and unnecessary to seek interviewees with identical 
characteristics.  The women with whom I engaged in London, therefore, 
were more likely to be in their 30s and to have slightly younger children 
than those I met in Athens.  This is because they were the ones to which 
the NCT and the day­playgroups catered.  Yet rather than judging this 
variance as an obstacle to or ‘bias’ inherent in my research study, I 
consider it instructive because it illuminates the difference in options 
available to women who are or who may potentially become mothers in 
each city.  In the same way, it was neither possible nor important to speak 
to equal numbers of London­based and Athenian women (or men).  Once 
again, due to the distinct opportunities available in each field site, the 
final pool of interviewees was larger in Athens than in London.  On the 
other hand, the Greek interviews were generally of shorter duration than 
the British ones, since a greater proportion of them took place in Lollipop 
rather than people’s homes.  Both methods of interview, however, 
ultimately served their purpose of providing information on informants’ 
distinct approaches to childbearing. 
2.5 Asking questions 
Asking direct and preconceived questions in an interview­format is not a 
favoured anthropological method of enquiry, for a number of well­ 
founded reasons.  Questions that have been determined in advance to 
entering the field inevitably consist of various prejudgements.  Every 
researcher anticipates certain results after reviewing the literature on his 
or her chosen field site(s) and a degree of familiarity with the research 
location may bias the interview.  In addition, asking individuals directly 
about a particular subject may lead to rationalisations rather than 
explanations.  However, participant observation is sometimes difficult to 
achieve in an urban setting (Firth et al. 1969), and I had few opportunities 
to make use of this method.  Although my frequent attendance at 
playgroups or at the ante­natal and post­natal classes of the NCT in 
London, afforded the chance to both observe and participate in casual 
conversations, I could not guarantee that such exchanges would take 
place on a regular basis and, therefore, that I would be present to witness 
them.  Consequently, I had to adopt a more structured method of 
approach than that typical of ethnographic investigations.  After all, both 
in Athens and in London informants themselves expected a certain 
degree of formality and orderliness from our meetings, and, during our
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encounters, I had to work hard to convince them why my only prop was 
a tape­recorder or a small notebook instead of a questionnaire. 
All the data I gathered, therefore, were a product of semi­structured 
and open­ended interviews, conducted in playgroups, coffee­shops, 
restaurants, places of residence or offices.  While for reasons of comfort, 
quiet and confidentiality, I tried to arrange as many meetings as possible 
in informants’ homes, it was not always convenient or welcomed.  In the 
end, 17 out of 106 interviews in Athens and 27 out of 79 interviews in 
London were home­based.  In total, 83 per cent of Athenian interviews 
were logged in a notebook and the rest were tape­recorded, whereas in 
London 73 per cent were noted by hand, 27 per cent were taped and only 
one was chronicled after the event.  The variation between the two 
settings in terms of the total number of interviews I managed to conduct, 
the manner in which I was able to record them and the location where I 
carried them out is indicative of the different methodological constraints I 
experienced in each.  For example, due the fact that in London I 
depended, largely, on the NCT to make contacts, I had more 
opportunities than in Athens to visit British informants’ houses and make 
greater use of the tape­recorder. 
In both settings, I prepared a list of key questions and themes that 
would guide my interviews. These were subject to constant revision, as I 
sought to explore new ideas and topics determined from each 
conversation.  In order to reduce the formality of the exchange, I would 
commit these guidelines to memory rather than have them in front of me 
on a piece of paper during the course of the interview.  Asking questions 
regarding reproduction is particularly challenging due to the assumption 
that it is a ‘natural’, biologically­driven act and that decisions about 
family­formation are private.  Therefore, requests for information 
concerning the timing and spacing of fertility or about family size were 
not particularly insightful or warmly received in either field site. 
Consequently, in both Athens and London I would kick off interviews 
with ‘grand­tour questions’ (Spradley and McCurdy 1972), such as, ‘tell 
me about how you felt when you found out that you were pregnant with 
your first child’ or ‘what do you think a woman needs to have in place 
before she goes on to have a child?’  Only then would I begin to ask for 
more details concerning situations, feelings and/or values expressed in 
response to the opening questions.  This method of interviewing was 
productive because it was a two­way process.  Although, inevitably, I 
was introducing the themes for discussion (such as motherhood, career, 
childcare, childrearing, partners’ views), it was entirely up to informants 
to provide its content, to determine its pace and direction and, even, to 
suggest alternative topics about which to talk.
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As Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) maintain, it is misleading to 
regard ‘solicited accounts’, gathered either formally or informally, 
through direct or indirect questioning, as ‘biased’.  The researcher’s 
presence as audience is part of the investigation process and it is 
impossible to remove him or her from it.  In talking to informants, 
therefore, the ethnographer should not expect to collect unbiased or ‘pure 
data’, for all accounts are subjective.  To gain a deep understanding of 
interviewees’ stories it is merely necessary to learn about the ‘context’ in 
which they tell them (Hammersley and Atkinson 1983, p. 112).  One of 
the benefits of conducting an ethnographic study is that the methods an 
anthropologist can employ to gather information are not predetermined 
and unchangeable but adaptable to the research site.  In this case, 
interviewing was the most effective way of learning about informants’ 
reproductive lives and attitudes toward having children.  However, in 
order to learn about the larger ‘context’ in which my informants’ lives 
were unfolding, I had to broaden my focus, as the following section 
explains. 
2.6 Popular discourse and the print media 
Aside from collecting personal narratives of childbearing, I decided to 
examine the Greek and British print media’s portrayal of the issue of 
below­replacement fertility.  As a recent article by Stark and Kohler 
(2002) demonstrates, across Europe there is widespread popular concern 
over low birth rates.  However, press coverage on the matter varies 
considerably between countries. While in some the emphasis is on its 
causes, in others it is on its consequences.  Moreover, cross­culturally, 
there is a variable degree of alarm over the reduction in family size and in 
how it might be possible to deal with it.  In a similar vein to that 
described by Stark and Kohler, the Greek and British national press had 
noticeably distinct styles of reporting on the subject of low fertility.  Yet, 
in each setting, I also noted a difference between how newspapers and 
informants debated the issue – an occurrence that I sought to explore 
further.  This then prompted me to examine the extent to which, in each 
field site, the ‘factors’ perceived to be responsible for low birth rates by 
the former were similar to those raised in connection with family­ 
formation by the latter.  In particular, I was interested in finding out 
whether the ‘causes’ of below­replacement fertility presented in the 
Greek and British press, also emerged in middle­class Athenians and 
Londoners’ personal accounts of childbearing.  In case they did, I wanted 
to know why and how. 
In another article, focusing specifically on the coverage of low 
fertility in the German press, Stark and Kohler (2004) contend that paying 
close attention to how the print media report and deliberate upon the 
subject can assist in the process of policy formation and help raise 
awareness among professionals of issues that are of importance to the
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public.  While I agree with Stark and Kohler’s assertion that studying 
press debates over below­replacement fertility is important, I believe that 
it is unwise to base ‘policy decisions and professional conversations’ 
(Stark and Kohler 2004, p.294) on the print media’s representations of the 
matter without, additionally, taking account of ‘ordinary’ citizens’ views 
of it, as well as their experiences of family­formation.  Firstly, as Misiti 
(2000) claims, it is now widely acknowledged that media audiences are 
not passive recipients but active interpreters of media messages. 
Therefore, the mass media neither represents nor shapes public opinion. 
The realities and characters they describe are always subject to 
contestation and reformulation.  Secondly, as Spitulnik (1993, p.293) 
argues, ‘mass media … are at once artefacts, experiences, practices, and 
processes.  They are economically and politically driven, linked to 
developments in science and technology, and like most domains of 
human life, their existence is inextricably bound up with the use of 
language.’  Consequently, they do not reflect their audience’s perceptions 
of their own lived realities.  Finally, I would add, that the media tend to 
generalise about events, practices and values in order to construct more 
sensationalist arguments, saying little about differences either within or 
between distinct social groups. 
An analysis of the media’s debate over low fertility in a specific 
location, therefore, is significant not because it can provide academics 
and policy­makers with accurate insight about the issues that matter to 
the public but because it is one of the sites responsible for the 
construction of meaning surrounding reproduction.  This is worthy of 
investigation in its own right, not as a window to ‘ordinary’ persons’ 
views and experiences but as a discourse.  As Fowler (1991, p.2) asserts, 
‘news is socially constructed.’  Events are not inherently ‘newsworthy’; 
they turn into ‘news’ by the media.  While audiences are critical of what 
they see, hear or read, the media have considerable influence over the 
range and content of the material they present.  As a result, the media are 
one of the key social institutions engaged in the process of creating and 
distributing ‘particular forms of knowledge’ (Lynn and Lea 2003, p.428). 
Empowering the media is language; and from language develops 
discourse, which Fowler (1991, p.42) describes as ‘socially and 
institutionally originating ideology, encoded in language’: that is, 
habitual, organised and, ultimately, controlled ways of talking about 
events, issues or people, demonstrative of the meanings and values of an 
institution.  In this sense, media stories are discursive rather than factual. 
While newspaper articles about low fertility may not motivate 
readers to have more children, they are largely responsible for how many 
of them understand the issue, because it is via the media that lay persons 
are most likely to hear about it.  Of greater influence on readers’ ways of 
thinking about childbearing and reproductive behaviour can be
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newspaper accounts concerning issues peripheral to low fertility.  In both 
Athens and London, therefore, I paid close attention to reports about 
reproduction and family life in general, from stories about the costs of 
childcare, to post­natal depression, to infertility, to the question of work­ 
life balance and so on.  As some of these topics also featured in 
informants’ narratives, I was interested in comparing the perspectives on 
each offered by both sources.  In gathering newspaper articles, once again 
the internet proved to be an indispensable resource. 
2.7 Analysing findings 
‘Qualitative analysis,’ Bernard (1995, p.360) argues, ‘is the search for 
patterns in data and for ideas that help explain the existence of those 
patterns.  It begins even before you go to the field and continues 
throughout the research effort … If you’re doing it right, it never stops.’ 
Indeed, my analysis of research findings started early on and is ongoing. 
The most consistent analytical effort, however, began once I returned 
from the field and started transcribing, verbatim, the 39 tapes I had 
collected in total.  Once this process was complete, I proceeded to enter 
these and the rest of the interviews into MAXQDA, a software 
programme for qualitative data analysis, which can accommodate both 
Greek and English typescript.  Next, I started to code them according to 
themes and sub­themes by looking for recurrent mention of topics in each 
group of interviews.  In the process, I also made sure to highlight key 
terms. 
Following, multiple readings and attempts at re­coding, I finally 
settled on the central list of themes emanating from each research site, 
and embarked upon the process of finding connections between them. 
While I did not seek to conduct a full­scale narrative analysis, I perceive 
informants’ accounts to be narratives of the self (Ochs and Capps 1996) 
and, in particular, ‘moral tales’ (McCarthy et al. 2000).  As Hammersley 
and Atkinson (1983) suggest, accounts gathered in the field, are readable 
in two ways: as ‘information’ or as ‘perspective’.  In other words, either 
we comprehend what informants tell us as simple ‘representations’, 
giving us access to knowledge about the persons, events or beliefs of their 
group, or we view them ‘as part of the world they describe … shaped by 
the contexts in which they occur,’ therefore, as object of analysis 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1983, p.107).  I interpret my informants’ 
accounts as both ‘information’ and ‘perspective’.
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3 BELOW­REPLACEMENT FERTILITY IN GREECE 
AND THE UK 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a brief summary of the key characteristics of below 
replacement fertility in Greece and the United Kingdom relative to other 
European countries and to the European Union as a whole.  Its purpose is 
to provide an overview of the wider context in which each group of 
informants’ views on childbearing and experiences of family building 
were set.  While in Europe birth rates have dropped to unprecedented 
levels in the post­World War II period, the degree of divergence in 
fertility patterns between countries is also plain to see.  The 
heterogeneous nature of low fertility has puzzled demographers and 
others interested on the subject of European demography.  It has also 
provided the inspiration for this research.  While the opinions and 
conduct of those whom I encountered in the field cannot account for the 
aggregate­level trends and patterns described below, or explain the 
overall differences between Greek and British fertility, they are 
illustrative of a tiny spectrum of local attitudes and practices that 
contribute towards low fertility in each of the two countries. 
3.2 Population size, structure and change 
The estimated population of the 25 countries of the European Union was 
459.5 million at the beginning of 2005 and of the EU­15 countries 385.4 
million (http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int).  Although there are more people 
living in Europe today than 46 years ago, between 1960 and 2002 the 
contribution of the EU­25 to the world’s population declined from 12 to 7 
per cent and of the EU­15 from 10 to 6 per cent (Eurostat 2004). 
Therefore, whereas global population has more than doubled in the last 
four and a half decades, from three to 6.4 billion, over 90 per cent of this 
increase has been in ‘less developed countries’ while only 2.4 per cent 
was due to population growth among the EU­25 (Pearce and Bovagnet 
2005).  Nevertheless, both Greece and the United Kingdom grew in size 
between 1960 and 2003.  The Greek population rose by 2.7 million, from 
8.3 to 11 million, while in the UK there were an additional 7.2 million 
people, from 52.2 to 59.4 million (Council of Europe 2005).  Latest figures 
reveal that the total population of the UK has surpassed 60 million and 
that Greece has continued to grow beyond 11 million ( 
http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int).  Forecasts suggest that the population of 
the United Kingdom will continue to expand, reaching 65 million in 2023 
and 67 million by 2031 (Babb et al. 2006).  Population projections for 
Greece, however, indicate that in 2010 there will be an extra 170,000 
people only living in the country, and another 99,000 by 2020, at which 
point the population will reach a peak of 11.3 million ( 
http://www.statistics.gr).  From then on, the General Secretariat of the
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National Statistical Service of Greece estimates, the population will start 
to decline.  By 2030, it will shrink to 11.2 million, by 2040 it will be 
roughly the same size as it was in 2005 (11 million) and by 2050 it will be 
even lower, 10.8 million (http://www.statistics.gr). 
Population change refers to the difference between the size of the 
population at the end and the beginning of a given period, and so 
depends upon net natural change – the difference between the number of 
births and deaths – and the net effect of people migrating to and from the 
country.  There is negative change when both of these components are 
negative or when one is negative and has a higher absolute value than the 
other.  Pearce and Bovagnet (2005) argue that in the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s the principal reason for Europe’s annual population increase was 
an excess of births over deaths.  In the last 15 years, however, net 
international migration has started to dominate the picture.  The 
Population and Demography Division of the Office for National Statistics 
in the UK (2005) claim that, until the mid­1990s the UK’s population 
growth was also largely a product of natural increase.  Since the end of 
that decade, however, although the number of births continue to surpass 
the number of deaths, net international migration into the UK from 
abroad has played an increasingly important role in population growth. 
Between 2001 and 2004, the same source suggests that two thirds of the 
rise was attributable to net in­migration.  In the future, the contribution of 
net migration to population growth in the UK will be even greater.  For 
example, between 2004 and 2031, 43 per cent of the projected increase of 
7.2 million people will be due to natural increase while 57 per cent will be 
thanks to net migration (Babb et al.  2006) 6 .  In Greece, Drettakis (2001) 
shows, the period 1961­1995 was characterised by natural population 
increase; that is, there were more births than deaths in the country. 
However, he argues, since the 1970s the number of births has been in 
general decline while the number of deaths has been on the rise.  In 1996, 
for the first time in the history of the country, excluding periods of famine 
and war, there was evidence of more deaths than births. In the last 
decade, with the exception of 1997, Greece has experienced negative 
natural change, while in 2004 the difference between the number of births 
and deaths was zero (Eurostat 1996).  In the mean time, positive net 
migration, though in decline since 1993, has been responsible for keeping 
the country’s population growing (http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int). 
A final feature of any population that, partially, relates to fertility is 
its structure.  Europe is the most aged continent in the world.  The 
median age of its population is 37.7 years, compared to a global median 
6 In fact, much of the natural increase is due to migrant children because 
they are often in their peak reproductive years when they arrive in the 
UK and many come from higher fertility countries.
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age of 26.4 years (Council of Europe 2005).  This situation is due to a 
reduction in the proportion of those aged under 16 and an increase in the 
number of people who are aged 65 and over.  The proportion of young 
people relative to old people ratio varies considerably for each of the EU­ 
25 countries (Figure 1).  Cyprus and Ireland, for example, have a higher 
proportion of young people and a lower proportion of older people, 
whereas countries like Italy, Germany and Greece have the reverse 
(Pearce and Bovagnet 2005).  In 2004, Babb et al. (2006) show Greece 
comprised the third highest proportion of people aged 65 and over 
(17.8%) among the EU­25 countries (average 16.5%).  At the same time, 
14.5 per cent of the Greek population was under 16 (EU­25 average 
16.4%)  (Figure 2).  By contrast, 16 per cent of the total population in the 
UK in 2004 was over 65 years old while 18.2 per cent was under 16 
(Figure 3).  In both countries, the percentage of young people has fallen 
steadily over time while the proportion of old people has gradually risen 
(Eurostat 2004).  However, both developments have occurred at a faster 
pace in Greece than in the UK. 
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Figure 1.  Population by age, EU comparison, 2004 (Source: Babb et al. 2006)
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3.3 Fertility rates 
The post­WWII period in Europe has been characterised by a unique 
blend of fertility patterns and trends.  Across Europe, without exception, 
the numbers of children born per woman are not sufficient to replace 
existing generations.  Below­replacement fertility (under 2.1 children per 
woman) prevails.  Coleman (1996) describes how after the Second World 
War, Western European countries experienced a rise in their birth rates, 
followed by a brief slump during the reconstruction years in the late 
1940s and early 1950s.  Then, suddenly, fertility increased again, reaching 
a peak in most countries in the middle of the 1960s.  Once the ‘baby 
boom’ ended, however, birth rates began to fall at an unprecedented 
pace.  By 1972, most of Western Europe had reached below­replacement 
fertility.  Yet, as Pearce et al. (1999, p.34) note, ‘at the individual country 
level … the picture, in terms of the timing of the decline, the level to 
which annual fertility rates have dropped, and whether or not there has 
been some recovery, is more variable.’  Diversity is also apparent at the 
regional level (Frejka and Ross 2001).
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Both types of heterogeneity are manifest through changes in the 
total fertility rate (TFR) of different countries since the 1960s (Figure 4). 
The total fertility rate reflects, ‘the mean number of children that would 
be born alive to a woman during her lifetime if she were to pass through 
her childbearing years conforming to the fertility rates by age of a given 
year’ (http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int).  It is, therefore, the completed 
fertility of a hypothetical generation.  Regionally­speaking, a shift in the 
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Figure 4.  Total fertility rates, selected European countries, 1960­2000 (Source: 
Council of Europe 2005) 
TFR first appeared in the 1950s and 1960s in the countries of Central, 
Eastern and Northern Europe; then in Western Europe in the 1960s and 
1970s, and finally in Southern Europe and the countries of the former 
Soviet republics in the 1980s and 1990s respectively (Frejka and Ross 
2001).  According to Schoenmaeckers and Lodewijckx (1999), between 
1960­65 and 1990­95 the TFR dropped, on average, by almost 40 per cent 
across Europe.  The highest plunge (47%) in the TFR value was in 
Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and 
Spain) and the lowest (30%) in the Scandinavian (Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden) and Central­Eastern (Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland and 
Romania) regions.  In Western Europe, which includes the UK, Austria 
and France, the decline (40%) was moderate. 
The total fertility rate of Greece and the United Kingdom, therefore, 
has followed a rather different trajectory during the period 1960 to the 
present (Figure 5).  In the UK, from a peak in 1964 (2.95) the TFR declined 
rapidly up until 1977 (1.69), after which there was a short­term recovery,
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followed by relative stability in the 1980s (Pearce et al. 1999).  In the late 
1980s and early 1990s, there was a slight increase in the birth rate as the 
‘baby boom’ generation of women entered their childbearing years (Babb 
et al. 2006).  After that, however, fertility began falling again.  In 2001, the 
UK’s TFR plummeted to a record low of just 1.63 children per woman 
(ONS 2005).  Since then, there has been some recovery.  By 2003, the TFR 
had risen to 1.71 and a year later to 1.77 children per woman (ONS 2005). 
Greece, did not experience a substantial ‘baby boom’ in the post­WWII 
period, and its TFR was lower than that of the UK throughout the 1960s 
(Coleman 1996).  It then hovered above replacement, at relative 
constancy, during the 1970s.  In 1981, however, it suddenly dropped 
below 2.1 children per woman.  Unlike in other European countries, 
including the UK, its TFR continues to decline.  In 2004, it was 1.29 
children per woman, well under the EU­15 and EU­25 averages (1.52 and 
1.50 children per woman respectively).  Only a number of Central and 
Eastern European countries have lower total fertility rates. 
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http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int) 
The total fertility rate is the number of children that would be born 
to a woman if current patterns of childbearing persisted throughout her 
reproductive life.  This measurement groups together the experiences of 
women of different ages into one imaginary lifetime and therefore reflects 
both the levels and timing of fertility of several generations at once.  A 
more accurate and stable way to measure fertility is to look at data on 
completed average family size.  The cohort total fertility rate (CTFR) 
describes the fertility experience of women born in specific years.  In 
general, the cohort data confirm the trend of below­replacement fertility 
in Europe (Höpflinger 1984).  As Pearce and Bovagnet (2005) show, for 
women born in 1930 (who were reproducing between the late 1940s and 
around 1980) in all EU­15 member states, except Luxemburg, the CTFR 
was above the current replacement level of 2.1.  In contrast, the
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completed family size of women born in 1963 (who had children at the 
end of the 1970s until now) in any of the EU­25 countries, except Ireland 
and the Slovak Republic, was either at or below replacement. 
According to Sardon (2004), in Greece the CTFR was at replacement 
among women born in 1940 (2.10) but fell below it among those born five 
years later (2.00), where it remained, more or less, until the 1955 birth 
cohort.  Greek women born in 1960, however, had a CTFR of 1.93 
children per woman, while those belonging to the 1965 generation had an 
average of 1.75 children per woman (Figure 6).  In England and Wales, 
the CTFR was 2.35 (1940 birth cohort), 2.16 (1945 birth cohort), 2.02 (1955 
birth cohort), 1.97 (1960 birth cohort) and 1.89 among women born in 
1965 (Sardon 2004).  As Figure 6 shows, however, the differences in 
cohort total fertility rates between Greece and the UK are not as acute as 
those exhibited by the total fertility rates (see Figure 5 above).  It is also 
apparent that women born between 1950 and 1960 in Greece and the 
United Kingdom had very similar birth rates, just under replacement 
level.  While the cohort total fertility rates among women born in 1965 
were less comparable, the gap between them was not as striking as that 
displayed by the total fertility rates. 
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Figure 6.  Cohort total fertility rates for Greece and the UK, 1930­1965 (Source: 
http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int) 
In order to grasp fully the European fertility situation, however, it is 
also necessary to take into account completed fertility data along with the 
mortality rates faced by a cohort of women until the end of their 
reproductive lives.  As Sardon (1991) contends, replacement fertility is 
not uniform though time and space but varies depending on changes in 
mortality conditions.  As a result, throughout the twentieth­century,
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Sardon claims, generation replacement fertility has been the exception 
rather than the norm for most European countries.  In England and 
Wales, for instance, since the beginning of the 1900s, generations of 
women have been having fewer children than necessary to replenish the 
population.  Only the 1930­1945 generations have ensured replacement. 
Greece, like Italy and Sweden, has probably never been guaranteed 
generation replacement during the twentieth century.  According to 
Smallwood and Chamberlain (2005), however, the year of birth of the last 
generation to achieve fertility of an average 2.1 children or more per 
woman in the UK was 1949 and pre­1935 in Greece.  By the 1960 cohort, 
they argue, only France, Ireland, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Norway, 
Serbia Montenegro and Romania had above replacement fertility in 
Europe.  Despite slight variability in ideas about which generation in 
different countries last had enough children to supplant itself, there is 
sufficient evidence to suggest that below­replacement fertility is not as 
recent a phenomenon as the ‘second demographic theory’ suggests. 
3.4 Age patterns of childbearing 
The postponement of childbearing has been a defining feature of many 
low fertility countries for the past few decades (Figure 7).  According to 
Prioux (1990), mean age at childbirth has been increasing across Europe, 
beginning in Northern European countries at the end of the 1960s, 
followed by Central and Western European countries in the 1970s and 
Southern Europe during the late 1970s and early 1980s.  As Prioux further 
notes, across Europe, except in the Southern region, women born around 
1945 are those who had children earliest (between 25.2 and 26.8 years 
old).  As Figure 7 shows, the mean age at which women are having 
children has risen further among the 1960­65 birth cohorts, exceeding 29 
years in a handful of countries (such as Denmark and the Netherlands), 
hovering around 28 years in England and Wales, Sweden, France and 
Germany, and reaching the 27 year mark in Greece.  The earliest mean 
age at childbirth among women born in 1965 was in Central and Eastern 
Europe (between 23.5 and 27.2 years), while in the rest of Europe the 1965 
birth cohort had a mean age at childbirth that ranged between 26.8 
(Cyprus) and 30 years (Ireland and the Netherlands) (Sardon 2004). 
Therefore, compared to the difference between Central­Eastern European 
countries and the rest of Europe, women born in Greece and the UK in 
1965 have a relatively similar mean age at childbirth, which may 
converge even further in the near future.
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A rise in the mean age at childbirth is due to a reduction in the 
number of higher parity births (three children or more; see next section) 
and a rise in the mean age at first birth (Pearce et al. 1999).  Except in 
Central­Eastern European countries, among recent birth cohorts the mean 
age at first birth has risen considerably across Europe (Figure 8).  The 
postponement of mean age at first birth began in the Scandinavian 
countries, then in the Western region and finally in Southern Europe 
(Schoenmaeckers and Lodewijckx 1999).  According to Sardon (2004), the 
mean age at first birth among women born in the mid­1960s is lowest in 
Central and Eastern Europe (22.1­24.4 years) and highest in the 
Netherlands (28.4 years).  The 1965 birth cohort has a mean age at first 
birth of 25.3 years in Greece and 26.3 years in England and Wales (Sardon 
2004).  Kohler et al. (2002) contend that in Southern European countries 
annual increases in the mean age at first birth have exceeded 0.2 per year 
between 1990 and 1999, with Greece experiencing a rise of 1.7 years from 
a mean age at first birth of 25.5 years in 1990 to 27.3 years in 1999.
53 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
19
30
 
19
35
 
19
40
 
19
45
 
19
50
 
19
55
 
19
60
 
19
65
 
A
g
e 
GR 
E & W 
Netherl. 
Italy 
Bulgaria 
Figure 8.  Mean age at first birth, selected European countries, 1930­1965 
cohorts (Source: Sardon 2004) 
Age­specific fertility data – that is, fertility rates at different age 
groups ­ add weight to the above observations.  Frejka and Calot (2001) 
show that women born during the 1930s in Western Europe, who had 
children just after the Second World War, had high fertility at a young 
age, whereas those born in the 1940s and 1950s had relatively fewer 
children when they were in their 20s and more, compared to earlier 
cohorts, when in their 30s.  The 1960s and early 1970s female birth 
cohorts, Frejka and Calot maintain, have lower fertility at comparable 
ages than women born earlier.  Frejka and Ross (2001) argue that, in 
general, in low fertility countries, childbearing now occurs in the middle 
of women’s reproductive lifespan.  They add that in Western and 
Northern Europe, between 1960 and 1996 fertility declined faster than the 
total fertility rate both in the ages above 40 and in those under 25, except 
in Great Britain where the fertility of the 15­19 age group did not fall as 
rapidly.  Among 25­39 year olds and 30­34 years, the fertility decline was 
smaller than the TFR decline.  In Southern Europe, Frejka and Ross claim, 
the fertility decline for ages 20­39 was almost equal to the TFR decline; 
however, in Greece and Spain birth rates dropped very slowly among 
women aged 15­20 years. 
According to Pearce et al (1999), in the UK there has been a rapid 
fall in the age­specific fertility rate for women between the ages of 20 and 
24, and an increase among those aged 30­34 (Figure 9).  In fact, the latter 
age group now has a higher fertility rate than the former, and there has 
been an increase in the rate for women aged 35­39 years.  Botting and 
Dunnell (2000) note that between 1976 and 1998 in England and Wales
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there was a 31 per cent decrease in live birth rates for women aged 20­24 
and a 19 per cent decrease for women aged 25­29.  For women aged 30­34 
years there was a 54 per cent increase in live birth rates and a 110 per cent 
rise for women between the ages of 35 and 39 years.  Between 1976 and 
1998, the proportion of live births to women in their twenties fell from 69 
per cent to 48 per cent, while for women in their thirties it rose from 20 
per cent of all births to 42 per cent (Botting and Dunnell 2000).  In Greece, 
there has been a considerable drop in the age­specific fertility rates of the 
young age groups since the 1980s (Siampos 1991) and in the 1990s there 
has been a rise in the rates of women aged 30­34 and 35­39 (Figure 10). 
As a result, whereas in 1979 the proportion of live births to mothers aged 
30 and over comprised 22.5 per cent of the total and 25.7 per cent in 1989, 
in 1999 it represented 41.9 per cent (Drettakis 2002), which is almost 
identical to women of the same age group from England and Wales. 
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Figure 9.  Fertility rates by age, UK, 1975­2000 (Source: 
http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int)
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Figure 10.  Fertility rate by age, Greece, 1975­2000 (Source: 
http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int) 
There is widespread consensus in the demographic literature that 
the postponement of childbearing to very late ages leads to particularly 
low cohort fertility because it allows little time for recovery (Frejka and 
Ross 2001; Kohler et al. 2002).  However, there are exceptions to the rule. 
Firstly, countries with an early mean age at childbearing and mean age at 
first birth do not necessarily have higher fertility than those where 
postponement is greater.  In a recent article, for example, Perelli­Harris 
(2005) reveals that in the Ukraine, which has one of the lowest total 
fertility rates in the world – 1.1 children per woman in 2001 – 
childbearing occurs mainly between the ages of 20 and 24, while the 
mean age at first birth was 22.8 years in 2000.  In addition, according to 
Frejka and Calot (2001), in a few low­fertility countries – for instance, 
Norway – the ‘fertility deficits’ incurred at young ages by women in 
certain birth cohorts (particularly the 1940s and 1950s ones) – were offset 
by higher fertility at older ages.  On the other hand, Frejka and Calot also 
show that in England and Wales among the 1960­61 birth cohorts, only 55 
per cent of the birth dearth incurred by women when they were young 
was compensated by a ‘fertility surplus’ when they were older.  Among 
women born in the mid­to­late 1960s and in the 1970s in low­fertility 
countries, Frejka and Calot conclude, the shortfall in childbearing at 
younger ages is likely to be even more marked and, as a result, only a 
small part will be recompensed at older ages. 
3.5 Childlessness and family size 
In a recent study, however, Billari and Kohler (2004) refute the idea that 
‘lowest­low’ fertility is due to low birth rates in women’s early 
reproductive years (up to the mid­20s).  Some of the youngest cohorts (up 
to 1975) in countries with especially low fertility, such as Italy, have an
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equal, or even greater, number of first births as women born in the same 
cohorts in European countries with higher total fertility, such as the 
Netherlands.  The reason for ‘lowest­low’ fertility in some countries and 
low fertility in others, they argue, is not due to a reduced proclivity 
among women in the former to become mothers or to have particularly 
low fertility in early adulthood.  Rather, it is because of a lower 
probability of progressing to second or higher parity births.  As Table 2 
shows, the differences in parity distributions between Greece and 
England and Wales appear to substantiate these claims. 
Table 2.  Family size at age 40 for women born in 1960 in Greece & England 
and Wales (Source: Frejka et al. 2001; Smallwood 2002; Berrington 2004) 
Greece England and Wales 
0 children 11% 19% 
1 child 17% 12% 
2 children 52% 39% 
3 children 15% 19% 
4+ children 5% 10% 
Patterns of childlessness also differ between European countries but 
the proportions of women staying permanently childless have increased 
across most of Europe (Figure 11). In general, among women born 
around 1945 in Northern and Western Europe (slightly later in Southern 
Europe) childlessness was the lowest ever recorded (Prioux 1990).  After 
that, it increased almost everywhere.  According to the ONS (2005), in 
England and Wales, 21 per cent of women born in 1920 remained 
childless for the duration of their reproductive lives, while only 9 per cent 
of those belonging to the 1944 and 1945 cohorts (who were having 
children in the 1960s) did the same.  The latest figures show that 18 per 
cent of women currently completing their childbearing years will be 
childless.  In other words, while around one in ten women born in 1950 
had no children upon completion of their reproductive years, it is likely 
that around one in five born in the early 1960s will never have children 
(Rendall and Smallwood 2003).  Berrington (2004, p.9) argues that ‘the 
increase in childlessness has been the driving force behind the decline in 
average completed family size in England and Wales, at least up until the 
1960 cohort.’
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Figure 11. Permanent infertility in female birth cohorts, selected European 
countries, 1930­1965 (Source: Sardon 2004) 
In Southern Europe, among couples formed immediately after the 
war, Italy had the greatest levels of childlessness, topping those of Spain 
and Portugal (Munoz­Perez 1989).  Among female cohorts born in the late 
1960s in Southern European countries, with the exception of Portugal, 
around 20 per cent will remain childless, with Italy still in the lead (Frejka 
et al. 2001).  In Greece, childlessness increased steadily among 
generations of women born in the post­WWII period, with 16.6 per 100 
women born in 1965 likely to remain childless throughout their lifetime 
and 19.7 per 100 women born in 1968 expected to do likewise (Sardon 
2004).  This means that permanent infertility in Greece is gradually 
catching up with levels in England and Wales.  For example, Sardon 
shows that 20.9 per 100 women born in 1968 in England and Wales have 
also stayed childless.  However, in both countries the late 1960s female 
birth cohorts still have time to have children before the end of their 
reproductive years, and therefore might start to display less convergence. 
3.6 Extra­marital childbearing 
Extra­marital childbearing is another feature of European below­ 
replacement fertility in the post­WWII period that varies enormously 
between countries (Figure 12).  In the Scandinavian region over 40 per 
cent of births in 1997 were outside marriage, in most of Western Europe 
the proportion was between 10 and 40 per cent while in Italy, Greece and 
Switzerland 10 per cent or fewer births were extra­marital (Kiernan 1999). 
In 2002, just over 40 per cent of live births in the UK took place outside 
marriage.  In England and Wales, between 1977 and 1993, the 
contribution of extra­marital births to total fertility grew three and a half­ 
fold from 97 births per 1000 to 322 births per 1000, with mean age at 
extra­marital birth increasing from 23.4 years to 25.5 over the same period
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(Hobcraft 1996).  Cooper and Jones (1992) show that between 1980 and 
1990 the rise in the percentage of births outside marriage was less for first 
births than for those of higher orders.  According to Smallwood (2002) 
more than half (51%) of births outside marriage are now second or higher 
order births.  This suggests either that an increasing number of women 
are having some or all of their children outside a marital union, or that a 
growing number of such births are due to divorced or separated women 
starting a second family following a failed marriage (Cooper and Jones 
1992). 
In Greece, extra­marital childbearing is very uncommon.  In fact, 
Greece has the second lowest proportion of births outside marriage in the 
‘developed world’, after Cyprus (Sardon 2004).  Although extra­marital 
births have increased slightly since 1970, in 2002 just over four per cent of 
Greek children were illegitimate, compared to the EU­25 average of 
around 29 per cent (http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int).  As Kiernan (1999) 
points out, one of the reasons behind the rise in non­marital childbearing 
is the increase in cohabitation.  Typically, countries with high levels of 
cohabitating unions also manifest higher rates of births outside marriage 
and vice versa.  In Greece, both cohabitation and extra­marital 
childbearing is rare.  The UK, however, has a higher percentage of births 
outside marriage relative to its levels of cohabitation, and an unusually 
high proportion of women who have babies outside even a cohabiting 
union, that is, pre­partnership formation (Kiernan 1999). 
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Figure 12.  Proportion of births outside marriage, selected European countries, 
1970­2000 (Source: Sardon 2004) 
A number of additional differences to the ones pointed out in this 
chapter exist between low­fertility countries, as well as between Greece 
and the United Kingdom.  Considerable variations are also present
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within each population, according to such variables as education, social 
class, and ethnic group.  However, the above description offers an 
overview of some of the key features of below­replacement fertility in 
Europe and each of the two countries in question.  While there are certain 
similarities between Greece and the United Kingdom (or England and 
Wales) in relation to fertility, and some converging trends, there are also 
considerable differences and patterns of divergence.  Irrespective of past 
and future fertility developments in the two countries, it is the 
contemporary conditions described above that provide the backdrop to 
the ethnographic accounts about to follow.
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PART 1 – ATHENS
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4 THE GREEK FIELDWORK SETTING 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the formation and character of three contexts that 
played a significant role in shaping the attitudes and experiences of my 
Greek informants in relation to reproduction.  While the term ‘context’ is 
difficult to delineate and many different, overlapping ‘contexts’ (political, 
economic, social and historical) are crucial in influencing fertility, I have 
chosen to highlight those dominant in the narrative accounts that I 
recorded.  The first and broadest of these ‘contexts’ is Athens, the city in 
which my informants resided, though were not necessarily born or 
raised.  The second is Nea Smyrni, the municipality where the majority of 
them lived.  Finally, I offer a portrayal of the Greek middle­class, the 
social group to which most of those I interviewed belonged.  The 
remainder of the chapters in Part 1, provide insight about further 
‘contexts’ important to the research, yet the three presented below are the 
broadest with the potential to elucidate the specificity of my informants’ 
ideas and practices about childbearing.  The intention, however, is not for 
them to act simply as a backdrop.  Athens, Nea Smyrni and the Greek 
middle­class all form part of the framework in which every single one of 
my informants had to consider and perform the process of family­ 
formation.  In this way, all had a profound rather than a superficial effect 
on their attitudes towards childbearing and their reproductive practices, 
the nature of which I highlight in each section. 
4.2 Athens and its inhabitants 
Athens became the capital of the newly established Greek nation­state in 
1834.  In 1805, it had a population of just 12,000 out of a total 600,000 
Greeks (Margaritis 2005).  Its character today, like that of Greece as a 
whole, has more to do with Western ideals than the traditions of the 
ancient Greeks who inhabited its lands centuries ago.  As Prevelakis 
(2001) notes, Athens’ selection as capital city was odd, given that at the 
time of its formation it was of little significance either commercially or 
agriculturally compared to other Greek cities, such as Ermoupolis on the 
island of Syros.  It was also strange because it was not as populated as 
other areas of the country.  In 1806, for instance, Thessalonica had 65,000 
residents, while in 1809 Larisa had 25,000 inhabitants, after Ioannina 
whose population in the same year numbered 30,000 (Margaritis 2005). 
The foreign powers of Britain, France and Russia, entrusted with the 
country’s transition to independence, chose Athens as the seat of 
administrative and political rule, however, because its historical 
importance suited the new ideology upon which they wished to found 
the Greek nation­state as a whole.  According to this ideology, if Athens 
was to be a ‘modern’ city, in line with other European cities of the 
nineteenth century, it had to forge a homogeneous identity with a
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common history originating in antiquity, in particular classical Athens 
(Panourgià 1995). 
Nevertheless, reality could not be further removed from that ideal. 
In the early 1830s, Athens was ‘little more than a dusty village’ (Clogg 
1992, p.50).  While the Greeks who resided in the shadow of the Acropolis 
upon liberation from Ottoman rule may not have been peasants, like 
those who lived in the rest of the country, they were no closer to the 
ancient Greeks.  At the time, Sant Cassia (1992) maintains, Athens 
consisted of ‘ordinary townspeople’, some of whom were craftsmen but 
most of whom were migrants with close links to surrounding villages, 
making a living out of domestic industrial activity, income from 
smallholdings and some animal husbandry.  They were largely of 
Arvanite, Vlach and Cycladean origin (Panourgià 1995).  There was also 
an elite group of landowning Athenians, who emerged during the 
Venetian occupation, with above average political power and access to 
resources relative to the times.  Yet this group gradually disappeared, as 
a new breed of economically able, mercantile­oriented families, known as 
the nikokirei, gained prominence (Sant Cassia 1992). 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Athens went 
through a major demographic and social ‘rebirth’ due to considerable 
economic expansion.  From a population of 12,000 in 1805, it rose to 
63,000 in 1879, 114,000 in 1889 and 168,000 in 1907 (Margaritis 2005), 
while two years before the Asia Minor Catastrophe (1922) it had 
increased to 317,000 (Polydoras 2002).  During this period, professional 
and salaried clerks working in commercial, government and financial 
institutions, as well as intellectuals and politicians settled in Athens.  As a 
result, according to Doumanis (1983), up until 1920 the two main 
characteristics of the urbanisation process in Greece were the growth of 
the capital, which led to the stagnation of other cities, and the non­ 
productive nature of its economy.  ‘At the end of the nineteenth century,’ 
Doumanis (1983, p.131) claims, ‘Greece appears to have had the highest 
percentage of civil servants in the world.’  Consequently, clientelism 
developed, as wealthy merchants and landowners moved to Athens to 
take advantage of new opportunities, promising those left behind that in 
return for their loyalty back home they would receive a share of any 
benefits acquired in the capital.  At the same time, many patriots, some of 
whom were Greeks of the diaspora, helped to turn Athens into a city 
worthy of western Europe’s much longed for recognition; for example, 
giving money to help found such institutions as the University of Athens 
in 1837 (Polydoras 2002). 
The face of Athens underwent further transformation following the 
Asia Minor Catastrophe, exacerbating the enormity of the task for which 
the country’s founders were responsible; that is, uniting people from
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diverse backgrounds, as well as different regional affinities, under the 
banner of a Greek nation, as opposed to simply a Greek state (Clogg 
1992).  The forced exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece, 
following the failure of the latter’s irredentist aspirations, meant that 
more than one million refugees had to be accommodated on Greek soil 7 , 
half of whom went to Athens and Thessalonica (Doumanis 1983). 
According to Burgel (1976), the settlement of so many refugees from Asia 
Minor, within the space of a few years, in a country of approximately five 
million, remains the most important event in the history of ‘modern’ 
Greece.  The same is true of Athens.  The 1928 Census shows that 230,000 
refugees established themselves in the capital, making up 30 per cent of 
the total population of the city at the time (Burgel 1976).  While the 
refugees brought with them new skills that were to prove extremely 
useful to the development of industry in and around Athens in the years 
subsequent to their arrival, they also caused much disorder because of 
their sheer number and distinctive identity.  As Woodhouse (1977) 
suggests, their presence was both advantageous and disadvantageous to 
the new kingdom.  On the one hand, the textile and tobacco industries 
blossomed as a direct result of the expertise carried by the new settlers 
and a series of satellite cities were created around central Athens, such as 
Nea Smyrni, Nea Ionia, Vyron, Kaisariani, Kokkinia, Peristeri, Philadelphia and 
Tavros (Map 1).  On the other hand, many of the refugees suffered from 
economic hardship and cultural displacement, and exerted great pressure 
on the city’s limited resources and infrastructure. According to Burgel 
(1976), the new settlers also increased Athens’ fertility, especially in the 
1930s, putting even more strain on the capital. 
7 1.3 million Greek Orthodox residents left the shores of Anatolia in 
exchange for 350,000 Muslim residents of Greece (Faubion 1990).
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Map 1. Athens and its municipalities, including Nea Smyrni (Source: 
www.nomarxia.gr) 
Mainly, however, they helped to turn Athens during the 1930s from 
a predominantly consumerist centre into an important hub of production, 
with a new proletariat and, inevitably, communist sympathisers 
(Prevelakis 2001).  While the Metaxas dictatorship (1936­1941), the Second 
World War (1940­1944) and the Civil War (1946­1949) interrupted the 
course of this transition, it resumed in the 1950s, marking the beginning 
of an age of great economic expansion and rapid creation of wealth that 
lasted until the early 1970s.  It was during this time that a large part of the 
construction of Athens took place.  As Kairofylas (1993) argues, the 
reason for this was, partly, due to a pressing need to house the vast 
number of people who came to the capital from the countryside in search 
of safety and shelter during 1940­1949 (WWII and Civil War period). 
While the State did participate in this process, housing construction was 
largely a product of private initiative (Kairofylas 1993), and it occurred 
using a system known as adiparohi (Prevelakis 2001) 8 .  This system of 
8 Antiparohi is an exchange process through which property is developed 
in return for conceded land.  A contractor receives an assignment to build 
on a private plot.  Once he has built it he keeps some of the property’s 
apartments for himself and gives the rest to the owner of the land.
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housing construction led to the demolition of many neoclassical buildings 
and the creation of seven­storey apartment blocks known as the 
polykatoikia, which now house the majority of the city’s dwellers but also 
businesses and government offices (Sarkis 1997).  According to Kairofylas 
(1993), between 1945 and 1955, 91,161 new apartments were available to 
Athenians, the majority of which (62,658) had been built within four 
years, between 1950 and 1954. 
Many of my informants expressed their disappointment with city 
life through reference to the polykatoikia, complaining of the solitude it 
encouraged through lack of neighbourly contact and the absence of 
communal space. For them it symbolised the end of family life, as they 
knew or had imagined it to be, and signalled the end of an era of ‘desire’ 
for many children.  Kairofylas (1997) echoes the view that architecture 
plays a major role in structuring the shape of the family and suggests that 
the polykatoikia apartments in which Athenians have had to live ever since 
the 1950s and 1960s hardly have room for more than one or two children 
and their parents.  Prevelakis (2001) argues that the systematic 
destruction of buildings from the 19th century, their replacement with 
bland high­rise blocks and the lack of quality architectural plans 
expressed the lack of ideology in post­war Athens.  The failure of 
irredentism, known locally as the Megali Idea (the ‘Great Idea’), he 
contends, changed the course of Athenian urban planning.  Whereas the 
original aim was to represent historical continuity from antiquity to 
modernity through the construction of neoclassical buildings, after 1922 
there was no clear direction in terms of the expression of values, other 
than the desire to make money (Plates 1 and 2). 
Plate 1. A view of Athens from Lycabetus hill
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Plate 2. High rise office blocks amid residential polykatoikies 
Athens’ period of prosperity ceased again, briefly, because of the 
1967­74 dictatorship headed by a group of Colonels.  Once democratic 
rule was back, however, the capital resumed its expansion across the 
Attic plain.  It now has a population of just over 3.7 million. This means 
that well over a third of the total population of Greece currently reside in 
the capital.  As Burgel (1976) notes, although between 1820 and 1923 
Greece’s borders kept expanding (see Appendix II), Athens in 1848 
comprised only 3.1 per cent of the total Greek population and 60 years 
later just under 10 per cent.  In the following 50 years (1920­1971), the city 
continued to grow so that by 1971 it already encompassed about 29 per 
cent of the overall population of the country.  ‘The sleepy village,’ as 
Faubion (1993, p.25) contends, ‘had grown into a metropolis.’  As 
Panourgià (1995, p.48) points out, ‘Athens is now a pastiche of identities, 
multifaceted and not always at ease with each other.’  This assortment of 
identities has much to do with Athens’ migration history.  While there 
were two important waves of mass emigration (the first in the late 19th to 
early 20th centuries and the second following World War II) from the 
capital to countries such as the United States, Egypt, Germany, Australia 
and Canada (Kasimis and Kasimi 2004), it is mainly immigration that has 
changed the character of the existing Athenian populace. 
The movement of people from the countryside to the towns started 
as early as the nineteenth century, becoming especially regular towards 
the end of that period and accelerating during the inter­war years 
(Mouzelis 1978).  In the post­WWII epoch, Athens was again the 
destination for masses of people from rural and semi­rural areas.  In the 
1950s, Siampos (1993) notes, as many as 382,000 people moved to the 
capital, followed by 502,000 in the 1960s and 360,000 in the 1970s.  The 
growth of communication networks, the development of the cinema and
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the spread of television encouraged this journey by making Athens more 
easily accessible, showing people in areas all over the country what it had 
to offer (Prevelakis 2001).  The majority of my informants either had 
parents who had been born and raised in a rural or semi­rural area, or 
were themselves from the provinces. 
More recently, predominantly in the 1990s, Athens and the whole of 
Greece have become hosts to a huge number of immigrants from abroad. 
In 2004, there were around 586,044 foreign citizens living in the country 
legally, most of whom were from Europe, in particular Central and 
Eastern European countries (518,293).  According to the 1999 Greek 
Fertility and Family Survey (FFS), 26.9 per cent of immigrants in 1998 
were from the EU, 33.4 per cent from other European countries, 18.5 per 
cent were from Asia, 12 per cent from America, and 8 per cent from 
Africa (Symeonidou 2002).  In addition, there are an estimated half a 
million foreigners living illegally in the country (OECD 1999).  While in 
the 1980s, Faubion (1993, p.70­1) observed that Athens ‘had no true 
ghettoes, whether religious, ethnic, cultural, valuational, or even 
gustatorial,’ making it ‘relatively ethnically simple,’ with no ‘foreign 
restaurants’ in sight, in 2003­4 the Greek capital embraced a variety of 
peoples, as well as their cuisines, from all over the world. 
Compared to such cities as London, however, Athens remains 
relatively homogeneous, as does the country overall.  The 1999 FFS, for 
example, revealed that out of the total sample, 92 per cent of interviewees 
were Christian Orthodox whereas only 1.4 per cent of respondents 
belonged to other religions and 6.5 per cent did not respond 
(Symeonidou 2002).  One year ahead of hosting the XXVIII Olympic 
Games, Athens was in the midst of a makeover.  Eagerly awaited public 
works were in their final stages of preparation.  While Athenians were 
excited by the prospect of the construction of new bridges, roads, 
highways and buildings, and the restoration of old ones, however, they 
were also fearful of the aftermath of the Games, when all the visitors had 
gone home and they were left to cover the costs of the most expensive 
Olympic Games ever organised.  It was an interesting time to be in 
Athens, as Athenians raced to prove to the world that their city was 
worthy of attention equal to that received by other European capitals. 
While many proudly pointed to the rapid progress that the capital had 
made in recent decades, others expressed a sense of nostalgia about its 
past and the life some of them had once known beyond its borders.
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4.3 Nea Smyrni 9 
Today Nea Smyrni has a population of 76,508 inhabitants spread over an 
area of 865 acres (Map 2).  Out of the total population, the majority 
(71,377) of those who live there are nationals while most of the rest are 
citizens of non­EU countries.  Out of the 76,508 residents of Nea Smyrni, 
the majority (31,002) are educated to secondary, second stage and post­ 
secondary level, 17,666 have reached tertiary level education and 27,840 
have been to secondary school, first stage or less.  From the 34,906 
inhabitants in the population who are economically active, 73 per cent 
work in the tertiary sector, that is, the service industries, and 15 per cent 
in the secondary sector.  Only 7.5 per cent of people in the borough 
belonging to the economically active population are unemployed.  The 
largest age group in Nea Smyrni is the 25 to 39­year­olds (17,967 out of 
76,508 residents), while 40 to 54­year­olds form the second largest age 
group (17,223 out of 76,508 residents).  This means that a substantial 
number of people in the area were either at the stage where they might be 
starting to think about forming a family, may have recently had children 
or were nearing the end of their reproductive cycle. 
9 Information on the 45 boroughs (demoi) and three communities 
(koinotites) that make up the prefecture of Athens (Nomarhia Athinon) is 
extremely difficult to find.  Most of the relevant literature focuses on the 
history of central Athens, which is now also a borough (demos), rather 
than on the areas that grew out of it.  However, a few key sources do 
exist.  One is Greater Athens by Polydoras (2002) and the other is Nea 
Smyrni: a photographic voyage through its architectural development by 
Hatzatourian (1999).  Both proved indispensable to constructing a profile 
of the municipality, as did two websites dedicated exclusively to the area. 
Also useful was a statistical survey of Nea Smyrni compiled from the 2001 
Census (ESYE 2001).  This section builds on the evidence found in all 
these sources.
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Map 2. Nea Smyrni (located within the purple line) and its neighbouring 
municipalities (Scale 1:12,000) (Source: Road Editions) 
While Nea Smyrni today is typical of other middle­class areas in the 
prefecture of Athens, its history is far from common.  The formation of 
Nea Smyrni began a few months after the signing of the Lausanne Treaty 
in 1923 that put an end to the ‘Great Idea’ and set off the exchange of 
populations between the two recently formed nation­states, Greece and 
Turkey.  Refugees from the coastal city of Smyrna were just some of those 
forced to flee their homes on the shores of Asia Minor to Greece, and
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many ended up in Athens.  In 1924, plans delineated the spot in which 
they were to settle: a rocky and barren stretch of land, overrun by 
streams, between Athens and Piraeus, just off Syggrou Avenue 
(Hatzatourian 2001).  The first houses in the area appeared between 1923 
and 1924, but it was not until 1926 that there were real efforts at 
construction (www.neasmyrni.gr).  According to the census, in 1928 only 
210 residents lived formally in the area.  It was really during the 1930s 
that Nea Smyrni turned from a ‘refugee’ settlement’ (oikismos prosfygon) 
into a proper ‘city’ (polis), its population growing from 6,500 in 1934 to 
15,000 on the eve of the Second World War (www.neasmyrni.net.gr). 
Founded at that time were many of the institutions that today 
characterise Nea Smyrni.  In 1930, for instance, the ‘Clubhouse of Nea 
Smyrni’ (Leshi Neas Smyrnis), now renamed the ‘Centre of Nea Smyrni’ 
(Estia Neas Smyrnis), was built at the entrance to the municipality in 
homage to its first inhabitants (plate 3).  Today it houses archives and 
books related to the Greek civilisation of Asia Minor and plays host to a 
series of lectures regarding that period of Greek history.  The foundations 
of the largest Church in the municipality, Agia Fotini, were also laid in the 
1930s while the church itself was completed in 1940 (plate 4), finally 
replacing the old wooden structure that the area’s early settlers had used 
as their place of worship in 1929.  Later, as a reminder of the area’s 
origins, an exact replica of the bell­tower from Agia Fotini in Smyrna was 
situated adjacent to the temple in Nea Smyrni (plate 5). 
Plate 3. The ‘Clubhouse of Nea Smyrni’
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Plate 4. Nea Smyrni’s largest church, Agia Fotini 
Plate 5. The replica bell tower from Smyrna 
The years of the Metaxas dictatorship (1936­1940) proved to be 
advantageous for Nea Smyrni (www.neasmyrni.net.gr).  Money flooded 
into the area, leading to the completion of many public works.  Just 
before that, Nea Smyrni was separated from the borough of Athens and 
had come to be regarded as a ‘community’ (koinotita), consisting mainly 
of civil servants, traders and businessmen who worked in Athens and 
Piraeus (Hatzatourian 1999).  Occupations such as these have remained 
dominant among those living in the area today, which might be because 
in the late 1920s, when Nea Smyrni was still a ‘city’, responsibility for its 
development fell in the hands of a French company that planned to turn 
it into a ‘garden city’ (Hatzatourian 1999).  Many refugees living there at 
the time felt that they would not be able to afford to build their own 
houses if the plans went ahead, and so sold their plots of land to 
prosperous Athenians in search of a suburban life. Nea Smyrni never did 
turn into a ‘garden city’ because the French company in charge of it went 
bankrupt in 1932 (Hatzatourian 1999).  However, as was evident from the
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architectural style of the houses built subsequent to the announcement of 
the plans, even at their preliminary stage, news of the changes had the 
effect of selling the image of Nea Smyrni to citizens that were more 
affluent (Hatzatourian 1999).  It is still possible to see one­ or two­storey 
villas, trapped among a group of high­rise apartment blocks, depicting 
their original owners’ fortunes (plate 6). 
Plate 6. Original two­storey villa amid Nea Smyrni high­rise blocks of flats 
When the Germans invaded Greece, Nea Smyrni became notorious 
as a breeding ground for Communists (Woodhouse 1977), and much 
street fighting took place (Polydoras 2002).  In 1944, once the war was 
over, Nea Smyrni finally became a municipality (demos).  After that, it 
gradually lost its individual character, expanding mainly to the south and 
to the east (www.neasmyrni.net).  Since the 1950s, Nea Smyrni has 
experienced rapid population growth and a sharp increase in traffic, 
shops, businesses and high­rise apartment buildings (plates 7 and 8), as 
an increasing number of Athenians seek a life away from the hassle and 
bustle of the city centre.  In the last decade alone, there has been a 5.6 per 
cent increase in its population (Polydoras 2002).  According to the 2001 
Census, there are 28,885 households in Nea Smyrni, the bulk of which 
contain two­persons (8,301).  One­person households make up the second 
largest category (7,344), followed by three­person households (6,536) and 
those including four­persons (5,402).  The vast majority of residents in the 
municipality are nationals (71,377), while 4,728 and 402 of the total 
population are citizens of non­EU and other EU countries respectively. 
Today, a two­bedroom apartment in Nea Smyrni costs between 200,000€­ 
300,000€ and a three­bedroom between 300,000€–400,000€ ( 
www.neasmyrni.net.gr).
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Plate 7. Typical middle­class high rise apartment blocks in Nea Smyrni 
Plate 8. A typical polykatoikia in one of the streets of Nea Smyrni 
4.4 The Greek middle­class 
The Greek nation­state entered into the industrialisation process 
relatively late in comparison to other western European countries.  As a 
result, there was considerable delay in the construction of a Greek 
middle­class.  As Woodhouse (1977) notes, after the Ottomans left Greece 
there was no social class system in place.  According to Koliopoulos 
(2002), under Ottoman rule, Greek society consisted of a large group of 
land­owning or landless peasants and shepherds, artisans organised in 
guilds and an upper class of functionaries in the service of the foreign 
overlord.  In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a powerful set of
74 
wealthy Greek merchants who lived abroad also emerged (Mouzelis 
1978).  Following liberation, however, all these groups changed in either 
shape or direction.  The wealthy merchants, who formed a major element 
of the Greek diaspora, stayed abroad ­ although they continued to be 
very influential in the life of the new kingdom (Koliopoulos 2002).  The 
upper class of functionaries working for the Ottomans gradually 
disappeared as a distinct group, and merged with the up­and­coming 
nikokirei group (Sant Cassia 1992).  Finally, the local landowners and 
peasants either moved to Athens to pursue a life filled with novel 
promises or, following the 1871 land distribution laws under Prime 
Minister Koumoundouros, acquired some landed property of their own 
and remained in the countryside (Mouzelis 1978).  Eventually, with the 
expansion of Athenian society, the State and industry, space did open up 
for the creation of a middle­class, comprised of merchants, bankers, 
clerks and, above all, civil servants working for the government.  Unlike 
in other parts of western Europe, including the United Kingdom (see 
Chapter 8, Section 8.3), however, these ‘city dwellers’ or ‘bourgeois’ 
(astoi) did not grow in opposition to state authority but in support of it; in 
other words, they were ‘state­subsidised’ (Koliopoulos 2002).  It was in 
the period between 1922 and 1960, therefore, with the rise in dominance 
of a capitalist mode of production, that Greek politics for the first time 
also acquired a more pronounced class character rather than one based 
on clientelism (Mouzelis 1978). 
The Greek middle­class today, can trace its origins back to the 
peasant population that moved to the urban centres of the new nation­ 
state in the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries as well as in the 
1950s and 1960s, and to the refugees from Asia Minor.  The Greek 
middle­class of the present­day, however, does not have much in 
common with its rural predecessors.  As Sant Cassia (1992) argues, 
urbanisation and commoditisation from the nineteenth century onwards 
did not result in the continuation of a traditional, rural ethic of family, 
work and kinship, at least in Athens, but to completely new patterns of 
family organisation and, more importantly, of property transmission. 
Rural migrants faced new resources, novel circumstances and unknown 
neighbours on arrival to such cities as Athens.  Moreover, the emerging 
Athenian middle­class, although uniformly rural in origin, was actually a 
rather diverse group, as one of my informants, Soula, pointed out.  The 
provinces (eparhia), from where rural families came, were very different 
in outlook, custom, social and family make­up from each other.  A 
particularly wide gap in noötropia (‘mentality’) between those who 
arrived in Athens from the islands and those who were from rural areas 
on the mainland is apparent even today, Soula insisted. 
While new arrivals to the city did not form a homogeneous group in 
terms of origin, they did have similar aspirations.  Since, for example,
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Greece did not have a strong industrial base until recently, the ever­ 
growing middle­class population sought to make investments in housing, 
a trend especially visible in the 1950s­1970s via the construction of 
numerous high­rise apartment blocks (Doumanis 1983).  In addition, 
education became a prime objective for the middle­classes and the main 
means of social mobility.  As Sant Cassia (1992) suggests, education and 
wealth continue to be synonymous in Greece to the present day.  In 
general, information about the development and character of the Greek 
middle­class is scant, especially in comparison with the volume that is 
available in relation to the English middle­classes (Chapter 8, Section 8.3). 
This is, partly, due to the relatively recent emergence of the Greek 
middle­class but also because of the absence of a rigid and hierarchical 
class system, similar to that present in the UK.  Greece, in particular 
Athens, does contain a small group of exceptionally wealthy families, 
whose fortunes derive, primarily, from shipping (most famously, the 
Onassis, Niarhos, Vardinoyiannis and Latsis families).  There is also a 
recent class of nouveaux­riches, which includes bankers, businessmen and 
celebrities.  However, most of the wealthiest members of society cannot 
trace their riches back to noble or aristocratic lineage.  Only a tiny 
proportion of Greeks, known as the Phanariotes because their ancestors’ 
lived near the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s seat in the Phanar district of 
Constantinople, are of aristocratic lineage, but they are hardly visible in 
contemporary Greece. 
At the other end of the spectrum, there are skilled, semi­skilled and 
unskilled workers who struggle to make ends meet.  Yet, the majority of 
people find themselves somewhere between these two extremes. 
According to an article in the centrist newspaper Ta Nea (02/02/2006), 
today the Greek middle­class amounts to 70 per cent of the total 
population of Greece.  Therefore, the majority of Greek people living in 
Greece, and Athens in particular, are middle­class.  This group, Ta Nea 
claims, may not be as anxious as the poorer social strata about how they 
are going to put food on their family’s table, but they do feel increasingly 
insecure.  They expect the government to reimburse them some of the 
money that they put into their children’s education and to provide them 
with employment opportunities.  They are also, I would add, the driving 
force behind the country’s ‘lowest­low’ fertility.  Their aspirations 
combined with the constraints that they face as parents in a city that is 
becoming increasingly expensive and overcrowded result in a unique 
approach to childbearing.  The following chapters explore why and how 
that is through an in­depth look at a small sub­group of relatively 
affluent, well­educated and professional middle­class Athenians, living in 
or close to the municipality of Nea Smyrni.
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5 CAUSES OF ‘UNDERFERTILITY’ IN THE GREEK 
POPULAR IMAGINATION AND PRESS 
5.1 Introduction 
The Greek press refers to the country’s low birth rate as ‘underfertility’ 
(ypogennitikotita) or ‘the demographic issue’ (to demografiko).  Unlike the 
concept of ‘low fertility’ (hamili gennitikotita), these terms articulate the 
idea that the number of children Greeks are having constitutes a major 
national problem.  Despite their connotations, however, ‘underfertility’ 
and ‘the demographic issue’ are the most popular expressions used to 
describe the phenomenon of below­replacement fertility and both were 
familiar to my Athenian informants.  As a result, though I did not wish to 
examine the subject of Greek nationalism and consciously avoided 
describing ‘underfertility’ or ‘the demographic issue’ as ‘problems’ (to 
provlima tis ypogennitikotitas or to demografiko provlima), as is often done in 
the press, I found the terms useful in introducing my research and 
starting interviews.  Nevertheless, I was aware of the need to exercise 
caution.  Under no circumstances did I want to suggest that I was 
interested in finding out why Greeks were not having ‘enough’ babies to 
‘save’ the nation; in other words, that I had a nationalist agenda.  Once a 
discussion with an informant was underway, therefore, I would 
encourage him or her to talk about the ‘causes’ (ta aitia) of Greece’s 
‘underfertility’ as opposed to its consequences and implications for the 
nation.  Informants were so confident that they knew the factors 
responsible for the Greek ‘demographic issue’ that one woman declined 
the offer of an interview because she did not feel the subject merited a 
whole study: ‘Why are you wondering why Greeks are not having 
children?’ she retorted ‘The reasons for underfertility are obvious.  You 
are wasting your time.’ 
Overall, with the exception of the above instance, employing local 
terminology to enter into a discussion about the country’s low birth rate 
facilitated the research process and led to lively debate.  It also generated 
a series of research questions.  Was I indeed ‘wasting my time,’ searching 
for answers regarding a trend whose origins were straightforward and 
clear to all but me?  If not, then to what extent did the factors to which 
informants attributed ‘underfertility’ in Greece also appear to shape their 
attitudes towards having children?  How many, if any, featured in their 
narratives of family­formation, and in what way?  If there were 
differences, to what were they owed?  In this chapter, I present the 
explanations that informants gave in response to my questioning about 
the causes of ‘underfertility’.  I also include excerpts from Greek 
newspaper articles gathered between 2001 and 2005 on the subject in
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order to give a broader picture of the discourse surrounding it 10 . 
Throughout this chapter, I explore the extent to which the reasons for the 
existence of the Greek ‘demographic issue’ talked about in the press were 
consistent with informants’ accounts of it, leaving the comparison with 
their personal experiences for the forthcoming chapters. 
5.2 ‘The economic issue’ 
Top in the list of factors responsible for ‘underfertility’, according to 
informants, was to oikonomiko (‘the economic issue’).  The financial 
burden of having children in Athens was heavy, apparent from the 
moment a woman became pregnant.  Since state hospitals lacked the 
means to provide a ‘good’ service, often there was little choice but to go 
private, which could prove a costly alternative.  Once a baby was born, 
there was childcare to consider.  ‘Playgroups are expensive,’ parents at 
Lollipop told me.  Yet their biggest source of financial worry came later, 
when it was time for their children to go to school.  Tsoukalas (1976) 
argues that ‘over­education’ or ‘over­scholarisation’ is characteristic of 
‘modern’ Greeks, especially Athenians.  According to informants, 
however, it was an increasingly competitive job market that was forcing 
them to spend a substantial amount of money on educating their 
children.  While in the past, a school diploma or, at most, a university 
degree would suffice for getting a job, today neither provided a 
guarantee against unemployment, especially for women. 
Hence the widespread demand for out­of­school tuition met by a 
series of private institutes, known as frontisteria (‘tuition centres’), in 
evidence all over the capital, including Nea Smyrni, and the sharp rise in 
demand for private schools.  As Clark (2002, p.19) argues, ‘education is 
one of the many areas of Greek life where a flourishing but shadowy 
private sector thrives on the inadequacies of an over­protected, over 
regulated public sector.’  Poorly equipped, badly staffed and, 
increasingly, populated with foreign immigrants ­ a considerable source 
of discontent among native Athenians ­ the capital’s state schools did 
little to alleviate the situation.  Consequently, informants argued, in order 
to give each child a ‘good’ education it was necessary to spend a great 
deal of money, making it difficult to afford a large family. 
10 The newspaper articles used in this chapter mainly come from four 
major national Greek newspapers, which I bought on a regular basis 
whilst in the field.  They are Eleftherotypia (left­wing), To Vima (centre), Ta 
Nea (centre) and Kathimerini (right­wing).  To ensure a more thorough 
search, I also scanned each newspaper’s online archive for relevant 
articles published between January 2001 to December 2005, using the 
keywords ‘underfertility’ (ypogennitikotita), ‘the demographic issue’ (to 
demografiko), ‘fertility’ (gennitikotita) and ‘births’ (genniseis).
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Echoing their line of reasoning was an article in the centrist national 
daily To Vima (21/01/2001), which began by informing readers that, 
according to the latest statistics from Eurostat, Greece is among European 
countries with the lowest birth rates, registering ‘just 9.8 births per 1000 
inhabitants.’  Starting from conception, the article claimed that ‘the 
economic cost’ entailed in having children is a root cause of Greeks’ 
reluctance to reproduce.  ‘In our time and age, the coming of the stork 
bears a heavy price,’ it stated.  For example, given that ‘three in four 
Greek women’ choose to give birth in a private hospital, the average four­ 
day stay can set them back anything from 851 to 7,337 euros.  In the first 
few years of a child’s life, parents are also likely to spend a considerable 
sum on decorating the baby’s room, clothing and other accessories (baby 
bottles, push chair, car seat etc.).  Day nurseries are expensive too. 
‘Depending on the service offered, the average monthly charge per child 
is between 88 and 8,804 euros!’  In a letter published by another major 
centrist national daily, Ta Nea (14/03/2003), a male Athenian reader 
estimated that the education of each child from primary school to 
university ends up costing, on average, around 3,000 euros a year, ‘this 
means that over 20 years, each child’s education costs about 60,000 euros.’ 
For a middle­class family, he contended, this is a considerable sum. 
Greece’s ‘serious demographic problem’ is ‘not pathological’ but 
founded, above all, ‘on economic reasons.’ 
To oikonomiko, however, did not only refer to the price of education. 
‘Underfertility’ was also a by­product of a sharp rise in living expenses. 
According to informants, the introduction of the euro in Greece (January 
2002) had a profound effect on the price of goods and services traded at 
street level.  Throughout my year of fieldwork in Athens, televised news 
reports focused on the exorbitant price of fruit and vegetables sold at the 
laïki agora, the weekly market that occurs in every neighbourhood across 
the capital.  In one such broadcast, a shopper questioned why the 
government lamented the country’s ‘underfertility’ when the average 
householder could not afford to buy even the most basic goods.  In a 
similar vein, a Professor Emeritus for the University of Ioannina writing 
for Ta Nea (22/04/2005) recently proclaimed, ‘we are a society in utter 
confusion.’ 
Ever  since  the  expansion  of  the  European  Union,  the  abolition  of  the 
drachma,  the Olympic Games (which cost 3.5 billion drachmas),  the cost 
of living in our country has reached European standards, while our wages 
remain at  the  same  level  as Turkey’s … So: Why should  ‘our  youth’ get 
married?   And  if  they do marry, why  should  they have children?   And  if 
they have children, what are  they going  to do with  them?   Who will  look 
after them?  (Ta Nea 22/04/2005) 
A 30­something, educated, working couple making on average 1,000 
euros a month in total can only scrape a living (fytozoei), the Professo
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argued.  Given this reality, ‘the clergy and politicians should stop 
whimpering about the “ageing” of our “brotherless/sisterless” (anadelfou) 
Nation!’ he concluded. 
Not everyone agreed with the idea that to oikonomiko was a key 
cause of the country’s low birth rate, however.  A number of informants 
argued that economic pressures were merely an excuse for other motives. 
For example, whereas Fotini claimed that ‘without to oikonomiko you 
cannot make a correct family,’ Adonia contended that: 
To  oikonomiko  is  not  an  important  reason  for  the  existence  of 
underfertility.    You  can  see  that  people  with  money  don’t  have  many 
children whereas  those who have  fewer economic means are  constantly 
reproducing  (yennovolane).    They  have  learnt  a  different  way  of 
communicating.   When you only think of  ‘me’  then  to oikonomiko gets  in 
the way.    It  is completely psychological.    It  is  then  that you start  to hear 
excuses about having to make too many sacrifices and so on (Adonia, 40, 
one child, no degree). 
The Greek press did not share Adonia’s scepticism.  For example, a 
headline for a detailed article by Drettakis, ex­vice president of the Greek 
Parliament, MP and professor at A.S.O.E.E., as well as a regular 
commentator on the Greek demographic situation across a range of 
national newspapers, declared, ‘Low fertility in poor regions’ (Kathimerini 
06/01/2002).  Based on statistics by Eurostat and the National Statistical 
Service of Greece (ESYE), the article reported that in 11 out of 18 regions 
in Greece (in other words, among 89 per cent of the population) fertility is 
closely tied to per capita income.  Consequently, Drettakis posited: 
It  is  clear  that  a  political  policy  that  will  contribute  to  the  economic 
development  of  the  country’s  least  economically  favoured  regions,  apart 
from  having  a  direct  benefit  on  the  population  (increasing  employment 
opportunities, improving their way of life etc.), in the medium term will also 
contribute  towards  dealing  with  underfertility,  which  is  the  country’s 
number  one  problem.    That  is,  regional  development  will  contribute 
towards  the  demographic  revival  of  the  native  land  (Kathimerini 
06/01/2002). 
Regardless of opinion about whether ‘the economic issue’ was a direct 
reason for Greece’s below­replacement fertility or a cover for a set of 
values simply incompatible with having many children, both the print 
media and my informants believed that there were other reasons for 
‘underfertility’ apart from financial ones.  One of them was ‘hyper­ 
consumption’. 
5.3 ‘Hyper­consumption’ 
In spite of complaints about the rise in the price of commodities and the 
escalation of living costs, informants and the press also pointed to 
Greeks’ newly inflated fondness for spending.  ‘Hyper­consumption’
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(yperkatanalotismos) was a term they frequently alluded to in relation to 
‘underfertility’, while characterising Greeks in general as ‘spendthrifts’ 
(spataloi).  For example, the same reader, cited above, who sent a letter to 
Ta Nea, making a case for the close relation between ‘the demographic 
issue’ and the cost of Greek education, ended his communication by 
saying that this link alone was not enough to explain ‘underfertility’. 
Unfortunately,  in  the  last  few  decades  in  our  country  there  exists  a 
mentality, never before witnessed, of hyper­consumption (yperkatanalotiki 
noötropia),  which  leads  precisely  to  underfertility  since  the  majority  of 
couples do not have more than 1­2 children so as not to spoil  their  lives. 
Merely because we want to have a good time … (Ta Nea 14/03/2003) 
Another article in Eleftherotypia (18/08/2002), in which there was mention 
of ‘underfertility’, described Greeks as ‘poor but intent on having a good 
time’ (ftoxoi alla kaloperasakides).  ‘A Greek does not have a lot of money, 
but s/he allocates as much as s/he can to consumption, for food but also 
for entertainment,’ noted the article’s opening paragraph.  In contrast to 
the European average (56.9%), Greeks spend 71 per cent of their income, 
according to evidence from Eurostat cited in the article.  While they use 
most of it to purchase food, a share of it (8.6%), the largest of all other 
European Union countries, goes towards buying clothes and shoes.  The 
assumed link between ‘hyper­consumption’ and ‘underfertility’ was also 
highlighted in an earlier piece in the same newspaper, entitled ‘We eat, 
but we do not give birth’ (Eleftherotypia 13/06/2001), which argued that, 
‘although Greeks consume the greatest number of calories, they neglect 
reproduction.’  Greek men, according to the article, hold the ‘record for 
obesity’ in the EU­15 while Greek women are the second most 
overweight European females along with the British. 
To a degree, among informants at least, the belief was that the 
source of ‘hyper­consumption’ was ‘deep capitalism’ (vathis kapitalismos) 
and the adoption of a western European or American lifestyle to which 
there was increasing exposure.  As Hara argued, the effects were pitiable: 
We Greeks,  we  like  to  imitate  others  but  we  do  so  badly.   We  are  like 
America was a few years ago.    I went  to Switzerland at Easter  last year 
and  things  there  were  a  lot  more  controlled.    They  served  us  a  small 
chicken  and  some  salad  and  nothing  else.    At  Easter,  we  load  up  with 
turkeys,  apples,  potatoes  and  then we  throw  everything away.    I  do not 
know why.   Are we not  satisfied?   My daughter  gives away piles of her 
clothes and shoes to the foreign women who work for her at home.  There 
exists  this strange form of wastefulness  (Hara, 60s,  two children, widow, 
retired, no degree). 
However, equally blameworthy for what one of the Athenians I met 
described as his compatriots’ increasing ‘enslavement to consumption’
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was ‘urbanisation’ (astikopoiïsi), a development about which another 
informant, Alexis, expressed the following view: 
Why  is  there  underfertility  in  Greece?    Life  has  changed;  reality  has 
changed, how can I put it?  People left their villages and came to the cities 
…  city  life  makes  a  lot  of  demands  on  people.    There  are  different 
expenses here and a different way of  life.   You want to buy that car, you 
want to dress better and you want to move around differently.  It is not like 
in the past (Alexis, 40, one child, married). 
For women who grew up in the post­war period, many of whom were 
from the countryside, consumerism was especially alien.  Informants 
aged in their 60s and 70s claimed that they embarked upon married life 
and parenthood with nothing other than the bare necessities, grateful at 
the opportunities with which they were occasionally presented to buy a 
few ‘luxuries’, such as a car or a refrigerator.  Yet they also felt 
responsible for spawning a spoilt generation used to a life of lavish 
possessions.  Hence, they wondered whether their hardship had made 
them ‘overprotective’ (yperprostateytikoi) as parents as well as excessively 
generous.  As Anastasia, a 65­year­old grandmother told me, ‘have you 
not heard the phrase “one generation is responsible for creating, the next 
one for destroying”?  My generation was the most creative of all.  This 
one is careless.’  In her view, the prevalence of ‘underfertility’ was a 
consequence of this recklessness. 
Nonetheless, as with regards to ‘the economic issue’, there was 
ambiguity concerning the significance of ‘hyper­consumption’ and, 
therefore, its impact upon ‘underfertility’, as I found out in a discussion 
with Myrto, her mother, Mairoula, and her mother’s two sisters, Nina 
and Yianna. 
Myrto: Shall I tell you something?  Yesterday, I was with a group of friends 
and one of  them was going on about how she is having to spend all  this 
money to make her newborn infant’s room look nice but the baby doesn’t 
care, does it? 
Mairoula: It is so that it can feel good. 
Myrto: It should be so that the baby can feel good, not me, because all this 
is just for show, for you, for the parents … 
Nina: And for the husband … 
Myrto: Exactly, it is completely selfish.  When I told them this, they all said 
‘oh, we don’t  recognise you anymore.   How can you say  that?’ and they 
are my friends, she is my friend.  ‘How can you speak in this way?  What 
is your psychology  right now?   Are you not well?   You are about  to give 
birth to a baby!  Don’t you want to have a nicely decorated room ready to 
welcome the infant?’ and I said, ‘I’m sorry but is it really for welcoming the 
baby or is it so as to make you feel better?  The baby cannot even see.  It 
will  not  even  be  able  to  distinguish  between  the  different  colours.    It  is 
amazing  that  you waste  so much money when  there are other  things  to 
worry about.’ 
Mairoula: Look, only people who can afford it actually do these things.
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Myrto: It is not that I cannot do it.  I can do it.  I can do it but I just think you 
are throwing money away.  So many gifts wasted, so many toys … a child 
cannot appreciate these things. 
Nina: It ends up playing with boxes. 
(Myrto,  30s,  pregnant,  married,  on  maternity  leave;  Mairoula,  60s,  2 
children, married, not working; Nina, 60s, 2 children, married, not working) 
While Myrto was appalled at her friend’s fixation with embellishing her 
expectant baby’s room and felt it was wasteful, her friend, in turn, was 
dismayed with Myrto’s lack of enthusiasm and her disinterested 
approach to the matter.  Myrto’s aunt, Nina, agreed with her niece but 
Myrto’s mother, Mairoula, cautiously suggested that decorating a baby’s 
room was important but that only the well­off were likely to be able to 
afford to engage in an activity of this kind.  As I later found out, 
underlying Myrto’s resentment about her friend’s display of ‘hyper­ 
consumption’ was another, more deep­seated cultural anxiety, upon 
which I shall focus in the next section. 
5.4 The demise of the family 
Along with ‘the economic issue’ and ‘hyper­consumption’, a key cause of 
‘underfertility’ was a change in the structure and values of the family. 
‘The classic Greek family is no longer in existence,’ one informant 
exclaimed.  ‘The shape of the family has changed,’ someone else added. 
‘Family ties have loosened,’ another alleged.  In spite of Greece’s low 
divorce rate relative to other European countries, the more frequent 
dissolution of Greek marriages often featured in conversations about the 
country’s low birth rate.  As Panos, a father of two in his 30s, maintained, 
‘the issue is not underfertility.  The issue is that there is no longer a 
family.’  Christina, a 45­year­old mother of two, agreed: ‘The meaning of 
the family as defined in the past has been lost.’  While certain 
transformations in familial relationships and in the organisation of the 
family were positive, such as that ‘man the master’ (o andras afendis) no 
longer dominated the household, the higher frequency with which 
couples were getting divorced was regrettable.  According to informants, 
‘urbanisation’ and the impact of ‘western European’ values upon Greek 
society had led to a reduction in levels of loyalty between family 
members, while parents failed to bestow a sense of security upon their 
children and couples no longer collaborated or compromised in an effort 
to save their marriages. 
While the press did concern itself with the rise in the country’s 
divorce rate and transformations in the character of the Greek family, I 
did not come across any articles suggesting that the increasing 
dissolution of marriages or changes to the family unit were responsible 
for ‘underfertility’.  In fact, in a piece in To Vima (19/09/2003), headlined 
‘One in three marriages ends in divorce ­ infidelity and the emancipation 
of women are key causes,’ findings from a study by EKKE were
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presented to show that couples, and women particularly, typically wait 
until their children have grown up before they decide to file for divorce. 
Nevertheless, I did find articles regarding the postponement of marriage 
and its relationship to ‘the demographic issue’.  For instance, in yet 
another contribution to Kathimerini (31/03/2002) on the subject of Greek 
‘underfertility’, Drettakis argued that one of the consequences of the rise 
in the age at which men and women in Greece marry is that they have 
fewer children.  ‘Consequently,’ Drettakis asserted, ‘the concentration of 
marriages and births in older age groups reinforces our demographic 
problem’ (Kathimerini 31/03/2002). 
Yet, despite further reports that Greeks continue to get married in 
high numbers; that they have one of the lowest proportions of extra­ 
marital births and that they have a low divorce rate compared to other 
European countries, the prevailing view among informants was that the 
demise of the family was real, contributing towards ‘underfertility’. 
Myrto’s account is instructive here: 
All  couples  have  now  come  to  realize  that  food  is  missing  from  their 
homes.  All divorces are due to this reason this is what I believe.  They get 
lost.    Couples  split  up  because  there  is  no  longer  a  family  nucleus  and 
because  the  child  no  longer  has  memories.    I  remember  my  mother 
preparing  for  my  birthday  at  home.    Now  all  my  friends  have  their 
children’s parties in playgroups where they eat plastic foods.  They do not 
have anything to remember apart from a world paid for and a hall that just 
happens  to have  been  decorated  ­  nothing  else.    I  have plenty  of  good 
memories, from my aunt to my cousins being at my parties.  What I want 
to  say  is  that  in my  house,  I  was  in my  own  space.    It  was  completely 
different.    Memories  of  this  kind  provide  the  foundation  stones  for  the 
family (Myrto, 30s, pregnant, married, on maternity leave). 
Myrto’s nostalgic recollection of her childhood and her sadness at seeing 
her friends’ children experience a different kind of upbringing to her own 
expressed the view that the institution of the family was presently in 
ruins and that it was accountable for bringing about ‘underfertility’. 
Myrto’s focus on food is particularly revealing.  For Myrto, the absence of 
cooked food from the contemporary Athenian home and its substitution 
with artificial substances consumed outside of the domestic domain 
signalled the end of traditional family ties and obliterated the memories 
that, according to her, epitomised family life.  This supposition echoes the 
idea, familiar to anthropologists, that food is a symbol of commensality 
whilst the process of eating together is central to the creation and 
sustenance of kinship ties (Carsten 1997).  Denied the opportunity to 
share a home­cooked meal, one of the key ingredients in the formation 
and preservation of the Greek family was, in Myrto’s eyes, quite literally, 
missing, while the consumption of foods prepared externally to the home 
represented an invasion of external and disagreeable family morals.
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Despite echoes of Myrto’s outlook in the narratives of other 
Athenians with whom I spoke, there was also an unshakable faith in the 
superiority of the Greek oikogenia (‘family’).  In comparison to other 
families in Europe, informants maintained that Greek family ties 
remained strong, though weaker than in the past.  ‘In Greece they are still 
pro­family,’ Lydia explained.  A group of forty­ and fifty year­old women 
and one man elaborated upon this point further in a focus­group 
discussion I orchestrated on the subject of ‘underfertility’. 
KG: Last  time we met  one of  you  told me  that  the  relationship  between 
Greek parents and their children was unhealthy (arrostimeni) and that this 
was the reason for Greece’s demographic issue.  Do you all agree? 
Valli: Yes, I said it.  I believe it is true. 
All: No, it is not! 
Jenny: I think Greek women are the best mothers in the world. 
Margarita: We have the best family. 
Valli: Wait a minute, let me explain what I mean by unhealthy.  I mean that 
our children are 30 years old and we still want them in the house.  We do 
not let them become independent. 
Kitsa: We live through our children … 
Rita: Valli, you behave  this way  towards  them.   I do not behave  like  that 
with my own children.    I  tell  them  ‘you will make your own house.’   Ok? 
How can I put it?  I give them incentives to move on with their lives, not to 
provide for me. 
Valli: Is your daughter not 27 years old? 
Rita: Yes. 
Valli: Do you not support her? 
Rita: Yes. 
Valli:  In England and America, nobody does  that  for  their children at  the 
age of 27. 
Rita: Yes, but I would never want my children to behave the way they do in 
England: for them to be alone at the age of 16 and to be pushing a pram 
at  18  so  that  they  can get  150,000 drachmas.    I would never want  that. 
Why should a child have to suffer such hardship, why? 
Nelly:  [pointing to me] Careful, she lives in England. 
Rita: I do not care.  I saw it and I think that is unhealthy… 
Frosso:  Parents  here  are  close  to  their  children;  they  want  them  close. 
Ok,  so  sometimes  it might be a bit  too much, as Valli  says,  they are 30 
years old and they do not let them go.  However, it’s not that we don’t let 
them go.  It is that they cannot live on their own.  What I am saying is that 
we do not let our children have a hard time. 
Rita: Our  children are  less prone  to drugs, alcoholism etc. because  they 
are  very  close  to  their  families;  because  you  are  concerned  about  your 
child’s problem rather  than about whether or not you should or shouldn’t 
provide for it financially.  You care about what it believes in, what it says, 
what it does.  These things are all interlinked ­ it is the only thing keeping 
Greek society alive.    If  it was my child, or your child,  let’s put  it  like  that, 
who was on drugs in one corner, my other daughter was drinking a bottle 
of  beer  or  whiskey  from  dusk  till  dawn  in  all  the  bars,  and  my  other 
daughter was trying to figure out what to do, eh, the whole thing would be 
a  total mess.    However,  it  doesn’t  happen  because  they have a mother 
who  runs  after  them.    You  might  think  that  is  sick,  I  call  that  being 
interested … (Focus group, 29/05/2003)
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This exchange reveals informants’ anxiety that the ‘traditional’ Greek 
family would undergo an invasion by foreign morals and alien behaviour 
­ a disturbance that they believed was potentially destructive since the 
family was the only entity ‘keeping Greek society alive.’  Focus­group 
participants argued that without it their children could not cope since the 
Greek state provided minimal welfare (see section 5.6).  Therefore, while 
Valli believed that the level of support parents gave to their children in 
Greece was excessive compared to that offered by other Europeans and 
that this was a major cause of ‘underfertility’, the others in the group 
disagreed, blaming the country’s low birth rate on a lack of alternatives. 
5.5 The ‘crisis’ in gender and sexuality 
Despite being ‘the best mothers in the world,’ according to both male and 
female informants, as well as the national press, women were answerable 
for changes in the family and, therefore, also for ‘underfertility’.  For that 
reason, ‘female emancipation’ (i hirafetisi tis ginekas) was double­edged. 
While the general view was that women’s entry into the labour force was 
encouraging, there was also a feeling that this development had had a 
negative impact upon childbearing.  On the one hand, informants 
acknowledged that the middle­class Athenian domestic unit could no 
longer survive on the husband’s income alone and that women were 
obliged to work.  On the other hand, they also claimed that for a family to 
‘take root’ women had to be ‘in the home’ (sto spiti) and in control of 
family affairs.  As a mother whom I overheard mutter in a taxi ride to Nea 
Smyrni pointed out, ‘in Greece the man might be the head of the family 
but the woman is the neck.’  Today, however, Greek females had 
ambitions other than looking after ‘the home’, which made them less 
attentive as wives and, more importantly, as mothers.  As Lila, a married 
mother of two and a full­time midwife, told me at Lollipop, ‘there is no 
underfertility in Greece, but which family has been able to survive?  The 
mother has stopped feeling like a mother.  Now women want this and 
that ­ divorce, freedom, a career …’ While in the past, Lila argued, 
women desired motherhood, presently they had other aspirations.  Lila’s 
comment, highlights the idea, already discussed, that the Greek family 
was in ruins but adds to it by pointing the finger for its gradual break­up 
at Greek women.  Interestingly, she argues that Greece does not suffer 
from ‘underfertility’, by which, I assume, she meant that Greeks were 
having as many children as they were able to cope with. 
Over dinner with a group of young, well­educated, middle­class 
Athenians, Giorgos also blamed his female compatriots for their part in 
the spread of the country’s low birth rate: 
It is no wonder there is a demographic problem in the country.  All Greek 
women do nowadays  is  act  like whores  (poutanizoun)  and  all  they  care 
about  is  finding  a  rich  man  to  marry.    Greek  women  have  more  of  a 
complex  today,  although  there  is no doubt  they have also become a  lot
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more beautiful.  Every day I go into the metro and I do not know which way 
to  look.    They  are  all  stunning.    They  all  look  like models  but  they  are 
whores (Giorgos, late 20s, working full­time, single, childless). 
The idea that Greek women were prostituting themselves, although 
extreme, had resonance in arguments I heard later on in the course of my 
fieldwork in Athens.  On ‘coming out into society’ (vgenontas sti koinonia), 
women had lost their way.  In Soula’s opinion, a 46­year­old, mother of 
two teenage sons, this was because the circumstances Greek women 
faced upon gaining their independence in the 1960s were radically 
different from those they had to confront a decade earlier.  ‘Whereas 
before man was the afendis (‘the master’) and woman was the noikokyra 
(‘the mistress of the house’), afterwards women were free to do as they 
pleased, and so they went crazy.’ 
During my research experience in Greece, I began to grasp the 
origins of both Giorgos’ and Soula’s reasoning.  On television, for 
example, it was customary to see women wearing tight and extremely 
revealing clothing, irrespective of the time of day. On the streets of 
Athens, though a more varied style was discernible, young Athenian 
women did sometimes dress provocatively when out socialising in clubs 
and bars, especially in the trendiest district of the capital, Kolonaki.  They 
also seemed to enter freely in and out of relationships prior to marriage 
(and reportedly also, sometimes during it), they talked openly about sex 
and they frequented the same places (restaurants, cafeterias, nightclubs 
etc.) as men.  Athenian females were certainly very different from the 
women I had read about in classic Greek ethnographies, such as 
Campbell’s (1964) Honour, Family and Patronage, which argued that 
‘modesty’ in dress and movement, and ‘shame’, especially ‘sexual 
shame’, were critical to the display of femininity and in order to protect 
female ‘honour’.  Even in light of these differences, however, Giorgos’ 
remarks seemed harsh. 
On the other hand, men were also held responsible for 
‘underfertility’ because they did not help relieve women of their 
increasingly multiple roles, as Soula explained: ‘Although women 
entered the market and gained independence, men still expect them to act 
as before and so, they still do all the cooking, the cleaning and the 
ironing.’  As a result, male sexuality was also in question. This was clear 
in the course of a conversation that took place in the taxi ride to Nea 
Smyrni noted earlier.  The trigger for the discussion was a young man in 
his 30s who was sitting at the back seat when I got in the vehicle.  After 
dropping him off, as is customary in Greece another passenger, the 
woman in her 50s also cited above, joined us.  It was then that the 61­ 
year­old taxi driver, whom I shall call Mihalis, started to talk.
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According to Mihalis, the young man, whom I had only briefly 
encountered in the taxi, was on drugs and, most likely, a homosexual too. 
‘You know what?’  Mihalis asked rhetorically, ‘Ninety out of a hundred 
women who get into my taxi are women but I would say ninety out of a 
hundred men who get into my taxi are not men.  That’s women’s fault, of 
course.’  ‘Why do you say that?’  I asked.  In response, Mihalis suggested 
that Greek women’s independence had made them more ‘like men.’ 
Greek men, on the other hand, had started to act ‘like women’, that is 
why the majority of them were homosexuals.  ‘I see women in the back of 
my taxi doing and saying all sorts of things.  You will not believe the filth 
that comes out of their mouths.  They even call each other malakas (a 
word used frequently in everyday talk, literally meaning ‘wanker’) and 
this is not all, they also treat men like men used to treat them.  They pay 
for their ride home, they buy them dinner and they even pay the bills! 
Men nowadays are mamothrefta (‘mummies’ boys’),’ Mihalis explained. 
All this, he argued, was antithetical to reproduction and, therefore, causal 
of ‘underfertility’.  Concurring with the taxi driver’s ideas was Soula’s 16­ 
year­old son, present on my initial meeting with his mother, who, on 
hearing of the topic of my research, mumbled, half­jokingly, under his 
breath, that ‘underfertility’ was due to men’s increasingly ‘non­male’ 
demeanour. 
In the Greek press, attention to alleged changes in gender and 
sexuality in relation to ‘the demographic issue’ was minor compared to 
its focus on the role of to oikonomiko or, as I will shortly discuss, social 
welfare and unemployment.  The only direct reference I encountered 
concerning the relationship between gender and ‘underfertility’ was in an 
article in Kathimerini (15/07/2001), headlined ‘A difficult life for 
noikokyres 11 and pensioners.’  The incentive for this piece was the 
publication of findings by the University of Athens based on a European­ 
wide study, whose aim was to survey its citizens’ quality of life. 
According to this research, as conveyed by a female journalist, a Greek 
woman has a lower quality of life than does a Greek man because she has 
‘to fulfil a double and triple role as a worker, a mother and an afendra 12 , as 
is the common description of her household responsibilities.’  The lack of 
part­time jobs available to Greek women in comparison to ‘Northern 
11 In the Oxford Greek­English Learner’s Dictionary (Stavropoulos 1988), the 
term noikokyra is translated as ‘landlady’, ‘hostess’, ‘housewife’, and 
‘housekeeper’.  A more precise translation, however, is ‘mistress of the 
house’.  In fact, the male equivalent term noikyris is translated in the same 
dictionary as ‘master of the house’, as well as ‘householder’ and ‘the head 
of the family’. 
12 The term afendra is very unusual and I have never come across it before. 
Clearly, it derives from the male word afendis, which means ‘lord’, 
‘master’ or ‘rich man’ (Stavropoulos 1988).
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Europe’, and the persistence of ‘old­fashioned social perceptions’ 
(koinonikes adilipseis), as a result of which women are still expected to take 
on the main share of house­ and childcare­related chores, has a profound 
‘emotional cost’ on the country’s female population.  ‘It is not surprising 
that the traditional Greek family has shrunk and that often­time couples 
refuse to have a child.  A child is expensive and it needs time and care, 
and deep­down a woman knows that her quality of life will decline as a 
result.’  ‘The demographic problem,’ the article ended by saying, ‘and 
women’s low quality of life’ will only be resolved with the support of the 
state. 
5.6 The absent state 
A major cause of complaint in relation to ‘underfertility’ by informants 
and the press alike revolved around the issue of welfare (koinoniki 
pronoia).  The government, both sources argued, gave people few, if any, 
incentives (erethismata) to reproduce, and childcare provisions were 
negligible.  A number of Athenians with whom I spoke complained, for 
example, that in order to guarantee their child a place in a state 
subsidised day­care centre, a meson (‘a go­between’ or ‘a person who 
pulls some strings’) often had to be employed.  Alternatively, they had to 
make use of scarce and expensive private childcare services.  The 
relationship between welfare and ‘the demographic issue’ attracted 
extensive press coverage as well.  A headline in Kathimerini (24/10/2004), 
for example, read: ‘The demographic issue: we are ageing but we do not 
care ­ the measures for dealing with underfertility in Greece are the most 
inadequate in the EU.’  Another declared, ‘A policy of benefits for fewer 
children!’  (Eleftherotypia 24/10/2004).  It then went on to argue: 
A  lot  of money  is  required  to  raise  a  child,  while  state  support  is  scant. 
The result:  Greek women and men are the most cautious in Europe when 
it comes to bringing a child into the world.  The consequence: the country 
is ageing, since we have the smallest proportion of children, the cost of the 
insurance system is continuously rising and the future of the country looks 
bleak.   Faced with this problem, the government … is slow to react.   We 
give family allowances that are twenty times lower in comparison to other 
members of the EU.  The quality of our nurseries and schools is poor and 
the  concept  of  a  support  programme  for  working  women  is  alien 
(Eleftherotypia 24/10/2004). 
Almost without exception, in newspaper articles there was a comparison 
drawn between the benefits offered by the Greek government in relation 
to childcare and the family and those of other European countries. 
In Ta Nea (13/03/2004), for example, a feature piece entitled, 
‘Having children is not “worth it”,’ gave a detailed comparative account 
of allowances and incentives that exist across Europe with the aim of 
‘combating underfertility.’  Whereas in most European Union member 
states, it argued, there is plenty of financial assistance for couples to
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encourage them to have children in Greece the benefits are few and 
‘poor’.  In France, for instance, fifteen different types of aid are on offer to 
cover all stages of family life, from pregnancy until the child leaves home. 
In contrast, the article claimed, in Greece there are only two or three 
equivalent forms of assistance.  While in ‘Northern European’ countries, 
allowances make up 25­30 per cent of a family’s monthly income, in 
Greece they add up to no more than five per cent.  Public sector 
employees (demosioi ypalliloi), for instance, receive a family allowance of 
35 euros a month plus 18­118 euros for 1­4 children and 73 euros for 
every child from the fifth one and above.  Private sector employees get 
5.87­48.13 euros per month for 1­4 children plus 8.07 euros per month for 
every child from the fifth one and above.  Based on similar figures, the 
article cited earlier calculated that ‘a Greek family with one child receives 
on average just 70 euros a year, as opposed to 1,676 euros in Germany, 
1,476 in Denmark, 1,388 euros in Austria and 1,284 euros in Sweden’ 
(Eleftherotypia 24/10/2004).  ‘A family with four children,’ it then 
estimated, ‘gets 576 euros per annum whereas in Belgium the equivalent 
allowance is almost 7,020 euros, in Germany 7,296 euros and in Sweden 
6,168 euros.’ 
Compensating for the government’s meagre support, informants 
argued, was inevitably the family.  Relatives, however, could not always 
act as a stable source of assistance.  For example, the extent to which 
grandparents and in­laws were available to help with childcare depended 
on how far they lived from their grandchildren.  Indeed, on occasion, I 
met individuals who had no family to rely upon at all, since their parents 
did not live in Athens but in the provinces.  Yet other times, on my visits 
to informants’ homes, the mother of my (female) host was often there to 
greet me.  Now and then, women would tell me that their parents lived 
within the same block of flats as them or in a nearby apartment block.  In 
her study of the family in Athens conducted in the late 1960s, Safilios­ 
Rothschild (1976) contends that the extent to which grandparents would 
help look after their grandchildren, the sort of assistance they were likely 
to offer and whether or not they lived with their children, depended 
upon the residence patterns of the wife’s parents and the wife’s regional 
origin.  This also affected family size, with native Athenian women more 
commonly having none, one or two children than women from places 
like the Cyclades who tended to have three or more.  Nonetheless, the 
extended family, or what Safilios­Rothschild calls the ‘modified extended 
family model’, was still in evidence in Athens at the time, while kinship 
relations continued to be relatively close.  Whether or not this was still 
true today, informants were in no doubt that gradually grandparents’ 
ability as well as desire to care for their grandchildren was waning ­ yet 
another reason for ‘underfertility’.
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Readers’ letters to newspapers voiced all of the above discontents, 
as this one, by a man living in Piraeus, headlined simply ‘underfertility’, 
stated: 
Over  time  I  have  been  reading  in  your  newspaper  various  articles  and 
statistics about how young people are not having children and that we are 
an  aged  country.    I  would  like  to  ask  the  prime minister  and ministerial 
officials:  I, who has  three under­age children, seven,  four and one years 
old, what must  I do to raise them properly?   I work  in a factory and earn 
587 euros a month; my wife gave up her work after giving birth to the third 
child because her mother  could no  longer  look after  them.   And nobody 
dare ask me, ‘What did you want a third child for?’  You cannot, on the one 
hand,  tell us  ‘why don’t you have more children’ and, on the other,  ‘deal 
with  your  own  survival.’    What  is  the  government  doing  to  wipe  out 
underfertility?  (Eleftherotypia 22/10/2002) 
Perhaps in response to such complaints, or as a way to gain votes, in 
2004, on its re­election to power, the Greek Conservative Party, Nea 
Demokratia, announced that it would give extra benefits and make 
concessions to couples with three or more children.  Consequently, these 
families would also be labelled polyteknes oikogeneies (‘large families’), a 
title previously applicable to those with four or more children. 
According to an article in Ta Nea (13/04/2004), this would assist the 
176,000 Greek families with three children.  However, ‘35 euros a month 
per child,’ a mother of three quoted in the article said, ‘is not going to 
make a difference’ unless there is also an increase in the number of public 
nurseries and other spaces in which children can be looked after.  ‘The 
government needs to make a more rounded examination of the matter,’ 
the woman concluded. 
5.7 Job insecurity and unemployment 
Another area in which informants were hoping for improvements was in 
relation to the labour market.  Longer working hours, low wages in 
comparison to the cost of living, a shortage of employment opportunities, 
jobs awarded as result of meson (a ‘go­between’) rather than on merit, and 
unemployment were all obstacles to childbearing that affected men and 
women in different ways, according to the Athenians with whom I 
talked.  For the female population, they argued, the conditions of the 
labour market were especially problematic and played a major role in 
delaying the start of family­formation.  Women I spoke to feared that 
taking time out for maternity leave would result either in the loss of their 
position or in demotion, especially if they worked in the private sector. 
Moreover, the benefits they received for each child were negligible and 
they worried about their loss of income if, after having children, they 
could not return to work. 
You cannot deny money  to a mother.   People with  two or  three children 
cannot survive nowadays.  You cannot support a family if the woman does
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not  work.    All  the  children  in  this  world  have  to  face  this  sacrifice 
unfortunately.    Perhaps  we  should  not  have  started  working  in  the  first 
place  and accepted  things  just  as  they were  (Myrto, married,  early  30s, 
pregnant with her first child). 
Men also expressed concern about the circumstances surrounding work 
and maintained that one of the key reasons for young Athenian males’ 
aversion to starting a family was the current lack of job security.  Finding 
a stable career (epaggelmatiki apokatastasi) was an arduous task before 
which there was little hope of having children.  Achilles, a man in his late 
60s looking after his daughter’s two children in Lollipop, spoke to me of 
the difficulties that his son was having with work and starting a family. 
My son is 37 and is unmarried.  He is afraid of unemployment.  In my time, 
there were plenty of jobs out there.  Today there is a lot of competition with 
regard to work.  ‘How can I get married?’ he asks me.  They do not decide 
easily.  Every parent worries about what his child is going to do, especially 
now with the euro!  The other day, did you know that I saw a grandfather 
crying  on  television  because  he  could  not  afford  to  buy  his  grandsons’ 
chocolate?  Everybody is in debt.  People have lost control.  Do you know 
you  can  get  a  loan  to  go  on  holiday  or  to  buy  furniture?    Men  have 
changed for the better.  They no longer go to the kafeneio, nowadays they 
go to the cafeterias.  The problem is work.  Do you know that there are taxi 
drivers with Masters’ degrees?  When will they be able to afford to have a 
family?  (Achilles, 60s, married, 2 children, retired) 
Achilles’ account of his son’s experience was instructive.  While men 
were now equal to women (signalled by the fact that they frequented the 
more European­based cafeterias, patronised by males and females, rather 
than the traditional all­male, Greek coffee shops or kafeneio), they were 
still reluctant to start a family because of their inability to find work and 
their money squandering. 
Despite the less than favourable conditions that middle­class 
Athenians said they had to cope with during their working lives, entering 
the labour market in the first place was of equal complexity.  Maria, a 31 
year­old single female living in Nea Smyrni, had been a qualified lawyer 
since 1998.  Her ideal was to have three children but she was aware that 
the chances of her having more than two were slight.  She and her 
boyfriend were not yet married and both were still living with their 
parents.  Maria told me that she longed to be independent yet she was 
having immense difficulties finding a job and, therefore, did not earn 
enough money to live on her own or with her long­term boyfriend.  As a 
result, she worked for her father who also was a lawyer, running his own 
practice.  ‘In Greece,’ Maria asserted, ‘employers expect that your family 
will look after you.’  Only those who are believed to be ‘in real need’ are 
likely to be hired according to their own merits, the rest are expected to 
rely for their survival upon their acquaintances and, more importantly, 
on members of their extended family.  While this is true of young men
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and women in general, it is especially applicable to the latter, Maria said, 
particularly at her age.  In one job interview, for example, Maria 
remembers mentioning the fact that her father was a lawyer.  At that 
stage, the interviewer stopped, looked at her and questioned why she 
had even contemplated applying for the post.  Why did she not work for 
her father? In another interview, Maria had to say whether she intended 
to have children.  ‘What could I say?’ she asked me, ‘That I am not going 
to have a family?  That I don’t want to get married?’  When I asked her 
how she responded she said, ‘well, I had to lie. I told them that I didn’t 
want children and that I was not planning to marry.  Of course, they 
didn’t believe me and I didn’t get the job.’  In Maria’s view, 
‘underfertility’ was, without a doubt, a consequence of unemployment 
and an unjust process of job recruitment. 
Accounts in the press matched Maria’s belief.  Unemployment and 
job insecurity received frequent mention (either on their own or in 
combination with other causes) in Greek newspapers in connection with 
‘the demographic issue’.  Articles focused particularly on young people’s 
difficulties in acquiring and keeping jobs, as did readers’ letters.  ‘The 
state supposedly laments its demographic problem,’ one reader wrote, 
‘but it does not help the young to create a family because it keeps them 
unemployed’ (Eleftherotypia 14/03/2001).  ‘One in two Greeks worries 
whether he will lose his job in the next 12 months,’ revealed a national 
survey reported in Kathimerini (15/10/2005).  ‘The same study,’ the 
journalist added, ‘also explains, to a certain extent, the demographic 
problem of Greece, since 30 per cent [of respondents] believe that 
children inhibit their career, while one in four believes that family life has 
a negative influence on career development!’  (Kathimerini 15/10/2005). 
According to reports in the press, backed by demographers, Greeks did 
want children but the character of the labour market prevented them 
from realising their ambitions, as the following excerpt suggests: 
The  experience  of  unemployment  and  job  insecurity  that  young  people 
face today deters them from deciding to create a family.  Relevant studies 
have shown that the actual number of children in Greek families does not 
correspond with the desired number of children … According to the Greek 
Centre  for Demographic Research,  it  is with  this  in mind  that  a national 
demographic policy must be developed (To Vima 17/02/2002). 
The press also reported that the labour market was especially 
inhospitable to women.  Citing demographic research, articles claimed 
that faced with an inflexible market in which part­time jobs were scarce, 
mothers had to give up work altogether resulting in a reduction of the 
total household income and exacerbating the ‘demographic problem’ of 
Greece, since these women ‘would not dare have more than one or two 
children’ (Kathimerini 21/03/2004).
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5.8 Lifestyle and the Greek ‘mentality’ 
Another reason for ‘underfertility’ was a general transformation in 
Greeks’ lifestyle choices.  Busy schedules, informants claimed, partly 
made up of work engagements but also increasingly of leisure pursuits, 
reduced the amount of time that middle­class Athenians had available to 
dedicate to family life.  Thus, while certain changes in lifestyle were 
positive, others were not.  For example, the desire for ‘comfort’ (anesi), the 
force of ‘individualism’ (atomismos) and deterioration in ‘communication 
skills’ (epikoinonia) were constraints to childbearing, having given rise to 
novel ‘needs’ (ta thelo mou) and an obsession with ‘profiteering’ 
(kerdoskopia) or ‘the hunt for money’ (to kynigi toy xrimatos).  As Panos 
explained, ‘underfertility is not just a practical matter; it also has to do 
with a particular way of thinking; a Greek mentality (noötropia).’  ‘Greeks, 
they like to have a good time (einai kaloperasakides),’ which Nikos believed 
made the idea of having children seem particularly burdensome.  In a 
letter entitled ‘Concerning vulgarity,’ a reader expressed similar views to 
the above. 
For many years now in this land, people have been talking about a crisis in 
values,  even  though we have not  realized who  is mainly  responsible  for 
this.    It  is  the country  itself, which has not managed  to differentiate  right 
from  wrong.    The  education  system  does  not  pass  on  principles  and 
ideals, but even if it wanted to pass them on, it fears accusations of being 
…  anachronistic.    I  mean  there  is  no  respect  anywhere,  even  a  large 
percentage  of  traffic  accidents  is  a  product  of  this.    We  say  that  our 
vocabulary has grown poorer, we allowed  tradition  to  fade and so much 
more … generally, we do not know why we are alive … We postulate that 
economic reasons are responsible for underfertility.  That is a big mistake. 
It  is  a  confused  …  lifestyle  that  is  our  biggest  crime.    Everyone  is 
wondering into what kind of world he or she will bring his or her children. 
Let’s,  each  of  us,  sit  down  in  front  of  the  television  one  day,  zapping 
through  the channels,  to see and  to  realize what nonsense, what vanity, 
what vulgarity, what obscenity, what dialogue in serials and what … plot … 
they transmit to us … it is unbelievable (Eleftherotypia 04/11/2004). 
I quoted this letter extensively because it highlights the idea that in the 
Greek popular imagination ‘underfertility’ has, at least partially, to do 
with a general decline in ‘tradition’ and ‘morality’, and the emergence of 
a new kind of ‘lifestyle’ 13 .  The writer of this letter does not explain what 
it is about this ‘lifestyle’, apparently reflected through Greek television, 
which is directly relevant to ‘underfertility’.  Instead, he expresses a 
general dissatisfaction with the content of television programmes and the 
state of Greek values.  Interestingly, he accuses the Greek education 
system of failing to teach children what is ‘right’ and what is ‘wrong’ for 
fear of being accused that it is ‘anachronistic’, while to him, it is the 
‘modern’ that seems to be the root of the problem. 
13 Incidentally, the man who wrote this letter used the word ‘lifestyle’, 
spelled in English, rather than the Greek equivalent tropos zois.
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5.9 Infertility and abortions 
A consequence of lifestyle changes and so, indirectly, of ‘the 
demographic issue,’ were various types of health problems.  Informants 
cited stress, pollution and the environment as likely reasons for growing 
levels of ypogonimotita (‘infertility’) among Greeks.  Moreover, Athenian 
women claimed they were fully aware that the window of opportunity 
for having children was small and that the ‘biological clock’ was ticking. 
In other words, they appreciated that, medically­speaking, it was best to 
reproduce before their mid­30s, after which they had less chance of 
having a baby.  While men, they claimed, did not have similar concerns, 
infertility was not a purely female­related problem.  More than once, I 
was told that, in no small measure, ‘underfertility’ was caused by the 
drop in men’s sperm count, a phenomenon that informants believed was 
rooted in a vague yet broad range of factors from unclean water to 
pollutants in the air.  The press served to verify these ideas.  One 
newspaper article claimed that there are ‘300,000 infertile couples’ in 
Greece, which is one of the reasons for the country’s ‘underfertility’ 
(Kathimerini 29/01/2003). Ta Nea (15/11/2002) confirmed the figure and 
added that there are 45 centres for assisted reproduction operating in 
Greece, only six of which are state­run.  Yet still, according to ‘scientists’, 
in 1991­2001 one in five Greek primary schools shut down because of a 
lack of students ­ a sign of the growing problem of infertility and 
‘underfertility’.  Suggesting the link between infertility and a low birth 
rate was the following headline: ‘Smoking, alcohol, stress impede the 
perpetuation of the species’ (Kathimerini 15/11/2002). 
In the print media’s view, however, the environment and a ‘modern 
lifestyle’ were not the only factors responsible for the relationship 
between infertility and ‘underfertility’.  Another major reason was 
abortion.  Interestingly, informants never mentioned abortions in relation 
to ‘the demographic issue’, yet the subject received considerable press 
coverage on its own as well as in connection with both infertility and/or 
‘underfertility’.  For example, one article claimed that ‘abortions’ lead to 
‘serious complications’ and are a principal cause of infertility and 
‘underfertility’ (Kathimerini 13/04/2002).  A few days later, the same 
newspaper published a piece amusingly entitled ‘Forecasts for “Hellas, 
the old people’s home”,’ which argued that ‘an important factor for the 
increase in underfertility are abortions, which are estimated to exceed 
250,000 a year, but also infertility, which many couples are now facing’ 
(Kathimerini 09/04/2002).  Abortion in relation to ‘underfertility’ also 
concerned the papers’ readers, as this letter clearly illustrates: 
Every  so  often,  we  see  articles  in  the  Press  more  or  less  relevant  to 
‘underfertility’  ­  a  disastrous  issue  for  the  nation  (me  tin  ethnoktonon 
ypogennitikotita) ­ but no suggestion at all concerning how to deal with it. 
In  my  humble  opinion,  the  people  do  not  suffer  from  a  shortage  of 
productivity, but  the state  is  lacking measures to help crack down on the
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merciless  genocide  of  300,000  to  400,000  embryos  that  happens  every 
year as result of abortions (amvloseis kai ektroseis).   Measures, such as 
the  creation  of  a  fund  for  assisting  couples  with  many  children  (ton 
polyteknon zeygarion), or special taxation for all Greeks according to their 
income, must immediately be taken (Ta Nea 03/05/2003). 
The Greek print media’s concern with abortion in relation to ‘the 
demographic issue’ is so widespread that it has captured the imagination 
of scholars.  In a recent book, Halkias (2004) argues that the press’s 
interest in abortions (amvloseis or ektroseis) as a cause of the country’s low 
birth rate is surprising given that there is little knowledge of the exact 
number performed.  While Halkias claims that figures could be anything 
from 100,000 to 400,000 abortions a year, the articles above reported a 
range of between 250,000 to 400,000 abortions per annum, a large though 
smaller variation than the former.  An equally questionable assumption, 
due to a lack of both data and evidence of its significance, concerns the 
link, also noted above, between infertility, abortion and ‘underfertility’. 
5.10 Conclusions 
The Greek print media and popular discourse on the reasons for below­ 
replacement fertility, or ‘underfertility’, included a long list of 
interrelated factors.  Most were important to both the press and my 
informants (particularly the ‘economic issue’, welfare and 
unemployment); others received an uneven level of attention by each (for 
example, ‘hyper­consumption’ and the transformation in gender and 
sexuality mainly worried my informants rather than the newspapers), 
while only abortion troubled the media exclusively 14 .  Apparent 
throughout this chapter is that according to press and popular opinion 
the ‘demographic issue’ in Greece was an outcome of both structural and 
ideational changes ­ the latter, related, in turn, to transformations in 
perceptions of motherhood, mothering and gender identity.  For 
example, a dominant cause of low fertility in the view of the press as well 
as in the minds of informants was a lack of state support for the family, in 
the form of childcare facilities and tax breaks.  Another was 
unemployment and the rise in the cost of living.  While these were all 
conditions about which Athenians felt they could do little to improve, the 
impression I got was that other concerns were self­inflicted. 
An exaggerated passion to consume, a desire to have a good time, a 
loss of interest in the family, along with a breakdown in ‘traditional’ 
gender boundaries, all pointed to changes in Athenians’ (particularly 
women’s) priorities in life and future aspirations.  However, the lack of 
consensus regarding the scope of these developments and the extent to 
14 Given, however, that some articles on abortion included readers’ 
letters, it seems that ‘ordinary’ Greeks, other than my informants, were 
concerned about it too.
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which they were responsible for the Greek ‘demographic problem’ hinted 
at the need to look beyond press and popular perspectives on the subject 
and focus instead on informants’ personal accounts of reproduction. 
Despite the widespread concern with ‘underfertility’ in the Greek press 
and in the Greek popular imagination, and a general willingness to 
discuss it, informants maintained that the country’s low birth rate was 
not sufficient reason for them to have more children than they were 
thinking of having or than they already had.  ‘Everybody knows about it,’ 
Kitsa, a 38­year­old teacher and mother of one explained, ‘but nobody 
had children because of “underfertility”.’  If middle­class Athenians were 
not reproducing for the ‘nation’, then why were they?  Were the reasons 
they attributed to ‘the demographic issue’ present in their narratives of 
family­formation?  The following chapters attempt to provide answers to 
these and other closely related questions.
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6 THE DUTY OF MOTHERHOOD AND THE 
CREATIVITY OF CHILDBEARING 
6.1 Introduction 
In the Greek press and in the Greek popular imagination, as the previous 
chapter showed, ‘underfertility’ was, partially, a product of changes in 
female behaviour.  According to both informants and the print media, 
Greek women’s increasing engagement within the labour market and 
their desire to pursue activities outside the home increased their 
reluctance to mother.  In this chapter, I turn to informants’ personal 
narratives of family­formation and their attitudes towards having 
children in order to examine the extent to which their approaches were in 
agreement with those dominant in the public sphere.  Did my middle­ 
class Athenian informants’ commitment to motherhood appear to be in 
decline?  Were the women I spoke to less inclined to mother because they 
were otherwise preoccupied?  If not, what, in their view, constituted 
good mothering?  Ideas about motherhood and experiences of being a 
mother featured highly in my discussions with middle­class Athenian 
informants, as they did among those with whom I spoke in London (see 
Chapter 11), and appeared to be important determinants of childbearing 
or teknogonia 15 . 
6.2 The ‘cult of motherhood’ 
In The Making of the Modern Greek Family, Sant Cassia (1992, p.220) argues 
that in late nineteenth­century Athens motherhood achieved a ‘semi­ 
sacred state.’  Admiration for the mother figure and respect for the act of 
mothering were not remnants from the past but originated in 
urbanisation and the rise of the Athenian middle­class.  Contrary to 
expectations, the Church, whilst supportive and encouraging of this 
phenomenon, was not the principal inspiration behind what Sant Cassia 
refers to as the ‘cult of motherhood’.  Chiefly responsible, instead, were a 
series of changes in the social and spatial organisation of people’s 
behaviour, such as the preference for neolocality, the separation of the 
private and public spheres and the subsequent seclusion of women in the 
home.  Western European models of the ideal family were, also, likely to 
have played their part in this development, and nationalist discourse, 
along with the spread of literacy, was especially influential in promoting 
an association between maternity and the nation­state. 
According to Sant Cassia, the ‘ruralisation of the city’ was, therefore, 
only partly accountable for the ideological significance of motherhood in 
the urban Greek context.  In rural Greece, key symbols of womanhood 
15 Childbearing in Greek is also translatable as teknopoiia or teknopoiisi, 
both terms literally meaning ‘the making of children’.
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were the ‘Mother of God’ (Panayia), who represented the good and caring 
side of women, and Eve, who symbolized their sinful and morally 
corrupt nature.  In urban Greece, however, the Panayia alone became the 
principal model for directing the behaviour of ‘modern’ Greek women in 
the latter part of nineteenth­century.  The growth of pilgrimage, 
throughout Greece, to monasteries associated with the ‘Mother of God’ 
(such as on the island of Tinos) and the extensive circulation of low­cost, 
mass­produced icons for display within the home provide proof of this 
shift in symbolic emphasis.  Accordingly, worship of the mortal or 
human character of the ‘Most Holy One’ (Panayia), began during this 
period.  As a result, there also developed less regard for the divine, 
virginal nature of Mary and more for her role as the mother of the child 
Christ.  Consequently: 
In an urban context, motherhood  itself  becomes  the problem  that hardly 
appears in rural contexts.  The ‘evil’ that they are capable of causing is not 
so much an outcome of women’s ‘natural weakness’ (as Eves), but rather 
of their failure to successfully perform their duties as mothers.  It is a result 
of their failure to uphold the ideals of motherhood and housewife which the 
culture  expects  and  which  they  have  internalized  according  to  a  private 
ideal  which  is  not  fully  resolved,  as  in  rural  areas  (Sant  Cassia  1992, 
p.225). 
In other words, rural societies concerned themselves with how to 
reconcile the tainted and malevolent side to women with their sacred role 
as child bearers.  In urban contexts, however, women’s childrearing skills 
and their aptitude for maintaining an orderly and tidy home became 
crucial components of their gender identity and the key qualities against 
which others judged them. 
Among the middle­class Athenians I met, motherhood appeared not 
to have lost the significance it gained in the late nineteenth century.  As 
Cowan (1990) notes in reference to the construction of gender roles and 
relations in a Greek provincial town, processes and ideologies of 
modernisation, frequently believed to provide a challenge to traditional 
ways of organising behaviour and thought, actually, often, end up 
reinforcing them.  Motherhood was still as crucial a precondition for the 
‘completion’ (oloklirosi) of a woman living in Athens at the beginning of 
the twenty­first century, as it had become for one in the closing stages of 
the nineteenth century.  As Paxson (2004) argues, becoming a mother in 
contemporary Athenian society continues to form a critical component of 
female identity.  Young Athenian women, she suggests, do not question 
whether they want to have children; they only ponder over when to have 
them and, I would add, over how many to have.  In order to understand 
this situation further and to assess its potential effects upon family size, in 
the following sections of this chapter I examine the sentiments that 
motherhood roused among my informants at the opening stages of the
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twenty­first century, and reflect upon their consequences for the process 
of family­formation. 
6.3 The ‘completion’ of woman 
The ‘completion’ of the female person through the production of 
offspring was a premise expressed frequently by the middle­class 
Athenians with whom I engaged.  Other anthropologists (Halkias 2004; 
Paxson 2004) whose research concentrates on Athens also note the 
prevalence of this saying.  Mothers often told me that they did not expect 
anything from their children but that without them they would feel 
incomplete. 
I  had  the  sense  that  I  discovered  the  true meaning  of  the  world,  of  my 
existence.   You  feel  complete  (Lila,  37, married,  2  children, working  full­ 
time). 
While both male and female informants agreed with Lila, they did not 
believe that both men and women achieved ‘completion’ upon having 
children.  Though men had a duty to protect and provide for their 
families, I found no evidence in favour of the view that a Greek man 
became ‘complete’ as a person through procreation per se.  This was, in 
part, attributable to men and women’s different physiological make­up. 
It  is a matter of completion … it was then that  I understood, for  instance, 
the reason for which my body, my breasts exist … (Alexandra, 28, 1 child, 
divorced) 
According to Alexandra, the purpose of the design of women’s bodies 
was reproduction and childrearing.  It was for this reason, that 
informants also claimed that women were armed with features essential 
to being effective mothers; qualities that men, incidentally, did not 
possess, as a young woman I met in ‘Lollipop’ articulated most clearly.  A 
while after wrapping up our discussion, Annoula came back to tell me 
that although she used to smoke three packets of cigarettes a day, from 
the moment she fell pregnant she quit.  ‘A man,’ she said, ‘could not do 
the same.’  While she knew of men who had given up smoking, none, she 
insisted, could have stuck to their guns with the same fervour as she had. 
Becoming a mother, she claimed, both required and conferred incredible 
strength.  ‘Resilience’, ‘patience’ and ‘sensitivity’ were, therefore, virtues 
characteristic of women, originating from deep within their bodies ­ 
‘motherhood comes out of her spleen,’ a 32­year­old father of one told me 
– hence a mother was ‘irreplaceable’ (adikatastati).  In light of these views, 
a woman was unlikely to feel fulfilled without children because she was 
by nature designed to reproduce.  In fact, I neither met nor heard of many 
Greek women who had chosen to abstain from motherhood (see section 
6.7 for exception).  As Era said, ‘girls are born mothers.’
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Women’s nature also made it likely that mothers would have 
stronger bonds with their children than fathers.  The great sense of 
‘satisfaction’ (ikanopoiïsi) that female informants claimed to have felt upon 
the arrival of each of their children, for example, was attributable to the 
mitriko filtro (‘maternal filter’ or ‘maternal instinct’ in English).  While 
women had ‘maternity’ (mitrotita), men lacked ‘paternity’ (patrotita), that 
is, the equivalent feature that would instinctively propel them towards a 
life devoted to the family.  As a result, according to a few of my male 
informants the realisation of being a father (patrotita) came later than the 
recognition of being a mother.  ‘For men, first the events happen and then 
the emotions … the reverse is true of women,’ Carolos, a 48­year­old IT 
consultant, told me.  Another man, agreed. 
Motherhood is definitely a sentiment that I know nothing about.  I imagine 
it is something stronger than fatherhood because a woman carries a child 
inside her.  It becomes one with her self, with her body, right?  In essence, 
she  sacrifices  her  body  for  the  creation  of  a  child.    It  is  completely 
different.  Of course, there are negative sides to it too … For paternity you 
do not really do anything special … I have sex in both  instances.  In one 
instance,  there  is  a  child,  in  the  other  there  is  no  child.    There  is  no 
difference … he [a man] cannot understand it.  Why should he feel more of 
a father  in  the one case and not  in the other?   In both  instances, he had 
sex, finished.  Eh, from the moment a woman gets pregnant, however, she 
starts  to  feel  completely different  things.    There  is  a hormonal … um, a 
hormonal inversion in her body, which on its own makes her crazy … Until 
this  hormonal  upset  eases  again,  some  time  has  to  pass.    I  mean  she 
spends at least two years for this pregnancy.  Nine months for carrying the 
baby,  for  the birth and until  her  organism  finds  its  balance again  it  is at 
least  two full years … What paternity should  I  feel?    (Constantinos, 40s, 
divorced, one child, self­employed) 
The idea that women’s physiological make­up guaranteed a stronger 
bond between a mother and her child than between a father and his child, 
to a certain extent justified the role of women as the household’s primary 
caregivers according to men, as Filippos’ account demonstrates. 
A woman  is usually  the one who  looks after  the children and this comes 
out why?  Because that is her natural role ­ what do I mean by natural?  I 
mean that because it is Ada [my wife] who gets pregnant, Ada who gives 
birth,  the woman  I mean not Ada specifically … her  relationship with  the 
children is a lot more intense than a man’s is.  No matter what, the bond is 
different  …  Consequently,  a  woman  from  her  nature  has  a  different 
function to a man and this, via Greek society, develops so that she is the 
one mainly responsible for looking after the children (Filippos, 47, married, 
2 children, working full­time). 
Filippos’ argument suggests that ‘woman’ (gineka), ‘body’ (soma) and 
‘nurture’ (anatrofi) are interdependent. Although ‘Greek society’ 
promotes the labour division between men and women, nature 
determines it originally, according to Filippos.  This contention
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complements the view of Andreas, who claimed that a woman is the 
‘binding ring’ (syndetikos krikos) between other members of the family and 
made ‘a home, homely’ (i gineka kanei to spiti spitiko) and ‘full of warmth’ 
(gemato zestasia). 
6.4 The angst of motherhood 
While women agreed with the general principle of the above men’s 
assertions, they insisted that it took time for them to become accustomed 
to the role entailed in mothering, casting doubt on the idea that they had 
an inbuilt aptitude to be ‘good’ mothers.  Female informants, therefore, 
also asserted that a ‘mother’ is not one who has given birth to a child but 
one who has raised it.  As a result, a few of the women I met viewed 
adoption in a favourable light, though I was unable to determine the 
extent to which adopting children was popular in practice.  Pregnancy, 
birth and breastfeeding were processes that gave women the opportunity 
to get to grips with motherhood gradually.  While nature helped women 
on the road to motherhood, according to my female informants, it did not 
certify that they would be mothers or that they would be competent 
mothers. 
As Paxson (2004) argues, ‘modern’ Athenian women felt that 
motherhood had to be ‘achieved’.  In other words, while women had the 
natural propensity to become mothers, in order to be ‘good’ mothers they 
had to exert themselves.  A number of my female informants, for 
instance, claimed to have consulted amateur psychology books in order 
to recognise their children’s needs and to be able to meet them in a more 
efficient way.  As Angela, a 40 year old mother of one teenage girl, told 
me when I asked her why she had not had a second child despite her 
husband’s wishes, ‘Out of fear – having a child is such a huge 
responsibility,’ she said.  ‘Already I think I have messed up with my 
daughter.  I wouldn’t dream of having another one.’  The insecurity that 
women like Angela felt about their abilities to mother intensified, as 
Doumanis (1983, p.101) suggests, by the ‘loneliness of the urban flat’ and 
the ‘self­doubt she experiences due to a lack of consensus about her 
everyday acts.’  This is in contrast to the rural Greek mother who, 
according to Doumanis, was not acquainted with the notion of ‘faulty 
maternal behaviour’ since motherhood and childcare was a more 
communal experience. 
The anxiety that the middle­class Athenian women expressed about 
being mothers makes sense when contrasted, as above, with the 
experience of motherhood in a rural Greek context.  The transformation 
in Greek women’s approaches to mothering that Doumanis claims occurs 
from a rural to an urban locale is not unique to Greece.  Collier (1997, 
p.142) also describes how in the mid­1960s, among village women in 
western Andalusia, ‘babies are in great demand and the mother who gets
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tired of hers can always take him to a willing relative.’  By contrast, the 
women that had migrated to urban areas from Los Olivos, whom Collier 
met in the 1980s, despite their possession of labour­saving household 
appliances, felt imprisoned in their own homes by the constant need to 
keep an eye on their children. 
Doumanis and Collier’s observations were echoed in a conversation 
between Xenia and Stefania, both of whose parents were from the 
‘provinces’ (eparhia) and both of whom had been born outside Athens, 
though they had moved to the capital while still children. 
Stefania: My mother was wiser than I am.  She trusted me more.  We are 
more anxious.  We are afraid. 
Xenia:  However,  I  would  also  say  that  we  are more  honest.    I mean  in 
comparison to the past … If I compare the older generation with ours, they 
had more clear­cut  roles.   This  is a man,  this  is a woman,  these are the 
children … they knew where they were heading.  They didn’t hesitate, as 
we do.  For example, we ask ourselves, ‘are we doing our jobs well?’  My 
parents  did  not  doubt  that  they  were  good  parents.    They  would  say, 
‘everything  is  for  my  child.  I  am  sacrificing  everything  for  my  children. 
They were not filled with remorse.  We are … our parents suppressed us, 
our children suppress us, our children are dragging us along, and we drag 
our  children  along … We  go  to  parenting  schools  (sholes  goneon) …  I 
went to a parenting school.  In the end, I said to my son, ‘son, I don’t know 
if I raised you well; all I know is that I loved you with all my heart ­ nothing 
else. 
Stefania: Yes, that’s what I was going to say … the older generation also 
loved us but  the fact  that you told him,  ‘I don’t know if  I raised you well,’ 
that shows a greater degree of honesty … 
Xenia:  I  mean  our  parents  believed  that  what  they  said  was  the  truth, 
something which stemmed from religion, from society … we feel weak … 
Our parents had the whole of society on their side, and all the centuries of 
tradition  to back  them up … They believed  that what  they  said was  the 
truth … 
Xenia: Whereas we doubt ourselves … 
Stefania: We do not know.   We have doubts.   At  least,  I  tell my children 
that  my  opinion  is  subjective  (Stefania,  43,  married,  2  children,  working 
full­time and Xenia, 55, widowed, 2 children, working full­time). 
The conversation between Xenia and Stefania is revealing for two 
reasons.  Firstly, it shows that my informants, like those of Doumanis and 
Collier, experienced a greater degree of seclusion and uncertainty about 
their mothering skills than did their rural predecessors and, therefore, I 
add, sought counsel and reassurance from impersonal rather than 
personal sources (parenting schools or psychology books rather than 
friends, neighbours and relatives).  Exacerbating their sense of isolation 
was the lack of childcare facilities and parenting networks, such as those 
available in London (see Chapter 8).  On the other hand, the discussion 
between Xenia and Stefania also reveals that while middle­class Athenian 
women felt less secure about their parenting skills, they were also pleased
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that, unlike their parents, they were able to be more ‘honest’ about their 
failures and mistakes as mothers.  ‘Honesty’, however, did not alleviate 
their angst over their children’s well­being and their sense of 
responsibility for how they turned out as adults in the future. 
One reason why Athenian women perceived motherhood to be such 
a huge responsibility relates to its role in fulfilling another important 
purpose.  The efficiency with which a mother carried out her mothering 
tasks had implications beyond the private realm of her existence, as the 
following two excerpts reveal. 
A child’s balance  in  the first  few years of  its  life depends on  the mother 
and she must manage that balance.   Therefore, a woman must be more 
complete … more complete as a personality  to be able to play her  roles 
well and they are nice roles.    I mean when you understand … when you 
realize how important a role you play in the family, that you are raising this 
little person, this tiny thing, and that it depends on you whether or not this 
person will be problematic in the future and, by extension, whether or not 
you  will  contribute  to  a  balanced  society,  it  is  then  that  you  understand 
how important a responsibility  it  is.    I mean you should feel  in awe when 
you realize how important a role you are playing but, on the other hand, it 
should  also  arm  you  with  strength  (Zina,  51,  married,  2  children,  not 
working). 
It was as if they had told me that you have an obligation to give birth and 
since I paid my debt  I felt … liberated, how can I put  it? … Every family, 
whether  explicitly  or  implicitly,  passes  on  certain  advice  to  its  children, 
compliant with  the parents’  values.   My parents,  for example, believed  it 
was  imperative  for  a woman  to have  children  (Rita,  44, married,  1  son, 
self­employed). 
In contrast to the rigid separation between the public and the private 
realms conceived by ethnographers as typical of Greece (Friedl 1986), 
Zina’s account reveals how women’s childbearing activities were not 
solely of private but also of public concern.  In addition, Rita’s excerpt 
suggests that becoming a mother was a daughter’s duty.  Both statements 
provide evidence in favour of the view that a ‘cult of motherhood’ 
continues to prevail in Athens today.  They also account for why female 
informants claimed to feel a sense of ‘completion’ upon becoming 
mothers.  If a woman was indebted to her family and to society to 
reproduce then the transition to motherhood relieved her of that duty. 
6.5 Pro­creation: childbearing as an act of creativity 
Consonant with the idea that motherhood, through the hard work it 
entails, brings about the ‘completion’ of a middle­class Athenian woman 
was the notion that having children was a creative process, an act of 
dimiourgia, translatable in English as both ‘creation’ and ‘creativity’, a 
detail whose implications will be discussed below.  On an empty 
bedroom floor of her newly purchased apartment in Nea Smyrni, Xenia,
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her friend Stefania (cited above) and I sat to discuss the highs and lows of 
parenthood, marriage and childbearing.  As darkness fell, the 
conversation turned to the issue of the value of children.  I asked Xenia 
what advice she would give to a friend uncertain about starting a family. 
Xenia: I would tell her and I do say … that in this world, the only thing we, 
who are not artists, who are not creators, can do is to have children.  It is 
the biggest joy, how can I put it, in spite of all the problems … 
Stefania: And our offering … 
Xenia: Our offering ­ that is creation, that is what eternity means.  Do you 
understand? Without  thinking about  it  or  anything,  of  course  she  should 
have children. 
Stefania: I see it as having a little garden that you do not cultivate.  Is it not 
a sin? 
Xenia: Exactly, exactly. 
Stefania: Let me put it to you again using the botanical example.  A child is 
like the trees.  What do the poor little ones ask for?  All they want is a little 
water;  that  is  all  and  they give  you  their  shade and  their  freshness  and 
their beauty,  life  itself and what do they ask of you?  That every so often 
you pour them a  little water … what  they give you  ­  I say  this now and  I 
shudder ­ is a lot more (Stefania, 43, married, 2 children, working full­time 
and Xenia, 55, widowed, 2 children, working full­time). 
Procreation, according to Xenia and Stefania, was a creative act and a 
means of immortality; the only thing that ‘ordinary’ folk could do to 
leave their mark in the world.  A fulfilling experience that required little 
effort in comparison to the benefits anticipated in return.  Stefania and 
Xenia’s conversation acquires special meaning when viewed in the 
context of Greek Orthodoxy. According to Dimopoulou (2000), a Greek 
Orthodox preacher, in The Child: Our Great Treasure, God gave humans 
the capacity to be His co­creators and to co­operate with Him.  This is 
what He meant when He said, ‘be fruitful and multiply’ (afksanesthe kai 
plithynesthe).  It was at that moment that God endowed men and women 
with the power to generate new persons and, therefore, to participate in 
the renewal of society. 
Viewed in this light, through procreation, middle­class Athenians 
were engaging in the re­enactment of the original Creation.  This might 
explain why a number of informants were adamant to point out that in 
Greek the word for ‘human being’ or ‘man’, anthropos, really meant ano 
thriskon, that is, he who looks up to God; in other words, he who is 
supposed to follow God’s commands.  Though I never found this 
etymological description in any dictionary of the modern Greek 
language, it seemed to me indicative of a particular lay understanding of 
a person’s place in the world and of the purpose of bringing new life into 
it.  The reproduction of the species was a duty and an honour bestowed 
upon human beings by God.  Therefore, those who chose to defy God’s 
request, and who rejected co­operation with Him ­ that is, to be His co­ 
creators ­ were committing a sin, as Stefania observed, and were liable to
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punishment.  It is fitting, in fact, that dimiourgia is translatable in English 
as both ‘creativity’, a secular term referring to one’s ability to produce 
something original, as well as ‘creation’, a notion with religious 
connotations. 
Today, Xenia speculated, people lacked a broader ‘vision’ (orama) of 
the social order and their position within it and thought only of 
themselves.  That is, young couples did not think of childbearing as a 
sacred, creative act, which both men and women, under God’s watchful 
eye, ought to perform.  They were, therefore, short of a particular notion 
of personhood, described most succinctly by Zina, a 51­year­old mother 
of two children in their 20s.  ‘Individualism’ (atomismos) and ‘the love of 
one’s own skin’ (filotomarismos), Zina argued, are antithetical to the 
essence of human beings.  ‘God made us different from animals,’ she 
claimed, ‘superior to them.’  Humans have to strive to be close to God, 
the most ‘supreme being’ of all, because that is what anthropos (‘human’ 
or ‘man’) means.  Since we are above other animals, however, we have to 
prove our superiority over them.  While ‘freedom’ is good in many 
respects, it also goes against our responsibility as human beings and, 
ultimately, can lead to our destruction.  ‘If everyone thought only of 
themselves it would be like living in the jungle,’ Zina alleged.  Therefore, 
along with being ‘independent’ (aneksartitoi) and ‘self­existing’ 
(afthyparktoi) as persons we must also show respect for those around us. 
‘I mean each one of us must know our role and our place in the family 
and in society,’ Zina said. 
According to Ware (1997), Orthodox man was created in the ‘image 
and likeness’ of God.  When God made man, He did not make him in the 
same way as other animals but modelled him upon Himself, that is, in 
His image.  Unlike animals that react merely according to instinct, man 
can think, reason, make decisions and plan, a point reiterated by Zina. 
Humans were made for fellowship with God too and were given the 
ability to communicate with Him since they are, in fact, His offspring.  If 
humans make proper communion with God, they can become like Him; 
in a sense, they can become deified.  To reach this point of ‘likeness’ with 
God, however, to become like Him, they must work very hard and this is 
because all of mankind, as exemplified by Adam, was led astray by 
deception.  ‘However sinful we may be,’ Ware (1997, p.219) argues, ‘we 
never lose the image; but the likeness depends upon our moral choice, 
upon our ‘virtue’ and so it is destroyed by sin.’  The idea that each of us is 
made in God’s image, that we each mirror God within us, is very clear in 
Orthodox religious thought but there is also the understanding that 
humans will never reach full union with God, though they are modelled 
on Him, due to Adam’s disobedience of His will and his ultimate fall. 
Unlike Roman Catholics, Greek Orthodox Christians believe that 
although humans have to take on board Adam’s corruption and mortality
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they do not have to inherit his guilt.  In any case, the whole aim or thrust 
of Greek Orthodox life is to achieve theosis, that is, ‘likeness’ with God. 
Xenia and Stefania did not make direct reference to man’s creation 
in the ‘image and likeness’ of God. In fact, both claimed not be 
‘religious’.  Their accounts, however, contain references to the standing of 
humans in relation to God and to childlessness as a ‘sin’.  Zina mentioned 
God in a more explicit way than Xenia and Stefania and believed that 
human beings had a responsibility to perpetuate the species because He 
had bestowed that power upon them.  In the opinion of all three women, 
then, motherhood did not only fulfil a duty to the family and to society 
but also to God.  Middle­class Athenian mothers often said that the 
feeling of satisfaction they experienced in raising children was not due to 
the expectation that one day they would get something in return from 
them; it derived solely from ‘moulding’ a human being and seeing him or 
her grow.  This did not mean that children did not compensate their 
parents’ for their efforts.  On the contrary, whatever you give to a child, 
Soula said, you get back with interest. 
Whatever you give to a child, Katerina,  it  is proven, whatever you give to 
him that is what he will give to you.  Will you give him love?  Love is what 
he will give you.  Will you show him malice or hatred?  Hatred he will show 
to  you.    Of  course,  a  child  is  born  with  a  particular  character  but  the 
environment also has a decisive  role  to play.   That  is a fact or, at  least, 
that’s what life has taught us (Soula, 46, married, 2 children, working part­ 
time). 
The benefits received by one’s offspring were not material but emotional, 
primarily in the form of ‘love’ and ‘joy’.  Children were independent 
beings but also a part (kommati) of their mothers, since they come directly 
from the woman’s body.  A child was also the fruit that solidified the 
union of two people.  Children were expected to bring ‘happiness’ and 
enabled parents to see the world ‘with fresh eyes,’ that is, they ‘gave life 
meaning.’  They were described as a ‘gift’, a ‘miracle’, a ‘blessing’, giving 
life ‘purpose’ and were the only way to achieve ‘immortality’.  These 
expressions, once again, echo the Greek Orthodox view of children, but 
they also reflect a broader transformation in the meaning and worth of 
children not exclusive to urban Greek society.  Since the nineteenth 
century throughout most of Europe and America, the ‘economically 
“worthless” but emotionally “priceless” child’ has been in existence 
(Zelizer 1994 p.3). 
6.6 The polytekni mother 
According to a recent article in the leftist newspaper Eleftherotypia 
(17/09/2005), there are 140,000 families with three children currently 
living in Greece.  Almost exactly a year earlier, the same newspaper 
reported that the figure was 176,000 (Eleftherotypia 27/09/2004).
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Regardless of their true number, families of this size, or bigger, carry the 
label polyteknoi, translatable into English as ‘families with many children.’ 
The polyteknoi receive a number of benefits from the state, from cheaper 
travel to various tax breaks.  In 2003, the year in which I conducted my 
fieldwork in Athens, polyteknes oikogeneies (‘families with many children’) 
were defined as those with four or more children, of which there were 
approximately 160,000 in total according to Eleftherotypia (29/04/2001), 
including 36,000 living within the Attic plain.  In 2004, the newly­elected, 
conservative government, Nea Demokratia (‘New Democracy’), announced 
plans to extend the privileges granted to couples with four or more 
children to those with three children and over, thus expanding the 
meaning of the term ‘large families’.  A series of associations devoted to 
the polyteknoi are in existence all over Greece.  Two of them ­ the Supreme 
Confederation of Large Families of Greece (Anotati Synomospondia Polyteknon 
Ellados), or A.S.P.E., and Ethniki Organosi Polyteknon Athinon (National 
Organisation of Large Families of Athens), or E.O.P.A. ­ have their base in 
the capital. 
Upon my arrival in Athens, I arranged to meet the President of 
A.S.P.E., hoping that through him, I would be able to get in touch with 
the polyteknoi of Nea Smyrni.  Knowing little about the organisation and 
the purpose of its existence, I asked the President, a father of more than 
four children himself, to tell me a few words about it and the nature of its 
campaign.  During the course of our conversation, it became apparent 
that the association’s philosophy and mission was broader than I had 
originally assumed.  ‘Greek culture and the Greek nation are in danger of 
disappearing,’ the President of A.S.P.E. alleged.  ‘The people of this 
country,’ he told me, ‘refuse to accept responsibility for raising more than 
two children and the government offers few incentives to those wishing 
to have large families.’  A mother of four or more children, he claimed, 
deserves to have equal status and rights as a civil servant. 
‘Underfertility,’ he added, was a major concern, particularly since 
foreigners (allodapoi) were coming into the country at an ever­worrying 
pace.  ‘Did you know,’ he asked me, ‘the other day, at a school on one of 
our islands, an Albanian burnt the Greek flag and shouted, “long live 
Albania”?’  I thanked the President for his time and for giving me the 
contact details of two of the organisation’s members who were residents 
of Nea Smyrni.  As I was leaving, he handed me a small selection of 
magazines published by A.S.P.E. every trimester, which he felt would 
help me gain a deeper understanding concerning the aims of the 
association. 
Flicking through the magazines on my way home, I noticed the 
depiction of a link between the plight of the polyteknoi, nationalism, and 
the Greek Orthodox Church and faith.  The April­June 2000 issue of The 
World of the Polyteknoi, for example, included articles with the following
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headings: ‘Polyteknoi and the children of the polyteknoi are the defenders 
of our national struggles,’ ‘The demographic problem – the polytekni 
family,’ ‘God will provide’ and ‘The decrease of native students.’  One of 
the magazine’s front covers contained a portrait of a Greek national hero, 
Ioannis Makrygiannis, who had fought in the War of Independence (Plate 
9), while another pictured a mural entitled ‘The birth of Christ,’ 
belonging to one of the monasteries of Agion Oros in Northern Greece 
(Plate 10).  Inside each issue, members from various A.S.P.E. branches, 
dispersed throughout Greece, reported on local events honouring the 
families of the polyteknoi in their vicinity.  Others wrote about the need to 
campaign for further benefits.  However, A.S.P.E. members were not the 
sole contributors to the magazine; journalists, clergymen, politicians, 
lawyers, doctors and university professors, including demographers, also 
made frequent, written contributions to The World of the Polyteknoi.  In 
2004, for instance, to mark the occasion of the Day of the Polyteknoi, one 
issue published messages sent to A.S.P.E. with greetings from the 
President of Greece, the leaders of the country’s two main political 
parties, as well as the Archbishop of Athens and the whole of Greece, 
Christodoulos. 
Plate 9. Ioannis Makrygiannis, a Greek freedom fighter in the War of 
Independence, depicted on the cover of the January­March Issue 2001 of The 
World of the Polyteknoi
109 
Plate 10. The ‘Birth of Jesus Christ,’ a mural in one of the monasteries at Agion 
Oros, depicted on the front cover of the October­December 2002 Issue of The 
World of the Polyteknoi 
Attitudes towards the polyteknoi varied within contemporary Greek 
society.  For some, the polyteknoi, and the polytekni mother in particular, 
were ‘heroes’.  In 2003, for example, a prime­time television chat show 
entitled Boro (‘I can’), hosted by the popular TV presenter Anna Drouza, 
devoted its hour­long programme to the ‘heroic polytekni mother.’  An 
article in Eleftherotypia (07/11/2003) also described the polyteknoi as the 
‘heroes of everyday life.’  A philologist­historian wrote an article for 
A.S.P.E. magazine headlined ‘The heroism of childbearing’ (Kargakos 
2000).  Yet, while some admired the polytekni mother, others questioned 
her sense of responsibility.  Marina, a married woman in her 40s, mother 
to four children who worked part­time and had a Master’s degree, was 
well aware of the scepticism that surrounded her ‘choice’ of family size.  I 
asked Marina what people’s reactions were to her having what was, 
according to Greek standards, a large family. 
Marina:  Oh yes,  I  did experience some negative  reactions because  the 
environment  I grew up  in was not one with many children nor were they 
very  Church­oriented  people  who  would  say  …  who  would  accept 
whatever God sends.  So, I had to face many battles with my mother. 
KG:  What were some of the things she would tell you? 
Marina:  Well,  every  time she would  find out  I was pregnant  she would 
start shouting,  ‘you’re not  thinking of your health!   How will you raise this 
child?’ and she would present me with all the problems in their worst form. 
So, sometimes,  I would hide from her the fact  that  I was pregnant until  I
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could  no  longer  do  so …  the  same  with  the majority  of  my  uncles  and 
aunts. 
KG:  How about other people, like non­family members, perhaps? 
Marina:  Yes,  there  were  comments  from  colleagues;  even  from 
gynaecologists … I remember the gynaecologist I had gone to when I had 
an extra­uterine miscarriage.   Because he heard  I had other children, he 
said in a sarcastic tone something like, ‘oh you’re so very active.’ 
KG:  How did you react to that? 
Marina:  I didn’t say anything.  I thought, ‘if that’s how he treats his best 
customers,  he  will  not  have much  of  a  future!’  (Marina,  40s,  married,  4 
children, working part­time). 
Of particular interest in Marina’s account is the description of her 
mother’s reaction to her multiple pregnancies because it reveals that the 
limitation of family size transcends generational differences.  In fact, 
Marina’s mother was more likely to be in agreement with Soula, a 
woman roughly the same age as Marina. 
Soula was married with two teenage sons and was, at the time of 
our encounter, 46 years old.  Soula had experienced difficulties 
conceiving her first child but did eventually manage to get pregnant with 
Grigoris, her eldest son.  Following his arrival, her husband insisted they 
should have a second child.  Though Soula was not as keen, she finally 
agreed with her husband that having a sibling for Grigoris was the right 
thing to do, and so Takis was born just over a year later.  I asked Soula 
whether she or her husband had ever considered having a third child. 
Her response, reproduced partially below, was instructive: 
We didn’t talk about having another child.  In any case, don’t forget … you 
have  to be able  to offer  certain  things  to  children.   So,  you have certain 
obligations.    You  cannot  have  an  uncontrollable  amount  of  children, 
without  being  able  to  offer  them  the  basics …  In  the  past,  back  in  our 
grandmothers’ generation they had twenty children, ok?  Today you can’t 
do that.  To have ten children, for example, and for them to suffer is silly, 
right?  They didn’t ask to be born so you have to be able to provide them 
with  the basics …  I mean,  I  couldn’t  imagine having  six  children and be 
able to give to all six.  I would rather have none.  I wouldn’t have them out 
of control, just so I could say that I had a child.  When I wanted one, I did it 
consciously.  I knew why I wanted it and what I could give to it, right?  Like 
I knew about  the second one also … and I am not  talking about families 
who have only one or  two children but  about  those who have more.   Of 
course,  it’s your choice, right?  Since you know what kind of country you 
live in, to choose to have six you are choosing to make them suffer. That 
is why underfertility  exists,  because  proper  couples  think,  plan  and  then 
act (Soula, 46, married, 2 children, working part­time). 
Soula’s response reveals the rationale against the behaviour of the 
polyteknoi.  To have many children, according to Soula, was a sign of 
irrationality, irresponsibility and a lack of foresight, given awareness of 
the less than favourable conditions in which contemporary Athenians 
had to raise the next generation.  ‘If logic ruled,’ I once heard, everyone
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would ‘choose’ to have a maximum of two children.  On the face of it, this 
supposition was straightforward:  why should Athenians have more 
children than they could afford to look after?  Yet Marina was in no better 
a financial situation than Soula.  Both Marina’s and Soula’s children 
attended state schools local to Nea Smyrni and both displayed equal levels 
of anxiety over managing the household resources and monitoring their 
children’s regular demands for the latest fashionable accessories. 
The difference between Marina and Soula, I suggest, was more 
deep­seated.  The lack of correspondence in the number of children that 
Marina and Soula each thought was necessary to make them feel 
‘complete’ as women lay in the ideologies that cultivated their sense of 
maternal duty.  Soula’s narrative exposes the rhetoric typical of liberal 
theories of subjectivity while Marina’s outlook is more akin to the values 
expressed in the Christian Orthodox faith and by the Greek Orthodox 
Church.  According to Ruhl (2002), the dominant ‘procreative ideology’ 
in advanced liberal states is that of the ‘willed pregnancy’.  While the 
drive to manage fertility has always been a feature of humankind, the 
way that societies contemplate and manage reproduction has varied over 
time and across space, she claims.  Characteristic of the ‘willed 
pregnancy’ is the idea that human beings, irrespective of the 
circumstances in which they find themselves, have the capacity to reason. 
‘Liberalism,’ Ruhl (2002, p.646) claims, ‘is posited on the notion of an 
ahistorical, disembodied, and hyper­rational individual.’  Those living in 
a modern liberal context have to make use of their rationality in order to 
overcome their animalistic urges and become adept at self­control. 
Through careful planning and the use of foresight, they then acquire the 
freedom to choose what is best for them and, ultimately, to control what 
is not.  Their reward is autonomy, especially from the burden of 
childbearing. 
The similarities between Soula’s account and Ruhl’s description are 
clear.  According to the liberal ideology of the ‘willed pregnancy’, it is 
simply not ‘proper’ to have children without due consideration of the 
consequences.  Every child must be a wanted child and, as Soula asserted, 
one must know why s/he wants it.  Adherence to such a philosophy 
neither precludes unplanned pregnancies nor suggests that middle­class 
Athenians consciously plan the birth of each of their children.  The 
‘willed pregnancy’ is an ideal model of conduct to which women like 
Soula aspired, and whose terms they drew on to make sense of their 
actions.  As Kanaaneh (2002, p.82) argues, having fewer, spaced, planned 
children is a ‘prime signifier of modernity’ and reflects modernisation 
theory’s ‘rational, economic, calculating individual.’  By having a small 
family, parents hope they will be able to provide it with all the necessities 
essential to being ‘modern’.  Among middle­class Athenians, the most 
important of these was a good education but it also included other, more
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material or consumer goods, such as fashionable clothing.  A childless, 
married teacher in her 40s, for example, told me that she felt sorry for the 
children of the polyteknoi because they could not enjoy the same material 
goods as others in their age­group. 
In contrast, according to the Greek Orthodox faith, planning a 
family is antithetical to the will of God (Dimopoulou 2000).  Unlike Soula, 
Marina claimed that she was not fearful of not being able to look after her 
children because God would provide for them ­ an assumption that most 
Athenians, like most Galileans, believed was ‘backward’, ‘old­fashioned’, 
‘fatalistic’ and ‘not modern’ (Kanaaneh 2002, p.89).  The majority of my 
informants claimed to want a maximum of two children, while many of 
those who already had two believed they were unlikely to have a third. 
According to most, ‘completion’ was not dependent upon the number of 
children a woman had nor was the amount of children she gave birth to a 
measure of her success as a mother.  As long as she had experienced 
motherhood at least once, a woman would feel ‘complete’. 
I just wanted to have a child.  I would have felt incomplete if I didn’t have 
even  just  one  child …  it  fulfils  me  as  a  woman  (Toula,  33,  married,  2 
children, working full­time). 
We would have felt complete with one, two or three children.  It’s not about 
the number … from children you get only satisfaction, nothing else (Panos, 
40s, married, 2 children, working full­time). 
Informants often recalled the saying ‘one child is like having none at all,’ 
yet they also maintained that it was increasingly difficult to have even 
two children.  In some ways, then, it was better to have one child than to 
have more than they could cope with.  Although not ideal, such an act 
did not violate most women’s understandings of ‘responsible’ 
motherhood, for its principal motivation was the welfare of the child. 
Another way in which I was able to access people’s opinion of the 
polyteknoi was through articles written about them in the press.  While 
most were simply educational, containing details of the latest benefits 
that the government proposed to offer those with ‘many children’, a 
small selection was clearly judgmental.  The following two excerpts stem 
from two mainstream national newspapers, Eleftherotypia and To Vima. 
The first is a letter sent by a young reader, the other a feature article 
written by a Professor of Political Economy from the University of 
Athens.  Each has its own take on why the polyteknoi should not receive 
special benefits just because they have more children than the rest of the 
population.
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I am a college graduate and I am looking for work.  I am in the process of 
filling in the forms for ASEP 16 and I see: 1) extra points for the polyteknoi, 
2) extra points for expatriate Greeks, 3) extra points for those with special 
needs  etc.    I  too  made  sacrifices  in  order  to  get  an  education  –  like 
thousands of others – and I have one brother, so why should I gain fewer 
points  than another candidate, who has  two siblings, and  is,  therefore, a 
polyteknos?   Enough already with  the polyteknoi … Do  the benefits they 
receive  not  suffice?  Is  it  not  enough  that  they  can  earn  20,000  euros 
without paying tax?  Why all  these exceptions?  I mean, when will  I, and 
thousands of other young people like me, find a job, get married and have 
a  family?    And  then  they  talk  about  underfertility.    If  someone  does not 
have  a  stable  job,  really,  is  marriage  what  he  needs?  (Eleftherotypia 
08/08/2005). 
The fifth reason why I am against the benefits that the polyteknoi enjoy is 
that  to  have  many  children  does  not  constitute  a  national  achievement 
(ethniko  ergo),  nor  even an achievement.    A  national  achievement  is  to 
make  good  citizens  and  that  is  something  that  both  those  with  many 
children  (polyteknoi)  and  those  with  few  children  (ligoteknoi)  do. 
Additionally, there is no need to receive payment for that because it is one 
of our responsibilities (To Vima 26/01/2003). 
The first excerpt reveals the frustration that some people felt over the 
favouritism shown to the offspring of polyteknes oikogeneies (‘families with 
many children’) in the labour market.  It is interesting to note that the 
young man complaining refers to the issue of ‘underfertility’ at the end of 
his letter.  This is ironic because, on the one hand, he is claiming that the 
government’s focus on helping the polyteknoi is preventing the non­ 
polyteknoi from finding gainful employment and so from getting married 
and having children, while, on the other hand, he is against the idea of 
assisting the very people who might help solve ‘the demographic issue’. 
Equally noteworthy is that he sees having a job, marriage and 
childbearing as being inseparable, echoing the view held by the majority 
of Greeks that having children is a process that has to occur inside 
marriage (see Chapter 2, Section 2.6), and within an environment of 
economic security (see Chapter 5, Section 5.7). 
The second excerpt is also against the benefits that the government 
bestows upon the polyteknoi, yet one of the reasons Prof. Lianos cites in 
support of his argument relates to the contribution of those with ‘large 
families’ to the overall good of the nation.  The notable aspect of Prof. 
Lianos’ line of reasoning is that he thinks childbearing is indeed a 
national ‘responsibility’ but that it is satisfied by raising ‘good’, as 
opposed to simply numerous, Greek citizens.  Underlying this assertion 
are liberal notions of subjectivity, as described above, and nationalist 
sentiment.  While I did not come across any such explicit statements in 
16 An independent body that is responsible for the recruitment of civil 
servants.
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my interviews with informants, there is evidence to suggest that 
‘ordinary’ Athenians agree with the Professor’s viewpoint.  In her study 
of abortion and attitudes towards the demografiko (‘the demographic 
problem’) among 120 Athenian women, Halkias (2003) observes that 
while her informants disagreed with the idea that in order to be ‘good 
Greek citizens’ they had to have more children, they believed that women 
needed to have at least one child in order to be ‘good Greek citizens.’ 
Compulsory motherhood of one child emerges as an uncontested victory 
of  the nationalist discourses animating the demografiko.   What stands as 
contested  territory  is  women’s  increased  reproduction  …  These  Greek 
women’s narratives reveal both that reproduction and national identity are 
intimately  affiliated  and,  at  the  same  time,  that  this  process  is  not 
seamless (Halkias 2003, p.224). 
When I set off to investigate low fertility in Athens, and even during the 
course of my fieldwork, I was convinced that, although ‘underfertility’ 
was a concept infused with nationalistic connotations, ‘ordinary’ 
Athenians did not ‘plan’ their families with the fate of the nation in mind. 
As already mentioned in Chapter 5, informants claimed that while the 
‘demographic problem’ was a worrisome development, they themselves 
did not have children in order to save the Greek ethnos (‘nation’). Even if 
they wanted to assist in re­populating it, they felt powerless doing so 
because of the enormous cost of having children and the lack of support 
(primarily by the state) in raising them.  I also felt that the connection 
between Greek nationalist ideology and ‘underfertility’ had already been 
examined (Halkias 2004, 2003, 2002, 1998; Paxson 2004).  I wanted to 
study the ‘real’ reasons behind the country’s 1.27 children per woman; a 
‘reality’ that I believed was a cause not a consequence of alarm over the 
loss of the Greek ‘race’.  Yet, in hindsight, I was somewhat mistaken. 
Although the support of the government and the Greek Orthodox 
Church, in their efforts to combat ‘underfertility’ was, partly, why the 
polyteknoi, a minority group, received such a great deal of publicity, their 
existence attests to the presence of a strong connection between 
childbearing and nationalism in contemporary Athenian society. 
Furthermore, the expressions of ambivalence towards them, articulated 
both in the print media but also by my own informants, did not provide a 
challenge to the above association.  Childbearing was still a national 
‘responsibility’ but it had to adapt to the times, which at present were not 
accommodating to large families according to my non­polyteknoi 
informants.  While the women with whom I spoke would, if questioned, 
most likely have denied the suggestion that their family­formation 
practices were fashioned by nationalist ideology, their perspectives on 
motherhood imply otherwise.  As Paxson (2004, p.48, my emphasis) 
contends, motherhood completes a woman in Greece because by
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becoming mothers, Athenian women are demonstrating that they are 
skilful at being ‘proper Greek women.’  In this sense, motherhood was not 
just a middle­class women’s duty to her family, to society, and to God but 
also to the nation. 
6.7 Childlessness 
During my research in Athens, I came across only a single informant who 
claimed to have remained ‘voluntarily’ childless.  Although in the last 
few decades childlessness has been on the rise in Greece (See Chapter 2, 
Section 2.5), judging from my own fieldwork experience as well as that of 
others (Halkias 2004, Paxson 2004), this trend is more likely to be due to 
an increase in infertility, instigated by the postponement of childbearing, 
rather than ‘voluntary childlessness’.  Indeed, a longitudinal study by 
Symeonidou (2000) reveals that the percentage of women in her sample 
who intended to remain childless was negligible and that among those 
who did have such intentions, all actually ended up having at least one 
child.  Moreover, both in the original study (1983) by Symeonidou and 
the follow­up (1997), merely 0.4 and 0.6 per cent of women respectively 
considered not having children as ‘ideal’.  While in Greece, more women 
end up having just one child than they originally set out to do, overall a 
greater proportion of Greek women ‘desire’, ‘expect’ and actually have a 
single child than no children at all (Symeonidou 2000). 
Dina was a 51­year­old divorcee who had decided not to have a 
child because of what she described as an ‘irresponsible’ and occasionally 
‘abusive’ husband.  Dina approached me following the focus group 
interview I had conducted in a social club local to Nea Smyrni. We 
decided to meet the following week for an afternoon coffee at a near­by 
cafe.  Dina told me that she had decided not to have children because she 
alone would have to provide for them, given her husband’s general lack 
of interest in family affairs.  While she thought she would be able to offer 
a child the protection and care that it would need, she knew she would 
require the financial support of her husband if she were to do her job well 
as a mother.  Dina felt deprived of motherhood, and told me that after 
she filed for divorce she entered into what was to be a brief relationship 
with another man.  Although by then she had put aside all thoughts of 
having a child, she told her new partner that she secretly wished to fall 
pregnant.  While she would not keep the baby, she told me, she wanted 
to feel the sensations that accompany carrying a child.  A short­lived 
pregnancy would have been sufficient to compensate for her sense of 
incompleteness at that stage in her life.  Although she had felt 
considerable contentment by looking after her nephews and nieces she 
described her experience as ‘the loss of my soul in the mirror,’ a poignant 
reminder that children are often regarded as a reflection ­ a mirror image 
­ of the self; their absence, therefore, a stark realisation of the definitive 
ending of the person.
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Dina’s story suggests that it was better to have no children at all 
under circumstances that would most likely prove unfavourable for the 
child.  This complements the vision of ‘responsible’ motherhood 
advocated by informants such as Soula, above. Her ‘choice’ to remain 
childless, given her husband’s behaviour, also reveals the strong 
preference for reproduction within a stable heterosexual union in which 
the man provides, if not emotional, than at least financial support.  The 
prospect of single motherhood was unthinkable.  Interestingly, Dina also 
confesses to feeling a strong desire to want to experience pregnancy, 
though not to full term.  In other words, in order for Dina to feel like a 
‘complete’ woman, she felt the needed to undergo the bodily process of 
carrying a child.  At first, this wish seems to contradict the view 
expressed by a number of my female informants, noted in Section 6.4, 
that motherhood entails nurturing rather than simply giving birth to a 
child.  Yet, on closer inspection, Dina’s assertion does not counter this 
view.  For Dina, her nephews and nieces afforded the opportunity to play 
a nurturing role, satisfying some of the sensations required to feel 
‘complete’.  Yet, as also mentioned earlier, ‘nature’ had designed the 
female body for reproduction.  Dina’s yearning, therefore, suggests a 
curiosity to experience what she considered a defining characteristic of 
femininity. 
Dina claimed that she could not recall facing any negative 
comments about her childlessness.  Yet Dina had not ‘chosen’ to remain 
childless because she disliked children or due to wanting to devote her 
attention to other activities or experiences.  Halkias (2004, p.186) argues 
that ‘women who simply do not want to have children are an invisible, 
and practically unimaginable, part of modern Greece.’  According to 
Paxson (2004, p.18), childless women are held to be ‘morally 
irresponsible’ for they have failed to live up to a social duty.  While 
Halkias and Paxson are, in principle, correct in assuming that in Greek 
society such women are in the minority because they do not conform to 
‘proper’ female behaviour, I believe that the attitudes towards the 
voluntarily childless were slightly more diverse than these two authors 
assume.  The passing of judgement over a woman’s decision to remain 
childless depended primarily upon what others believed were her 
motives.  As Dina’s story has already demonstrated, if a childless 
woman’s reason for not wanting children was ‘legitimate’, for instance 
because it was ‘better’ for the welfare of the unborn child, then she was 
cleared of acting selfishly.  If her reasons were ‘illegitimate’, then she was 
condemned for being egotistical. 
Yet again, the interview with Xenia and Stefania proved insightful 
on this account.  The issue of childlessness emerged on two different 
occasions during our lengthy conversation.  In the first instance, Xenia 
and Stefania were talking about a colleague from work that they both
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knew.  According to Stefania, one day their colleague announced that she 
and her husband did not want children.  When another male co­worker 
asked why, the alleged woman said that it was because she wanted ‘to 
get married in order to get married, not in order to have children.’  Upon 
recounting the story, Stefania said that she considered this woman a 
‘selfish creature’ (egoïstiko plasma), though she wondered whether she was 
covering up an infertility problem.  While she could empathise with a 
woman who did not want to admit that she was infertile, she could not 
sympathise with her female co­worker, characterising her as a ‘bitch’ 
(skyla).  When I asked Stefania whether that meant she thought women 
who did not want to have children were generally egotistical, she again 
retorted that she did not believe her colleague was telling the truth. 
However, she then said that the only person she believed was honest 
about wanting to remain childless was a child psychiatrist friend of hers. 
‘Eleni,’ according to Stefania, ‘must have had good reason not to want to 
have children’ and, Xenia intervened, ‘had really given it a lot of thought, 
perhaps because of what she had experienced as a child psychiatrist.’ 
At a later stage in the conversation, the issue of childlessness re­ 
emerged.  This time, I initiated the discussion by asking both informants 
whether either one of them felt that a woman who did not have children 
could feel ‘complete’.  ‘If she feels it then yes; you could feel miserable 
and yet have a dozen children.’  ‘Irene Papas and Melina Merkouri 17 did 
not have children and they were complete,’ said Stefania.  ‘But these 
people,’ Xenia added, ‘will not live on forever.  They say that people die 
when the living forget them.  That is when people die, do you 
understand?’  ‘If I could not have children,’ Stefania finally said, ‘I would 
probably be fine and be complete … I would probably adopt.’  The first 
point of interest in this discussion is that Stefania refuses to accept that 
her female colleague was indeed against the idea of having children.  This 
lays bare her inability to conceive of ‘voluntary’ childlessness as a 
genuine option.  The second interesting feature of the conversation, 
however, complicates the issue because it indicates that for some women, 
like their child psychiatrist friend, the ‘choice’ not to have children, even 
under regular circumstances, may be justifiable.  This seems to be the case 
when the would­be child’s well being is at stake. 
The third notable point pertains to the matter of ‘completion’. 
While most informants told me that motherhood ‘completes’ a woman, 
according to Stefania some women can feel ‘complete’ without having 
children.  Yet the two women that she mentions are both eminent figures 
in Greek society.  Therefore, it appears that only exceptional personalities 
can make up for the loss entailed in not having children.  This is 
consistent with Stefania’s belief, noted earlier (Section 6.5), that 
17 Both are famous Greek actresses.
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childbearing is the only ‘creative’ act ‘ordinary’ as opposed to ‘gifted’ 
women can accomplish.  Finally, Stefania claims that if she were unable 
to reproduce she would feel ‘complete’.  This line of reasoning again 
highlights the importance of having a ‘legitimate’ reason for remaining 
childless.  Infertility, while unfortunate, is not a product of selfishness but 
bad luck.  Nevertheless, Stefania still concludes by saying that though she 
would probably be able to find fulfilment through other means, if she 
were unable to conceive she would most likely adopt, thereby satisfying 
what she seems to believe is every ‘ordinary’ woman’s most important 
contribution in life: to nurture. 
6.8 Conclusions 
Motherhood and raising a ‘good’ Greek child fulfil a duty to the family, 
society, God and the nation.  To refute motherhood under more or less 
‘favourable’ circumstances is to reject the Greek nation and to contribute 
to the degeneration of Greek society and the Greek family.  Conversely, 
by raising a ‘well­behaved’ and ‘good’ child, a woman also involves 
herself in reproducing an orderly society and a respectable nation, the 
foundation of both of which is a stable family.  Yet being a mother in 
contemporary Athenian society was a demanding experience.  Women 
felt anxious about motherhood and questioned their abilities as mothers. 
While many relied on their parents for childcare support, others could 
not, which left them feeling trapped inside their small Athenian 
apartments and isolated from other mothers.  In combination, having no 
more than one or two children made good sense to the majority of 
informants.  Consequently, the figure of the polytekni mother prompted 
mixed reactions.  In the popular imagination, having a ‘large family’ was 
a brave decision but few were willing to take it in practice.  Contrary to 
popular and press discourse, however, the Greek family was not showing 
signs of demise and ‘underfertility’ was not a product of women’s 
reluctance to mother (see Chapter 5, Sections 5.4 and 5.5).  Yet, as Xenia 
hinted, the ‘cult of motherhood’ had to compete with novel female 
aspirations.  The reconciliation of maternal duties with other forms of 
female preoccupations and its effects on women’s attitudes towards 
having children and experiences of family formation will be subject to 
discussion in the proceeding chapter.
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7 FROM ‘MISTRESS OF THE HOUSE’ TO 
‘MISTRESS OF THE SELF’: THE IMPACT OF 
CHANGES TO FEMALE IDENTITY ON FERTILITY 
NEGOTIATIONS IN ATHENS 
7.1 Introduction 
The middle­class Athenian women who participated in this study 
perceived the process of family­formation as a life­altering experience. 
As the previous chapter showed, becoming a mother was a necessary 
step in the ‘completion’ of being a woman and thus a highly significant 
event in the female life course.  Yet the changes involved in the transition 
to motherhood were also the cause of considerable conflict for women. 
Therefore, a dominant focus in the interviews I gathered concerned the 
impact of childbearing upon women’s senses of self and vice versa.  In 
the following sections, I trace female informants’ ‘multiple narratives of 
self’ (McKinnon 1997) or identities, and the ideologies of personhood that 
informed them, and explore how these shaped the process of negotiating 
fertility. 
7.2 Female personhood in Greek ethnographies 
In Contested Identities, Loizos and Papataxiarchis (1991a) describe the 
model of personhood that has dominated in ethnographic accounts of 
Greece.  In acknowledgement of Collier and Yanagisako (1987), they 
demonstrate that key to the constitution of Greek personhood have been 
the ‘mixed metaphors’ of kinship and gender.  Women, in particular, they 
argue, have realized their standing as persons mainly through being 
meticulous in their undertaking of tasks in the domestic domain and by 
successfully fulfilling their duties as mothers, wives and daughters.  It is 
primarily through their relationship to kin and in terms of domesticity, 
therefore, that Greek society has defined women as persons.  In Portrait of 
a Greek Mountain Village, du Boulay (1974) argues that Ambeliots derived 
a sense of themselves only through the enactment of roles prescribed by 
society.  In other words, self­worth emanated solely from successfully 
accomplishing tasks recognized in the social context and, of course, 
specific to each gender.  Since the dominant roles of society related to the 
family, it was through marriage and, therefore, by being ‘good’ wives, 
mothers and house mistresses that women in Ambeli attained 
personhood.  Hirschon (1989) describes a similar set of values among a 
group of Asia Minor refugees living in Athens in the 1970s.  In order to be 
a ‘proper’ person, a woman in Kokkinia had to pass from the role of 
daughter or sister to that of wife and mother. 
The aforementioned studies all draw comparisons between Greek 
notions of personhood and those originating in countries typically 
grouped together under the banner of ‘Western’ Europe.  Both du Boulay
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and Hirschon point out that at the time of their fieldwork in Greece there 
was little scope for the development of the individual who was 
accountable only to and for him or herself.  In fact, individuality or acting 
with a view to gaining personal gratification rather than with the aim of 
fulfilling one’s responsibilities to others was damaging to the reputation 
of both men and women. 
Indeed,  I  would  argue  that  the  notion  of  the  single  individual  as  it  is 
understood  in  the  West  may  still  be  inappropriate  for  understanding 
contemporary  Greek  society,  even  with  the  rapid  changes  which  have 
occurred in the 1980s (Hirschon 1989, p.141). 
Thus,  to  the extent  that  the  villager’s  personal  integrity  is  identified with 
that  of  his  family,  he  is  correspondingly  involved  in  a  type  of  self­ 
awareness more extrovert than introvert.  He acts more as the protagonist 
of  his  family  group  than  as  a  person  with  his  own  individual  moral 
existence (du Boulay 1974, p.74­75). 
Scholars outside the field of anthropology have also noted the distinction 
between Greek and ‘Western’ European conceptualisations of 
personhood.  Pollis (1965; 1987), for example, a political scientist, has 
written extensively and in detail on the differences between the Greek 
and the ‘Western’ view of ‘self’ 18 .  In Greece, she argues, the notion of 
individualism in the Anglo­Saxon sense is largely absent.  In the Greek 
view, a person does not exist as an autonomous being but is defined by 
his or her relationships to specific people (usually belonging to his or her 
extended family) and particular groups (typically, the community and 
the local Church).  Whereas in the Anglo­Saxon and mainly Protestant 
perception of the self responsibility lies with the individual, according to 
the Greek perspective a person is accountable to society for his/her 
actions and decisions.  This helps clarify, she contends, why, in Greece, 
deviation from socially­imposed sanctions does not result in feelings of 
‘guilt’ but in those of ‘shame’.  It also explains why such abstract concepts 
as justice, equality and uniform laws applied independently of personal 
relationships have been slow to appear in Greek legal terminology and 
why filotimo (the ‘love of honour’), instead of personal integrity, has been 
the key guiding force of behaviour among Greeks.  Finally, it shed lights 
on the idea that for Greeks self­fulfilment stems from the successful 
implementation of one’s role within the greater whole whereas in the 
‘West’ it is through the achievement of personally formulated goals. 
Pollis claims that a highly centralised and regulative state, the late 
development of capitalism and industrialisation, widespread 
nationalism, and persistently strong bonds to local political and social 
groupings, ensured that the idea of the individual as a being separate 
18 Pollis uses the word ‘self’ instead of ‘person’ interchangeably in her 
work.  However, she is referring to personhood as defined in the 
Introduction of my thesis.
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from society and against the state did not develop in Greece until 
recently. 
The ethnographies cited above, however, also note the existence of 
an alternative sense of personhood to that just described ­ one more akin 
to the ‘Western’ European or Anglo­Saxon perception.  According to 
Loizos and Papataxiarchis (1991b), gendered personhood occasionally 
developed in contrast to or separate from kinship.  These alternative 
discourses of gender and personhood most frequently appeared outside 
marriage; that is, beyond the hold of the ‘dominant conjugal model’, 
which was the primary guiding force of Greeks’ everyday activities.  In 
Dance and the Body Politic in Northern Greece, Cowan (1990) also describes 
a space in which the basis of what her informants did depended not on 
ideas of personhood defined by women’s positions within the family but 
by the rhetoric of individualism.  The kafeteria was, according to Cowan 
(1990, p.86), a chiefly female space where women saw men as their equals 
and claimed to make decisions not mindful of their reputation in the 
community but based on their ‘own needs, desires and interests.’ 
This nonconforming definition of female personhood accompanied 
a unique perception of female sexuality.  While according to the 
dominant ideology of female personhood, a woman’s sexuality was 
attributable to her kinship role and, via procreation, directed towards the 
perpetuation of the family, in the alternative model, expressed within the 
kafeteria, a woman was simply a ‘human being’.  There, others viewed her 
capacity to bear children as separate from her status as a person and her 
sexuality as positive and under her full control, as was her body.  Such 
conceptions of female personhood, Cowan (1990, p.87) argues, provided 
‘a discursive space’ in which ‘hegemonic ideas about women’s nature 
and women’s place’ were contested, though not necessarily overthrown. 
In part, they stemmed from a feminist discourse that embraced the idea 
of the female person as ‘autonomous’ and ‘self­determining’. 
7.3 ‘Women have their own personalities now’ 
The subdominant ideology of female personhood, described in these 
ethnographies, was highly visible in Athens during my fieldwork 19 .  In 
fact, it was clear that this previously minor model of personhood had 
now gained prominence and was influencing female informants’ senses 
19 On my numerous visits to the Greek island of Andros, I have often 
heard the question asked to members of the younger generation, ‘whose 
are you?’  (tinos eisai?)  as opposed to ‘who are you?’  This question 
exemplifies the difference between the model of personhood that defines 
persons as, above all, members of particular kin and social groups and 
one that characterises them as individuals.  I have never come across that 
question in Athens.
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of self or subjectivities, and consequently, their approaches to family­ 
formation.  Informants would frequently tell me that, a ‘woman has her 
own personality (prosopikotita) now,’ meaning that she acted with regard 
for her own well­being and without feeling accountable to others 
(particularly, her husband and father).  While ‘motherhood’ was still 
essential to being a ‘good’ Greek woman, the terms ‘woman’ and ‘person’ 
were no longer synonymous with the word ‘mother’.  Male informants 
agreed.  For example, I asked Constantinos what would make him most 
proud about his teenage daughter when she grew up.  This was his 
response: 
I want her to be strong.  I want her to be able to have a personality, to be a 
mature personality.  That’s what I’d like.  That’s why I’m telling you: I would 
admire  any  woman  who  was  beautiful  as  a  woman,  as  nature,  as  a 
personality and as a mother.   If she can achieve all of  that,  I  think she is 
worth it (Constantinos, 40s, divorced, one child, self­employed). 
According to Constantinos, an admirable woman is one who has a 
‘personality’ but who is also a ‘mother’.  By making this distinction, 
Constantinos suggests that motherhood and being a self­assertive 
‘individual’ are different yet equally important aspects of female identity. 
However, it also means that being a mother in the service of others does 
not meet the requirements necessary for developing a ‘personality’ 
(prosopikotita) and vice versa.  As a result, Constantinos distinguishes 
between being a ‘woman’ (gineka) with a ‘personality’ and being a 
‘mother’ (mitera). 
This line of reasoning was also evident in women’s narratives of 
family­formation.  For example, Magdalena, a married, 35­year­old, 
mother of two children, rationalised her lack of intention to have a third 
child by telling me that after having two, ‘I am not going to go through 
the same again, especially now that I have started feeling like more of a 
person.’  Vicky, a married 39­year­old mother of one child, who worked 
as a teacher in a private Athenian school and had a Master’s degree, also 
noted the importance of remembering that, ‘you don’t stop being a 
woman or a person because you have a child.’  Finally, Eleni, a married 
29­year­old with no children of her own yet, pointed out: ‘a woman is not 
just there to give birth.’  Although all three informants valued the role of 
the mother, they also believed that womanhood and motherhood were 
separate states of being; in other words, they felt that kinship did not 
define female personhood exclusively. 
As Chapter 6 showed, the ‘cult of motherhood’ was responsible for 
generating the belief that middle­class Athenian women had a duty to 
reproduce.  The definition of ‘modern personhood’, however, demands 
that individuals be proprietors of their own selves, self­conscious, 
autonomous, willing, desiring, and ambitious (Collier et al. 1997).
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Accordingly, women who sacrifice themselves entirely for their children 
do not possess the characteristics that define ‘modern personhood’. 
Childbearing alone did not, indeed could not, define my female 
informants as ‘modern’ persons.  As Bordo (1993) argues, this notion of 
personhood also upholds the Cartesian separation of consciousness from 
the body, and assumes the subordination of ‘mere bodies’ to the mind. 
As a result, women whose defining quality is a product of their bodily 
functions – for example, motherhood ­ rather than of their mental abilities 
are not persons in the ‘modern’ sense of the term. For this reason, 
informants assumed that older generations of women did not possess a 
‘personality’ because they were ‘just’ mothers. 
When  my  mother  became  a  mother,  she  became  a  mother,  that’s  it. 
However,  I want  to  live.    I  have needs  too and  temptations.   Things are 
different now; perhaps  that  is why  there are so many divorces  (Era, age 
unknown, married, 2 children, working full­time). 
According to Era, previous cohorts of women lacked ‘needs’ and 
‘temptations’, and therefore, ultimately, a sense of self.  Her mother, for 
example, simply fulfilled a role prescribed by society.  Yet, as Collier 
(1997, p.6) argues, shifts in narratives of personal motivations for action 
reveal ‘less a change in people’s willingness or ability to act out their 
inner desires than a subtle difference in the concepts and practices people 
used for managing their presentations of self and for interpreting the 
actions of others.’  As the following sections will show in more detail, 
Athenian women were in the midst of experiencing opportunities, as well 
as constraints, unique to their age groups.  Like Collier, I do not believe 
that this had given them a greater degree of self­consciousness than that 
possessed by their predecessors.  Rather, it had equipped them with a set 
of ideas about personhood, sexuality, gender and the body, which drove 
them to make sense of their practices and beliefs (including those 
pertaining to childbearing), and those of others, in terms of ‘personal 
initiative and abilities’ (Collier 1986, p.105). 
In distinguishing between motherhood and womanhood, 
informants engaged in the construction of two separate identities ­ being 
a mother and being a woman – both of which they were constantly in the 
process of trying to accommodate in their everyday lives. 
One big problem that you face when you are  raising children  is  that you 
forget yourself a little bit.  This is something that creates conflict inside of 
me because I am also very dynamic.  I want things for myself too and this 
constantly  creates  conflict  inside of me … Sometimes  I  feel  like  I  outdo 
myself and  that  is  the moment at which  the conflict occurs.   That  is why 
women with  children go mad.    At  some point  we  forgot  that  we …  they 
forget  that  they are also women.   Somewhere along  the  line,  they forget 
that  they are also career women;  they forget  that  they want  to have fun. 
Or,  the  other  thing  that  happens  ­  I’ve  seen  this  happen:  they  start
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searching  for  a  big  romance  …  Other  women  leave  their  children 
completely and run off with someone else, but that’s also natural under the 
circumstances (Voula, 43, married, 2 children, not working). 
According to Voula, being a mother was difficult to reconcile with being 
a woman.  While, to a certain extent, she felt able to accept the loss of her 
self in order to concentrate on her maternal duties (she gave up her job 
after having her second child), others, she claimed, were unable to do the 
same, taking drastic measures to escape the ‘insanity’ they suffered as a 
result. 
The internal strife described by Voula appeared to affect the process 
of negotiating fertility both prior to the initiation of family­formation and 
once it had already begun.  A number of female informants, for example, 
claimed to have deferred the process of starting a family in anticipation of 
having to deal with these conflicting identities.  For example, when I 
asked Sofia, a 30­year­old, childless woman, why she had not yet had 
children, she told me: ‘I don’t want to change.  I don’t want to leave 
myself behind.’  In order to embark upon the process of teknogonia 
(‘childbearing’) a woman had to be prepared to let go of her self. 
A person must be willing to give up a part of herself, of her life before she 
decides to have children (Artemis, 56, married, 2 children). 
Really  you  shouldn’t  even  have  one  [child]  …  You  don’t  take  care  of 
yourself,  your  personal  life  is  over,  you  end  up  going  backwards, 
especially when you don’t have help from your husband … I would advise 
them [people] not  to have any  if  they’re not  ready  to give themselves up 
(Theano, 30s, married, 2 children, working). 
Theano was the only female informant with children that I met who 
openly claimed to have regretted having them (the other was a male 
informant).  When I asked her whether she thought becoming a mother 
had ‘completed’ her as a woman, she was also one of the few who said 
‘no’, telling me instead that ‘having a good time completes me.’  While 
atypical, Theano’s response provides a warning against seeing 
motherhood as an experience that all middle­class Athenian women 
longed for and enjoyed.  It also points to a growing appreciation of the 
value of self­fulfilment, a by­product of ‘modern’ personhood.  Yet the 
fact that Theano had children, despite claiming not to want them, also 
signals the importance of distinguishing between personal aspirations 
and practice. 
During the course of our conversation, Theano told me that she had 
never given motherhood a lot of thought and had not imagined what it 
might be like to have children.  Eventually, however, her husband had 
convinced her that it would be the right thing for them to do.  Her 
mother­in­law, she added, had persuaded him to think in this way.  As
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Theano’s story reveals, while informants claimed to ‘have their own 
personalities now,’ in reality, their actions were always a result of 
compromise and negotiation, rather than ‘autonomous’ and derivative 
from ‘within’ their selves.  In the following sections, I describe further the 
challenges faced by them in trying to realise their aspirations as ‘modern’ 
women.  In each section, I also trace the effect these had on their attitudes 
towards having children and their approaches to childbearing. 
7.4 Money, work and women 
Financial independence through entry into the labour market was the key 
change that had endowed women with a ‘personality’ (prosopikotita).  All 
of those with whom I spoke held financial independence in high esteem. 
‘We now have our own money in our pockets,’ they told me.  While 
many women felt they were obliged to work in order to make ends meet, 
employment was also valued for other reasons.  For example, Theano 
maintained that working was the only time she felt she was doing 
‘something for me’ and she would never contemplate giving up her job in 
order to look after her children on a full­time basis.  Other mothers 
worked in order to ‘unwind’.  This made them ‘better as mothers’ by 
giving them the opportunity to get out of the house and spend quality 
time with their children upon their return. 
If I stay at home, I will have nothing new to tell him, that is why I consider it 
imperative to work.   Women who are not happy when they have children 
are those who stay at home 24 hours a day, those who stay with their kids 
all day (Alexandra, 28­year­old, divorcee with a 2­year­old son). 
My own mother was traditional … she gave herself completely and that is 
not good.  She didn’t have a vision.  Twenty­four hours a day, she was by 
her  children’s  side.    That  was  bad  for  her  self  and  it  made  her 
overprotective  …  I  don’t  like  passive  people  …  I  don’t  like  to  ask  for 
money.    I am more dignified than my mother was.    I have a much more 
developed personality.  I have the power of speech (eho logo).  When you 
have financial independence, you are better off.  You can take initiative.  I 
don’t like a woman that sits in the corner (Aphrodite, 58, married, 1 child, 
self­employed). 
As the above examples illustrate, Athenian women expressed feeling a 
lack of contentment solely from executing the roles of noikokyra (‘mistress 
of the house’) and mother, and appeared willing either to shed some of 
the tasks involved in ‘keeping a home’ or to relinquish some of the 
responsibilities to professional housekeepers.  Whilst a few decades 
earlier, status was conferred on a woman in Athens through the 
fulfilment of her household duties ­ that is, by being a good noikokyra ­ 
and women who went out to work were looked down upon (Hirschon 
1989), today being house­bound was a less welcomed option.  That said, 
maintaining a tidy home was still important.  A messy house was an 
embarrassment, a sign of familial disorder, especially in the presence of
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strangers.  On my numerous visits to informants’ households, therefore, 
clutter, even in the form of children’s toys, was imperceptible. 
For those women without any children yet, being a working mother 
was a desirable prospect.  I asked Vasso, a 22­year­old student, to 
imagine what her life might be like as a mother. 
Well, first, I would like to be a working mother.  Why?  Because comparing 
the character that my friends’ mothers, who don’t work, and that my own 
mother, who does work, have formed with that of others, eh, I believe that 
a job offers you many more opportunities.  Opportunities not just in terms 
of enabling  you  to develop or  build a  career or  financially  but  in another 
way  also,  primarily  by  helping  you  to  develop  a  personality,  and  other 
criteria.  And more generally, it gives you the chance to pass onto another 
spiritual and, of course, social  level … whereas when you close yourself 
inside  the home,  your  interests are  limited.   Someone will  not  criticize a 
working woman who chooses to go out for a walk, who will not come back 
home to cook but who will,  instead, order some take­away, but a woman 
who doesn’t work  is obliged  to  keep a house spick­and­span.   Since no 
house can ever be perfect, even if you spend 24­hours a day cleaning it, 
the result is that this woman will never have time to herself.  Yes, there are 
many benefits for a woman  that works … In any case,  if you don’t have 
anywhere else to release your energy,  I think that most mothers become 
overprotective, destroying every chance they have to enable their children 
to develop their own personality and to stand on their own two feet (Vasso, 
22, single, no children, student). 
Vasso reaffirms many of the ideas already noted.  Women engaged in 
some form of employment have more ‘character’ and are ‘better’ mothers 
than those who are unemployed.  In addition, working women have the 
excuse not to carry out as many domestic tasks.  This implies that, unless 
they have a valid reason, middle­class Athenian society still expected 
women to be the principal minders of their homes.  The claim that a non­ 
working woman could not be ‘seen’ to be walking about the city in 
abandonment of her household duties is surprising coming from a girl of 
Vasso’s age.  Yet it shows that the role of the noikokyra (‘mistress of the 
house’) was still fundamental to a being a ‘proper’ Greek woman and, 
perhaps more importantly, to be ‘seen’ to be one (Paxson 2004). 
Financial independence was also synonymous with ‘freedom’ and 
‘autonomy’.  Those coming of age in Athens in the 1960s claimed to be 
the first generation of women granted the opportunity to work without 
feeling castigated.  Moreover, they were the first women given the chance 
to carry on working following marriage and childbearing, though there is 
evidence to suggest that many did not do so (Sutton 1986).  Earning 
money, they claimed, was something that they were encouraged to do by 
their own mothers, especially by those who lived in the provinces. 
Artemis, a 56­year­old married woman with two children, aged 25 and 
26, was originally from Crete.  Along with the majority of her female
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school friends, Artemis’ mother and father sent her to Athens from Crete 
in the 1960s in order to get an education.  Her parents were aware that 
there were better opportunities for girls in the capital and education was 
the only way to have a chance at savouring them.  ‘Feminist movements 
were just beginning to gain some recognition,’ Artemis explained.  While 
her grandmother would never have encouraged her own daughter to 
migrate to Athens to study and look for work, Artemis’ mother believed 
that village life was full of hardship and that this was likely to be even 
more the case for her daughter.  As a result, she encouraged Artemis to 
create a different future for herself. 
My mother used to tell me,  ‘so that you can be the mistress of your self,’ 
(kyria  toy eaftou sou) she would tell me,  ‘first you find a  job, first you will 
work, so that you can have your own money and then nobody will be able 
to  do  what  they  want  with  you’;  ‘so  that  you  can  be  independent.’    My 
mother used to tell me this from a young age; she would say,  ‘you must 
have your own money’ (Artemis, 56, married, 2 children). 
Artemis’ account hints at a radical shift in attitudes towards female 
employment; a transformation explained partially, it seems, by 
urbanisation.  While Artemis’ mother also worked, she was an agrotissa (a 
‘farmer’).  According to Artemis, this did not prevent her from being 
financially dependent on her husband, Artemis’ father.  ‘Even if she 
wanted to buy a dress, she would have to ask him for money; even if she 
wanted to buy a pair of socks, she had to ask my father to give her some 
drachmas.  This bothered her I assume and she would always tell us to be 
sure to have our own money.’ 
The women I engaged with, however, also described the advantages 
of working in a broader sense, not just in terms of personal benefit. 
According to many, work, like motherhood, was a key channel through 
which they could contribute to society. 
When you work,  you  just  feel  that  you are contributing  something  to  the 
whole.  A woman’s role does not become confined exclusively to the home 
as  a mother,  wife  and  noikokyra.    I,  at  least,  feel  that  I  am  contributing 
something, um, to society.  I mean, I understand that I am useful to some 
people.    They  come,  they  ask me,  they  seek my  advice,  and  I  take  on 
certain  responsibilities.    That  gives  me  satisfaction  (Margarita,  47,  re­ 
married, 1 daughter, working full­time). 
I mean it is very important to, on the one hand, be an energetic member of 
a society.    I mean to be where … where the kneading takes place; to be 
included  in  the production process;  to participate.   That  is very  important 
and it is alluring too.  It is not all bad; I mean it’s not only tiresome.  Work 
doesn’t just make you tired, it also has its charm, right?  Because the role 
of  the noikokyra …  it’s  something  that  you do alone,  trapped  inside  four 
walls.  You do the same thing day in, day out.  Whereas ‘coming out’ [into 
society] you have a job ­ you work in a ministry ­ you see people, you get 
up, you get dressed, you put on your make­up, you fix your hair, you say
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good morning, you get out of your house.  You are in the centre of things, 
inside  the  production  process  (mesa  sti  paragogi)  and  that  is  very 
important, isn’t it?  (Artemis, 56, married, 2 children) 
Margarita and Artemis both deemed communication with the world 
beyond the home and participation in the labour force vital. The 
derivation of self­worth from involvement with the means of production 
(paragogi) points to the spread of a capitalist work ethic.  The role of the 
noikokyra (‘mistress of the house’) was, informants were aware, not 
valued in the same way as that of the employee, and created few 
opportunities for meaningful exchange with other adults.  Female 
informants, therefore, referred to the noikokyra with growing contempt. 
In fact, the term had started to take on a more deprecating meaning, 
similar to the English term ‘housewife’, which itself has been frowned 
upon only recently (since the 1960s). 
Working life, unlike an existence confined to the domestic domain, 
was a generally rewarding experience for middle­class Athenian women. 
Yet, it also had a negative side.  Many of my female informants expressed 
resentment at having to divide their time between work and home, 
especially after spending numerous years in education.  Some were 
unable to find the right work­life balance and had to give up their jobs 
once they had children.  According to the Greek Fertility and Family Survey 
(Symeonidou 2002, p.6), an inflexible labour market either seriously 
impedes women from returning to the workforce upon having children 
(especially after the birth of their first child) or prevents them from 
interrupting it for ‘any serious length of time.’  In fact, the recent increase 
in the employment rate for Greek women is the lowest among the EU 
countries.  Nevertheless, the opportunity to enter and participate in the 
labour market had changed women’s perception of themselves and their 
‘wants’ (ta thelo mou), as Eugenia told me.  Women had fresh demands 
now and having money had taught them to ‘manage themselves’ in a 
different way and to have ‘a changed air’ (Lena, late 40s, married with 2 
grown­up children).  Although they were finding it increasingly hard to 
maintain equilibrium between being ‘responsible’ mothers and ‘good’ 
workers, from being ‘mistresses of their homes,’ middle­class Athenian 
women now sought to become ‘mistresses of their selves.’ 
7.5 Marriage and divorce 
In the Greek popular imagination, as Chapter 5 (Sections 5.4 and 5.5) 
demonstrated, both male and female informants regarded women’s 
financial liberation as a major cause of animosity between them with 
detrimental effects on the family and, more generally, the desire to 
reproduce.  For many of the women I spoke to, however, working was 
essential to achieving a sense of security in what they perceived to be an 
increasingly insecure world.  As a result, women’s admiration for their 
own mothers, some of whom had been dedicated entirely to the role of
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motherhood, went hand in hand with discomfort at the thought of not 
having any money to call one’s own.  This was particularly since personal 
wealth conferred power and a woman without ‘her own money in her 
pocket’ was in danger of putting herself in a subordinate position to her 
husband. 
I  wanted  to  have  my  own  job  so  that  I  would  not  be  dependent  on 
anybody.  I saw women around me relying financially on their husbands.  I 
wanted  to  be  financially  independent  and  then  find  a  suitable  man  and 
have  children.    I  saw  women  making  many  concessions  because  they 
could not do otherwise.  You never know what the future holds.  I wanted 
to have my own money (Kirki, 30s, married, 2 children, working full­time). 
Families  are  no  longer  patriarchal.    Men  engage  much  more  in  their 
children’s  upbringing …  There  is  equality,  a  man’s  logos  (‘word’)  is  not 
above  that  of  a woman’s.    Now  that  women entered  the  labour market, 
they are more independent and it is not possible for men not to help (Era, 
30s, married, 2 children, working full­time). 
Not only was financial independence considered a safeguard against 
divorce, it was also believed to be the seed that should ideally bring to 
fruition a relationship of equality between husband and wife.  Couples 
that contributed an equal share to the household’s overall income, female 
informants believed, were more likely to maintain a level balance than 
those where the wife was financially dependent on her husband.  The 
‘traditional’ model of the family in which the husband was the afendis 
(‘master of the household’) and the wife the noikokyra (‘mistress of the 
household’) had been replaced by that in which husbands and wives are 
in partnership with an equivalent load of household chores to carry out. 
In contemporary Athenian society, therefore, the marital union was 
not ‘a social and symbolic unit … in which each one may realize his or 
her own social personality according to its ideal role’ (du Boulay 1974, 
p.90).  Ideally, marriage was a means to display the affection that a man 
and a woman, as two autonomous beings, felt for each other. 
Accordingly, if the love between two people faded, divorce was the right 
option. 
Marriage forces two autonomous persons to live in the same house … the 
decision to get married is a difficult one.  Marriage is a form of oppression 
(Christina, 45, married, 2 children, working full­time). 
You  know  what  happens  ­  at  least  as  I  see  it  ­  you  marry  as  Ada  or 
Katerina,  as  Philip,  and  through  marriage,  if  you  are  not  fully  ready  to 
change and to become half Ada, half Philip and you’d rather stay what you 
were,  you  can’t  do  it.   You shouldn’t  do  it.    I mean ultimately  you  leave 
behind  the  identity  that  you  once  had.    That  absolute  identity  you  once 
had.    You  are  no  longer  alone.    If  you  are  not  ready  to  face  this,  then 
you’re  destined  for  a  divorce  …  For  example,  I  am  not  Ada.    At  this 
particular moment in time, I am in four pieces.  I mean I have one piece for
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three others and myself.  If you, for example, want to stay whole and you 
say ‘me’ and ‘my life,’ ‘the life I once had’ and ‘who is going to respect it’ 
and who  this and that …  then egoism (egoïsmos) enters  into  it, which  is 
excusable,  in some  instances  (Ada, 42, married, 2 children, working full­ 
time). 
In order for marriage to work, according to Ada, it was necessary to 
accept the partial loss of one’s individual identity.  By extension, the 
grounds for divorce were legitimate when the infringement upon a 
person’s ‘wholeness’ or individuality had become unbearable.  After all, 
as Christina said, ‘marriage was a form of oppression.’  In other words, 
the responsibilities formed by virtue of being a wife, or a husband, were 
burdensome, destructive rather than constructive of gendered identities. 
Despite this perception of marriage, relative to other European 
countries, the Greek divorce rate remains low while its marriage rate is 
high.  In 2001, for instance, the crude divorce rate in Greece was 1.1 per 
1000 inhabitants, compared to 2.6 per 1000 inhabitants in the UK 
(Eurostat 2004).  By comparison, the Greek crude marriage rate was 4.6 
per 1000 inhabitants in 2000, while in the UK it was 5.1 per 1000 
inhabitants (Eurostat 2004) 20 .  Cohort marriage data reveal that although 
among those born between 1960 and 1966 the proportion ever married 
dropped slightly (3%), the figure is still over 90 per cent (Eurostat 2004). 
In the UK, in contrast, among the same female cohorts the proportion of 
women ever married fell from 86 to 77 per cent (Eurostat 2004). 
Despite the inconsistency of these figures with informants’ ideas 
about marriage and divorce, they do make sense when looked at in the 
context of some of their experiences.  For a few of my informants, the 
reality of marriage was very different to how they thought it ideally 
ought to be.  Lia was originally from the provinces but moved to Athens 
with her family as a young girl. 
I  got married  at  21 …  I  didn’t  choose  the  time  in which  to get married. 
Look, my family did not favour the idea of me being free at home, to go out 
I  mean,  to  have  friends;  it  was  not  permitted.    So,  either  I  had  to  get 
married  or  leave  the  house  and  go  live  by  myself,  somewhere  where 
nobody  could  find  me.    Otherwise  they  would  kill  me  …  My  parents 
wouldn’t say anything but I could see for myself, I didn’t feel comfortable;  I 
didn’t  have my  own  space.    I  couldn’t  leave  by myself,  so  I  had  to  get 
married … Socially, for a woman to rise she had to get married to become 
a  lady  (kyria).   She became a  lady when she was by  the side of a man. 
Now  it’s  not  like  that.    A  woman  becomes  a  lady  on  her  own.    She 
emancipates herself, she studies, and she works.   She wants a man for 
company and to have children (Lia, 40s, married, 2 children, not working). 
20 This is partly due to a higher rate of re­marriage in the UK.
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Lia’s marriage was the route to independence from parental control and 
the only way to achieve adult status.  In contrast, she claimed, a young 
woman today did not need to be married in order to be her own person 
because she was financially independent. While for Lia’s generation, it 
seems, husbands had assisted women ‘to come out into society’ 
(Hirschon 1993), for the more recent ones marriage was to be postponed 
until one’s life ‘had been lived’ and after as many experiences as possible 
had been accumulated. 
Calliope, a 53­year­old woman with a 21­year­old daughter, was 
also in a marital union that turned out to be different to how she had 
imagined it to be, even though she had always been financially 
independent from her husband.  Calliope had grown up in one of the 
industrial districts of Piraeus, which she described as ‘like a small 
village.’  She got married aged 30, following a period of studying 
business as well as working.  Although she admitted to marrying late by 
her own generation’s standards she also claimed that getting married was 
a way of escaping from her parents’ control.  Unfortunately, her marriage 
had not been a happy one as her husband had failed in what she 
perceived to be his duties as a husband and, most importantly, as a 
father.  He was not ‘attentive to her needs,’ he ‘lacked responsibility 
towards what they call family,’ he was not ‘the pillar of the home’ and his 
financial contribution to the household was minimal.  As a result, 
Calliope decided to have only one child, though she felt that even having 
one was ‘selfish’ under the circumstances.  Over coffee in one of the 
numerous cafeterias surrounding the square of Nea Smyrni I asked 
Calliope why she, a well­educated, self­sufficient and, up until recently, 
working woman, had not decided to leave her husband. 
I overlooked my beliefs in order to hold together a marriage … I followed a 
life different to the one I had dreamt of  in order to keep a family together 
as  best  as  possible.    I  ended  up  sustaining  a  marriage  that  was  not 
harmonious … I would never get a divorce because I do not want to upset 
.my family, even though I know that I would lead a better life if I did … So 
as not to upset my father I stayed in a relationship that did not fulfil me.  I 
never  told my  parents  about  the  troubles  I  was having  so  that  I  did  not 
pass any of my worries onto them …  I created a fantasy marriage based 
on lies …  As a mother I should have guaranteed for my daughter an ideal 
father.    That  is  something  that  burns  inside  of me …  It  is  a  role  that  I 
should have played as a woman (Calliope, 53, married, 1 child, retired). 
According to Calliope, her husband was not a ‘proper’ ‘head of the 
family’ (oikogeniarhis) in the same way that her father had been.  Yet 
divorce was not preferable to staying married because she could lead ‘an 
autonomous existence’ within her marriage while shielding her parents 
from what she assumed would be extremely distressing news.  Calliope’s 
story suggests that for her and her parents’ generation familial 
disharmony was shameful (Hirschon 1989).  For Calliope to admit that
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her marriage was not a success would be to show that she had been 
unsuccessful in her socially­ascribed roles of wife and mother that still 
largely defined her as a person.  It is extremely revealing that towards the 
end of the above account Calliope speaks of her remorse at failing to 
ensure that her daughter had a ‘good’ father.  She then goes on to say that 
not only as a ‘mother’ but as a ‘woman’ too it was her most important 
‘role’; one which she felt she had neglected.  In Calliope’s understanding, 
therefore, being a ‘good’ woman and being a ‘good’ mother were 
synonymous.  Moreover, guaranteeing a ‘good’ father was a ‘good’ 
mother’s job and, by extension, also that of a ‘good’ woman. 
Therefore, alongside idealistic portrayals of contemporary Athenian 
marriages based on a ‘modern’ conception of personhood, lay an 
apparently different reality, at least for women in their 40s and 50s.  To 
begin with, it was clear that equality between husbands and wives, which 
female informants assumed would be a consequence of their financial 
independence, was not always achievable.  In reality, informants often 
told me, Athenian men had not yet accepted their changed status within 
the family and had trouble adjusting to it.  According to popular belief 
men were ‘like children’, expecting their wives to behave in a manner 
similar to their mothers; that is, at their disposal at all times.  Magdalena, 
for instance, who was even younger than Lia and Calliope, recounted 
how her husband did not like her being ‘so reactionary.’ 
He’d like me to be less outspoken.  He wants to be the centre of attention. 
He’d like it if I cooked a warm meal for him from time to time but I don’t do 
it.    If you’re hungry, go and fix your own meal.   He doesn’t say anything 
but  sometimes  it  comes  out,  ‘you  don’t  look  after  me’  (Magdalena,  35, 
married, 2 children, working full­time). 
Underlying men’s behaviour was the Anatolitiko stihio (‘Eastern element’), 
according to informants.  ‘In Greece,’ Carolina, in her early 30s, 
explained, ‘men do not generally have the mentality of Europeans … my 
husband is a classic Anatolitis (‘an Easterner’).’  Equating men with the 
‘East’ was revealing of the deep­rooted tension in contemporary 
Athenian gender relations.  While women modelled their marriages upon 
‘Western’ European ideals of, in Carolina’s words, ‘mutual help’ and 
‘mutual understanding’, apparently men were still acting in a way 
women thought typical of an ‘Eastern’ mentality; that is, based on the 
conjugal model of ‘man the master’ and woman the ‘mistress of the 
house.’ 
Throughout my fieldwork, I wondered whether Athenian women 
were generally reluctant to marry because they knew that in practice 
marriage was far from what they ideally hoped it would be.  Since 
childbearing was inconceivable outside a marital union, I also wondered 
whether their readiness to postpone childbearing was largely due to their
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unwillingness to marry.  Indeed, the mean age of Greek women at first 
marriage (below age 50) had increased from 23.6 years in 1975 to 27.3 
years in 2002, while the mean age of women at first birth had risen from 
24.5 years in 1975 to 27.9 in 2002 (Council of Europe 2005).  Judging from 
informants’ accounts there was certainly a mismatch between existing 
ideologies of female personhood outside and within marriage.  Whereas 
outside the marital union the idea of woman as an autonomous being 
prevailed, inside it men still expected their wives to act in compliance 
with the notion of gendered personhood according to which womanhood 
was synonymous with motherhood and the noikokyra (‘mistress of the 
house’).  While informants, like Lia and Calliope, were prepared to 
conform to the latter, others, like Magdalena, appeared less willing.  Both 
groups of women, however, negotiated between these two ideal models 
of personhood by limiting family size to a maximum of one or two 
children. 
7.6 Sex, beauty and consumer culture 
Contrary to Greek Orthodox doctrine, contemporary middle­class 
Athenians acknowledged that sex before marriage was an inevitable 
consequence of ‘modern’ life.  According to the Greek Fertility and Family 
Survey (Symeonidou 2002), the age at first sexual intercourse in Greece 
has not changed significantly during the last few decades.  From those 
born in the first half of the 1950s to those born between 1980 and 1981, the 
median age at first sexual encounter has remained around 19 years for 
women and 17 years for men 21 .  However, the same survey shows that 
over a matching period of time the median age at first marriage has risen, 
widening the gap between first sexual experience and matrimony.  For 
example, women born between 1955 and 1959 married for the first time at 
the age of 22.5 years whereas those born between 1965 and 1969 did so at 
the median age of 23.1 years.  At the same time, a growing proportion of 
sexual relationships do not lead to marriage.  Therefore, female sexuality 
no longer has an explicitly procreative end that can only be expressed 
within the bounds of the marital union ­ as it did in Kokkinia in the 1970s 
(Hirschon 1993) ­ nor does the open pursuit of pre­marital relationships 
21 A recent survey conducted in Athens and Thessalonica by the research 
firm Alco for the Female Sexual Health Institute shows a slightly lower 
average age for women at first sexual contact.  Just over 43 per cent of the 
women polled said they lost their virginity between the ages of 15 and 18. 
About 38.3 per cent said they had sex for the first time between the ages 
of 19 and 22.  Four per cent waited until after the age of 26, while nine per 
cent said their first sexual encounter was before the age of 15 (Athens 
News 01/10/2004).  The difference in the survey and FFS results is partly 
explicable by the fact that the former refers solely to cosmopolitan urban 
environments, rather than the country as a whole.
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bring shame upon a family’s honour, as it did among Dubisch’s (1993) 
informants in a village in rural Greece. 
In any case, among middle­class Athenians female sexuality was 
separate from procreation and there was less emphasis on its control, 
once demonstrated via the display of modesty and shame (dropi) in 
‘movement, speech, gesture and associations’ (Hirschon 1993, p.54).  This 
shift partially relates to the rise of consumer culture in Greece, which 
exhibits and promotes a particular kind of female sexuality.  While 
excessive consumption or ‘hyper­consumption’ (see Chapter 5, Section 
5.3), was a vice, most middle­class Athenians displayed a great deal of 
concern about their outward appearance.  Far from being a sign of vanity, 
‘dress … is, manifestly, a means of symbolic display, a way of giving 
external form to narratives of self­identity’ (Giddens 1991, p.62). 
Different outfits promote ‘a different awareness of one’s self,’ reflecting 
and reinforcing the ‘”person” we wish to be at that time’ (Nippert­Eng 
1995, p.51).  In addition, consuming is a deeply ‘passionate experience, an 
expressive act’ (Tomlinson 1990, p.17) from which derives identity and a 
sense of self (Jagger 2000).  Whereas ‘consumption is an act, consumerism 
is a way of life’ (Miles 1998, p.4).  People do not consume commodities 
merely because of their functional worth but for what they denote.  When 
a person purchases a car or a piece of clothing s/he is not just buying a 
lifeless object but an image with which s/he partly constructs his or her 
identity, that is who he or she is or wants to be.  As Tomlinson (1990, p.9) 
says, ‘the commodity has acquired, in late consumer culture, an aura 
beyond just its function.’  In the words of Jagger (2000, p.50), 
‘consumption, then, is far from being simply about the satisfaction of 
fixed needs; it is about desires and dreams.’ 
In Athens, consumerism has become a matter of necessity precisely 
because of its promise to fulfil certain wishes and imaginings.  As a 
result, Greece has transformed from ‘a saving culture’ to ‘a debt culture’ 
(Athens News 25/02/2005).  While Greeks’ per capita income is only 65 
per cent of the EU average, consumer prices are at the same level as those 
of the most expensive European capitals (Athens News 25/02/2005).  On 
one level, for middle­class Athenians, as for Galileans, ‘style and keeping 
up with it had become a major marker of modernity and class’ (Kanaaneh 
2002, p.95).  Through wearing the latest ‘Western’ fashion, informants 
were defining themselves as ‘Europeans’ and distancing themselves both 
from their provincial predecessors and ‘Eastern’ (that is, Ottoman) past. 
On another, more personal level, however, as Dubisch (1993) 
anticipated 22 , through paying close attention to their attire and 
22 ‘In particular, one might ask whether women are becoming less 
significant as representations of communities, as well as whether they 
themselves are less concerned with reputation in a bounded social group
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purchasing the most up­to­date commodities, my female Athenian 
informants displayed theirs and their family’s status.  In their opinion, it 
was not only important for them to look good but for their children too. 
In a system where school uniforms do not exist, the women I spoke with 
often claimed that keeping up their children’s appearances had become 
an almost daily struggle.  Despite their complaints, however, they 
seemed quite happy to participate in it.  For example, Arleta, a married 
41­year­old mother with two children, and a regular at Lollipop, told me 
that when her second son, now a toddler, was born she never thought of 
passing her eldest son’s clothes onto him, and found it strange that I 
assumed she would have.  Given the huge boom in the exchange, sale 
and purchase of second­hand (children’s) clothing in the UK, I was 
surprised at Arleta’s response.  However, her actions were in tune with 
the ‘modern’ conception of personhood and a middle­class Athenian 
understanding of ‘good’ mothering, according to which each child is 
‘unique’ (Doumanis 1983), deserving of his or her parents’ undivided 
attention and so, also, of his or her exclusive material possessions. 
While the spread of a ‘consumption ethic’ (Jagger 2000) affects both 
men and women, it does so in different ways.  In Athens consumption, 
expressed primarily through the beautification of self, took on special 
significance for women, coinciding with a shift in notions of female 
personhood and therefore, also, perceptions of female sexuality.  As 
Anthi explained, beauty was not only skin­deep. 
I  like  looking after myself.    I mean when  you  respect  yourself  you want 
there  to be … you want  to portray a good  image  to  the outside world.    I 
mean I wouldn’t dream of going to the office without make­up and not well 
groomed, never.  Not as I am now.  When I go out food shopping or I want 
to  relax  at  home  I  want  to  feel  more  free  but  I  believe  that  when  you 
respect yourself you want the image that you present to the outside world 
to be analogous (Anthi, late 30s, married, 1 child). 
According to Anthi, looking attractive was a sign of self­respect ­ her 
external appearance reflecting her internal state.  As Collier says: 
A woman’s physical appearance is always open to being interpreted as a 
statement  about  her  moral  and  social  worth  …  Whatever  a  woman’s 
appearance it is never without significance.  The woman who takes care of 
her body and dresses attractively, particularly as she grows older, displays 
and more concerned with demonstrating ‘modernity’ in an urban setting 
(see, for example, Collier 1986) and with establishing their own senses of 
personhood (Cowan 1990).  With increasing affluence, does Greek 
women’s maintenance of family reputation now rest more on their role as 
consumers, demonstrating a family’s material status in both urban and 
village settings, and less on the control of sexuality and the maintenance 
of the integrity of the ‘inside’?’  (Dubisch 1993, p.282)
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her  ‘womanliness’ …  The  woman  of  slovenly  appearance,  on  the  other 
hand, suggests both inward and outward failure (Collier 1986, p.104). 
In a context where ‘gender proficiency’ (Paxson 2004) prevails ­ that is 
where femininity and masculinity have to be ‘displayed’ ­ where a 
woman is the guardian of the family and the home but also where she is 
an ‘individual’, consumption and body adornment have become key 
defining features of being a ‘woman’.  Just as the Virgin Mary had lost 
her prominent place as the archetypal model of womanhood in the minds 
of the female residents of Los Olivos studied by Collier (1986), and had 
been replaced instead by the ‘Modern Woman’ shown in advertisements 
and television, so too the Panayia.  While the All­Holy Mother of God 
remained the archetypal figure of motherhood in Athens, she did not 
provide the role model of womanhood. 
Indeed, being a ‘mother’ and being a ‘woman’ stood in sharp 
contrast to each other.  For example, female informants argued that 
pregnancy was damaging to their bodies and having children reduced 
their sexual appetite, spoilt their physical appearance and, ultimately, 
made them less attractive to their husbands.  The defining features of 
being a ‘woman’ or a gomena (roughly translatable as a sexually alluring 
female), as Athena, a 37­year­old mother of twins described herself as 
being prior to having children, radically diverged from those that 
characterised a mother.  For Athena, being a ‘woman’ or a gomena meant 
‘from having a bath to … instead of wearing large pants for example, to 
put on a string, to dress provocatively, to be brave … to go out with a 
friend.’  While Athena claimed she had not completely abandoned ‘the 
role of woman,’ when she became a mother her appearance changed and 
she temporarily ‘let herself go’ physically.  As a result, she claimed, she 
lost her ability to ‘act the bully’ (exasa ton tsabouka mou), meaning that she 
lost her confidence, and she became depressed (epatha psyxoplakoma), 
especially since her husband did little ‘to reassure her.’  According to 
Athena, it was important for a woman not to lose the respect of her 
husband as a ‘woman’ during their marriage and especially after 
becoming a mother.  Her father, she told me, was unfaithful to her 
mother because, though he loved her, he did not see her as a ‘woman’ but 
only as a mother, who would ‘iron and clean’ after him and their three 
children. 
In the Greek press and in the Greek popular imagination, ‘hyper­ 
consumption’ was an important cause of ‘underfertility’.  While 
informants did not explicitly purport to be excessive consumers 
themselves, both in appearance and in their personal accounts of family­ 
formation, there were signs that material possessions used up a 
considerable proportion of the household income, as did going out to 
restaurants, bars and clubs.  Although ‘hyper­consumption’ was 
negative, individuals seemed to be under its spell.  Not only was there
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great pressure through advertising to own certain types of goods, 
especially for one’s children, but there were also an extraordinary 
number of outlets in which to spend money.  Since the late 1980s, I had 
personally witnessed great transformations in Athens’ commercial 
landscape.  Retail stores of the same calibre as those found in other major 
European capitals had gradually appeared, opening initially in the city’s 
wealthiest districts such as Kolonaki and Kifisia but soon spreading to 
areas all over Athens.  The fashion sense of both Athenian men and 
women started to reflect the modes of dress advocated in the latest 
foreign style magazines, while the widespread development of an 
industry devoted to health and beauty mirrored a growing interest in 
physical appearance. 
To a certain extent, therefore, consumerism did appear to be a 
source of competition for resources that could otherwise go towards 
having additional children.  Yet Athenians’ fondness for spending was 
possibly a manifestation rather a cause of their disinclination for 
teknopoiΐa (‘making children’).  In other words, indulging in the purchase 
of goods and services reflected an underlying shift in informants’ sources 
of fulfilment and, ultimately, senses of self.  While motherhood still 
completed a woman, it did not express her autonomy and individuality, 
both attributes necessary to qualifying as a ‘modern’ person.  It was also 
not enough to display her and her family’s status.  This was evident in 
Athenians’ choice of consumer products.  Unlike the British women that I 
met and observed in London, in general Athenians preferred to buy and 
wear brand names, a tendency which suggests that they had a penchant 
for displaying personal wealth rather than a unique style, developed 
irrespective of cost.  For example, wearing Levis jeans, Ralph Lauren 
shirts and Timberland boots has been especially popular among young, 
old, male and female Athenians since the 1990s, a combination of clothing 
described humorously as making up Greece’s new ‘national costume’. 
Ironically, therefore, despite their efforts to exhibit their individuality 
through fashion, many Athenians ended up resembling each other. 
7.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have shown that beneath contemporary, Greek middle­ 
class women’s attitudes towards having children and practices of family­ 
formation were a series of previously subdominant perceptions of female 
personhood, sexuality, gender and the body.  These had changed 
women’s senses of self, directing their attention away from their 
domestically­defined roles towards the pursuit of personal pleasure and 
individual self­fulfilment, expressed most visibly in their enthusiasm for 
consumption and the beautification of their bodies.  These perceptions 
had also altered the dynamics of male­female relations, transforming 
women’s ideas about marriage and lifting the moral ban that existed on 
divorce.  However, formerly dominant perspectives on personhood,
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sexuality, gender and the body continued to have an impact on women’s 
everyday struggles to be ‘modern’.  In fact, it was clear that informants 
were attempting to fulfil a duty both to their selves, by indulging in self­ 
gratifying activities such as work, but also to their families, society, God 
and the nation, by reproducing.  As Nico pointed out, ‘Children are not 
accessories; you can’t have children just because you feel like it.  But first 
you also have a duty to your self’ (Nico, late 30s, childless, in partnership, 
self employed). 
The multiple roles, which female informants had to juggle with 
today, were unmanageable, they claimed.  Whereas once, a woman was 
content to be a noikokyra, a mother and a wife, now she aspired to play all 
of those roles in combination with having a career and being an 
‘independent’ woman.  As Athena told me, ‘it’s hard to perform all our 
roles perfectly; to be beautiful; to be the perfect wife, the perfect lover, the 
perfect worker, the perfect mother.’  For many women, it seems that 
limiting family size was a key strategy in managing the pressures exerted 
by the demands of these conflicting identities. 
Look,  I  just  think  I wouldn’t  be able  to offer much,  to offer as much as  I 
wanted, to more than two [children] and I am not just talking about material 
goods,  ok?    I’m  even  talking  about  my  ability  to  love  and  to  care,  ok. 
When I would have already raised two kids or I will still be raising two kids, 
to  raise  another  one  would  mean  that  my  love,  my  care,  my  affection 
would  have  to  be  shared  out  between  three.    You  know  it  is  not  a 
coincidence that we have two hands with which to hug … the third [child] 
someone else would have to care for and I wouldn’t want that nor would I 
want one of the three children to suffer.  You know, it is a bit like puppies, 
if they all have to drink milk from the same bowl, it is inevitable that one of 
them will die (Vasso, 22, student, single, childless). 
For Vasso, having two children was not only ‘logical’ but also ‘natural’. 
Like most of the women whose stories and views have featured in Part 1, 
Vasso had ambitions beyond motherhood yet also felt compelled to 
become an affectionate and caring mother; a ‘good’ Greek mother who 
did not outsource the task of childrearing to outsiders.  In order to fulfil 
both sets of aspirations, according to her, it was only sensible to have a 
maximum of two children.  Vasso’s reasoning, as well as that of other 
informants, captures the essence of middle­class Athenian women’s 
childbearing influences. 
As this chapter has argued, being a mother and being a woman 
were different sources of identity that were difficult to reconcile.  Yet, to a 
degree, they were compatible.  Motherhood was still essential to the 
completion of women, even though there were now other activities 
implicated in the formation of feminine identity.  The difficulty of 
reconciling motherhood and womanhood, therefore, did not lie in 
informants’ inability to conceive of themselves simultaneously as dutiful
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mothers and ‘modern’ women, but in their capacity to be both at the 
same time.  As Chapters 5 and 6 mentioned, neither the state nor civil 
society provided informants with the infrastructure and support 
necessary to combine effectively both their duty to themselves and to 
their children.  In attempting to manage on their own, compared to the 
London­based informants (as Part II will reveal next), middle­class 
Athenian women expressed no alternative but to keep the size of their 
families to, at most, one or two children.
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PART 2 – LONDON
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8 THE ENGLISH FIELDWORK SETTING 
8.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to offer a description of the English fieldwork 
setting in which the second half of this research study was undertaken. 
This, however, is not a straightforward task.  London is a ‘world city’ 
(Underhill 2005, p.57), home to thousands of people from outside the 
United Kingdom.  In addition, its origins stretch back to thousands of 
years.  As a result, it would be impractical to attempt an historical 
overview of London comparable to the one I composed for Athens in 
Chapter 4.  While the Greek capital also has a lengthy and rich past, its 
naissance in 1834 as the administrative and governmental seat of the 
‘modern’ Greek nation­state is a clearly identifiable starting point for a 
synopsis of its recent history.  Although the Industrial Revolution in 
some ways marks the origins of ‘modern’ English society, it is impossible 
to identify a single moment in time when England and its capital 
underwent a major ‘rebirth’.  Consequently, this chapter has a slightly 
different layout to that implemented in Chapter 4.  Instead of a brief 
historical account of the city, I begin with a short description of London’s 
population make­up.  Next, I consider what characterises the English 
middle­classes, to whose ranks my informants belonged.  In this section, I 
give a short account of the genesis of the English middle­classes, as well 
as of their present­day features.  After that, I introduce the National 
Childbirth Trust, an organisation that proved crucial to the progress of 
my fieldwork in London.  I end with a presentation of The Borough of 
Hammersmith and Fulham, the area in and around which I recruited the 
majority of those I interviewed.  In this section, instead of an historical 
approach, similar to that used to portray the municipality of Nea Smyrni, I 
focus solely on the area’s current situation. 
8.2 London and its inhabitants 23 
In mid­2004, the UK was home to 59.8 million people, of which 50.1 
million lived in England (ONS 2005).  In 2001, London had a population 
of just over 7 million residents (12% of the total population), making it the 
most populous city in the European Union and one of the most densely 
packed.  In 1999, for example, there were 4,486 people per sq km living in 
London compared to 906 people per sq km in Athens.  The population of 
London reached a peak in 1939 with 8.6 million.  After that, it 
experienced a decline. In 1988, it reached its nadir with 6.73 million 
23 Unless otherwise stated, this section has been compiled using 
information published in Focus on London 2003 (Virdee and Williams 
2003), the most comprehensive statistical digest of the capital’s 
demographic, social, industrial and economic make­up, put together by 
the Greater London Authority, the Government Office for London, the 
London Development Agency and the Office for National Statistics.
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residents.  Since then, however, its population has recovered and today 
there is an annual average increase of about 19,000 people.  In 2011, 
London could have close to 7.5 million inhabitants and in 2021 just over 
7.7 million.  The capital consists of Inner and Outer London.  In 1901, the 
former was home to 4.9 million people while only 1.6 million lived in the 
latter.  Today, the situation is very different.  In 2001, Inner London had 
2.77 million residents and Outer London 4.42 million.  This shift occurred 
mainly in the 1920s and 1930s, as the city expanded.  Central London, 
which includes the City of London, Camden, Kensington and Chelsea, 
and the City of Westminster, had 546,000 inhabitants in 2001. 
In sharp contrast to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when 
there was an excess of deaths over births, the capital has recently been 
experiencing a natural population increase.  In 2001, for example, there 
were 104,200 live births and 58,600 deaths, a natural population increase 
of 45,600 people.  This means that London accounted for 70 per cent of 
the total natural growth of the UK – an impressive proportion, given that 
it possesses only 12 per cent of the country’s total population.  Compared 
to the rest of the UK, London also has a high proportion of women of 
childbearing age.  As a result, in 1999 its crude birth rate was 
approximately 15 live births per 1000 residents, which is high in 
comparison to most other European cities.  In Athens, for example, the 
crude birth rate in the same year was 10.6 live births per 1000 inhabitants. 
London’s crude death rate (8.2 deaths per 1000 population), on the other 
hand, is comparable to that recorded in the majority of cities in mainland 
Europe, including Athens, where the crude death rate was 9.9 deaths per 
1000 residents in 1999. 
In 2001, the total fertility rate (TFR) in London was 1.62 children per 
woman, comparable to the UK rate of 1.63.  Since 1971, however, there 
has been an overall decline in the capital’s TFR, dropping from 2.09 
children per woman to 1.71 in 1981, rising to 1.74 in 1991 before falling to 
current levels.  Of course, total fertility rates vary considerably within 
London.  In 2001, for example, a number of boroughs, including 
Hammersmith and Fulham, had a TFR around 1.4 children per woman, 
while Hackney (2.08) and Newham (2.19) had among the highest total 
fertility rates in the country.  Age­specific fertility rates (ASFRs) differ 
slightly between London and the UK.  Teenagers and women in their 
twenties, living in the capital, have had lower fertility rates than those 
residing in other parts of the country.  Yet, females in their thirties and 
forties who live in London have higher ASFRs than do their counterparts 
elsewhere in the UK. In 2001, for instance, there were 94 live births per 
1000 women between the ages of 30 and 34 living in London, whereas in 
the UK there were 88 live births per 1000 women from the same age 
group.  For those between 35 and 39 years old, ASFRs were also higher in
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London than in other parts of the UK (59 live births per 1000 women 
compared to 41 live births per 1000 women respectively). 
In general, the capital has a younger age structure than the UK 
overall, with proportionately more children under five and more adults 
aged between 20 and 44.  In contrast, London has relatively fewer people 
between the ages of 5 and 15, and 45 and over, compared to the UK as a 
whole.  Responsible for these disparities are, to a certain extent, migration 
patterns.  London is a city that attracts individuals both from within and 
outside the UK.  Many of those who settle in the capital are young adults 
between the ages of 16 and 44.  At the same time, a number of men and 
women in their thirties and forties, who wish to settle down and start a 
family, either go to live in Outer London or elsewhere in the country. 
Those of retirement age are equally likely to leave the capital. 
Approximately 60 to 65 per cent of the total that decide to move away 
from the city go to the South East and East of England regions.  In fact, 
London’s annual net migration loss to the rest of the UK grew from 
approximately 69,000 in 1999/2000 to 98,000 in 2001/2002.  However, in 
2001, 147,800 people also moved to the capital from outside the country 
while only 81,200 left to go abroad.  In that year, therefore, London 
became home to an extra 67,000 people from outside the UK.  According 
to the 2001 Census, 29 per cent of the city’s population are from a 
minority ethnic background while the rest are White (of whom 60% are 
White British). 
Finally, Londoners have an average household size of 2.3 people, as 
do those living in England and Wales, the North East and the South West. 
Inner Londoners, however, have a slightly lower average (2.2 persons) 
than Outer Londoners (2.4 persons).  They also are more likely than those 
who live in boroughs on the periphery to cohabit, to be lone parents and 
to live alone.  In contrast, people living in Outer London are more likely 
to be married.  Throughout the capital, the most common type of 
household is that comprising of one­person (35%; that is, five per cent 
higher than the proportion characteristic of the UK as a whole), followed 
by the married couple household (29%).  Lone parent households are also 
quite widespread (11%), while cohabiting couples occupy 8 per cent of 
the total number of households.  Despite enormous variability between 
them, in 1999­2002, households in London had an average gross weekly 
income of £711, around £200 more than that of the average UK 
household. 
8.3 The English middle­classes 
Social class is an important cause of variation in fertility within countries. 
Haines (1989), for instance, has shown that fertility decline in England 
and Wales did not occur at the same time and with equal speed among 
the working­, middle­ and upper classes.  Instead, class fertility
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differentials widened during the early stages of the fertility drop (late 19 th 
century), with the middle­ and upper classes having a lower birth rate 
than the working classes, possibly also beginning at an earlier period.  In 
a recent article, Buxton et al. (2005) show that parental social class and 
own social class, along with educational attainment, played an important 
role in determining the timing of first birth among women in England 
and Wales, aged between 25 and 29 in 2001.  For example, nearly three 
quarters (73%) of the daughters of professional and managerial parents 
had not had a child by age 25­29 compared with 46 per cent of women 
whose parents were part skilled or unskilled, and 39 per cent of those 
with economically inactive parents.  Of those who had a child in their 
teens, only 12 per cent had a parent from the top social classes while 29 
per cent had a parent or parents who were either unemployed or 
economically inactive.  Among women with a degree or equivalent 
qualification, 85 per cent had not had a child, 1 per cent had become a 
mother as a teenager and 6 per cent when in their early 20s. 
Despite evidence showing that social class influences fertility, there 
is still widespread disagreement over its precise meaning.  Sociologists 
have long struggled over the definition of class, yielding a variety of 
ways to characterise it.  Opinions on the subject are diverse and divided. 
In addition, British sociologists and historians have placed 
disproportionate emphasis on the working classes, leaving the middle­ 
classes relatively under­theorised.  While I do not aim to enter into the 
class analysis debate, it is necessary to justify the manner in which I 
conceptualise the term ‘middle­class’, since that is how I define the 
majority of my informants.  As Gunn (2005, p.62) argues, ‘middle­class’ 
is, above all, ‘a historical category, the result of accumulated “middles” or 
spaces between ­ between aristocracy and working class, land and labour, 
highbrow and lowbrow, provincial marginality and metropolitan power 
– the balance of which has altered over time.’  It is, therefore, difficult to 
understand the middle­classes without some knowledge of why and how 
they came into existence.  Their origins, however, lie back to English 
society in the second half of the eighteenth century.  While some of their 
original features remain, their meaning has undergone such considerable 
transformation over the last two hundred years that it is feasible to speak 
and make sense of the post­WWII middle­classes without extensive 
reference to their character in earlier epochs. 
Initially, Gunn and Bell (2002) explain, the term ‘middle­classes’ or 
‘middling’ groups applied to tradesmen, merchants, manufacturers, 
attorneys and shopkeepers whose only unifying feature was that they 
were against the aristocracy and the Church of England, and in favour of 
moderate reform of the constitution.  Unlike today, in the 1830s and 1840s 
this group was a moral and political entity rather than a socio­economic 
category with occupation, status, income or lifestyle in common.  It was
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only in the 1911 Census, Gunn and Bell contend, that a system of 
classifying the British population according to occupation developed.  As 
a result, Class I comprised the upper and middle classes (large 
landowners, professionals, scientists, writers, insurance officials, mine 
owners and businessmen), and Class II encompassed tradesmen and the 
lower middle­class (shopkeepers, publicans, actors, boarding­house 
keepers, municipal officers and seed merchants), while the skilled, semi­ 
skilled and unskilled formed the remaining three classes.  By 1900, almost 
25 per cent of the UK’s working population had a non­manual occupation 
(Gunn and Bell 2002). 
During the late nineteenth (late Victorian) and early twentieth 
centuries, the middle­classes gradually expanded.  According to Roberts 
(2001), key to their development was The Northcote Trevelyan Report, 
put into practice in the 1870s, which suggested that government positions 
become available via competitive examinations rather than by patronage 
and the purchase of office.  From that period onwards, Roberts argues, a 
number of other professions 24 came into being and universities 
introduced matriculation (entrance) examinations; though it was not until 
after WWII that the majority of occupations (including engineers, 
accountants, solicitors and journalists) required the possession of an 
academic qualification.  As Gunn and Bell (2002) add, it was in the late 
Victorian era that ‘mental’ as opposed to ‘manual’ culture developed. 
This, they suggest, gave rise to the notion of a ‘career’, based on 
knowledge and expertise, fashioning, in turn, a uniquely middle­class 
perception of time and the future.  The idea that life had to follow a plan, 
beginning with schooling, followed by university and then entry into a 
profession, itself consisting of different stages, led to a belief in ‘deferred 
gratification’, ‘savings’ and the value of ‘children’s education’. 
In the beginning of the twentieth century, the growth of the middle­ 
classes was mainly due to the increase in government employment 
(Roberts 2001).  It was then that suburbia became associated with 
‘middle’ England (Gunn and Bell 2002).  Whereas previously the 
dominant middle­class figure was the industrialist, the banker and the 
‘lady’ whose role was to manage the household’s servants, between the 
death of Queen Victoria in 1901 and 1939, the middle­classes became 
synonymous with the office worker, the salary earner and the 
‘housewife’, living in their personally owned ‘home’ 25 in the suburbs 
24 According to the Penguin English Dictionary (1965), a profession is an 
occupation requiring training and intellectual abilities, practised to earn a 
living, or a body of persons practising such an occupation. 
25 Gunn and Bell (2002) argue that in the inter­war years (1918­1939) there 
was a housing boom in the country, led by the middle­classes and 
encouraged by the government through a series of Housing Acts.
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(Gunn and Bell 2002).  However, the spread of the middle­classes, whose 
form would be recognisable today, really took off, Roberts claims, after 
WWII with the expansion of higher education and the growth of the 
corporate economy.  As Gunn and Bell (2002) explain, in the 1950s and 
1960s, ‘organisation man’ appeared.  He (characteristically male) was a 
white­collar employee in a technical, managerial or administrative post of 
a large business enterprise (bank, insurance company or industrial firm). 
In exchange for his loyalty to the same organisation, he enjoyed a life­ 
long, financially secure and stable career, moving up the corporation’s 
hierarchy until retirement age when he could finally reap the benefits of 
his pension plan.  In the 1970s, a combination of political and economic 
events (oil crisis, miners’ strike, Thatcher), however, spelled the end of 
‘organisation man’. 
According to Gunn and Bell (2002), the decline of manufacturing 
and economic stability resulted in a new work ethic and an 
‘entrepreneurial revolution’, which made the professions competitive, 
while simultaneously subjecting them to external regulation. 
‘Individualism’ succeeded ‘corporate loyalty’ and the City was, for the 
first time, open to women and those without a public school education. 
This led to the creation of ‘yuppies’ (young urban professionals) in the 
1980s.  In the 1990s, unemployment and the threat of it, intensified 
competition in the workplace and career and ‘home’ became increasingly 
separate and incompatible spheres of life, especially for women (Gunn 
and Bell 2002).  This led to a renewed tendency among the middle­ 
classes, similar to nineteenth century practice, to outsource childcare and 
housekeeping tasks by employing nannies and cleaners (Gregson and 
Lowe 1995).  Today, the British middle­classes form the second largest 
group in the country after the working­class, comprising almost a third of 
the population (Roberts 2001). In Inner London, they represent 
approximately 20 per cent of the population (Butler with Robson 2003). 
Whereas once they used to be concentrated in the suburbs, London and 
the whole of the South East have become ‘escalator’ regions for many of 
those who wish to pursue a managerial or professional career (Fielding 
1995, p.176). 
Butler (1995) suggests that three sub­groups make up the 
contemporary middle­classes: the routine white­collar workers, a service 
class of professionals and managers, and a distinct class of self­employed 
Whereas in 1914, only 10 per cent of the national housing stock was 
owner­occupied and renting was most common, by 1939 the figure had 
risen to 31 per cent.  As a result, the ‘home’ became the pride and joy of 
the middle­classes, central to which was the ‘housewife’ whose role was 
to look after her husband and nurture her children.  Servants, ceased to 
be a symbol of middle­class status, as they could no longer be afforded.
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petite bourgeoisie.  According to Abercrombie and Warde (1988), the first 
group (routine white collar workers) consists mainly of clerical workers, 
sales assistants, personal care assistants, waiting staff in restaurants, and 
secretaries.  The second group, professionals, typically includes judges, 
lawyers and solicitors, accountants, scientists, doctors and dentists, 
engineers, architects, air pilots, higher education lecturers and teachers. 
Managers, on the other hand, are those in marketing and sales, 
production, building and mining, wholesale and retail, as well as the 
service and leisure industry.  Finally, the petite bourgeoisie is self­ 
employed owners of small businesses and people working on their own 
account.  Characteristic of this group are shopkeepers, traders, but also 
independent business consultants, farmers, and self­employed plumbers. 
While there is widespread agreement about the existence of these 
three middle­class sub­groups, there is little consensus about what it is 
that actually separates them and, conversely, unites them.  In Property, 
Bureaucracy and Culture, for example, Savage et al. (1992) challenge the 
idea that inter­ and intra­class differences are occupational or 
employment­based.  Instead, they believe that social classes are ‘stable 
social collectivities’ with ‘shared levels of income and remuneration, 
lifestyles, cultures, political orientations and so forth’ (Savage et al. 1992, 
p.5).  According to Savage et al., therefore, membership to the middle­ 
classes depends upon the ownership and interplay of three types of 
assets.  Firstly, organisational assets, that is, the collection of advantages 
that result from being an employee in a large organisation where the 
chance of promotion is high, jobs are subject to generous rewards and, in 
principal, are under the employee’s control.  Secondly, cultural assets, 
namely a certain kind of lifestyle, taste and educational qualifications. 
Finally, it hinges on the control of property assets; in other words, home 
ownership.  The ability to store and transmit each of these assets under 
different circumstances, Savage et al. contend, determines the stability 
and security of each middle­class sub­group and accounts for many of the 
behavioural and attitudinal differences between them, especially those 
between professionals and managers.  Whereas professionals rely more 
heavily on cultural assets, for example, managers are almost wholly 
dependent on organisation assets, while the petite bourgeoisie, especially 
shopkeepers, are entirely reliant on property assets 26 . 
26 In a climate of economic restructuring, however, Savage et al. (1992) 
maintain that each group has had to reassess its situation and rearrange 
its assets.  Large firms, for example, now need the services of specialists 
and professionally qualified workers.  As a result, their customary policy 
of recruiting personnel with the intention of keeping them for life is no 
longer profitable.  Consequently, nowadays managers do not expect to 
stay in the same job forever and have had to trade their organisational 
assets for other more reliable ones, such as cultural assets (e.g. gaining
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In spite of these differences, Savage et al. insist that the middle­ 
classes are a cohesive social collectivity.  Firstly, all three groups depend, 
in one way or another, on the state and its policies.  For example, the state 
regulates and structures the assets of the middle­classes, especially 
education.  Secondly, the formation and unity of the middle­classes is due 
to the durability of a specific mix of gender relations.  Key to the 
development of the British middle­classes has been the separation 
between the male (public) and the female (private) spheres, because of 
which men have been able to focus on their careers, leaving domestic 
responsibilities and childcare in the hands of women.  As a result, women 
participating in the workforce, traditionally, have taken on junior level, 
routine or clerical work, while their husbands have been able to focus on 
climbing up the career ladder to senior­level posts.  The third and final 
unifying force among the British middle­classes and key to their 
formation is geographical mobility (less marked among the petite 
bourgeoisie).  Neither managers nor professionals are dependent on locally 
based information.  Their success lies in their ability to adapt quickly to 
different geographical locales and in their willingness to move to 
wherever their services are required. 
In the late twentieth and early twenty­first centuries, the features 
that unify the middle­classes and, in turn, distinguish them from the 
upper­ and working classes, remain subject to dispute.  Recently, for 
example, a media agency’s annual guide to the new middle­class claimed 
that in ‘contemporary Britain, almost everyone, from the Chelsea 
dilettante to the Chav delinquent, can now be said to be middle­class’ 
(The Fish Can Sing 2005).  However, what defines the middle­classes is 
now more difficult than ever, the report adds.  Education, accent, 
profession or skin colour no longer distinguishes the middle­classes.  If 
anything marks them out as different, it is taste, especially for consumer 
products or brands, such as Lavazza coffee, shopping at Selfridges, Gap 
and Primark, drinking Amstel beer, and Bugaboo buggies for babies. 
According to Roberts (2001, p.157), ‘the present­day middle classes are 
distinguished by the fact that there are so many lifestyle variations 
among them, some related to age, gender, ethnicity and education.’ 
Middle­class individuals, for example, tend to go on holidays, play sport, 
visit the theatre and the countryside, and eat at restaurants more 
regularly than anyone else.  ‘It is their omnivorousness rather than any 
specific tastes that sets the contemporary middle class apart from the 
working class’ (Roberts 2001, p.158). 
specialist qualifications, of the kind possessed by professionals).  They 
have had to ensure the same for their children.
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8.4 The National Childbirth Trust 
The National Childbirth Trust (NCT) is a charity that aims to offer 
support in pregnancy, childbirth and early parenthood.  It is run 
predominantly by women for women, though men are encouraged to 
participate on certain occasions, such as during the course of their 
partners’ antenatal classes.  According to its website, the NCT has 
approximately 400 branches throughout the UK and every year claims to 
be in contact with 300,000 parents and parents­to­be.  As an organisation, 
the NCT provides a wide range of information and services to parents 
and parents­to­be through its website and various support lines, such as 
the Breastfeeding Line which mothers can call seven days a week in order 
to speak to a trained breastfeeding counsellor.  At a local level, a group of 
volunteers, some with professional training and expertise and others 
without, organise weekly NCT group meetings with pregnant women 
and mothers.  Most of these gatherings are in the shape of antenatal and 
postnatal classes led by trained NCT antenatal and postnatal teachers 
who offer attendees advice on preparing for birth and the early stages of 
being a parent respectively.  Others, however, have an even less formal 
format: a group of mothers or mothers­to­be who live in close proximity 
to each other arrange to get together in one of their homes to chat and 
share their feelings and experiences surrounding this particular phase in 
their lives. 
Whilst a few of the gatherings organise themselves around a specific 
theme, such as the ‘Working Mothers’ groups, the majority have a more 
general character, such as the ‘Bumps and Babies’ groups.  Through these 
meetings, long­term friendships often develop and an informal but 
essential support network becomes established between women who 
often encounter difficulties adjusting to motherhood.  Although the NCT 
welcomes individuals from all socio­economic groups and any cultural or 
ethnic background, it remains a predominantly white, British, middle­ 
class organisation.  While this varies considerably depending on the 
location, from the numerous meetings that I attended in West London 
only a handful of women were non­white, non­British and from a 
working­class background.  For the purposes of the research under 
consideration, this made the NCT an invaluable resource.  Not only did 
its members fit perfectly the criteria of those whose opinions and 
experiences I sought to record but also its style of organisation made it 
extremely approachable.  As a result, I met numerous informants via the 
NCT groups operating in West London, particularly in and around The 
Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham. 
8.5 The Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham 
Each one of London’s 32 boroughs and the City Corporation reflects the 
diversity of the capital and its inhabitants.  Hammersmith and Fulham, 
from which the majority of data for this study derive, is no exception.  In
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comparison to other boroughs, however, it is characterised by many of 
the features deemed important to the research in question.  The 
limitations it posed, therefore, were trivial when weighed against its 
merits.  Located on the western periphery of Inner London (Map 3), The 
Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham is both geographically (6.34 square 
miles) and demographically (165,242 according to the 2001 Census) the 
fourth smallest of all the capital’s boroughs.  As a result, the task of 
finding suitable informants was considerably easier than it would have 
been in a larger borough.  It also made the process of moving around it 
much more manageable, and I soon became familiar with its main streets 
and attractions.  An additional benefit was that, like Nea Smyrni, 
Hammersmith and Fulham is a complete municipality and not an area 
contained within a larger borough, as is East Finchley or Hampstead for 
example, both of which would also have been suitable research sites. 
Moreover, Nea Smyrni and Hammersmith and Fulham are both close 
enough to their respective city centres so as not to be considered suburbs. 
Map 3. London divided into boroughs (Source: www.ukstudentlife.com) 
Entering the borough from the east via the Hammersmith Road 
leads to an encounter with Hammersmith and Fulham’s busiest location, 
its business district.  Sprawling out from the Hammersmith Broadway ­ a 
vast structure incorporating one of the area’s main underground stations, 
a large bus station/interchange and a shopping centre ­ are a series of 
offices and commercial spaces.  Although the borough’s manufacturing 
activities have been in long­term decline, the huge influx of service
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industries has more than compensated for the loss.  Reportedly, 11.61 
million square feet is office­space, although some of it, primarily in the 
College Park and Old Oak ward, the Askew ward and the Sands End 
ward (Map 4), is still devoted to manufacturing 27 .  Accounting for the 
borough’s successful large­scale redevelopment, especially around the 
Hammersmith Broadway, is its strategic location, with good links to 
Heathrow and an extensive public transport network.  In 2000, there were 
105,000 people employed in the borough along with an additional 14,500 
self­employed.  Most of those who work in Hammersmith and Fulham 
do not reside in the borough.  Conversely, the majority of residents have 
jobs elsewhere. 
27 Unless otherwise noted, all the data (including those from the Census) 
relating to Hammersmith and Fulham in this section come from Borough 
Profile (Hammersmith and Fulham 2002), the only comprehensive guide to 
the area, published by the local Council.
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Map 4. The wards of The Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham (printed with 
permission from the borough) 
Despite the hustle and bustle in the centre of Hammersmith, there 
are also pockets of residential districts.  Rows of Edwardian and Victorian 
houses ­ detached, semi­detached and terraced ­ kept as family homes or 
divided into flats, line the small streets to the left and to the right of the 
main roads extending outwards from the Broadway Centre in a web­like
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fashion (Plate 11 and 12).  It is here, in an area re­branded by estate agents 
as a ‘village’, a definite selling point, that a number of my informants 
lived.  Brackenbury Village, bordered by Ravenscourt Park to the west, 
Hammersmith Grove to the east, the Goldhawk Road to the north and 
Glenthorne Road to the south, consists of an array of pretty, 2­ and 3­bed 
early Victorian terraced cottages, small villas and larger family houses, 
sometimes split into flats.  A hundred and fifty years ago, most of the 
area consisted of market gardens and brickfields but by 1890, it had 
turned into a residential quarter.  Following WWII, it was so run­down 
that it narrowly avoided demolition.  In the 1960s and 1970s, however, 
the area underwent a process of regeneration and in the 1980s, young city 
professionals with well­paid jobs in the City and generally affluent 
lifestyles, moved in from Notting Hill and Kensington in search of family 
homes. 
Demand for houses in Brackenbury Village is now at its peak, as 
reflected in property prices: a 2­bedroom terrace costs on average 
£400,000, while the bigger 3­ or 4­bed houses can fetch between £475,000 
and £700,000 (The London Property Guide 2004).  The residents of 
Brackenbury Village were certainly one of the wealthiest groups in the 
borough and those most likely to be married with children.  Dispersed 
throughout the Askew, Ravenscourt Park and Shepherds Bush Green 
wards, however, resided many more middle­class, married or cohabiting 
couples with dependent children.  This was also the case in the wards 
south of the A4 Hammersmith Flyover, particularly off the Fulham Palace 
Road.  In contrast to Athenian informants, the residents of Hammersmith 
and Fulham lived in relatively spacious accommodation, with bedrooms 
fit for a family of two or three children – even with an ideology of one 
room per child.  Most houses also had a garden, unlike in Athens.
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Plate 11. Typical residential streets in Hammersmith and Fulham 
Although between the 1991 and 2001 Censuses there had been a 
slight drop (4.8%) in the percentage of employed residents aged 16 to 74, 
the majority of those who did work continued to be engaged in typically 
middle­class activities.  In 2000, 21 per cent of residents were 
professionals (such as solicitors, doctors, teachers, accountants or 
architects), and 13 per cent were administrators and secretaries.  Twelve
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per cent were managers and senior officials (civil service executives, army 
officers and company managers), 11 per cent were associate professionals 
(such as nurses, computer programmers and journalists), and 9 per cent 
were in sales and customer services.  Only 8 per cent of residents were 
engaged in the skilled trades (such as builder, skilled machine operator, 
mechanic and tailor).  The majority of those who were employers, 
managers and professionals lived in such wards as Avonmore and Brook 
Green, Addison, Askew, Munster, Fulham Reach, Town as well as the 
more affluent parts of the borough, like Parsons Green and Palace 
Riverside.  More women than men were in administrative and secretarial 
occupations while there was a higher concentration of male managers 
and senior officials.  In 1991, of the 71,173 residents in employment three 
quarters were working full­time, almost half of whom (49%) were 
women, but there were approximately four times more female part­time 
employees than male.  In 2002, only 5.4 per cent of residents were 
unemployed, one of the lowest rates for Inner London, the average being 
7.1 per cent. 
The ACORN profiles 28 for Hammersmith and Fulham, also show 
that residents are likely to be ‘highly’ to ‘very highly’ educated, that they 
have above average interest in current affairs and that they are avid 
readers of The Guardian and Independent newspapers.  According to 
ACORN, persons living in central Fulham are ‘affluent urban 
professionals’ with ‘highly disposable incomes’.  They are also the ‘type 
most likely to go skiing,’ to attend the theatre, ‘enjoy good food and wine 
both at home and in restaurants,’ with investments in ‘a broad range of 
products including high interest accounts, ISAs, and stocks and shares,’ 
‘highly qualified’ and ‘spending long hours at work’.  Although the same 
source contends that residents of central Hammersmith are ‘multi­ethnic, 
young,’ living in converted flats or purpose built estates, my own 
experience tells me that there are pockets of individuals similar to those 
living in central Fulham.  As indicated by ACORN, neither part of the 
borough consists of many couples with children.  However, as explained 
above, this is a feature typical of Inner London. 
28 ACORN profiles are available in www.upmystreet.com.  They are a 
classification system that illustrates likely consumer preferences and 
behaviour according to postcode.
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Plate 12. Typical family homes in Hammersmith and Fulham 
In 2001, 45.1 per cent of residents were qualified to degree level or 
higher, whereas only 17.9 per cent had no qualifications at all.  In 
addition, while two thirds of the borough’s householders live in flats, 
maisonettes or bed­sits, and one third resides in single­family houses, 
there has been a notable increase in owner occupation in the last two 
decades, particularly between 1981 and 1991. Although many people live 
on low incomes, Hammersmith and Fulham is a very high cost housing 
area, partly, due to its proximity to Central London.  In 2001, it had the 
fourth highest average residential property prices in the capital, behind 
only Kensington and Chelsea, the City of Westminster and Camden. 
Rents have also risen in recent years but prices for both sales and lettings 
generally vary depending on the area within the borough, with the north 
being more affordable than the centre or south.  In 2004/05, the average 
price of a 2­bed flat in Hammersmith and Fulham was between £200­ 
£400,000, while a 3­bed house cost an average of £350­£750,000 (The 
London Property Guide 2004)
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While the good transport links are part of the reason for the area’s 
appeal to the affluent middle­classes, also responsible for its pulling force 
are the open spaces and education facilities, ideal for those wishing to 
raise a family.  There are 227 hectares of parks and open spaces in the 
borough, with Ravenscourt Park in Hammersmith and Bishops Park in 
Fulham being two of the most popular.  Besides the private schools, there 
are three nurseries (but also 30 primary schools with nursery classes), 2 
early years’ centres, 36 primary schools and 9 secondary schools spread 
across the borough, along with five special day schools.  All of them cater 
for 17,722 pupils in total.  After­school care and holiday care is also 
available for children aged 5 to 12 years and there are six main children’s 
centres that operate all year round, with various satellite after­school 
centres offering term­time care and a number of under­fives drop­in 
sessions taking place in some of the community’s main education centres. 
The borough as a whole does contain a diverse mix of people.  For 
example, according to the 2001 Census, 54.7 per cent of the total resident 
population of Hammersmith and Fulham were single (never married), 
with the modal household (40.3%) containing only one person, most of 
whom were under pension age.  Those married or re­married (29%) 
formed only the second largest group of inhabitants in the borough with 
a mere 13,908 out of just over 75,000 households consisting of a married 
couple and 6,850 of a cohabiting couple.  Additionally, Hammersmith 
and Fulham consists of a smaller proportion of children aged 0­16 than 
do other Inner or Greater London boroughs, although the amount of 
children has increased and is projected to grow, partly as a result of a rise 
in the proportion of women of childbearing age in the population. 
Conversely, almost half the borough’s population (47%) consists of 
younger adults aged 17­39, a significantly higher proportion than that 
recorded in other areas.  In contrast, those aged 40 or over are less 
numerous than elsewhere in the capital.  In 2001, the majority of 
Hammersmith and Fulham’s residents were White (78%), Christian (64%) 
and British (66%).  In London terms, therefore, the proportion of ethnic 
minority groups in the borough is not particularly high, although there 
are more Irish residents than is usual in other areas.  Despite its diversity, 
however, The Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham embraced many of 
those whose profile suited the purposes of this study.  It is upon their 
narratives that most of the following chapters rest.
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9 FERTILE DEBATES: AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
REASONS FOR LOW FERTILITY ACCORDING TO 
THE BRITISH PRESS 
9.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 5, I presented an outline of the issues that dominated Greek 
popular opinion and the Greek press on the subject of below­replacement 
fertility.  ‘Underfertility’ or ‘the demographic issue’ emerged as powerful 
constructs through which the Greek print media and ‘ordinary’ middle­ 
class Athenians debated the reasons behind the country’s birth ‘shortage’. 
This chapter details the findings of an analogous exploration, this time 
relating to low fertility in the UK.  Unlike in Chapter 5, however, I do not 
consider both press reports and informants’ perspectives on the topic but, 
instead, focus only on the former.  This is because the absence of 
politically charged terms in the English language equivalent to 
ypogennitikotita (‘underfertility’) or to demografiko (‘the demographic 
issue’) rendered awkward any attempt to raise the subject of low fertility 
during the course of interviews in London.  Although there are a number 
of suitable expressions that capture the concept (such as ‘below­ 
replacement fertility’, ‘low fertility’, ‘fertility decline’, ‘low birth rate’ and 
‘birth rate decline’), they are more commonly used in academic or formal 
exchange than in everyday talk. 
In addition, on occasions when I did broach the issue using any of 
the above terms, informants seemed to have little to say.  In general, 
white, British, middle­class women living in London were very 
demographically unaware.  This contrasted sharply with my experience 
in Athens where I frequently employed the word ‘underfertility’ as an 
‘ice­breaker’ at the start of an interview and as a way to get my 
informants to talk about their own lives.  Whereas middle­class 
Athenians appeared well versed on the general topic of below­ 
replacement fertility, their counterparts in London did not seem 
conditioned to talking about it in the abstract.  Consequently, the 
following discussion centres exclusively on the causes of low fertility 
assumed by a cross­section of the British press. 
The articles on which this analysis rests come from a wide range of 
newspapers, namely The Guardian, The Observer, The Times, The Sunday 
Times, The Daily Telegraph, The Sunday Telegraph, The Independent, the 
Independent on Sunday, the Daily Mail and the Evening Standard.  A 
number of reasons were behind this selection.  To begin with, I believed it 
was important to include those newspapers with wide circulation among 
the middle­classes and, therefore, most likely to be read by my 
informants.  This instantly led to the exclusion of most tabloid 
newspapers (except the Daily Mail) and the inclusion of the majority of
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broadsheets, in the form of national dailies and their weekend editions. 
Secondly, it was necessary to capture views from both sides of the 
political spectrum.  While The Times, The Sunday Times, The Daily 
Telegraph, The Sunday Telegraph and the Daily Mail offered a conservative 
outlook, The Guardian, The Observer, The Independent and the Independent 
on Sunday provided more centre­ to left­wing perspectives.  Finally, 
although there are numerous local papers reporting on news specific to 
different areas of the capital, I chose the Evening Standard to represent all 
of them. 
In order to identify relevant articles published between 2001 and 
2005 in the above newspapers, I used Lexis­Nexis 29 .  Initially, I searched 
for the keywords ‘birth rate’, ‘population’ and ‘fertility rate’ in the 
headline and then looked for major mention of the words ‘birth rate’, 
‘fertility rate’ and ‘population decline’.  Finally, I carried out an index 
search of the words ‘births, birth rates and demographics’.  All of these 
terms were selected following a number of failed attempts to find an 
adequate amount of articles using the words ‘low fertility’, ‘fertility 
decline’ or ‘below­replacement fertility’ either in the headline or as major 
mention – further proof of the infrequency with which these expressions 
are used in the public sphere.  The keywords chosen, therefore, were the 
ones that achieved the best results.  From the final collection, I decided to 
leave out from the analysis articles about worldwide or pan­European 
fertility trends and concentrate on ones specifically about the United 
Kingdom.  Of those, I left out pieces explicitly about Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, as each region has unique demographic characteristics. 
However, I did include articles that were about the UK overall and 
England in particular. 
In a cross­national study, Stark and Kohler (2002) reveal that in 
comparison to such countries as Italy and France, newspapers in the UK 
are relatively silent on the subject of low fertility.  For example, between 
1998 and 1999, Stark and Kohler found just 37 articles in the national 
press on low fertility per se.  Of those, 73 per cent identified it as a 
negative phenomenon, 5 per cent as a positive one, while 22 per cent 
were neutral in perspective.  Most articles showed above average concern 
over the consequences rather than the causes of low fertility.  However, 
the UK press was one of the few with an ‘outward’ focus regarding the 
former; in other words, it discussed how low fertility might also affect 
other countries and minority groups not just the UK.  Articles that did 
refer to the origins of low fertility at least once (11 out of 37) mainly cited 
the role of women and cultural attitudes, followed by economics, 
29 Lexis­Nexis is an online database from which it is possible to search 
and access full­text articles published between specified dates in the 
British press and a selection of foreign newspapers.
160 
contraceptive knowledge and costs; a minority alluded to family policies 
and other issues.  Finally, only 32 per cent of articles suggested 
interventions for changing low fertility while an equal share proposed 
ways to accommodate it. 
Stark and Kohler’s findings are extremely insightful and provide a 
useful overview of the low fertility debate in the UK relative to other 
countries.  As a result, I do not wish to replicate their approach or refute 
their conclusions.  Instead, I want to use their study as a starting point for 
my own investigation.  Unlike Stark and Kohler, I do not intend to 
present a quantitative account of the causes of low fertility debated in the 
British press.  In other words, I do not aim to determine the frequency 
with which newspapers raised a particular issue or to establish whether 
certain newspapers favoured a specific reason over others.  Rather, I 
would like to take a qualitative approach, treating the content of the 
articles I gathered as discourse (see Chapter 2, Section 2.6).  In doing so, I 
ask whether the factors that, according to Stark and Kohler, the British 
press held responsible for the national ‘birth dearth’ in the late 1990s 
were the same as those debated in 2001 to 2005.  Moreover, I explore how 
newspapers during the latter period talked about each reason (as 
opposed to how regularly) and examine whether different newspapers 
debated the same cause in a distinctive way.  As Fowler (1991) asserts, 
journalists writing for a particular paper adopt a style appropriate to it. 
Since newspapers are commercial institutions with political motives, the 
style that they expect their writers to assume ‘encodes’ an ideology 
(Fowler 1991, p.46).  By using the language that already embodies that 
ideology, Fowler argues, print media communicate a set of values that 
they, and they assume their readers also, hold about the world.  In the 
ensuing paragraphs, therefore, I attempt to point to some of the values 
that different newspapers appear to embrace in connection with the 
causes of low fertility. 
9.2 Childcare and the cost of childrearing 
Extensively discussed in the press throughout my fieldwork was the 
financial burden of bringing up children, attributed especially to the cost 
of childcare.  While newspapers often reported on this issue 
independently of the low fertility debate, there was no scarcity of articles 
proposing a direct association between a decline in the national birth rate 
and the increasing expense of raising children in the UK.  One of the 
arguments underlying such reports was that the drain on household 
income caused by having a family was responsible for a growing unmet 
demand for children.  ‘We have to acknowledge that a small human 
being has a market price,’ journalist, Christina Odone, asserted, and 
although many women long to be mothers, children are simply ‘out of 
their price range’ (The Observer 09/05/2004).  As the following two
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extracts reveal, this was a widespread belief, articulated by others in the 
industry. 
David and Claire Webster are well­educated,  successful  professionals  in 
their  mid­thirties  living  in  London.    Between  them,  they  earn  well  over 
£100,000 a year, so you might expect them to ski in St Moritz and summer 
in  Juan­les  Pins.    They  would  love  to,  but  they  cannot  afford  it.    The 
reason  is  not  some  outrageous  drug  habit  but  another  weakness:  a 
fondness for children.   The Websters already have  two under  the age of 
five and would like to have another.  They cannot afford this, either.  They 
already  pay  £1,500  a month  in  childcare and when Claire goes  back  to 
work part­time, this will increase by £500.  In a couple of years’ time, when 
both  girls  are  at  nursery  school  their  parents  will  be  paying  £1,800  in 
school  fees and £972 a month  for  the nanny who  takes  them  to  school, 
picks them up and looks after them before their parents come home from 
work.    ‘Financial  concerns  are  the number  one  thing  hindering me  from 
having another baby,’  said Claire,  a  commercial  property  agent.    ‘It  is  a 
very depressing situation.’ (The Sunday Times 25/09/2005) 
Kate  Harris  and  Tony  Yeo  are  grapping  with  an  age­old  problem:  they 
would  like to have another baby but they cannot afford to … Mr Yeo and 
Ms  Harris  are  among  thousands  of  couples  going  through  this  dismal 
exercise.  Consequently, Britain’s birth rate is plummeting.  The number of 
children  per  woman  has  dropped  from  2.4  to  1.6  in  the  past  30  years, 
which  means  we  are  not  replacing  ourselves  (The  Independent 
27/09/2003). 
The inclination to report on the value of parenthood in economic terms 
communicated a profoundly negative message to readers.  Having 
children, was a resource depleting and, therefore, emotionally draining 
experience.  ‘You thought children would make you happy?  Not really ­ 
just poorer,’ read one headline in The Observer (16/11/2003).  ‘The 
average cost of the first five years of a child’s life is more than £20,000,’ 
claimed a special report in The Sunday Times magazine (15/02/2004).  The 
idea that low fertility was due to Britons’ inability to afford a family also 
generated the impression that reproduction was a product of rational 
economic decision­making; a process engaged in either jointly by the 
couple or by the woman alone. 
9.3 House prices 
Together with childcare costs, the value of property received a great deal 
of attention in the British press in relation to low fertility during 2001 to 
2005.  In part, this was due to Conservative MP and shadow work and 
pensions’ secretary, David Willets’ proclamation in September 2003 that 
‘high house prices are a very powerful contraceptive,’ preventing young 
couples from owning a home in which they could begin to form a family 
(The Daily Telegraph 23/09/2003; The Guardian 06/10/2003).  Yet the print 
media’s impression that there is a link between the cost of property and 
fertility long preceded Willets’ public statement.  In 2001, for example, 
The Sunday Times (01/04/2001) carried an article entitled, ‘Hot market
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may have cooled birth rate,’ an assumption echoed fourteen months later 
in a piece by The Sunday Telegraph (12/05/2002) headlined, ‘Price boom, 
baby bust: as house prices keep rising, so the numbers of children being 
born in Britain keep falling.  Could there be a connection?’  According to 
journalist Ross Clark, who authored the article, the answer is a 
resounding ‘yes’, since richer areas in the capital have lower birth rates 
than poorer ones in which houses are, still, relatively inexpensive. 
However, Clark overlooks the fact that the relationship between house 
prices and fertility rates may be due to association rather than causation. 
Interestingly, the effect of property costs on birth rates attracted 
attention from the whole range of mainstream national newspapers, 
including the Sunday Telegraph, The Sunday Times, The Observer and The 
Guardian.  However, each presented the issue in a distinctive way.  For 
example, below are two extracts: the first is from The Sunday Telegraph, 
the second from The Sunday Times article briefly mentioned already. 
There  is  little  doubt  that  the Government’s  failure  to  control  house­price 
inflation  is acting as a brake on the birth  rate.  Save for a miniscule  rise 
last year, the birth rate has been falling steadily since the current property 
boom began in 1996 … What is more, a disproportionate number of births 
are  taking  place among poor  immigrant  populations and  in  areas where 
social  housing  is  prevalent,  such  as  the  London  Borough  of  Newham, 
which has the highest birth rate in the country.  Middle­class areas, where 
house  prices  are  highest,  have  the  fastest­falling  birth  rates;  even  in 
Wandsworth, once nicknamed ‘Nappy Valley’, the birth rate is now below­ 
replacement.    So  dramatic  has  been  the  fall  in  births  that  one  wonders 
whether the Government is using housing policy as a form of birth control 
(The Sunday Telegraph 23/11/2003). 
Society  is changing as people who cannot afford a mortgage or spiraling 
rents stay at home.  For generations, it was the same old story: boy meets 
girl,  falls  in  love,  gets  married,  finds  home,  meets  bank manager,  buys 
home, has kids.  These days, the boy meets girl, falls in love, get married, 
finds home,  sees bank manager, wrings hands, and  instead buys a  fast 
car.  The new story has no children, sometimes no marriage and, often, no 
move beyond the childhood bedroom first provided by mum and dad.  Is it 
feasible  to  blame house  prices  for  all  of  the  above,  in addition  to  falling 
birth rates, late marriages, and what European sociologists are now calling 
‘living  together  apart’  marital  arrangements?    Figures  from  property 
studies and estate agencies tell us that our population profile will continue 
to  support  a  buoyant  property  market.    But  consider  another  argument: 
that the property market itself has a part to play in reducing the population 
(The Sunday Times 01/04/2001). 
Although both articles argue that property prices are directly responsible 
for the UK’s low birth rate, The Sunday Telegraph attempts to incite 
resentment among its readers by suggesting that, while immigrants are 
becoming ever more populous, white, British, middle­class Londoners 
are unable to reach their desired family size due to the Government’s
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unwillingness to help them purchase a home.  Immigrants, on the other 
hand, can afford to have children because they live in social housing, 
handed to them by the Government.  In essence, the newspaper asks 
readers to consider the view that the Labour Party (which The Sunday 
Telegraph readers are unlikely to have voted into government) is keeping 
white, British middle­class fertility rates low through its open 
immigration policy. The Sunday Times article is less provocative and 
avoids the introduction of conspiracy theories.  However, it chooses to 
grab its readers’ attention by simplifying the issue with a ‘boy meets girl’ 
story and by linking the rise in house prices with ‘population decline’ 
rather than low fertility.  This ignores evidence reported in the same year 
by The Times (23/11/2001), as well as other national broadsheet dailies, 
including The Guardian (16/11/2001), The Independent (16/11/2001) and 
The Daily Telegraph (16/11/2001), showing that, thanks to immigration, 
the UK’s population is growing despite below­replacement fertility, and 
will continue to grow in the future. 
9.4 Female education 
The timing of intense media coverage of a particular issue is often 
attributable to the publication of an ‘expert’ survey or academic research 
on the same topic.  In April 2003, the Office for National Statistics made 
available to the public a report maintaining that female graduates are 50 
per cent more likely than non­graduates to remain childless throughout 
their lives.  The news caught the attention of most major national 
newspapers, including The Guardian, The Times, and The Daily Telegraph. 
Although the print media had stated its suspicion that the rise in female 
education was responsible for lower birth rates a while before the 
emergence of the ONS report (the Daily Mail 17/05/2002), once it 
appeared, different newspapers treated its findings in distinct ways.  A 
closer look at two excerpts from The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph, 
published on the same day, serve to illustrate this point. 
Women  with  university  degrees  are  50  per  cent  more  likely  to  remain 
childless than those who do not pursue further education.  Those who do 
become mothers have their  first child at around the age of 29; five years 
later than  less qualified women.   But  they have  their second child faster. 
The findings are in a report which, for the first time, shows the strength of 
the  link  between  educational  qualifications  and  late  motherhood.    It 
explains how, with feminism and the contraceptive pill, Britain’s birth rate 
has come  to fall  to an average of 1.74 per woman.   Experts say greater 
access  to  higher  education  will  mean  fewer  women  having  children  as 
they pursue careers and take longer to find a husband or partner – often 
encountering  fertility  problems when  they do  settle  down … While  fewer 
children  will  be  born  to  these  women,  however,  Britain’s  population  will 
rise because of migrants (The Daily Telegraph 25/04/2003). 
Women  graduates  are  50%  more  likely  than  non­graduates  to  remain 
childless  throughout  their  lives,  the  Office  for  National  Statistics  said 
yesterday  in a  report which may explain the decline  in Britain’s birth  rate
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… Graduate mothers who delayed having children until after 25 tended to 
have  them  in quick succession, and their experience of higher education 
made  little  difference  to  the  size  of  their  families.    At  any  given  age  of 
childbearing,  mothers  with  a  higher  qualification  were  more  likely  than 
those without to have another child, and were more likely to do so quickly 
… Steve Smallwood, one of the authors of the report, said it could not be 
proved that  the expansion of higher education had caused  the decline  in 
national fertility rates over this period, but it was possible that there was a 
link (The Guardian 25/04/2003). 
Although there are a number of overlapping statements in the above 
excerpts, the overall presentation of the findings from the ONS report is 
not identical between the two.  For example, it is evident that each 
newspaper has chosen to include and exclude a unique set of points from 
the publication.  This has led each to a different conclusion.  Both The 
Guardian and The Daily Telegraph begin with a similar declaration: women 
who graduate from university are more likely than those who do not to 
remain childless.  From this point on, however, the two articles diverge in 
focus.  Despite inconclusive evidence in the publication that there is an 
association between higher levels of education and lower fertility rates, 
The Daily Telegraph asserts that the report ‘shows the strength of the link 
between educational qualifications and late motherhood.’ The Guardian, 
in contrast, chooses not to ignore this point, citing one of the authors of 
the report to emphasise that further education does not necessarily lead 
to smaller families; in fact, it is just as likely to lead to larger ones. 
Therefore, while both articles suggest that there is a connection 
between the rise in female education and the decline in ‘Britain’s birth 
rate,’ by asserting that there is a definite rather than a potential link 
between them, The Daily Telegraph appears to condemn women 
graduates.  In a more overt fashion than The Guardian, it accuses female 
university degree­holders for not having enough children to prevent a 
fall in the national birth rate.  The accusatory tone of The Daily Telegraph is 
also clearly manifest in the article’s headline: ‘Graduates less likely to 
become mothers’; as opposed to The Guardian’s more gender­neutral 
wording: ‘Graduates less likely to bear children.’  In addition, The Daily 
Telegraph indirectly assigns blame to women with university degrees for 
an impending growth in immigration, by mentioning, midway through 
the article that in spite of low fertility the British population will grow 
‘because of migrants.’ The Guardian also refers to immigration; however, 
it does so briefly and at the very end of the piece, along with other data 
regarding Britain’s demographic make­up, such as dependency ratios 
and marriage rates.  Finally, it is worth pointing out that both 
newspapers erroneously assume that Britain’s birth rate has been in 
constant decline, when in fact total period fertility rates have been 
relatively stable since 1975.
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9.5 The work­life balance: career versus family 
A further cause of below replacement fertility debated in the British 
press, closely allied to female education, was the issue of work­life 
balance.  The popular view among newspapers was that as greater 
numbers of British women graduate from university so more of them are 
entering the labour market and becoming financially independent. 
Consequently, they are delaying the start of family­formation.  The longer 
they leave it, the less likely they are to be able to conceive.  If they can 
have children, the complexity of combining work with motherhood is so 
great that they are either unlikely to have a large family or they will forgo 
childbearing altogether, thus keeping birth rates low.  In spite of 
widespread consensus over the contribution of the ‘career versus family’ 
challenge to the UK’s fertility situation, not all newspapers agreed over 
the force driving it forward. 
Increasing numbers of women are putting off having a family until they are 
in  their  thirties,  figures  showed yesterday.   According  to a breakdown of 
birth rates by the Office for National Statistics, women aged 30 to 34 are 
now  bearing  more  children  than  those  in  their  late  20s.    The  maturing 
childbearing age reflects ever­greater number of girls taking advantage of 
educational  opportunities  and  going  on  to  careers  that  have  become 
increasingly open to women.  More young women appear to be placing a 
greater  importance  on  developing  their  careers  than  starting  a  family 
(Daily Mail 16/12/2005). 
Birthrate at record low as women opt for jobs: Better career opportunities 
and greater lifestyle choices for women have helped to push the birthrate 
down to 1.64 children per women, the lowest level since records began in 
1924  …    Greater  choice  in  contraception  and  the  increase  in  women 
postponing  children  until  later  in  life  or  remaining  childless  are  largely 
responsible for the decline, experts said (The Times 17/05/2002). 
Clearly, some women feel that work and children don’t mix.  Yet the facts 
contradict  this.    That  same  study  at  Bristol  University  found  that  only  a 
quarter of  the women interviewed thought  the  ideal family set up was for 
the  woman  not  to  work  …  Britain  still  has  poor  childcare  by  many 
continental  standards;  and  anyone  who  has  struggled  to  bring  up  small 
children, juggling them with a full­time job, knows how hard it can be (The 
Guardian 01/05/2003). 
Female fertility rates are down, the number of single mothers up.  Perhaps 
this is the ultimate sign of female emancipation.  Educated women opting 
for  careers  are  no  longer  bound  to have  children.    Independent  women 
opting to have children are no longer bound to have a spouse.  But scratch 
below the surface and it is clear that lack of choice, not wider choice, fuels 
these  trends.    The  government’s  tax,  benefit  and  work  policies  leave 
women juggling work and motherhood, unfulfilled by either (The Observer 
26/06/2005). 
The difference between the four articles is in the degree to which they 
regard women as playing an active role in the construction of the work­
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life balance conundrum.  While the Daily Mail and The Times both suggest 
that women are actively choosing to work rather than to reproduce, The 
Guardian and The Observer imply that they are passive victims of a weak 
childcare support system, which leaves them ‘juggling’ incompatible 
home and office tasks.  Accordingly, low birth rates are either expressive 
of too much or too little ‘choice’.  Whatever the case may be, the press 
assumes that childbearing is ultimately a matter of preference, 
particularly that of females. 
9.6 Individualism, hedonism and selfishness 
Complementary to the print media’s view that the UK’s birth rate is 
below­replacement because educated, working women are opting to 
either postpone the process of family­formation or abstain from 
childbearing forever, was the idea that a new set of values, adverse to 
reproduction, currently underlies young British people’s outlook on life. 
In 2001, Laurie Taylor and his son, Matthew, wrote an article in Prospect 
magazine in response to the question ‘what are children for?’  According 
to a piece in The Guardian (06/06/2001), the Taylors argued that 
parenthood is now ‘counter­intuitive’ and that men and women have 
fallen victim to ‘the central tenet of liberal modernity: individual self­ 
fulfilment.’  At the time, both The Sunday Times (27/05/2001) and The 
Guardian (06/06/2001) took a critical view of the Taylors’ premise.  Yet, 
the relationship between individualism, selfishness, hedonism and low 
fertility remained in the headlines throughout the duration of my 
fieldwork.  Especially vocal in connection with this issue, and in support 
of the proposed link, were the right­wing dailies: the Daily Mail and The 
Daily Telegraph.  In an article entitled ‘Sex and the selfish society,’ 
journalist, Melanie Phillips, said the following: 
… the Office for National Statistics revealed that birth rates in Britain have 
now  dropped  to  a  historic  low,  with  women  having  an  average  of  1.6 
children … So it appears that sex is no longer being used by our society to 
reproduce  itself  through  having  children.    Instead,  it  is  producing 
promiscuous  children  who  are  contracting  sexually  transmitted  diseases 
(not to mention our appalling teenage pregnancy rate).  How can we have 
got  ourselves  into  such  a  disturbing  situation,  which  poses  such  grave 
dangers  for  the  well­being  and  even  the  survival  of  our  society?    The 
answer lies in the revolution that has occurred in the way we look at birth, 
marriage, family life and the relations between men and women.  Sex has 
become detached  from  reproduction.    Instead,  it  has been  turned  into a 
recreational sport denuded of any moral or social constraints.  These are 
symptoms  of  a  society,  which  now  worships  at  the  shrine  of  personal 
fulfilment and instant gratification, producing a profound change in sexual 
behaviour (Daily Mail 14/12/2002). 
Three years later, Phillips reaffirmed her views in a similarly themed 
article (Daily Mail 22/06/2005).  Britain, she claimed, has become a 
‘hedonistic culture’ and ‘appears to have lost any sense of its collective
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and long­term interests.’  Young women and men are living for the 
present with no regard for the future.  Consequently, Phillips argued, 
women no longer consider children essential to self­fulfilment.  ‘In our 
industrialised, highly individualistic welfare states’ and ‘affluent 
consumer society,’ she claimed, ‘children have turned from a necessity 
into an obstacle to adult self­realisation.’  While women might like to 
have children, it is only ‘as an adjunct to lives that are much more 
interesting and fulfilling, centred on work, playing the sexual field and 
generally having a good time … ‘ she argued. 
Sarah Womack, Social Affairs Correspondent for The Daily Telegraph, 
also proposed a link between low fertility and the values listed by 
Phillips and the Taylors.  In reaction to the publication of ‘The Family 
Report 2003: Choosing happiness?’  (Stanley et al. 2003), Womack, like 
Phillips, attributed the shift in the nation’s birth rate chiefly to changes in 
British females’ aspirations. 
Britain’s birth rate has fallen to a historic low, because professional thirty­ 
somethings  want  to  enjoy  the  good  life  for  longer,  says  new  research. 
Labelled  ‘later  maters’,  they  believe  children  are  mixed  blessings  with 
clear penalties for parents, especially women.   They say  the prospect of 
sacrificing  a  hard­earned quality  of  life makes  them  cautious … Women 
said that if children were to enhance their relationship, there needed to be 
fewer  ‘trade­offs’ between parenthood and  lifestyle … In  response  to the 
question:  ‘Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be 
fulfilled?’  fewer  than  one  in  eight  British  women  said  ‘yes’  (The  Daily 
Telegraph, 14/11/2003). 
Unlike her counterpart in the Daily Mail, however, Womack was less 
overtly hostile to women in the wake of yet another publication 
suggesting that the phenomenon of low fertility was a by­product of an 
ever­growing female desire for self­gratification.  The female ‘late 
maters’, according to Womack, are justified for not finding children 
fulfilling any longer, since childbearing entails ‘sacrificing a hard­earned 
quality of life.’ 
Yet not only the right­wing, conservative press had taken part in the 
debate over values and low birth rates.  In a feature article in The 
Guardian entitled, ‘No kids please, we’re selfish: The population is 
shrinking, but why should I care … My life is far too interesting to spoil it 
with children,’ Lionel Shriver, childless author of the controversial book 
We Need to Talk about Kevin (2003) 30 , offered her own thoughts on the 
subject. 
30 We need to talk about Kevin is a novel about a mother’s desperate attempt 
to understand why her son, 15­year­old Kevin, murdered seven of his 
fellow­classmates, a cafeteria worker and an English teacher in a 
Columbine­style school massacre.
168 
I propose that we have now experienced a second demographic transition. 
Rather  than  economics,  the  engine  driving  Europe’s  ‘birth  dearth’  is 
existential.   To be almost  ridiculously sweeping: baby boomers and  their 
offspring have shifted emphasis from the communal to the individual, from 
the future to the present, from virtue to personal satisfaction.  Increasingly 
secular, we pledge allegiance to  lower­case gods of our private devising. 
We are less concerned with leading a good life than the good life.  We are 
less  likely  than  our  predecessors  to  ask  ourselves  whether  we  serve  a 
greater  social  purpose;  we  are more  likely  to ask  if  we  are happy.   We 
shun values such as self­sacrifice and duty as the pitfalls of suckers.  We 
give little thought to the perpetuation of lineage, culture or nation; we take 
our heritage for granted.  We are ahistorical.  We measure the value of our 
lives within the brackets of our own births and deaths, and don’t especially 
care what happens once we’re dead.  As we age – oh, so reluctantly! – we 
are apt to look back on our pasts and ask not ‘Did I serve family, God and 
country?’ but  ‘Did  I ever get  to Cuba, or  run a marathon?   Did  I  take up 
landscape painting?  Was I fat?’  We will assess the success of our lives in 
accordance not with whether  they were  righteous,  but with whether  they 
were interesting and fun (The Guardian 17/09/2005). 
In linking individualism, selfishness and hedonism to low fertility, via 
women in particular, Shriver, Phillips and Womack imply that high 
fertility is a consequence of (female) conformity, selflessness and self­ 
denial.  Excluded from all these accounts are men.  Equally missing is an 
attempt to differentiate values according to class, ethnic group, regional 
origin and other social categories. 
9.7 Cohabitation and the breakdown of marriage 
In the opinion of the British press, the population’s growing desire to lead 
a hedonistic lifestyle, in pursuit of self­gratification and independence, 
has both a direct and an indirect effect on the number of children born in 
the UK.  On the one hand, these values reduce people’s willingness to 
procreate because they are simply incompatible with the kind of existence 
that accompanies family life: looking after children entails self­sacrifice 
and responsibility rather than self­centredness and recklessness.  On the 
other hand, individualism results in the growth of cohabitation and the 
decline in marital unions; trends that the press wrongly assumed are, 
ultimately, a reason for low birth rates. 
There  have  been  other  changes  too.    In  the  UK  the marriage  rate  has 
been falling by 34% annually since  the early 1970s … At  the same time 
brides  have  been  growing  older  …  The  most  obvious  reason  is  an 
increase  in cohabitation … Though  ‘illegitimacy’  is no  longer  the  taboo  it 
was for modern women’s grandmothers, and  ‘bastard’ has all but  lost  its 
meaning,  cohabitation  still  does  not  rival  marriage  as  an  engine  of 
procreation.    ‘Living  together’  is  still  seen  as  a  temporary  state,  always 
vulnerable to breakdown (The Sunday Times magazine 15/02/2004). 
Demographic data, however, do not entirely support the view expressed 
by The Sunday Times.  In certain European countries where cohabitation is
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frequent and extra­marital births are common, fertility rates are close to 
replacement level, whereas among populations in which marriage is still 
popular and only a small proportion of children are born outside the 
confines of marital unions, birth rates are relatively low.  In Nordic 
countries, for example, there are high levels of cohabitation and high 
rates of non­marital childbearing (Kiernan 1999).  In this region, in 2002 
total fertility rates were between 1.65 and 1.75 (Eurostat 2004).  In 
contrast, in southern Europe, where total fertility rates have been 
characterized as ‘lowest­low’ (Kohler et al. 2002), both cohabitation and 
extra­marital births are uncommon (Kiernan 1999).  Cohabitation, 
therefore, does not always ‘rival marriage as an engine to procreation.’ 
Rather, marriage can often obstruct the path to high fertility. 
9.8 Infertility and abortions 
The supposition that abortion and infertility are associated with the state 
of the UK’s birth rate was not a dominant feature of the low fertility 
debate, although both issues received considerable and widespread press 
coverage outside its frame.  The three excerpts cited below, therefore, are 
unusual in that they assume a direct link between below­replacement 
fertility and either abortion or infertility. 
Britain  is  sitting  on  an  infertility  time  bomb.    A  leading  fertility  expert, 
Professor  Bill  Ledger,  has  warned  that  within  the  next  ten  years  the 
number of couples experiencing problems conceiving children is expected 
to double … He blames this looming crisis on modern lifestyle factors such 
as delays in starting a family, obesity, falling sperm counts and rising rates 
of  sexually  transmitted  diseases.    His  warning  compounds  a  deep  and 
increasing anxiety about low fertility rates not just in Britain but across the 
whole of Europe and beyond … (Daily Mail 22/06/2005) 
I  am,  as  Tony  Blair  might  say,  deeply  passionately  personally  deeply 
personally opposed to abortion.   But, unlike him, I  think  it ought  to be an 
election  issue.    Not  because of my  personal  beliefs …    the  point  about 
abortion  is not  that  it’s a  ‘matter of conscience’ for  individuals  to  ‘wrestle 
with’, but that it’s a crucial part of the central political challenge of our time. 
Almost  every  issue  facing  the  EU  ­  from  immigration  to  crippling  state 
pension liabilities – has at its heart the same glaringly plain root cause: a 
huge lack of babies (The Daily Telegraph 22/03/2005). 
It  is  a  sign  of  the  rather  crazy  society  we  live  in  that  there  should  be 
general rejoicing last week at the news that, despite all the worries about 
the economy,  house  prices  are  continuing  to  rise.   On  the  same day,  it 
was reported that in 2001, there were 170,000 abortions ­ in other words, 
about one in four pregnancies  is now ending in termination.   The statistic 
excited  little  interest  that  I  could  see  …  It  may  be  tempting  to  put  the 
blame  on  the  permissive  society  and  the  late  Lord  Jenkins  but  the  real 
explanation,  I  suspect,  is  an  economic  one,  namely  that  many  couples 
simply cannot afford to have children. And the reason for that is the point I 
referred to at  the beginning, namely the ever­increasing price of housing. 
This in turn involves both parties in a relationship having to work in order
170 
to keep up with the never­ending mortgage repayments.  The prospect of 
the birth of a child, which could force the mother to stop earning,  is seen 
not as a happy event  (as  it  should be) but a disaster  for which abortion 
may be the only answer (The Observer, 02/02/2003). 
Despite their distinct focus, the first two excerpts describe below­ 
replacement fertility as an alarming development: ‘Britain is sitting on an 
infertility time bomb’; Abortion is a ‘crucial part of the central political 
challenge of our time.’  They are also explicitly pronatalist.  Having an 
abortion or leaving childbearing until it is too late exacerbates the baby 
‘shortage’.  Thus, indirectly, both the Daily Mail and The Daily Telegraph 
urge their readers to take this state of affairs as a serious threat and 
reproduce. The Observer assumes a different approach to the matter by 
depicting a chain reaction between high house prices, abortion and low 
birth rates.  Women, it alleges, are rational, economic decision­makers 
who may resort to an abortion after realising that they cannot afford to 
have both a child and a mortgage.  While they are active in their decision 
to abort, however, ultimately, they are the victims of circumstances (a 
strong housing market) beyond their control.  This conjecture is the 
opposite of that supposed in the articles from the Daily Mail and The Daily 
Telegraph, both of which imply that individuals’ irresponsible behaviour 
is having a negative effect on society at large.  Yet The Observer also 
disregards evidence suggesting that the majority of abortions take place 
outside marriage and that a major reason for the termination of 
pregnancies is because they are unplanned; in other words due to 
ineffective contraceptive use. 
9.9 Childlessness and the rise of the only child 
All of the issues described above are, in large measure, keeping the birth 
rate low by delaying the start of family­formation, according to the 
British press.  ‘Birth rate drops to the lowest ever; As mothers leave it 
late, average family has 1.64 children,’ reported the Daily Mail 
(13/12/2002).  Moreover, some women are abstaining from motherhood 
for such a lengthy period that they find themselves ‘involuntarily’ 
childless or with only one child, as their ‘biological clock’ eventually 
stops ticking.  Exacerbating the problem, newspapers maintained, is 
British women’s ever­increasing difficulty of finding a partner with 
whom to have children.  This is the ‘Bridget Jones’ generation, the press 
declared between 2001 and 2005, after the popular British comedy film hit 
depicting a single, childless woman in her early­30s desperately seeking 
love in the hope of settling down. 
Women in their twenties and thirties who want to marry and start a family 
could struggle to find a husband of similar age.  The 2001 Census figures 
show  that  females  in  their  twenties outnumber men of  the  same age by 
81,300 in England and Wales, confirming the picture of a  ‘Bridget Jones’ 
Britain … The  figures go  some way  to explaining Britain’s plunging birth
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rate, with women taking longer to find a partner and leaving it later to have 
children (The Daily Telegraph 08/05/2003). 
Birth  rate plunges  for Bridget  Jones and her  sisters:  The Bridget  Jones 
generation  of  young  women  who  are  more  likely  to  remain  single  and 
childless means  that within  the next decade  the birthrate will  fall  to only 
1.66  per  woman,  experts  predict  …  The  birth  rate  has  been  falling 
consistently since the late Seventies, with women leaving it later and later 
to  have  children or  choosing not  to have  them at  all  (Evening Standard 
31/12/2001). 
Although successive cohorts of women in England and Wales born since 
WWII wait longer before starting a family, and there has been a rise in the 
number of females remaining childless at the end of their reproductive 
lives, there is no conclusive evidence to show that later entry to 
motherhood leads to lower cohort fertility (Rendall and Smallwood 2003). 
It is possible, for example, for a woman to become a first­time mother in 
her early thirties, then go on to have a second and perhaps even a third 
child in the rest of her thirties, assuming that she continues to be able to 
conceive.  Accordingly, it is also likely that a woman who has her first 
baby at the age of 25 does not have another one until her late twenties or 
early thirties, subsequent to which she does not have a third child.  In 
fact, Rendall and Smallwood (2003) found that British females with a 
higher qualification, who tend to start childbearing five years later than 
those without the same level of education, at any given age of 
childbearing are more likely than the latter to have another child and to 
do so quickly. 
The above excerpts, however, advocate the view that ‘plunging 
birth rates’ are, unambiguously, due to increasing delays in family 
formation 31 .  Supplementary to this perspective is the belief that the 
‘Bridget Jones’ generation of women want to marry and have children 
but that they are unable to do so in time to realize their wishes.  This 
hypothesis is even more explicit in an article in The Times, excerpted 
below: 
A  generation  of  British  women  is  pining  for  babies  that  they  will  never 
have,  research  reveals.   Figures published yesterday  show  that  growing 
numbers of women are becoming so preoccupied with their education and 
careers  and  are  finding  it  so  hard  to  find  Mr  Right  that  they  never  get 
round to having the children they always longed for.  Although 20 per cent 
of  women  remain  childless by  the  time  they  reach  their  late  thirties,  the 
figures show that only 15 per cent of women intended this to happen.  The 
finding  suggests  that  a quarter  of  women who  find  themselves  childless 
31 Yet again, both The Daily Telegraph and the Evening Standard wrongly 
assume that Britain’s birth rate is falling when in reality total period 
fertility rates have been relatively stable for the last 30 years.
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toward  the  end  of  their  childbearing  years  are  not  happy  about  it  (The 
Times, 27/06/2003). 
As Brown and Ferree (2005, p.14) found in a study of the British print 
media’s framing of the issue of falling fertility and rising immigration, the 
press supposes that all women ‘naturally’ want to reproduce, and that 
their inability to do so results in both a ‘personal’ and a ‘national’ crisis. 
Moreover, the idea that women yearn to have children but that they leave 
it too late suggests that they are inattentive to their biological ‘drives’ or 
‘clocks’.  Men, on the other hand, never appear to be as neglectful; in fact, 
newspapers hardly ever define them as ‘reproducers’, Brown and Ferree 
argue.  This is clear in The Times article quoted.  The idea that women are 
‘preoccupied’ with education and their careers, and that most of them do 
not ‘intend’ to be childless, gives readers the impression that British 
females are not in control of their lives; if they are, it suggests that they do 
not plan them carefully.  As a result, they do not guarantee meeting ‘Mr 
Right’ and they do not reproduce; men’s participation in either process is 
deemed irrelevant. 
While some women are ‘pining for babies,’ however, according to 
the British press others are actively denying motherhood, as an article in 
The Observer, entitled ‘Wanted: a baby boom,’ suggests. 
The  evidence  is  now  conclusive:  women  are  turning  their  backs  on 
childbirth  and  marriage  in  unprecedented  numbers  as  part  of  a  radical 
redefinition of the female role in society.  Against a backdrop of sweeping 
social change, new figures  reveal that around one  in  four women  is now 
taking a  conscious  decision not  to  conceive,  preferring  the  freedom  and 
career opportunities of  a  child­free  life … According  to predictions  in  the 
Office of National Statistics’ latest Population Trends report, about 22 per 
cent of women are now choosing not to have children, compared with just 
nine  per  cent  of  women  born  half  a  century  ago  …  (The  Observer 
14/12/2003). 
Articles on the ‘childfree’ were ample throughout the four years that I 
monitored the issue of below­replacement fertility in the print media (see 
Chapter 11, Section 11.5).  Nevertheless, they were not frequently present 
within news reports on the state of the national birth rate.  This suggests 
that the prevailing view among the press was that the majority of women 
in the country still aspire to become mothers, even though they might 
never do so.  In this sense, the ‘childfree’ are an exception to the rule and 
motherhood is the ‘norm’.  This is a problematic assumption, which 
conceals a diversity of attitudes towards motherhood and countless 
approaches to family­formation.  It is also difficult to know, and there is 
yet no way of finding out, what proportion of those without children are 
‘childless’ (‘involuntarily’) and how many are ‘voluntarily childless’ or 
‘childfree’ (Houseknecht 1987).  In addition, even though individuals 
may say that they do not want children at a given time, it is possible for
173 
them to change their minds.  Others, may be less clear as to whether or 
not their childless status is indeed ‘voluntary’ or ‘involuntary’; in other 
words, if it is what they ‘truly’ want.  The British press, however, did not 
seem prepared to delve into any of these issues at the time of this 
investigation. 
They were equally adamant that although most British women want 
to reproduce, an increasing number do not intend to do it more than 
once.  ‘One­child families are now commonplace,’ The Guardian 
(18/12/2002) stated, having a direct and negative effect on the birth rate, 
as others concurred. 
With fertility rates falling across Europe, the United States and even parts 
of Latin America, siblings are  fast becoming an endangered species.    In 
tomorrow’s world, like it or not, the only child will reign supreme …  Even 
in  Britain,  with  a  comparatively  healthy  birth  rate  of  1.7  children  per 
woman, the trend is set firmly in the same direction as the rest of Europe. 
An estimated  17 per  cent  of British  couples with  children  currently  have 
one child, in contrast to just 4 per cent who have three or more …  While 
the one­child family will be a deliberate choice for some parents, for many 
others  it will be the result of  their age and fertility, quite against their will. 
Women  are  leaving  it  later  and  later  to  have  their  first  child  (The  Daily 
Telegraph, 30/06/2001). 
The  reasons  may  be  varied  –  a  desire  to  give  the  child  everything,  an 
inability  to  conceive  more  than  one,  or  financial  restrictions  –  but  it 
appears that one­child families are becoming more common … A majority 
still  say  they  want  two  children,  but  key  findings  from  one  recent  study 
suggested that  the proportion that  think they will only have one child has 
risen in recent years … The social aspect of a rise  in only children is not 
usually  discussed.   The common concerns of  low  fertility  rates are more 
economic in nature … It  is clear that many women are now choosing not 
to have any children or just to have one child.  But some are finding that, 
although  they  would  like  to  have more  than  one,  it  just  doesn’t  happen 
(The Guardian, 18/02/2004). 
Yet the only­child phenomenon is not as widespread as the print media 
claimed.  In a recent article, Berrington (2004, p.9) argues that ‘in contrast 
to other European countries, the one child family has not yet become 
significantly more common in England and Wales.’  Few British men and 
women, also, intend to stick to only one child.  Berrington does claim, 
however, that females with a university degree, as opposed to those 
without any educational qualifications, are more likely to have a one­ 
child family ­ a point that neither of the articles cited above mention 32 . 
32 Ironically, The Daily Telegraph article states that the British birth rate is 
relatively ‘healthy’.  This is unusual given newspapers’ overall tendency 
to maintain (wrongly) that the country’s fertility has been unhealthily 
declining for decades (see previous articles).
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9.10 Conclusions 
The reasons for low fertility cited above were those most prominent in 
the articles that I gathered between 2001 and 2005 in the British press. 
For the purpose of clarity, I introduced and discussed each one 
separately, although multiple causes were often included in a single 
account.  Despite the diversity of explanations for the existence of below­ 
replacement fertility in the UK assumed by the British press, and in spite 
of the variable emphasis given to each by different newspapers, a number 
of approaches to the issue were common in all reports.  This is partly 
evident from the recurrence of keywords in the articles examined, one of 
which was ‘choice’.  Irrespective of underlying motive, the print media 
argued that individuals or couples were consciously and actively 
deciding whether to have children and if so, how many and when. 
‘Modern women choosing to have smaller families,’ wrote John Carvel, 
social affairs editor for The Guardian (17/05/2002).  While certain articles 
described low fertility as a product of excessive ‘choice’, others claimed it 
was due to an insufficient amount of available options.  The cost of 
childcare and property, for example, put people off having large families 
and delayed the start of family­formation, as did the difficulty of 
combining a career with motherhood.  In contrast, education and 
financial independence, had given women the opportunity to experience 
a range of lifestyles, some of which were hard to sacrifice in favour of 
childbearing. 
In addition to a consensual approach over the issue of ‘choice’, press 
coverage was also, uniformly, female­centred.  In other words, the debate 
over the causes of low fertility was, above all, about women.  Men were 
either entirely ignored or they featured as peripheral characters only 33 .  In 
contrast, newspapers treated changes in female behaviour as a reason for 
the state of the UK’s birth rate, and regarded women as the chief 
reproductive decision­makers.  Particularly scrutinised and, 
consequently, stigmatised in this debate were ‘career women’. 
‘Professional women or female graduates’ most frequently remained 
childless and infertile because of the intricacies involved in sustaining a 
work­life balance.  Therefore, it was they who caused fertility to decline 
in the first place, and they who were currently responsible for keeping 
birth rates below­replacement level. 
The chapters that follow are equally partial since they only take into 
account the views of a tiny section of the British female population: 
white, middle­class, educated women, living in a particular area of 
London.  Unlike the articles extracted from the British print media 
between 2001 and 2005, however, I do not treat the opinions or 
33 In 2006, however, articles regarding ‘late fatherhood’ have been more 
frequent in the national press.
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experiences of those whom I interviewed as representative of British 
women in general.  Whilst I also cannot claim that the narratives I 
collected give a more accurate account of the causes of low fertility in the 
UK, I can utilise them to point to areas where the print media misguides 
its readers in its assessment of the situation.  In fact, a striking feature of 
British press coverage of the causes of low fertility is how ill­informed it 
is regarding Britain’s latest demographic developments, which in turn 
appears to be an outcome of journalists’ misreading and 
misunderstanding of demographic data.  Despite the media’s insistence, 
for example, the UK’s fertility rate is not currently in decline and the 
British population is not falling. 
In the chapters that follow, I question whether it is appropriate to 
talk about low fertility as a product of ‘choice’ (either too little or too 
much), and whether it is accurate to suggest that reproduction is an 
exclusively female concern.  Is below­replacement fertility female­driven? 
Are there certain issues that affect only the middle­classes in their 
approach to family­formation?  While these and other questions shape 
the remainder of Part II, in the ensuing chapters I also seek to assess the 
degree to which informants’ accounts contained the language used in the 
press about low fertility per se and issues proximate to it.  Finally, in the 
Conclusion I compare the focus of British and Greek newspapers on the 
subject of below­replacement fertility.
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10 PATHWAYS TO CHILDBEARING: FROM 
‘PLANNED ACCIDENTS’ TO ‘ACCIDENTAL 
PLANS’ 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the pathways of entry to family­formation 
described by my London­based informants.  In particular, it looks at the 
extent to which those with whom I engaged had thought about having 
children prior to putting the wheels of the process in motion.  Were their 
actions conscious and premeditated?  Was childbearing the outcome of 
purely rational motives, based on abstract calculations of ‘costs’ and 
‘benefits’, unaffected by emotions, uncertainty and improvisation? 
Moreover, to what degree did informants appear to be able to exercise 
‘choice’ over the course of their reproductive lives?  Divided into three 
sections, the chapter begins with an account of informants’ thoughts and 
experiences leading up to the event of having a first child.  In this section, 
I conclude that, despite the need to refine and re­evaluate the concept of 
‘reproductive decision­making’, and to re­assess agents’ control over the 
direction of their reproductive futures, it is also necessary to focus our 
attention away from the individual.  This leads on to the second part of 
this chapter in which I introduce evidence found within informants’ 
narratives, of where persons, other than the narrator, appear to have 
played a formidable role in the configuration of events linked to the birth 
of the first child.  In the third section of this chapter, I concentrate on 
informants’ assessments of the ‘right time’ to have children, an 
expression that they frequently resorted to when discussing the reasons 
for the timing of their entry to motherhood. 
10.2 Deliberating the start of family­formation 
Enquiries into the question of family­formation instigated a series of 
responses among informants that ranged widely in emphasis.  While 
some women described having made a conscious effort to plan the timing 
of their first pregnancy, others claimed they had no strategy in place. 
These observations are akin to a qualitative study conducted by Currie 
(1988) in relation to the postponement and rejection of motherhood 
among women living in London.  According to Currie (1988, p.237), her 
respondents’ accounts of their reproductive lives were characterised by 
‘ambivalence, conflict, and indecision.’  Whereas some had deliberated a 
great deal about the prospect of having children, others seemed to have 
become ‘childless by default’ (Currie 1988, p.237), or to have experienced 
considerable uncertainty over whether or not to become parents.  Almost 
two decades later, I discovered that approaches to the start of family­ 
formation were no less heterogeneous.  Contrary to the dominant 
assumption in the demographic literature and in the print media (see 
previous Chapter), I found that informants’ transition to motherhood was
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not strictly the result of ‘reproductive decision­making’, and that the term 
‘choice’ failed to capture the experience leading to the birth of their first 
child. 
Jane was a 35­year­old, non­working woman with two young 
children.  For her, becoming a mother was never in question.  Once 
married, therefore, she and her husband, George, had started trying for a 
family.  Though it took a while for her to conceive, Jane eventually 
became pregnant with her son, Jake.  Approximately two years later her 
daughter, Hazel, was born.  During the course of the interview, Jane 
claimed she was seriously considering having a third child sometime in 
the near future. 
I’ve wanted children ever since I can remember, you know, certainly all my 
adult life … at the age of 18 or 16 or whatever, or old enough to be able to 
think about things, what I wanted in life was to be a mother and a wife.  I 
was busy being a  schoolgirl  and a  student and a graduate but, um,  I’ve 
always wanted to be a mother and a wife probably in that order, um, and I 
went to university ‘cause that’s what everyone does, you know, sort of, but 
I always had a job, it was never a career.  I never saw myself going down 
that path to the detriment of family life.  Family life was what I wanted and 
George was aware of  that … from my point of view I’m doing what  I was 
destined to do (Jane, 35, 2 children, married, not working). 
When asked to elaborate, Jane claimed that having children ‘really felt 
like a biological need.’  The above passage, however, reveals that she was 
never fully in control of her reproduction.  Although she wanted to be a 
mother and a wife from her late teens, she had to go to university and 
then find work, as this was the ‘proper’ thing to do within her peer group 
(because ‘that’s what everyone does’).  Educated at a private, 
independent school in London, Jane recalled the pressure exerted upon 
her within that environment to get a degree and, subsequently, pursue a 
career.  In Chapter 8, I described how the concept of a ‘career’, as 
opposed to a ‘job’, has been a defining feature of the English middle­ 
classes.  While a ‘job’ is a means to earn a living, ‘the term “career” 
implies some long­term progression within an occupation, or through a 
series of occupations involving increasing levels of responsibility at each 
stage’ (Hardill et al. 1997, p.316).  A ‘career’ is an essential component of 
the identity of British middle­class men and, increasingly, women (see 
next Chapter).  The same is also true of higher education (see Chapter 8). 
Therefore, despite feeling that her work was ‘never a career,’ to a certain 
extent, Jane was compelled to conform to the expectations specific to her 
social class.  As a result, she had children later than she originally hoped. 
Another setback to Jane’s goal of becoming a mother, however, was 
her temporary experience of infertility. Planning gone wrong was a
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recurrent theme in informants’ narratives of the process of childbearing, 
and infertility was often the cause. 
It was absolutely planned;  I  calculated  the days exactly  but  in  the end  I 
found it difficult getting pregnant and we went to an infertility clinic.  I used 
to think that you just decided to have a child and that was it, but it’s not like 
that (Susie, 35, 2 children, married, not working). 
It  took me 18 months to get pregnant.   I was very  irritated.  Up until  then 
everything  in my  life was planned and  I got everything  I wanted, but  this 
was out of my control.    I was pissed off (Wendy, 38, 2 children, married, 
working part­time). 
That reproduction was not in their grasp was especially traumatic for 
Susie and Wendy, as it had been for Jane.  No matter how much energy 
these women had invested in creating the ‘right’ conditions for starting a 
family (see Section 10.4), they were not prepared to have trouble 
conceiving and to hear there was a chance they would remain childless. 
This is despite the intense media attention that the subject of infertility 
and the ‘biological clock’ received during the period of my fieldwork 
(Chapter 9, Sections 9.8 and 9.9).  Yet, it is not surprising given that all 
three women claimed they were accustomed to feeling a sense of control 
over their lives.  Informants often told me that if faced with a problem at 
work, they usually knew of a way to fix it.  Pregnancy, childbirth and 
motherhood, on the other hand, were sometimes beyond their command; 
an eventuality that well­educated, professional middle­class women like 
Susie, Wendy and Jane had not anticipated. 
Plans to start a family could also change owing to forces beyond the 
realm of biology (see Section 10.4).  More commonly, however, there was 
no strategy to be disturbed.  In fact, the majority of informants expressed 
having had a casual attitude towards their reproductive futures. 
I was never, you know, I’d read about women who were desperate to have 
children.  I just never felt like that, not ever.  You know, I had a good job, a 
career,  um,  and until  I met my  husband,  although  I’d  been with  various 
people, I’d never really, it’d never been on my agenda particularly.  To be 
honest even when my husband and I got married it wasn’t particularly high 
on  our  agenda.    I  was  kind  of  like,  ‘if  it  happens  it  will  be  fine  and  if  it 
doesn’t it will be fine’ (laughs).  So, no, I’d never thought about it before … 
and, to be honest, when I found out I was pregnant I was quite shocked … 
we never really made a conscious decision … I mean I didn’t go all out to 
stop it but nor did I, you know, make the decision this is going to be it now, 
kind of  thing.  I’d  been  on  the pill  for  quite  a  long  time and didn’t  really 
want  to  continue  that,  you  know,  the health part  of  that,  but  then  I  was 
thinking ‘whatever else I do is not going to be as reliable.  Does that bother 
me or not?’ And  I kind of  figured,  ‘well, probably not,’ so  if  it happens,  it 
happens (Nancy, 41, 1 child, married, not working). 
Nancy’s approach to childbearing counters the assumed subjectivity of 
individuals living in ‘modern’ societies, according to which fertility is a
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product of ‘rational’ and ‘active’ decision­making (Carter 1995).  In other 
words, it challenges the ‘procreative ideology’ that is dominant in Euro­ 
American contexts, described by Ruhl (2002) as the ‘willed pregnancy’. 
Instead, Nancy’s transition to motherhood entailed a gradual process of 
coming to terms with the idea of having children and allowing herself to 
get pregnant without actively pursuing it.  This tactic is similar in kind to 
a ‘non­decision’ (Finch and Mason 1993).  Fjellman (1976, p.89­90) first 
coined the phrase ‘non­decision decisions’ in order to define ‘situations in 
which one lets the flow of time take the decision out of one’s hand by 
making no explicit choice at all.’  Finch and Mason (1993) refine this idea 
by suggesting that ‘non­decisions’ encompass acts that are neither the 
outcome of purposeful intentions nor obvious elusion, but of an 
unspoken means of ‘reaching an understanding’ via a series of subtle, 
more or less unconscious negotiations with one’s self or others. 
Another way to characterize Nancy’s experience would be to use 
the phrase planned accident.  While she made no explicit effort to have a 
child, Nancy did not fall pregnant entirely by chance either because she 
stopped using contraception, knowing what the consequences might be. 
The term planned accident does not imply that informants had a 
predetermined strategy in mind, which they implemented under 
supposedly unscheduled circumstances.  Instead, it aims to encapsulate 
the view that individuals possess agency but that they do not always 
exercise it in a straightforward, rational or explicit manner.  Childbearing, 
and particularly the start of family­formation, for reasons that will 
become apparent in the remainder of Part II, is a major life­change for 
white, well­educated and professional middle­class women, residing in 
London.  Having children is an event that my female informants believed 
would permanently alter their way of life; an impression that the print 
media helped to reinforce.  It would seem that for some of them the 
changes ahead were, potentially, too colossal and tumultuous to 
contemplate and intentionally consent to.  One way of confronting the 
issue without having to make a decision per se was by leaving it up to fate 
to decide for them. 
While the phrase planned accident best describes a number of 
informants’ modes of approach to the start of family­formation, the 
expression accidental plan depicts more accurately the manner in which 
others entered the transition to motherhood. 
We didn’t really want children; we just thought we had to have them.  We 
lived in a nice flat; we always stayed in nice places; we travelled; we went 
skiing, and we had a lovely life.  But suddenly, at 30, I thought ‘we should 
have a family’ … But it was a big step and we hadn’t really thought about it 
very much … Life has  to move on,  it’s natural …  It  gives  you a  reason. 
Physically your body is meant  to go through things like this (Zadie, 31, 1 
child, married, on maternity leave).
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Laura: I didn’t intend to have children … I was 29 years old when I did and 
was well established as a civil servant.  It felt right though.  There was no 
decision to be made.  I had some moments of doubt but nothing serious. 
It’s funny, I still see an old boyfriend of mine from when I was young and 
he keeps  telling me  that  I  never  really wanted  to have children.    I never 
thought  I  particularly  wanted  them  but  I  know  I  would  have  been 
disappointed  if  I couldn’t have any.    I wanted  to have  the choice  (Laura, 
50, 2 daughters, in long­term partnership, working full­time). 
I  thought  I’d wait  to have children until  I got  broody.   When  I was  in my 
30s, I realized I would never get broody (Zoë, 42, 2 children, married, not 
working). 
For Zadie having children was not a long­held ambition.  In fact, she did 
not particularly yearn to be a parent, nor did her husband.  For a while, 
therefore, she did not plan to get pregnant.  Turning 30 years old, 
however, made her rethink her future and, in the end, she concluded that 
she ‘ought’ to have a child.  All of a sudden, then, childbearing became a 
desirable prospect.  Laura also never really planned to have children but 
she had not ruled out the possibility either.  However, when she fell 
pregnant unexpectedly with her first child she felt it was ‘right’ to keep it. 
Zoë, on the other hand, hoped that one day she could crave motherhood. 
When that moment never arrived, she imposed it upon herself.  None of 
the three women, therefore, had expected to have a child when they did 
but, for different reasons, there arrived an instant in each of their lives 
when starting a family seemed like the ‘right’ thing to do.  The next 
section discusses the influence that persons close to my informants had 
on shaping the timing of their entry to motherhood, and the final section 
of this chapter explores the events that conspired to make it ‘suitable’. 
10.3 Social influences 
An upshot of the tradition of liberal individualism is that it imagines 
people not only as rational decision­makers but also as autonomous decision­ 
makers, that is, as self­governing individuals who are free to act without 
obligatory regard for the opinions and authority of others (Meyers 2001). 
Biological reproduction, however, is inherently social (Petchesky 1984). 
This means that the power relations operating between people (especially 
between men and women), as well as between individuals and 
institutions, in any particular context, determine reproductive behaviour 
and, ultimately, influence fertility rates (Petchesky 1980; Petchesky 1984; 
Browner 2001).  This happens at all stages of the reproductive process, 
from its very beginnings, when contemplating whether to have children, 
to its final stages, when thinking about completing the process of family­ 
formation.  Depending on the nature of social relations therefore, control 
over the methods and goals of reproduction may be hotly contested 
(Browner 2001).  To paraphrase Ouroussoff (1993), the ‘western’ 
individual as master of his or her own reproductive fate is a myth. 
Women are neither ‘agents acting solely of their own free will’ nor
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persons ‘completely constrained by the actions of men’ (Browner 2001, 
p.784).  Rather, their identities and practices are ‘relationally’ determined 
(Mason 2004). 
Although people may like to believe that they are or that they ought 
to be in control of their own agency, they can never escape their 
entanglement in a web of relationships.  This is also the case concerning 
activities pertaining to reproduction, as Bernardi (2003) illustrates in a 
study of attitudes towards having children and experiences of family­ 
formation based in the northern Italian region of Lombardy.  Despite the 
belief that childbearing is a strictly private matter, Bernardi found that 
her interviews were full of references to persons other than the 
interviewee.  Their influence on reproduction, however, was far from 
straightforward, ranging from the explicit to the implicit.  In certain cases, 
for example, starting a family was a process instigated because of social 
pressure from parents but, at other times, it was something that 
individuals felt they should do, like everybody else.  My informants also 
denied that their fertility behaviour was, in any way, shape or form, 
subject to the influence of others.  In fact, if asked directly, they 
vehemently opposed the speculation.  Yet, their narratives were replete 
with references to persons both within and outside their immediate 
family circle.  Especially visible were their friends and siblings but 
parents, parents­in­law and partners were discernible too.  Crucially, 
none of the evidence cited below transpired because of overt questioning 
concerning the subject of social influences on reproduction.  Rather, I 
identified and extracted relevant passages in the coding and analysis 
phase of the research process.  Whereas some of my informants gave 
lengthy accounts of the impact of others upon their efforts to start a 
family, a few referred to influential characters only in passing and with 
minimal explanation. 
10.3.1 Friends 
Friends were at the forefront of informants’ accounts of family­formation. 
However, their impact was not singular or uniform.  Friends’ experiences 
both encouraged and discouraged the process of initiating childbearing. 
The first time I became aware of the influence of friends upon the timing 
of each other’s transition to motherhood was during my focus group 
interview. 
Fiona: … as you get older, more and more of your friends around you are 
having children, and I think when you’re young and you see other people 
with children, it looks like really hard work and you kind of think, ‘oh, can I 
face  that?’    But  when  you  get  older  and  your  friends  around  you  are 
having  children …  I mean we  came  to a point where we  couldn’t  go on 
holiday with friends any more unless we had  their children as well … so 
you kind of think, after a while, ‘well, if I’m going to have to have a holiday 
with their children I might as well have my own!’
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Gloria: If you can’t beat them, join them (everyone laughs). 
Once the ‘right’ circumstances were in place, news of a pregnancy within 
a friendship network stimulated the interest of others in the group, as 
Zadie illustrates: 
Everyone else was  doing  it.    All  our  friends were,  so why  not  us?   We 
didn’t want to be in our 40s and have no children … I was 30 last year.  I 
just  said,  ‘shall  we  do  it?’    Our  best  friends  had  just  fallen  pregnant,  a 
couple, and I thought if they can do it, we can too … Three friends of ours 
had  babies  one  year  after we  had  gotten married  and  now most  of  our 
friends are pregnant and have one child already.  I think what’s going on in 
your  friendship  circles  really plays a part.    Those  friends of ours without 
children  feel  excluded.    I  can  see  that  they  feel  out  of  place.   We  think 
they’re having a great time but they’re not … In fact, two friends decided to 
have children because we managed to do it, and like I’d thought about my 
other friends, ‘if they can do it, we can do it too,’ so they thought about us, 
‘if  they  can  do  it,  we  can  too’  (Zadie,  31,  1  child, married,  on maternity 
leave). 
Zadie’s claim is particularly interesting given that earlier she had 
admitted that she did not especially want to have children but felt that 
she ‘ought’ to have them (see Section 10.2).  While ‘subjective beliefs’ or 
‘individual perception of what others may think are sometimes sufficient 
to affect behaviour’ (Bernardi 2003, p.538), the execution of an act is also 
likely to provoke a similar reaction among peers.  In Zadie’s case, both 
were crucial.  For others, the negative experience of friends prompted 
them to begin trying for a family.  For example, Rosie, a 34­year­old, non­ 
working mother of two, expecting her third child with husband Elliot, 
had considered launching herself into a new profession but after hearing 
that a few of her friends had difficulties conceiving, at the age of 29, she 
decided to have children first and a new career later. 
Of course, not everyone I met had children at the same time as a 
friend or because of their influence.  Even they, however, mentioned the 
importance of having shared experiences with others in the same 
friendship network.  Kimberly was aged 31 when we met and already 
had two children that she was looking after on a full­time basis at home 
with the help of her husband, Tim.  When she became a mother, 
Kimberly was relatively young compared to her friends, though many of 
them, she claimed, soon caught up with her.  Being the youngest in her 
group to have children was difficult, according to Kimberly, not least 
because the transition to motherhood brought about a change in lifestyle. 
Her friends’ ‘carefree, very sort of affluent, nice London’ existence made 
it difficult for her to remain in contact with them during the early years of 
her children’s lives.  While Kimberly had no regrets for having formed a 
family ‘early’, she contended that it ‘makes a huge difference to do things 
roughly at the same time as everyone else.’
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10.3.2 Siblings and other kin 
A common complaint in London, which I did not hear in Athens, 
concerned the general lack of contact with children and families prior to 
reproducing.  The capital’s size, as well as the diversity of informants’ 
origins from across the British Isles, meant that many of their family 
members lived far away.  All this intensified their sense of isolation from 
children and left them ignorant of the responsibilities involved in looking 
after them, as Amber explains: 
Amber:  I  knew  time was  running out and  it was  really  only prompted by 
this sister of mine turning up [that I thought] it was human to have children 
and I was really sort of shocked because I was working in an environment 
where people weren’t discussing children.  None of the people I knew had 
children. 
KG:  So, you thought it was normal not to have children. 
Amber:  Totally and, in fact, none of our friends had children.  It was only 
when just before I got pregnant that two close friends of ours got pregnant 
…  it  was  quite  odd,  it  really  was  quite  odd  …  (Amber,  39,  3  children, 
married, not working) 
Amber’s experience, prior to her émigré sister’s visit from Australia, was 
typical of many of my informants who, like her, had highly paid jobs in 
the City before leaving to have children.  As a high­ranking employee in 
a large commercial firm, Amber claimed to have known few female co­ 
workers of her standing who were also mothers.  This, and the fact that 
her friends at the time had not yet reproduced, meant that she was 
unaccustomed to thinking that having children was ‘normal’.  However, 
her sister’s arrival triggered a response in her that, as she recalls, made 
her consider that it was the ‘right’ time for her to start a family. 
Amber, in fact, had four sisters and a brother, all of whom had 
married at a young age and had children.  When I asked Amber why she 
claimed not to have spent much time interacting with children when so 
many of her siblings had families before her, she told me that they all 
lived in different parts of the world and so they had little contact on an 
everyday basis.  Having brothers and sisters who had experienced the 
transition to parenthood was, therefore, not the sole ingredient necessary 
to inspire childbearing.  Close proximity, frequent communication and a 
degree of participant observation were also useful stimuli.  This means 
that it was not just the existence but also the nature of the relationship 
between siblings that was important in determining whether one would 
influence the other in starting a family. 
Jill, 37 years old, a resident of Putney, married with two children 
and on maternity leave at the time of our meeting, was originally very 
reluctant to reproduce.  In a local coffee shop chain near her home, I sat 
with Jill and her baby daughter for what turned into a lengthy and 
captivating conversation.  Jill was born in Birmingham, raised in
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Cambridge, studied in Essex, where she met her husband, Phil, and, after 
a brief spell in York, came to live and work in the capital.  She was the 
youngest of five children.  When Jill moved to London, two of her sisters 
and her older brother already had families of their own but at 28 years 
old, with none of her friends in the ‘reproduction phase,’ she did not feel 
under any pressure to start a family, even though she was in a long­term 
relationship with Phil. 
Jill: Then, my brother called me and said he was expecting their first child, 
and that hit me.    I was sort of  jealous … simultaneously my friends were 
getting married and so the penny dropped, and we decided we should be 
doing it next.  I never felt maternal or anything, unlike my sister who said 
she had felt this huge maternal urge … 
KG:  Tell  me  a  bit  more  about  why  you  felt  compelled  to  have  children 
when you found out that your brother was expecting his first child? 
Jill:    I wanted to strengthen my connection with him.    I really admire him. 
He’s a really kind person and has lots of  integrity.    I always looked up to 
him  so  …  he  was  also  the  nearest  sibling  to  me  (Jill,  37,  2  children, 
married, on maternity leave). 
Jill’s relationship with her brother, Mark, made her want to imitate him. 
This coincided with some of her friends getting married.  Although her 
other siblings already had children, it was Mark, the closest one to her, 
both in age and in emotional terms, that inspired her.  A further point 
that Jill raises above is that by having children at roughly the same time 
as her brother she hoped their relationship would strengthen.  This belief 
is noteworthy because it highlights another aspect of the social nature of 
reproduction: having children reinforces relationships. 
It also creates fresh ones.  This observation extends beyond the 
sibling network to other kin and to friends.  For example, informants 
frequently mentioned that, since becoming mothers, they had formed 
numerous new friendships.  The pre­ and post­natal NCT groups as well 
as the various independent playgroups they attended provided the 
perfect space in which to bond with others who were also experiencing 
the highs and lows of early parenthood.  Having children also enhanced 
relations with parents.  According to some informants, this was an 
unexpected effect of childbearing, yet others claimed to have purposely 
brought forward the timing of conception in order to ensure that their 
parents were still alive when their grandchildren were born. 
Well, if you have children when you’re older they have less of a chance of 
meeting their grandparents.  It’s personal (Martha, 39, 2 children, married, 
working part­time). 
I was very conscious of  the fact  that  I wanted  to have children when my 
parents were still alive.  I hadn’t been close to my grandparents and I felt 
that I also wanted my children to be close to my brother’s children.  It was 
not  that  I  felt  family pressure but  I  saw  the big picture and  I wanted my
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children  to know their grandparents and  to be close to their cousins  (Jill, 
37, 2 children, married, on maternity leave). 
I’d never been into kids before.  I never wanted to hold a baby or anything 
like that.    I never had a maternal urge at all.   At  the same time,  I knew I 
wanted the life my parents had.  I didn’t want it to be just Greg and me.  I 
knew it was the next step and I didn’t want  to be an older mother.    It’s a 
compromise you have to make … My mother always wanted a grandchild. 
She’s gone on at me about having a baby since the age of 19 or 20.  She 
had to wait a long time! …  So mentally I was not ready but I felt I had to 
be  ready …  my  mother  had  always  given  me  lectures  how  I  shouldn’t 
leave  it  too  late.   Neither of my siblings had children  (Claire, 33, 1 child, 
married, not working). 
The creation and re­creation of kin and friendship ties was, therefore, a 
crucial component of reproduction, and while informants claimed that 
overt pressure from parents, siblings or friends to procreate was not 
effective, their narratives of family­formation suggested otherwise. 
10.3.3 Husbands and partners 
During the course of fieldwork, I began to wonder about the extent to 
which there was a difference between how informants felt they ought to 
present their agency to others (including the anthropologist) and how 
they employed it in practice.  This is not an easy divergence to explore, as 
I discovered when analysing husbands or partners’ influence upon the 
timing of the transition to parenthood.  In the vast majority of cases, my 
female informants were adamant that their husbands/partners agreed 
over when to begin trying for a first child.  As a result, I did not record 
any consistent patterns of discord between spouses over matters 
pertaining to the start of childbearing.  Female informants presented 
themselves and their husbands/partners as a team with roughly equal 
weight of authority in negotiations over the initiation of the process of 
family­formation.  Indeed, it often struck me how little informants 
claimed they had discussed the issue of starting a family with them prior 
to conceiving.  This is akin to Fisher’s (2000) observations with regard to 
family planning among British working­class couples born in the early 
decades of the twentieth century.  Most of her respondents, Fisher asserts, 
recalled rarely having had explicit conversations with their spouse about 
the use of birth control or even family size.  The majority claimed to have 
reached easy consensus while only a handful had not.  These were the 
only occasions when an open dialogue between a couple transpired, 
according to Fisher. 
The same apparent lack of inclination to talk about matters 
concerning the start of family­formation was evident among my 
informants and their husbands/partners.  Likewise, the only instance I 
recorded of an explicit verbal exchange between a couple about when to
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begin trying for a baby was the same as that in which there was a major 
conflict of opinion on the subject.  The reason that I did not come across 
any cases, except one, of marital discord over the timing of family­ 
formation may be due to a tendency for couples whose views on the issue 
diverge to either split up or not have children at all.  In addition, those 
who have experienced or who continue to experience problems over the 
timing of fertility or family size may not be willing to speak about them 
to outsiders, especially anthropologists.  A further explanation relates to 
issues discussed in the previous section.  Childbearing is not always 
subject to debate or a product of explicit decision­making but rather the 
result of tacit and possibly extended negotiations.  It is likely, for 
example, that individuals who end up getting married or cohabiting also 
have similar opinions about whether or not to have children and if so, 
when the ‘right’ time might be to start trying for them.  Occasionally, 
informants did state that they felt a sense of obligation to their 
husbands/partners to instigate family­formation, similar to that which 
they sensed in relation to their parents. 
I felt that it was difficult to deprive George and his parents and my parents 
of, you know, having children, um, so I did feel a pressure from that side, 
um, and it’s a question of how long you put yourself first really, I suppose 
… (Germaine, 50s, 1 child aged 10, married, not working). 
More frequently, however, my female informants (unlike Fisher’s) 
claimed to have had the upper hand concerning the timing of first 
childbearing, and that their husbands or partners had no objections.  The 
proclivity to present a united front, though potentially reflective of 
practice, might also have been due to imaginary rather than actual 
equality in ‘decision­making’ between spouses or partners.  As Hardill et 
al. (1997, p.324) argue, in middle­class, dual­career households 34 while 
there is an ‘ideological commitment’ to egalitarianism, when it comes to 
‘important, infrequent, lifestyle decisions’ it is common to find that one 
person usually takes the lead. 
Yet studies also show that husbands’ or male partners’ preferences 
with regard to having children and the timing of the transition to 
parenthood sometimes differ from those of their wives or female 
partners, and that disagreements over fertility desires among couples in 
low fertility settings tend to reduce birth rates below average (Thomson 
et al. 1990; Voas 2003).  While the suggestion that men and women have 
specific fertility ‘preferences’ or ‘desires’ is problematic for the reasons 
discussed in Section 10.2, it is important to acknowledge that male and 
34 Dual­career households are defined as ‘those households containing 
two or more adults living as a couple, with or without household 
members, where both partners are working in managerial, professional or 
associate professional occupations’ (Hardill et al. 2001, p.316).
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female attitudes towards family­formation, as well as their experiences of 
parenthood, are not identical.  This was evident in the only case of open 
spousal conflict regarding childbearing that I heard about during my 
fieldwork in London.  Fiona and Gregory were both in their mid­30s. 
They lived in Hammersmith with their one son, Nicholas, who was 
almost two years old.  Gregory was a doctor while Fiona had a part­time 
career in business.  Fiona and Gregory had been in a long­term 
relationship before deciding to get married in their mid­20s.  It was 
approximately five years into their marriage that they started to quarrel 
over when to have children.  According to Fiona, early on in her life she 
became aware that she was ‘programmed to have a baby.’  When many of 
her female friends started falling pregnant in their early 30s, she began to 
think that it was time for her to do the same.  Gregory, on the other hand, 
never had ‘the same burning desire’ to become a father until one morning 
he hoped he would ‘wake up’ and feel ready.  Unable to envision the day 
that this would happen, Fiona started to worry that Gregory would 
postpone the process ad infinitum.  An endless round of arguments 
ensued, which eventually led the couple to seek counselling.  Soon after, 
Gregory agreed to set a month when they could start trying for a baby.  It 
was not long before Fiona was pregnant.  I asked Gregory what had 
made him change his mind. 
Gregory: Um … well, I suppose it was two things really.  One was that if I 
kept waiting for something, for  this mythical event, you know,  this sort of 
realisation,  it  was probably never going  to  come  so,  I  was  probably  just 
going to have to shut my eyes and do it, and secondly … arguing about it 
was  not  making  us  happy  so,  um,  if  we  continued  to  argue  about  it,  it 
would continue to make things very unpleasant.  So it was that really, um, 
and I don’t regret it at all … 
Fiona:  Yeah,  I  don’t  think  you  were  won  round  by  argument.    I  mean  I 
don’t think I persuaded him it was the right thing to do.  He just, it was kind 
of  almost,  there was no option  really …  (Gregory,  30s, married,  1  child, 
working full­time) 
Although Fiona claimed that in the end Gregory had no alternative but to 
comply with her wishes (by which I assume she meant that the marriage 
would have ended had Gregory refused to have a child), she claims she 
had not managed to persuade him.  Therefore, while Fiona and Gregory 
ended up having a child, Gregory’s reluctance to become a father had led 
to the postponement of their transition to parenthood as a couple.  A year 
and a half after our meeting, I found out that Fiona and Gregory were 
expecting their second child. 
For the purpose of clarity, in this section I have discussed separately 
each of the most prominent figures to appear in informants’ accounts of 
family­formation.  In reality, however, a combination of characters affects 
the course of a person’s reproductive behaviour at any one time.  It is also 
likely that friends, family and partners have different levels of influence
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over a woman’s life course and under novel circumstances, though I was 
unable to confirm this among my informants after spending only a year 
in the field.  Regardless of how ‘decisions’ or ‘non­decisions’ about 
fertility were reached, by whom and under whose influence, for the 
majority of women in my study there came a moment when it seemed 
appropriate to have children.  The next section explores the meaning 
behind the phrase ‘the right time.’ 
10.4 The ‘right’ time 
Judgments regarding the ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ time to become a mother 
entail both moral and practical reasoning.  While informants were 
reluctant to speculate about whether there was an ‘ideal’ moment in a 
woman’s life to experience motherhood, they were less hesitant to discuss 
when it felt ‘right’ for them to have children.  As Currie (1988) argues, 
among her respondents the ‘right’ instant for starting a family was not 
attributable to a specific age or phase in their life­course.  Rather, ‘time’ 
referred to ‘a configuration of material circumstances’ (Currie 1988, p.243) 
which, once deemed to be in place, enabled women to envision 
motherhood as a ‘viable alternative’ (Currie 1988, p. 244).  Although 
Currie suggests that questions concerning the ‘right’ time to procreate are 
‘individualised or personal solutions to structural processes’ (Currie 1988, 
p.245), she does not mention the practice of interpretation and moral 
reckoning in which agents engage when situated within a specific social 
setting.  While my informants faced more or less similar structural 
constraints, they also shared a moral outlook with regard to the ‘correct’ 
conditions under which to enter the transition to motherhood. 
Yet, what exactly did feeling ‘ready’ mean?  How did informants 
know that a particular instant was indeed appropriate for setting in 
motion the process of family­formation?  Miriam and Barbara were able 
to give the most concise answers to the above questions. 
KG: What do you mean you felt ‘ready’? 
Miriam:  It’s suddenly on your  radar.   The fact  that you even notice baby 
clothes are cute … it’s weird, before I never saw it as related to me at all. 
Slightly  ridiculous  for  a  30­year­old  to  say  but  it’s  true.    Then  friends 
started getting pregnant and you start thinking of the possibility it might be 
the right time for you.  For me it was also feeling ready for a new challenge 
at work and at  home.    Let’s mix  it  all  up!    (Miriam, 32,  1  child, married, 
working part­time) 
I just started thinking, ‘well actually everything in my life at the moment is 
okay  to have children.’   Like, you know, you go  through  like kind of your 
teens and your early twenties and you think,  ‘oh,  if  I have children now it 
would  be  a  bit  of  the  disaster.’    It  would,  you  know,  either  my  parents 
would  be  angry  or,  you  know,  my  education  would  suffer,’  and  then 
suddenly I thought, ‘well, actually none of that really applies now.’  Now it 
wouldn’t be a disaster if I had children, now it would actually be quite nice 
(Barbara, 28, 1 child, married, not working).
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In the rest of this section, I offer a more in­depth look at the state of affairs 
that constituted the ‘right’ time for my informants to have children, 
showing, where relevant, the diversity of ways in which different people 
reacted to them.  As in the previous section, I separate out the various 
circumstances that constituted the ‘right’ time though they were not 
distinct within informants’ accounts. 
10.4.1 Financial and career considerations 
One of the most consistent themes to emerge from women’s accounts of 
family­formation concerned the issue of money and employment.  British 
females’ labour market participation has increased over recent years and 
their employment rates have risen (Hibbett and Meager 2003).  Increased 
opportunities for flexible working, including part­time employment have 
played a crucial role in generating these trends and in assisting an ever­ 
greater proportion of women to return to work following childbirth.  In 
1979, for example, only 24 per cent of women were back in employment 
eight to eleven months after having a baby, whereas in 1996 there were 67 
per cent (Hibbett and Meager 2003).  Prior to having children, all of my 
informants had been engaged in some form of employment and during 
my fieldwork many of them were in the course of maternity leave, still 
working or intending to go back to work (either part­time or full­time) at 
some point in the near future (see Appendix I).  As a result, their 
narratives were awash with references about the relationship between 
fertility and employment.  While many of them touched on the subject of 
working­women’s struggle to maintain a work­life balance (see next 
Chapter), others centred on the impact that their experiences in the 
labour market had in shaping their perceptions of the ‘right’ time for 
starting a family.  As the two extracts below illustrate, the ‘decision’ to 
have a first child sometimes coincided with a longing for a career­break 
or a career­change. 
I always thought I wanted children.  I was bored with working really.  I was 
either going to change my job or have a family (Susan, 38, 2 children and 
pregnant, married, not working). 
I guess it took us a long time to have children because we wanted careers. 
We wanted  to get  into a financial position when one of us could give up 
work and look after the children … I started my career when I was 23.    I 
did  a  languages  degree,  so  it  took  a  bit  more  than  the  standard  three 
years because I went abroad for a while.  So, I had 10 years at my career. 
At  10  years  a huge  change  occurs.    I  think  you will  find  that  with other 
women  too.    It’s  at  10  years  that  you ask  yourself,  ‘do  I  carry  on  doing 
this?    Shall  I  change  or  shall  I  have  children?’    For me  it  all  happened 
when  I was almost  35.    I was bored with my  job,  so  I  thought  either  I’d 
have to change my job or have children (Leila, 39, 2 children, married, not 
working).
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Guaranteed maternity pay after working for a number of years, 
informants claimed to have been keen to seize the opportunity to take a 
respite from their jobs for six months to a year.  To do so, however, was 
not always easy.  First, there were economic issues to consider, that is, 
whether it made financial sense for them to give up work or to go on 
maternity leave knowing that they may never return.  On more than one 
occasion, I met women who, though initially intending to go back to their 
employers, found it impossible to do so after having a baby.  On the other 
hand, many of my contacts came from relatively affluent backgrounds, 
either because their partners/husbands had well­paid jobs or because 
they were in a position to cope for a while without pay after building 
successful careers themselves.  While important, therefore, money was 
not at the forefront of these middle­class women’s minds when recalling 
the onset of the ‘right’ time for them to start a family. 
Equally decisive was their willingness to desert their careers.  For 
example, Jane, mentioned earlier, was happy to stop working in order to 
have children. 
I  felt settled  in my mind, with my  job.    I wasn’t out  there trying to do  the 
best job anymore.  I’d never been in a career, it was just a job and I was 
really enjoying it at the 24­25 mark and … it wasn’t that I stopped enjoying 
it but  I  felt  that  I’d got enough from  it by  the time  I was 29ish.   Whereas 
previous to that I’d been busy being me … (Jane, 35, 2 children, married, 
not working) 
In contrast, Barbara, who had recently given birth to a baby girl, 
experienced serious conflict when thinking about getting pregnant 
because, unlike Jane, she described her work as a ‘career’. 
Um, growing up, um, the sort of thinking amongst my friends was that you 
should always have your career first, get yourself established in a career, 
and then it will be easier and then you can have children.  Whereas if you 
have children first  then you won't  then be able  to get  into a career, your 
opportunities  will  pass  and,  um,  that  kind  of,  um,  thinking.    And,  and  I 
wasn’t a sort of, we didn’t, I didn’t know how difficult it would be to do that 
option biologically.    I  just always thought  that  it would be easy at 42,  if  I 
wanted to have a child I’d have a child.  I didn’t realize that it wouldn’t be 
as easy as at 25, um, and I just started thinking that … that biologically it 
wasn’t going to be a good option and that actually what did I actually want 
with my  life?   Do  I  want  a good  career?    Yes,  I  did.    And did  I  want  a 
family?   Yes,  I did.   But  if  it came  to a choice, which one would  I  rather 
have?  Would I be prepared to sacrifice having a good career for a family? 
Yes.   Would  I  be prepared  to do  it  the other way around?   No …  I  just 
thought everything is set up for me to have a family now so,  let’s  just go 
for it and if a career hit the skids then hopefully it will pick up afterwards.  I 
still feel that … that, um, I mean a lot … about two or three of my friends 
have also done the same thing, have sort of had good careers that they’ve 
sort of spent a long time working towards, like getting Masters or whatever
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and then … then suddenly decided to have a family so … but by and large 
most  people my  age  probably  say,  ‘what  are  you  doing?’    You  know,  it 
doesn’t  yet  seem  to  be  the  …  the  right  …  the  normal  way  of  thinking 
(Barbara, 28, married, 1 child, on maternity leave). 
Contrary to her friends and most other interviewees, Barbara took the 
unorthodox approach of having a child first and attempting to build a 
career later.  Fearful of infertility and aware that the nature of her 
profession was not favourable to working mothers, particularly those 
who were hoping to reach higher­level positions, compelled her to give 
priority to building a family.  For her peers, as for a number of my 
informants, this was not a wise move.  In part, their reluctance stemmed 
from their ambition to reach a certain level of financial independence.  To 
some extent, it was also dependent on the structure of the profession in 
question.  For example, Susie, a 35­year­old mother of two young 
children argued that in her profession, law, there were few windows of 
opportunity available for women to have children.  To a degree, however, 
middle­class women’s opposition to starting a family at the beginning of 
their career cycle derived from, what some of them described as, a 
pressure not to ‘squander’ their educational and professional 
achievements.  Consequently, the ‘right’ time for them was after having 
reached a stage in which their qualifications had translated into 
considerable advantage. 
10.4.2 Relationships 
A neglected dimension in analyses of fertility behaviour concerns the 
significance of relationships.  To what extent does the timing of meeting a 
suitable partner affect the onset of childbearing?  How important is it to 
be in a stable, long­term relationship when thinking about having 
children?  What sorts of relationships do different people deem 
acceptable in order for family­formation to take effect?  Is a relationship 
as vital a criterion in the timing of reproduction as other criteria?  Does 
the nature of a relationship have to change prior to the birth of a child, for 
example, to turn from a cohabiting union into a marital union? 
According to Nancy and Jenny, being in a stable relationship was a key 
prerequisite to having children: 
Well,  as  I  said  in  the  beginning  I  was  never  really  in  a  position  to have 
children.  I wouldn’t have had a child with someone that I didn’t feel I was 
going  to be with you know forever,  for a  long  time, you know, whatever, 
and so although  I’d have boyfriends and stuff  I wouldn’t have ever have 
had a child with any of them.  So, I was never really in a position to do it. 
But, I often say now that if I had been in a position in my late 20s or early 
30s  to  have  children,  especially  with  someone  that  hadn’t  had  children 
before I would probably have had three.  You know, I think I’ve ended up 
with  one  ‘cause of  circumstances.    If  I  had  started when  I  was  younger 
with a partner who was younger, I probably would have had three (Nancy, 
41, 1 son, married, not working).
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If I’d met my partner five years earlier then maybe I’d have them younger. 
It’s better  to have a child at a younger age: physically, mentally … but  it 
was  a  good  time  for  our  relationship.    We  were  seven  years  together 
before  then.   We’d had our holidays,  our partying; we’d got  it out  of  our 
system.    So maybe  if  we  had had  them  earlier we’d  be  frustrated now. 
OK, so we can’t go skiing twice a year any more but we’ve done that … 
We’d  got  over  the  initial  honeymoon  period  of  the  relationship  and  the 
falling  out  period  too.    We  felt  we  knew  each  other  well  enough. 
Everything  had  been  said  and  done.    I  don’t  understand  how  people 
who’ve known each other for only one or two years can get married and 
have a baby.  After seven years, I knew we’d be fine.  He wasn’t going to 
be a slacker (Jenny, 37, 2 children, in partnership, not working). 
A surprising finding to emerge from the field relates to informants’ 
stance on marriage.  In Great Britain, cohabitation is widespread (Haskey 
2001) and is closely associated with extra­marital childbearing (Kiernan 
1996).  Given the popularity of such unions, therefore, I expected my 
informants to have less regard for marriage than they did and to be more 
open to the idea of having children outside a marital union.  Out of 82 
informants, however, 66 that I knew of were married.  Yet, marriage on 
its own was not enough to activate the ‘right’ time for childbearing.  A 
number of my informants claimed they did not want to start a family 
immediately after exchanging their vows.  Some wanted to test the 
relationship prior to getting pregnant while others wished to enjoy 
married life before becoming parents. 
I was married for four years, so it was the right time in my relationship to 
extend the family … I always thought  it was the natural progression after 
being married (Jessica, married, 28, 2 children, not working). 
Jessica’s account illustrates that although, in her mind, marriage and 
having children were closely associated practices ­ childbearing had to 
occur within the marital union – the two states were different.  She 
wanted to experience the pleasures of married life independently of 
parenthood.  In this sense, marriage was a worthwhile pursuit in and of 
itself. 
Yet the middle­class ideal of having children within a marital or 
cohabiting union was not a reality for all my informants.  Anastasia was a 
43­year­old single mother of a baby girl who was only a few months old. 
At the age of 30, she learnt she had endometriosis, a painful and chronic 
gynaecological disease that makes it difficult or impossible for the 
sufferer to conceive.  At the time, Anastasia was not in a relationship and 
alleged not to have even considered the idea of becoming a parent at that 
stage, although she ‘loved children.’ 
KG: Perhaps we can start from the moment you found out that you might 
possibly never have children.
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Anastasia:  Yes,  yes,  so, when  you’re  told  something  like  that,  um, well, 
and, also, I was told, ‘well, the best thing is actually to go and try and get 
pregnant’ and I thought, ‘well that is so ridiculous, how irresponsible.’  I’m 
not with anybody,  there’s nobody,  you  know,  around and  I  don’t  want  a 
baby  for  the  baby’s  sake  …  I  always  believed  that  you  needed  a 
committed relationship  in order to bring up a child.   So, you know,  it was 
out  of  the  question  and  it  was  completely  out  of  the  question  for  many 
years  because  I  wasn’t  in  a  relationship  and  I  didn’t  think  it  was 
appropriate … [and  then  I] entered  this mad sort of  relationship with  this 
man that I’ve known for years and sort of literally, almost spontaneously … 
well, I mean immediately in a sense, I got pregnant and I couldn’t believe 
it.  I thought, ‘no, this cannot be!  How can I have just got pregnant like this 
at 42?’  (Anastasia, 43, 1 child, single mother, not working) 
Anastasia both expected and wanted to have children within the context 
of a relationship.  To start a family outside ‘a committed relationship’ was 
‘irresponsible’.  On the other hand, both her endometriosis and the fact 
that she had not met anyone with whom she could settle down, meant 
that she ended up getting pregnant unexpectedly outside the confines of 
a stable relationship.  Despite conditions being different to what she had 
imagined, she decided to keep the baby.  Her daughter’s father now lived 
in Austria and only saw them both occasionally.  Anastasia’s experience 
reveals that being in a stable relationship or marriage prior to having 
children is, in practice, not always achievable even among the affluent 
middle­classes.  However, it also highlights the persistence of a domestic 
ideal that is middle­class in origin and, as Crow and Allan (1990, p.11) 
argue, ‘contains notions about equality and companionship within 
marriage; it perceives children as being a focal life interest; and it sees the 
home as a comfortable relaxed environment in which personally fulfilling 
family relationships can grow and develop.’ 
10.4.3 The ‘biological clock’ and the fear of infertility 
Nowhere was the lack of control that informants felt they had over the 
‘right’ time for family­formation more vividly expressed than when they 
discussed the issue of age.  Ideally, having children ‘too young’ (on 
average below the age of 26) or ‘too old’ (over the age of 35) was best 
avoided.  The ‘right’ age for female reproduction was the late 20s or early 
30s.  The fear of infertility or the ‘biological clock’ ticking away had a 
strong presence in informants’ narratives, as it did in the print media. 
However, each woman I spoke with seemed to have dealt with it in a 
different way.  As with all the conditions involved in making up the 
‘right’ time, ultimately, the onset of childbearing was the result of 
compromise, reached following a process of negotiation.  In this case, 
what had to be resolved was the conflict between perceived bodily 
demands and personal wishes. 
My brain was not  ready  to have kids before then but at  the same  time,  I 
knew I was getting older (Claire, married, 33, 1 child, not working).
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For some, the route to reconciliation was easy because their bodies were 
‘telling’ them it was the ‘right’ time.  Overwhelming feelings of 
‘broodiness’ were often explained in this way.  For others, the intention to 
have a certain number of children coupled with knowledge of the 35­year 
age limit urged them to consider having children earlier than they would 
have perhaps liked.  A few, however, did not feel rushed by the 
‘biological clock’.  Instead, they were opposed to the idea of being ‘old’ 
mothers, out of touch with their children’s lives because of generational 
distance.  Regardless of opinion and the chosen mode of negotiation, 
perceptions of the ‘right’ time for family­formation were never separate 
from ideas about the body.  This is easy to forget in a ‘disembodied 
ethics’ or ‘ethics of modernity, in which the subject ideally acts 
independently of interests, bodily desire, others, prejudice or tradition’ 
(Colebrook 1997, p.21).  As Petchesky (1984) reminds us, however, while 
reproduction is a ‘social activity,’ pregnancies still occur within women’s 
bodies. 
10.4.4 Lifestyle and the ‘home’ 
Informants would not always point to concise reasons, events or 
processes in reference to what made it seem the ‘right’ time for them to 
have children.  Instead, they spoke about a combination of coincidences 
and a general shift in lifestyle.  The start of family building, however, was 
also a consequence of more existential motives; that is, of issues based on 
experience and relating to or dealing with existence.  As Leila, a married 
39­year­old non­working mother of two children told me, at some point 
she thought, ‘is this all there is to life?  Work, the fantastic holidays, the 
nice restaurants?’  In this sense, informants believed that children would 
fill the void that pleasure­seeking activities, or the opposite, abstemious 
pursuits, such as work, could not satisfy.  In order for an informant to 
arrive at the stage where she was willing to relinquish her previous 
lifestyle in favour of motherhood, it was necessary to have obtained an 
adequate level of confidence and independence both financial and in the 
sense of carefree living. 
I  think  you  have  to  be  ready  in  yourself.    You  have  to  have  done 
everything  you  wanted  to  have  done.    I  was  ready  emotionally,  and 
financially (Emma, 37, 2 children, married, not working). 
This was tantamount to a series of shifts, including that from being 
‘selfish’ to being ‘selfless’ and from being ‘irresponsible’ to being 
‘responsible’.  Symbolising these shifts was the purchase of a house. 
Although practical on one level, owning a house was a sign of maturity 
and adulthood as well as the material manifestation of a new beginning. 
It also expressed an important facet of middle­class status: ‘having a 
home of one’s own’ (Crow and Allan 1990, p.19).
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Therefore, while leaving a certain lifestyle behind was not easy, 
becoming a parent also signalled a new phase in life or the realisation of a 
manner of living long anticipated. 
Just wanting a baby is quite hard, sort of,  to explain as a biological urge. 
But  I would also say that  there was quite a strong desire for a change of 
lifestyle  because,  not  that  my  job  was  particular  high  powered,  but 
nonetheless it had certain stresses and a certain way of being which in a 
way I didn’t like that much.  I always liked being at home.  Although I’m a 
well  educated,  middle­class  person  and  all  that  kind  of  thing,  I’m  quite 
homely  and  I  like,  um,  the home  lifestyle.   So,  I  think  it  was almost  the 
change of lifestyle that I wanted as much as a baby (Rachel, early 30s, 1 
child, not working). 
Interestingly, for Rachel having a child was a legitimate excuse for her to 
stay at home and escape the pressures of work, which suggests that she 
needed a reason to justify her time out of the labour market.  As the next 
chapter will show, while a career is a typically middle­class ideal, an 
equally dominant belief among white, British middle­class women living 
in London is that a mother provides the best form of care for her children 
and that the ‘home’ is the idyllic setting in which she must raise them 
(Vincent and Ball 2001). 
10.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has demonstrated that, contrary to claims in the print media 
and in a sizeable section of the demographic literature, the start of family­ 
formation is not a self­originating, self­interested, rational and economic 
process.  As Johnson­Hanks (2005b, p.364) argues, ‘action has been 
commonly theorized as the fulfilment of a prior intention’ but ‘social 
action everywhere combines intentional strategy and judicious 
opportunism; only the relative proportions change with time and 
context.’  Though less uncertain about the future than Johnson­Hanks’ 
educated, Cameroonian women, the highly educated, professional, 
middle­class women whom I met in London had equally vague plans 
concerning the timing of initial childbearing.  Instead of recalling detailed 
reproductive strategies, they preferred to explain, as did Johnson­Hanks’ 
informants, why, in hindsight, a specific moment in their lives seemed 
‘right’ to either begin trying for a family or to carry an unplanned 
pregnancy to term.  Judging from their accounts, ‘judicious opportunism’ 
­ in other words, the ability ‘to adapt to the moment, to be calm and 
supple, recognising the difference between a promising and an 
unpromising offer,’ (Johnson­Hanks 2005b, p.370) ­ is a much more apt 
characterisation of informants’ approaches to the start of family­ 
formation than ‘rational choice’.  This chapter also calls for the need to 
recognise that women do not usually make individual and autonomous 
‘decisions’ when it comes to having children, but are, to a substantial 
degree, influenced and pressured into reproducing by persons both
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within and beyond their immediate family circle.  As Meyers (2001, 
p.752) contends, ‘if women were autonomously becoming mothers or 
declining to, we would expect to hear a splendid chorus of distinctive, 
confident voices, but instead we are hearing a shrill cacophony of trite 
tunes.’  In the next chapter, I investigate the reasons behind the ambiguity 
and uncertainty in informants’ narrative accounts of family­formation by 
exploring the relationship between motherhood, identity and 
reproduction.  In doing so, I look at the ideological and structural context 
of childbearing and propose an explanation with regard to why some 
women are willing and able to forgo motherhood altogether.
197 
11 GUILT, MOTHERHOOD AND THE 
‘CHILDFREE’ 
11.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I look at the manner in which the interplay of ideas and 
experiences of motherhood, mothering and womanhood shaped British 
informants’ approaches to childbearing and their attitudes towards 
having children.  Regardless of the manner in which the women I met 
deliberated over whether or not to have children and if so, how many 
and when, ultimately the outcome of their deliberations was a product of 
negotiating between and managing conflicting and competing sources of 
identity specific to their gender, age and social class.  A leading theme in 
this chapter is guilt.  Narratives of British informants’ transitions to 
motherhood were awash with references to it.  Accounts of their efforts to 
reconcile paid work and nurturing, their attempts to organise childcare, 
and their decisions over how to mother were constantly discussed in 
tandem with feeling guilty.  Although the notion of guilt (tipsis) exists in 
Greek society also, Athenian informants rarely expressed feeling guilty in 
relation to motherhood.  According to Giddens (1991, p.67), guilt derives 
from a ‘feeling of wrongdoing towards a respected or loved other’ and 
anxiety over having failed to behave in a ‘proper’ way, in accordance 
with established moral precepts.  Giddens believes that shame rather 
than guilt characterises ‘conditions of modernity.’  Yet the women I met 
in London never referred to the former.  Creighton (1990, p.297) argues 
that guilt is found in cultures that perceive human beings as inherently 
evil and sinful, and that view morality in ‘absolute terms based on 
principles of right and wrong that are not considered to vary with the 
situation.’  He also contends that guilt, as opposed to shame, is likely to 
emerge as a chief mechanism of both social and self­control in cultures 
that emphasise autonomy and individuality. 
While all societies possess a concept of the ‘individual’ as a person 
distinct from others (Macfarlane 1995), English society has held 
‘individualism’ in high esteem since before industrialisation, possibly 
even as far back as the mid­thirteenth century (Macfarlane 1978; 1992). 
As Strathern (1992, p.14) points out, this does not mean that English 
society is composed of persons disengaged from relationships with each 
other; on the contrary, ‘the individuality of persons’ is ‘the first fact of 
English kinship,’ and originates in rather than beyond relationships.  The 
English, however, greatly value self­reliance and autonomy as opposed to 
dependence on others, especially one’s kin group.  Parents, therefore, 
regard their children not simply by virtue of their ‘genealogical positions’ 
but as ‘unique individuals’ (Strathern 1992).  As a result, in English 
society, there are no specific rules of conduct or obligation among kin but 
simply ‘guidelines’ for action (Firth et al. 1969; Finch 1989; Finch and 
Mason 1991, 1993).  In cultures that prize the development of an
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‘independent’ adult, the emphasis is on teaching children to be self­ 
sufficient from an early age.  ‘Good parenting’ in English society, 
according to Finch and Mason (2000, p. 176), rests on the ‘concept of 
independence between generations and, specifically, the responsibility of 
the older generation for fostering and facilitating the independence of the 
next, either by giving them a “good start” or by helping them to learn to 
fend for themselves.’  The pursuit of individualism also has a bearing on 
a person’s sense of self in ways that conflict with the enactment of 
familial roles, but it can also encourage childbearing, as the following 
discussion will demonstrate. 
11.2 Motherhood as ‘choice’ 
In Chapter 6, I described Athenian informants’ attitudes towards 
motherhood and argued that the majority appeared to consider it a duty. 
Among London­based informants, I came across an entirely different 
outlook.  Motherhood was not a ‘duty’ nor did it ‘complete’ a woman. 
Instead, having children was a ‘personal choice’, one driven by the 
‘desire’ to reproduce and to be part of a family unit. The British press 
corroborated the view that children were not an individual’s duty, as 
reaction to the remarks made by the country’s Trade Secretary, Patricia 
Hewitt, demonstrates.  ‘Children are not a duty, nor a right.  They are a 
blessing,’ stated journalist, Amanda Platell in the Daily Mail 
(23/09/2004), in the days following Hewitt’s proclamation that everyone 
had a ‘duty’ to have babies for the social and economic success of the 
country.  In the same article, broadcaster, Anne Diamond, said, ‘Don’t 
look at me – I’ve done my bit for Britain! But I did it out of love, not duty, 
and a belief that children were a gift from God and motherhood an 
honour and a blessing.’  ‘As if I didn’t have enough to feel guilty about,’ 
added another female broadcaster and columnist from London in the 
same article, while a former editor of Cosmopolitan magazine contended, 
‘Having a baby isn’t a duty, Ms Hewitt, it’s a luxury.’  ‘If childbearing is a 
woman’s duty,’ writer, Rachel Royce, finally asserted, ‘it’s a duty to 
herself.  Women who deny themselves that joy in life are in danger of 
hurting themselves.’ 
While The Daily Mail’s criticism of the then Trade Secretary’s 
proposal is particularly scathing, it reveals the basic premise in defence of 
which the print media reacted against her, and on account of which 
informants considered childbearing as driven by a personal ‘desire’ 
rather than a ‘duty’ to mother. 
One of  the  hallmarks  of  a  free  society  is  that  deciding whether  to  have 
children is a private matter, of interest solely to the prospective parents.  It 
should  be  of  no  concern  whatsoever  to  the  Government  …  To  regard 
having  children  as  a  public  matter  is  to  believe  that  the  individual  is 
essentially a tool of the state.  The production and rearing of children lie at 
the  very  core  of  personal  liberty  ...  [According  to  Hewitt]  children  are
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regarded simply as units of production and usefulness, to be valued by the 
state  merely  as  participants  in  a  workforce  or  as  carers  of  the  older 
generation (The Daily Mail 22/09/2004). 
According to this line of reasoning, the Minister’s proposition 
encouraged an infringement on individual freedom and the right to 
reproduce independently of state control (Plate 13).  For the British, 
Hewitt’s suggestion was highly undesirable, not least because it 
interfered with the dominant ideology of English personhood – 
individualism. 
Plate 13. Cartoon in reaction to Patricia Hewitt's remarks (Daily Mail 
22/09/2004) 
More in tune with London informants’ way of thinking was Selena’s 
(39, married, 2 children, working full­time) view that motherhood was 
‘an opportunity to reinvent yourself; [to change] all the things you didn’t 
like in your own past; to be someone else.’  One of the reasons for which 
reinvention was necessary was to escape what many perceived to be a 
negative offshoot of individualism and personal choice – selfishness. 
I guess you can’t go on being self­indulgent forever, and I do like it; I really 
do; I like having a baby.  It’s a bit more practical, a bit more mundane but 
life has to move on.  It’s not natural to go on forever as you were. I think 
having  a  baby  is  the  most  natural  thing  in  the  world  but  there  are 
sacrifices.   When  I  reached  that 25­30 stage  I was  ready  in my mind for 
that step, I was ready to, if you like, start caring for somebody else or stop 
being  so  selfish;  being  so me,  me,  me.    And  it  took  till  then  because  I 
suppose  I was having  such a good  time being me  (Jane,  35, married,  2 
children, not working).
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The idea that motherhood was, in some ways, a personal quest for self­ 
improvement, reinforces the hypothesis that among the British becoming 
a mother was a wholly private affair.  Although Jane describes the 
transition to motherhood as an opportunity to become more altruistic, 
she still assumes that the process is of personal rather than social 
consequence.  That becoming a mother was subject to individual 
initiative rather than a sense of duty, however, did not diminish London­ 
based women’s sense of responsibility towards their children’s 
upbringing, as the next section will show. 
11.3 Mummy knows best but nanny knows too 
Childcare featured highly in informants’ narratives of their experiences of 
motherhood.  In order to guarantee the development of a self­reliant and 
independent adult, parents felt a huge burden of responsibility. 
Exacerbating that sense of accountability was the ever­increasing 
commercialisation of childrearing – specialised books and magazines, 
television programmes (such as ‘Supernanny’), parenting classes, shops 
and advisory centres – a process that begun in Britain during the inter­ 
war years and intensified during the post­war years (Richardson 1993). 
A dominant belief among British informants was that mothers are the 
ones best able to take care of the ‘needs’ of their children.  This partly 
mirrors the fact that almost half of the women with whom I spoke were 
not in employment at the time of our encounter (see Appendix I).  As 
Collins (1994) reminds us, not all women possess the financial security 
required to take time off work or to stop working altogether in order to 
focus exclusively on childcare. 
Yet looking after a child on a full­time basis was an option that most 
of my London­based informants could afford to take advantage of owing 
to their or their husbands’ relative affluence. 
I  hadn’t  realized  how  much  with  a  baby …  how  much  the  person  who 
looks after them shapes them … I thought, ‘oh yeah,’ you know, ‘someone 
looks after your house, looks after your cat …’  But someone looking after 
her two or three days a week is going to have such a big impact on her life 
that even if there were hundreds of great choices ­ maybe if my mum was 
a lot younger and a lot more similar to me, maybe that would be an option. 
But I can’t see it being something I could really entrust somebody with.  It’s 
a bit like saying you trust someone to live with your husband or … it’s just 
kind of difficult to imagine (Moira, 33, married, 1 child, not working). 
KG: Did you consider hiring someone to help you out with childcare? 
Caroline: The thought of anyone else looking after my children was … the 
fact  that  they are getting paid to  look after someone … they will not give 
the same care as I would.  I couldn’t do it and my husband feels the same 
way (Caroline, 34, married, 2 children, not working). 
I  think  childcare  is  really  a  horridly  difficult  issue …  [I]  just  increasingly 
came to the conclusion that  the standard of care that  I wanted to give to
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my children  I couldn’t pay for actually.    It wasn’t a question of money.    I 
just wanted to bring up my own children.  I didn’t want someone else to be 
doing that and I just felt a huge responsibility to bring them up.  I felt, you 
know,  we’ve  had  them,  my  husband  works,  you  know,  till  one  in  the 
morning most nights, he travels all the time, he’s mostly here at weekends 
but he works so hard.  I just thought, ‘if we’ve had children and neither of 
us is actually going to be here apart from the beginning and end of every 
day  then what’s  the point, you know, why have we had  them?’   And so, 
um, I just, I just realized that no nanny or childcare situation was actually 
ever going to be perfect for me and I would always not really like it.  I just 
felt a responsibility to my children, to give them the best that I could and I 
thought that that was me (Kimberly, 31, 2 children, married, not working). 
A running theme in all three excerpts is that childcare is suspect because 
it involves a stranger.  Care offered in exchange for money and, more 
importantly, by someone other than a close member of the family is 
inferior to that given in exchange for love, a natural by­product of the 
mother­child bond (Vincent and Ball 2001).  While Caroline, Kimberly 
and Moira could afford to pay for some form of childcare, they were 
morally against it.  As Kimberly said, ‘it wasn’t a question of money.’ 
According to another informant, Rosie, the idea that ‘mother knows best’ 
was a consequence of mothers wanting ‘to be in control.’  All of these 
ideas reflect the view that the bond between mother and child is the 
strongest possible and that as a result the former are instinctively capable 
of assessing and dealing with the latter’s ‘needs’ better than ‘outsiders’. 
Smart (1996) argues that a ‘naturalistic chain’ that links sexual activity to 
pregnancy, pregnancy to birth, birth to mothering and mothering to 
motherhood is responsible for the assumption that the mother­child 
relationship is both natural and superior.  Yet this sequence is historically 
and culturally specific, with roots in the late nineteenth century.  It is also 
class­based (see Chapter 8, Section 8.3).  Moreover, contrary to the print 
media’s impression (Chapter 9, Section 9.2), childcare was not an issue 
driven solely by economic considerations but also, and perhaps more 
importantly, by moral reflections. 
While many of the women I spoke with in London were not in the 
labour market at the time, over a third were self­employed or engaged in 
either part­time or full­time employment, and an additional 12 per cent 
were intending to return to work once their maternity leave was over (see 
Appendix I).  Unlike Athenians, London­based mothers who did rely on 
some form of external childcare did not depend on it from their own 
parents.  I never encountered any grandparents living next door to their 
grandchildren in London as I did in Athens, nor was any such 
arrangement ever described to me.  The majority of those who sought 
help in looking after their children (most of whom were also working) 
were paying for it.  The most popular choice of paid childcare seemed to 
be nannies or au pairs.  In their study of the role of spatiality in the 
production of home space and social reproduction in middle­class
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Britain, Gregson and Lowe (1995) argue that many of the householders 
whom they interviewed also chose to place their child in the care of a 
nanny.  The first reason related to the ‘organizational advantages’ on 
offer.  By employing a nanny, Gregson and Lowe’s study­participants 
could carry on using the same ‘time­space schedules’ as before without 
needing to make many adjustments.  A second, more important reason 
however was that a nanny remains in the parental home.  ‘Quite simply,’ 
Gregson and Lowe (1995, p.230) argue, ‘the parental home was cited time 
and time again as the best place for the care of young children, whilst the 
nanny (by virtue of her location within the parental home) was presented 
to us as the closest approximation to maternal care and therefore as the 
best substitute for this maternal care.’  A third and final reason was 
financial.  Hiring a nanny was cheaper than sending two children to 
nursery, since the cost of a nanny does not increase with the number of 
children in her care. 
Among my own interviews, all three reasons emerged as important. 
‘You can take them to nursery, but a nanny can deal with everything,’ 
Wendy, a working 38­year­old married mother of two, told me.  Leila (39, 
married, 2 children, not working), on the other hand, thought that 
‘society was pushing childcare too far,’ and although she had decided to 
stay at home in order to look after her son on a full­time basis, she 
believed recruiting a nanny was ‘better than being sent to childcare.’  ‘It’s 
human nature,’ she explained to me.  A few of the women I met, 
preferred to take their children to nurseries or to employ a cleaner rather 
than a nanny, outsourcing the domestic tasks involved in looking after a 
family, while they continued to be responsible for the ‘educational’ or 
‘fun’ side to looking after children.  For example, Hillary’s (32, married, 1 
child, on maternity leave) ‘dream’ was to hire a Filipino, live­in 
housekeeper who would look after her children, clean, iron ‘and just be 
part of the family,’ while she either went out to work part­time or spent 
‘quality time’ with her son.  This approach is reminiscent of what Uttal 
(1996) calls ‘custodial care’, where mothers maintain that they are the 
primary adults responsible for childrearing, covering their children’s 
emotional and educational ‘needs’ while the childcare provider is there to 
do the rest. 
However, while in comparison to Athenians, London informants 
were a lot more open to the idea of handing over aspects of childcare to 
others, unlike them, they felt guilty irrespective of the degree to which 
they retained control over their children’s upbringing.  Working mothers 
partly experienced guilt because of their reservations concerning the sort 
of care that their children were receiving in their absence. 
I’m going to put her in a nursery, which I’ve already reserved and it’s great 
because [my company] will subsidise  it.    In this area, nurseries cost over 
£1000 a month.    It’s a  little  less with the subsidy … However,  I do worry
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about  sending  him  to  nursery …  I  do  feel  slightly  guilty  (Hailey,  33,  in 
partnership, 1 child, on maternity leave). 
Women who remained at home on a full­time basis also worried about 
their mothering skills and the kind of influence that they were having on 
their children.  For instance, Hillary became certain she would return to 
work once her maternity leave was over after realising that her son was 
‘getting clingier and clingier.’  Rosie felt likewise, though she hoped to go 
back to work at a later stage in her children’s lives than Hillary. 
I want to be there one hundred per cent for my children but the whole point 
is that they become autonomous, self reliant and independent.  If you want 
to have healthy  teenagers,  you don’t want me around all  the  time and  I 
don’t want to be left alone at home.  Their need won’t be nearly as great 
then  and  I’ll  need  something  to  fill  my  time.    I’ll  only  be  39  when  my 
youngest goes to school.  To do nothing else would be terrible.  I mean the 
past  few  years  I  have  been  intellectually  starved  (Rosie,  34,  married,  2 
children & pregnant, not working). 
Hillary and Rosie’s reluctance to devote themselves permanently to their 
children’s upbringing makes sense when viewed in relation to the 
principles of English personhood.  As mentioned earlier (Section 11.1), 
independence is a key attribute to be in possession of in the process of 
becoming a person in English society.  According to this line of thinking, 
Hillary and Rosie feared that personally involving themselves for too 
long with childrearing would hinder their children’s chances of becoming 
fully qualified persons because it would make them dependent rather 
than self­reliant, which in turn would make both mothers feel guilty.
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Plate 14. Depiction of the association of childcare with guilt in the British 
press (The Times 04/02/2005) 
Amber, a married 39­year­old mother of twins and a third child, all 
of whom were under the age of 10, also felt guilty about her mothering 
skills, even though she had given up a highly­paid job in the City to look 
after them every day. 
I feel … I always feel guilty about the amount of time that the children have 
with  me  singularly.    So  I  always  feel  this  huge  amount  of  sharing  and 
because  the youngest does five mornings at nursery, she gets all of  the 
afternoon with me.   But  the other  two do full days at school now and so 
when  they  come home, neither of  them gets  to spend enough  time with 
me (Amber, 39, married, 3 children, not working). 
Amber’s narrative shows that despite the fact that non­working mothers 
were displaying their commitment to the ideology that ‘mother knows 
best,’ they were still uncertain about whether they were being ‘good’ at 
being full­time mothers.  As a result, while Amber did not feel guilty 
about her decision to look after her children on a permanent basis she 
could not help but experience a sense of guilt about her particular 
approach to mothering. 
Responsible for exacerbating informants’ sense of guilt over their 
childcare preferences was the press (Figure 14).  Throughout 
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fieldwork in London, newspapers printed reports on the benefits of but 
also the injury caused by different forms of childcare provision.  In 2005 
alone, the following headlines appeared:  ‘Why granny’s a bad babysitter’ 
(Daily Mail 22/08/2005),  ‘Why nurseries can help cut the stress in 
children’s lives’ (The Daily Telegraph 21/11/2005), ‘Free nursery scheme 
could be bad for young children, says study: home­based care “better for 
babies and toddlers”: findings raise questions over government policy’ 
(The Guardian 04/10/2005), ‘How busy mothers can pass on stress to their 
children’ (Daily Mail 21/11/2005).  The contradictory messages contained 
within these articles were an extra source of anxiety for British 
informants, adding to the confusion already generated by an over­ 
abundance of childrearing manuals, and affecting anyone irrespective of 
their childcare choices.  Yet the guilt suffered by the mothers with whom 
I spoke did not derive exclusively from their uncertainty over what 
constitutes ‘good’ and ‘bad’ parenting.  It also, in large measure, 
originated in their attitudes towards and relationship with the labour 
market; in other words, their career experiences and aspirations. 
11.4 Careers, identity and motherhood 
The idea that childbearing was ‘natural’ to being a woman gave shape to 
informants’ expectations of motherhood.  Coupled with their previous 
lack of contact with children, most claimed to have had a relatively 
‘romantic image’ of what the process of becoming a mother entailed.  Yet 
reality was very different, resulting in the loss of confidence and control, 
as well as an unexpected sense of failure and guilt. 
The change is so drastic that there is no ‘me’ left.  It’s easier to accept that 
when  you  are  older  …  You  open  up  to  so  much  pain,  fear  and 
responsibility.   The responsibility of keeping someone alive everyday … I 
ended  up  taking  anti­depressants.    I  didn’t  feel  worthy  looking  after  my 
baby.    I  had  no  time  to myself.    If  I  was  not  feeding  him,  I  was  getting 
ready to feed him.  Everything you do with your body you do for your child 
… You have to sleep so you can have good milk, you have to eat so you 
can  produce  good  milk,  everything.    Unfortunately,  you  still  have  a 
husband, you still have to do the housework; everything else still has to be 
achieved.  It’s overwhelming (Emma, 37, married, 2 children, not working). 
Helping to generate such apparently misleading portrayals of 
motherhood was, once again, the media, as Rachel asserted. 
I  think one of  the  things  that’s difficult with pregnancy and with having a 
baby  is  that when you  read magazines you are very much  told how you 
should  feel.    ‘Oh  you’ll  be  overwhelmed,’  ‘oh  you’ll  be overjoyed,’  and  if 
you don’t feel  like those things you sort of  think, ‘what’s wrong with me?’ 
(Rachel, early 30s, 1 child, not working) 
Martin (1990) suggests that middle­class women often sense a loss of 
control over reproductive matters because of their relationship to the
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labour market.  In her study of attitudes towards giving birth among 
middle­ and working­class American women, she noticed how the 
former were more concerned about being in control during the birthing 
process than the latter.  Middle­class women, Martin argues, are used to 
being in charge (as managers, supervisors and professionals), whereas 
working­class women are typically under the command of others (as 
clerks, factory workers etc.).  The physical dependence of young children 
on their mothers further exacerbates the former group’s impression of 
losing control.  As Rothman (1994, p.146) contends, motherhood is ‘the 
physical embodiment of connectedness.’  Individuals ‘do not enter the 
world as autonomous, atomistic, isolated beings, but begin connected’ to 
their mothers.  ‘Motherhood is,’ therefore, ‘the embodied challenge to 
liberal philosophy, and that, I fear, is why a society founded on and 
committed to liberal philosophical principles cannot deal well with 
motherhood.’ 
In addition, Rothman maintains, the emphasis of liberal philosophy 
on the separation between body and mind leads women to conceive of 
their bodies as machines or resources available for use.  Since the mind is 
seen as superior to the body, middle­class women, such as Emma ­ for 
whom, moreover, a lengthy period of breastfeeding was an essential 
feature of ‘good’ mothering (Stearns 1999; Murphy 2000; Wall 2001) – feel 
hopeless when their sole purpose becomes their infant’s survival. 
Emma’s body was no longer ‘a physical marker of individuality’ (Bailey 
1999) but a vessel commandeered by another being.  As Martin (1984, p. 
1204) argues, ‘perhaps we no longer see women as so enslaved by their 
reproductive organs.  But we are still a long way from seeing 
quintessentially female functions as acts women do with body, mind and 
emotional states working together or at least affecting one another.’ 
In my interviews, it was clear that informants’ sense of loss but also 
guilt stemmed, in large part, from the perceived difference between the 
working and mothering experience.  Irrespective of whether or not the 
women were in employment at the time of our encounter, a comparison 
between having a career and being a mother frequently transpired. 
Well,  the British attitude  is,  if you’re not working, you’re shirking.   You’re 
not contributing to the economy and to society, so it takes a very confident 
person not to feel sensitive about it.  You are not valued at all by society if 
you’re just a mother.  People tend to write you off a little bit.  I found myself 
having  to  affirm my  image by  talking about my past  career  and a  lot  of 
people did talk about what they used to do (Leila, 39, married, 2 children, 
not working). 
KG: Why does working make you feel more confident? 
Hillary: I think … for me it’s something to do.  Somebody says you need to 
be somewhere at nine.  You get up for a purpose.  You get dressed, you
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think,  ‘what  shall  I  wear  to  work  in  a  library,  or  to  work,  to  look  smart’ 
instead of, ‘what shall I just put on?’  Um, talking to other people, helping 
somebody else gives you confidence … um, earning some money.   Um, 
it’s nice to have your own money in your wallet rather than your husband’s 
...  you see new people … getting out of the house makes you get a more 
outward  looking  approach  and  realize  there  are  other  people  with 
problems,  it’s  not  just  you.    And  you  know  that  famous  expression,  ‘a 
change is as good as a rest’?  I remember a much more confident person. 
I mean I think that’s gonna come back with getting help and going back to 
work … but, um, much more confident, much more happy go lucky, um … 
yeah, I think I felt I could do anything and now I sort of think, ‘oh God, got 
a baby.’  I think there’s a lot more guilt in motherhood ‘cause a lot of what 
happens is a result of what you’ve done or what you’ve perceived you’ve 
done.  Whereas at work if something happens you’re not thinking, ‘oh my 
God, why did I do that?’ You think, ‘oh, let’s solve the problem and move 
on,’ which if you came in to look after Jamie for the day you’d probably do 
exactly the same (laughs) because you just haven’t got that tie, emotion or 
guilt.  For example, I’ve discovered that Jamie’s allergic to cow’s milk and 
goat’s milk.  Now everyone else would say, ‘ok, not to worry, he just won’t 
have it.’ But  I start  thinking,  ‘oh my God,  if  I hadn’t done this when I was 
pregnant  and  maybe  if  I  hadn’t  had  any  dairy  products  when  I  was 
pregnant, it might have made a difference,’ and that’s a pretty bad starting 
point (Hillary, 32, married, 1 child, on maternity leave). 
Leila and Hillary’s accounts reveal some of the reasons why motherhood 
was associated with a sense of guilt and a loss of autonomy, confidence 
and control, whereas work gave them the impression of being in charge. 
According to Bailey (2000, p.61), ‘work is constructed … as important not 
just for financial reward, status or social interaction, but as a means of 
contributing value to society and allowing expression of ethical aspects of 
the self.’  Both of the above excerpts suggest likewise.  Yet they also 
confirm the argument presented in the previous section that in contrast to 
work, British informants deemed motherhood a private experience of 
limited significance in the public sphere. 
To ease their sense of guilt, British women often described 
motherhood as a ‘job’ ­ one that, despite its complications, was extremely 
rewarding.  Some expressed a sense of satisfaction at being their ‘own 
boss’ (Jessica, 28, full­time mother, 2 children, married) while others 
described childcare and childrearing as a challenging ‘project’ (Susie, 35, 
full­time mother, 2 children, married). 
This is my job now and this is my working day.  It takes a while to get your 
head  around  that.  It’s  a  job  (Jenny,  37,  full­time  mother,  2  children,  in 
partnership). 
It’s a tough journey, it’s a sacrifice if you want to do it well but as with all 
sacrifices, there is a reward at the end:  you produce a more stable child, 
who  is  better at  school etc.   No work  is ever without  its  rewards  (Sadie, 
age unknown, full­time mother, 3 children, married).
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I value the work of raising children.  It’s the most rewarding job.  I think it 
is.  No job will ever be as rewarding or challenging, I’m sure of it … (Rosie, 
full­time mother, 2 & pregnant, married). 
As  a  career  woman  it  was  difficult  …  you  feel  competitive  about 
motherhood  just  as  you  do  about  your  career  (Melanie,  35,  married,  1 
child & pregnant, not working). 
According to Bailey (2000), seeing mothering as a ‘job’ helps women to 
bridge the gap between the private sphere of the home and the public 
sphere of employment, or their mothering and working identities.  As a 
result, I would emphasise that it also assists them in regaining a sense of 
being in control of their lives. 
For British informants, therefore, employment was a central aspect 
of their identities and many had battled long and hard to succeed in their 
careers.  Unsurprisingly, returning to work after having a child, either 
part­time or full­time, was essential to their well­being. 
I  feel  I’ve worked  really  hard  to be where  I  am and  to give  it  up  for  five 
years, essentially until the children start school, would be difficult.  Women 
find it difficult to get back to work; so I decided, regardless of the hardship 
…  I  don’t  feel  I missed out.   Women who stay at  home  feel quite noble 
doing  it.    But  you’re  not  necessarily  engaging  with  the  child  if  you’re  at 
home  full­time  as  opposed  to  working  three  times  a  week  (Selena,  39, 
married, 2 children, working full­time). 
Zadie:  The  problem  is  being  seen  as  a  housewife  and  a  mother  and 
nothing else.  I’m going back to work.  It’s part of my identity.  I’m not sure 
I  could  cope with  just  being  a wife or  a mother.    I  feel  too  young  to be 
written off as, ‘your life is over.’ 
KG: Is that how you feel? Do you feel that your life is over? 
Zadie: Not at all.  Once I go back to work I will get my identity back (Zadie, 
31, married, 1 child, on maternity leave). 
Dan wants me  to  go back  to work.  He  doesn’t want me  to  turn  into his 
mum and I want  to have intellectual conversations with him.  We want to 
be whom we set out  to be.   We want  to keep our  independence … I do 
feel slightly guilty but I have to go back to work for my sanity (Hailey, 33, 
on maternity leave, 1 child, in partnership). 
In all of the above excerpts work is the means to personal fulfillment, a 
source of female autonomy and therefore key to the construction of 
feminine identity.   While work is ‘challenging’, encouraging the use of 
one’s ‘brain’, motherhood is boring and mind numbing.  Whereas by 
working, informants felt appreciated, mothering did not occasion praise. 
Interestingly, Hailey maintains that her partner and she wished to remain 
self­sufficient and to ‘be whom we set out to be.’  This objective is in line 
with ideas about English personhood.  Neither Hailey nor her partner
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wanted to be dependent on the other, and their ultimate goal was to 
become autonomous individuals. 
Despite such ambitions, however, female informants often felt 
cheated into thinking that they could achieve their career aspirations at 
the same time as motherhood. 
In a way, I think that it’s really misleading for women all those years spent 
in education and working.  I know it’s a very anti­feminist thing to say, but 
if you want to have children why go through all that?  I have a friend who 
got married when she was 21 and had children soon after and I remember 
thinking,  ‘how could she possibly enjoy  it?’   We totally drifted apart as a 
result but now I feel that I have given myself an experience that is always 
going to make being a parent more difficult.    It would have been better  if 
someone had warned me.  Basically, I think that having had an education 
and a  job has made it harder to accept being a mother.   Then again,  if  I 
had been  told  that  I  should have a  child at  18,  I wouldn’t  have  listened. 
When my husband and  I started going out,  I was more qualified  than he 
was  but  now  the  gap  between  us  is  massive.    It’s  the  same  with  my 
colleagues  at  work.    They  have  progressed  whilst  I  am  here  doing, 
basically, the same job I did when I started working (Jill, 37, 2 children, on 
maternity leave, married). 
Jill highlights the class and gender­specific nature of her inability to see 
motherhood and work as compatible.  As Segura (1994, p.212) argues, 
‘the notion of a private­public dichotomy largely rests on the experiences 
of white, leisured women, and lacks immediate relevance to less 
privileged women (for instance, immigrant women, women of color), 
who have historically been important economic actors both inside and 
outside the home.’  The Mexican immigrant women she interviewed, for 
example, perceived employment and motherhood as harmonious rather 
than conflicting, irreconcilable experiences and, incidentally, reported a 
higher fertility rate than Chicanas, or U.S.­born Mexican women for 
whom motherhood was mutually exclusive from work outside the home. 
Whereas Mexicanas saw employment as a way of helping the family, 
Chicanas, like the British women in this study, expressed feeling ‘guilty’ 
about being working mothers. 
Due to this rigid separation between home and work, some 
informants tried to maintain a considerable distance between their lives 
as workers and as mothers. 
It  took me seven months  to say anything  [about being pregnant] at work 
because it would have been construed as a betrayal.  I work in a museum 
where  the people  at  the  top are male and  the  rest  are  female.    I  try  to 
maintain a degree of professionalism apart from if I have to leave.  I try to 
keep a separation.  There are no pictures of my children in the office.  I try 
to minimise that.   You’ve made a decision  to have children, not anybody 
else … (Selena, 39, married, 2 children, working full­time).
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Selena’s decision not to display any photographs of her children in her 
office is expressive of her wish to keep her ‘work’ and ‘home’ identities 
(or ‘public’ and ‘private’ self) strictly apart.  As Nippert­Eng (1995, p.35) 
argues, ‘physical appearances, certain artifacts and activities, and the 
people surrounding us are particularly important reflections of who we 
are … Through the visible presence of a variety of living and inanimate 
“props”, we enhance and attenuate the mental distinctions between 
realms and selves.’  Placing a family member’s photograph on one’s 
office desk, she suggests, is a common act workers execute to try to 
overcome the mythical boundary that exists between home and work. 
Selena’s conscious decision not to do so is thus indicative of her need to 
create and maintain two distinct ‘territories of the self’ (Nippert­Eng 1995, 
p.34).  She was, in other words, an ‘extreme segmentor,’ seeking to 
preserve ‘different aspects of self in their appropriate places by keeping 
associated realm contents to their mutually exclusive locations’ (Nippert­ 
Eng 1995, p.36).  While not all of my informants needed to keep their 
private selves separate from their working selves, many did claim to have 
hidden the fact that they were pregnant from their work­colleagues, and 
particularly their employers 35 . 
Consequently, British informants felt they were unlikely ever to 
achieve the perfect work­life balance without making considerable 
sacrifices.  A few came to this realisation early on in their lives, others 
later, adjusting their career plans accordingly.  Some, like Lucy, were 
relatively successful in achieving a degree of stability. 
Lucy: I took a step down in status in order to be at home some of the time 
but it was too much of a compromise, so I looked for another job and now I 
have the perfect job in advertising.  I knew I was capable of doing the job 
but I told them that I didn’t want to work long hours. I still work 28 hours a 
week,  four  days  a  week  and  sometimes  40  hours  but  I  can  juggle  the 
hours I work around my daughter rather than the other way round.   It’s a 
fantastic job. 
KG: Why did you feel the first job you got after you had your daughter was 
too much of a compromise? 
Lucy: When you start to work part­time it means that compared to men or 
full­time people you end up having to prove yourself.  You have to prove to 
them that working part­time is ok.  They pay lip service to you for work­life 
balance but in reality, it’s not the same.  I told them I would do anything as 
long as it’s not at the last minute. I felt I was not doing the childcare very 
well,  or  the wife bit  very well,  or  the  job bit.   When you start  something 
from a blank piece of paper, you can negotiate the contract around what 
you can and cannot  do.  It’s  said  and agreed.    I  explored many different 
opportunities in many areas.  I expected to get something, which would be 
of  lower  status not  at  all  at senior  level.    It  turned out beautifully.    It’s  a 
permanent contract as well. It has worked but it was a risk leaving the job I 
35 Another reason for doing so was in order to ensure that they would get 
their full maternity benefits.
211 
had. I’d rather do that though then something boring.  I expected to have a 
boring job (Lucy, 48, married, 1 child, working full­time). 
Lucy’s narrative highlights the gendered nature of the work­life balance 
issue.  Lucy did not expect to get as high a status position as she did 
because she was aware of how difficult it is for working mothers to 
progress along the same career paths as before they had children.  Absent 
from their accounts are their husbands.  Lucy never questioned why it 
was she and not her spouse who had to reconsider her career options.  As 
a result, she felt guilty for her perceived inadequacies as a wife, mother 
and worker. 
Working mothers could both defend their decision to stay in or 
return to the labour market in terms of their children.  This suggests that 
they were trying to accommodate two conflicting middle­class ideologies: 
one contending that ‘mothers know best,’ the other that working is the 
most important measure of personal fulfilment. 
Now  I  go  out  to  work  to  be  a  good  mother  whereas  before  I  did  it  for 
myself and I do it so that I can have something in the future when my son 
goes to school.  If I was with him all the time, I would get bored with him. 
Absence makes the heart grow fonder (Fiona, 34, works part­time, 1 child, 
married). 
I think I’m a better mother by being away from my children, even for a little 
while (Wendy, 38, works part­time, 2 children, married). 
Spending all day with one’s children did not constitute ‘good’ mothering, 
according to Fiona and Wendy.  Going out to work not only furthered 
their careers but also helped them become ‘better’ mothers.  By feeling 
good about their selves through work, they felt good about themselves as 
mothers because what mattered was not the quantity but the ‘quality’ of 
time that they spent with their children.  In justifying their actions in this 
way, Fiona and Wendy were attempting to deal with a ‘double bind’ in 
which they had to be both ‘ideal workers’ and ‘ideal parents’ (Stone and 
Lovejoy 2004, p.62). 
Yet despite their best efforts, working mothers were especially hard­ 
hit by feelings of guilt, as Lucy suggested earlier. 
I mean everybody  says,  ‘oh,  you  know,  you will  always have guilt when 
you’re a working mother.’    I  just didn’t realize how much guilt, and how it 
would actually tip the balance when it came to decisions.  That living with 
the guilt might actually  lead you to decide not  to return to work (Barbara, 
28, married, 1 child, on maternity leave). 
Jill:    I am planning to go back to work  in September but  it’s bad because 
my son starts school and I have to find a childminder for him for six hours
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a day  two days a week.    I  feel sorry for  the childminder.    I can’t  imagine 
anyone else coping with him. 
KG: Why do you want to go back to work? 
Jill:  It’s  a  different  compulsion  than  being  with my  son.    On  a  practical 
level, I wouldn’t be able to find another job like it.  It’s very accommodating 
and it’s hard to find.    I also feel  like I’m expected to go back and I’d  feel 
odd if I didn’t, like there is no end in sight to this … There’s no justification 
for me not working if he’s at nursery and she goes too … I hope I’ll work 
following the role of my mother.  She went to work when I was eight years 
old.  I’ll go when it becomes practical.  I’d love to go work in some stress­ 
free sociable  role.    I enjoy working;  I  feel useful;  I enjoy  it;  I enjoy being 
appreciated.  I don’t feel I do a very good job with my son.  You got me on 
a very negative day.  I’ve created an extra­person who needs looking after 
and it could go terribly wrong. I hope he doesn’t get into too much trouble 
(Jill, 37, married, 2 children, married, on maternity leave). 
Jill and Barbara experienced guilt because of deciding to return to work. 
Interestingly, Jill claims that she would need to justify herself if she were 
to decide to look after her children on a full­time basis.  This reinforces 
Leila’s point that in Britain, ‘if you’re not working, you’re shirking.’ 
The majority of informants believed that, as their children grew 
older, they would be able regain control of their lives and their selves, 
particularly since most planned to go back to work.  Yet the clash 
between their working and mothering identities, and the guilt they 
suffered as a result, combined to influence their attitudes towards as well 
as their experiences of family­formation.  The majority of my informants 
had postponed the initiation of childbearing until their late 20s and 30s 
owing to their educational and professional obligations.  Upon becoming 
mothers, few felt they could cope with having a ‘large family.’ 
KG: Would you like to have more children in the future? 
Hillary: Yeah,  I’d  love to have six children.  I  think  I’ve  realized financially 
that’s quite tricky, physically it’s exhausting and to … I know I need help to 
make me feel confident.   To go out  to work or  just  to go out do my own 
thing  to  keep confident,  to  keep,  um,  things going we need  to have or  I 
need  to have  an  income  that  I  can  do  that.    Even  if  I  just  earn enough 
money to pay for the nanny, so I have to be able to do that and in order to 
give all the other little extras I have to have a lot of money … so I suddenly 
realized it  is all about compromise.   I mean you can have twenty kids all 
squished into the house but that’s not the quality of life that you might want 
them to have so I’ve probably scaled down to four … My husband comes 
from one of four and I come from one of three.  My husband’s father is one 
of six, his mother is one of four, my mum is one of four, and my dad is one 
of two (Hillary, 32, married, 1 son, on maternity leave). 
In order for Hillary to consider having the six children that she ‘ideally’ 
wanted, she felt she would have to abandon her plans to return to work 
and compromise on the nature of care that she felt would be appropriate 
for her children.  The lack of value attached to motherhood in comparison 
to work, along with her standards regarding childcare, therefore
213 
combined to reduce the prospective size of her family to four children, at 
least in theory. 
Nevertheless, only a small number of women had or seemed likely 
to want to stop reproducing after having one child, and some even 
appeared reluctant to end family­formation after having two children. 
Although, as chapter 10 showed, fertility desires and intentions do not 
always translate into actual numbers of children, contrary to reports in 
the print media (Chapter 9, Sections 9.4, 9.5 and 9.6), the highly­educated, 
professional women I spoke to were not opposed to the idea of having 
children and intended to have them in relatively quick succession. 
KG: So how soon would you like to have another child? 
Hillary:   We were talking about  that  the other day.    ‘Do we  just go for  it, 
one,  two,  three, and four?’ but  I  think one or two­year gaps is good.   My 
mum’s quite into amateur psychology and she always says, ‘oh well, two is 
a very good gap or three is a very good gap.’  She keeps telling but I think 
two is quite a good gap and I also have to think about how old I am.  If I’m 
32 now, then I’ll be 39 or something, nearly 40, so I had better hurry up … 
I  think  for me  it  would  purely  depend on  the  help  I  could  get,  if  we  can 
afford it.  If my husband is still in the City and we can get help then I’d feel 
fine, but if we can’t get help, well I don’t know what we’ll do. 
KG: So, the financial element is quite important. 
Hillary: It will come into it.  I don’t think it will be about having a child; it will 
be about things like educating the child, or things like, um, will Johnny go 
to  Eton  or  not  (laughs)?    I mean  that  will  be  a major,  how’d  you  afford 
that?  So, it comes into it but I think if it came down to the fact we couldn’t 
afford to live in London we’d move to the country and have another baby 
(Hillary, 32, married, 1 son, on maternity leave). 
For Hillary, as for other informants, a two­year gap between children was 
ideal, though not always feasible. Despite the difficulties involved in 
maintaining a work­life balance and the strict separation between their 
working and mothering identities, therefore, London­based women keen 
to have children experienced higher fertility aspirations than those 
expressed by Athenians (other than the polyteknoi), as well as a better 
chance of realising them.  The centrality of work in informants’ lives, 
though guilt inducing, was also a source of income, which, combined 
with that of their husbands or partners (who were often lawyers, doctors 
and bankers), enabled them to afford childcare provision.  In addition, 
the childcare services on offer were relatively generous compared to 
Athens, as were the support networks for mothers, in the form of NCT 
post­natal groups among others.  These were available to women both in 
and out of employment.  For those who chose to remain in the labour 
market, the option to work part­time afforded them the opportunity and 
the flexibility to consider having a second or third child. 
Alternatively, the rigid separation between work and home, while 
disliked by many, drove some women out of the workforce and into full­
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time motherhood, giving them the time to dedicate to the process of 
family building, with the backing and financial support of their husbands 
or partners.  Moreover, the value that all women placed on individualism 
made mothering a less intense experience than it appeared to be for 
Athenian mothers, and childcare beyond the home, in playgroups, 
nurseries, as well as by nannies and au pairs, more acceptable.  Children 
were encouraged to be independent from their parents from a young age 
and the guilt that mothers could potentially suffer from raising a needy 
child, paradoxically, worked in favour of fertility.  In order to promote 
the social skills necessary for independence, such as sharing, compromise 
and negotiating, British informants believed that children needed 
siblings.  The more they had, the greater their capacity to learn to 
communicate with others, and the better they would be able to handle 
being in the company of people with a diverse range of characters. 
Although for many a family with four, five or more children was 
impossible for practical reasons (for example, lack of time, space and 
money), having three was both feasible and desirable.  Yet, the obstacles 
to childbearing presented by the work­life balance issue, in combination 
with faith in the principle of individualism, were also sufficient reason for 
a number of my British informants to either consider or pursue a 
‘childfree’ existence, as the next section will show. 
11.5 ‘Child­freedom’ 
Journeying back to their pre­motherhood existence, a number of British 
informants recalled having contemplated remaining childless.  Taken 
aback by the frequency of this admission, I started to ponder whether 
being a mother was as essential to the identity of those I encountered in 
London as it had been to the Greek middle­class women I met in Athens. 
KG: Did you ever consider not having children? 
Selena: Yes, definitely,  I had such a fantastic  lifestyle,  lots of disposable 
income.  It was two years before I broached the subject with my husband 
and it was me not him who brought it up … I used to be completely blank 
about children.    I must  say  that  at  first  I was quite adamant  not  to have 
children.   Before we married,  I  actually  told  him  (Selena,  39, married,  2 
children, working full­time). 
I think if somebody doesn’t really want to do it or they’re not sure … I don’t 
know, that’s a very difficult one.   But … I  think, fundamentally, when you 
have children for the next ten, twenty years you’re going to spend a huge 
amount of your time focusing on them, ‘cause you have to, and that’s a lot 
of  time  that  you  could  otherwise  be  spending  doing  something  which 
actually was much more outward looking and that contributed much more 
to society.  So actually, I think it would be more selfless not to have them, 
maybe,  for  some people.    I mean  I  remember  hearing  Janet  Baker,  the 
opera singer,  talking about how she  really wanted children  [but] she  just 
knew that if she had children she wouldn’t be able to sing … so she made 
a  conscious  choice not  to and  I,  you  know,  I  think  the world  is a  richer
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place  because  of  that  probably.    The  world  doesn’t  need more  children 
(Fiona, 34, 1 child, works part­time, married). 
According to Selena and Fiona, not having children conferred personal, 
social and financial benefits.  Not surprisingly, the percentage of women 
remaining childless in the UK has grown in recent decades and continues 
to do so (See Chapter 3, Section 3.5).  According to Jefferies (2001), among 
women born in England and Wales in the 1950s and even more recently, 
the proportion that had no children by age 45 exceeded the proportion 
that had only one child by the same age. 
As the print media acknowledges, childlessness is on the increase 
and not only because of the growth in the number of women ‘leaving it 
too late’ (see Chapter 9, Section 9.9).  While exact figures are unknown, 
many of those who end up childless in the UK are physically able to have 
children but do not ‘want’ to reproduce.  The ‘childfree’ or ‘voluntarily 
childless’ have received considerable coverage in both mainstream British 
newspapers and the tabloids, though largely independently of the low 
fertility debate.  The reasons for remaining ‘childfree’ are numerous 
according to the press.  ‘For some, it’s about lifestyle and their 
relationships.  For others, it’s about money.  A few feel the world is 
overpopulated enough’ (The Sunday Times magazine 29/01/2006, p.16). 
‘Freedom,’ ‘spontaneity,’ ‘careers,’ the ‘possibility to take risks,’ spending 
‘quality time’ with husbands or partners, occasions to go on ‘holiday’ and 
‘weekend breaks on a whim,’ an aversion to ‘nurturing,’ the sense that 
children are an enormous ‘responsibility,’ and a lack of ‘yearning’ to be a 
mother, were all reasons newspapers cited a number of women were 
‘choosing’ childlessness. 
A common grievance expressed in articles written by the ‘childfree’ 
was that parents, otherwise known as ‘breeders’ (Sunday Times 
07/03/2004) or the ‘mummy mafia’ (The Daily Telegraph 26/05/2005), 
were receiving unwarranted amounts of concessions at work and 
beyond, leaving their ‘childless’ or ‘childfree’ colleagues with either an 
extra workload or exhorbitant taxes.  This, they believed, was 
unjustifiable because parenthood is a ‘lifestyle choice’ (The Daily Telegraph 
25/03/2005; The Evening Standard 22/11/2005; Sunday Times 11/11/2001; 
The Times 21/05/2001). 
Having  children  is  a  lifestyle  choice  and  while  I  have  no  objection  to 
contributing to basic schooling for the next generation, people who choose 
not  to have children  should  not be expected  to subsidise  those who do, 
outside  this  minimum  requirement  (Letter  to  the  Editor,  The  Daily 
Telegraph 13/09/2004). 
While disparaging comments about parents by the ‘childfree’ were 
frequent, adding to the guilt of motherhood, retorts by the non­‘childfree’
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were scarce in the print media.  In fact, most articles were sympathetic 
both to their ‘decision’ not to have children and to their requests not to be 
’treated as second­class citizens’ (Sunday Times 07/03/2004).  Journalist, 
Laura Tennant, writing for the Independent on Sunday (07/03/2004) 
argued, for instance, that those who ‘decide’ not to have children are 
making a ‘wholly rational choice,’ whereas ‘choosing’ to procreate, like 
she had done, was ‘for far from altruistic reasons.’ 
In a rare counter­attack on the ‘childfree’, journalist Jay Rayner, 
angered by an interview with Jonathan McCalmont, chairman of Kidding 
Aside, an organisation representing the ‘childfree’, said: 
I think about trying to argue with him.  I think about telling him that without 
children,  without  my  children,  there  will  be  nobody  to  look  after  the 
miserable,  lonely gits  that people  like him will  doubtless become  in  their 
old age, but  then decide  I  really have much better  things  to do.    It’s  late 
afternoon,  and  Eddie  has  proposed  that  I  take  him  and  Daniel  to  the 
playground (Observer Magazine 05/06/2005). 
Despite the infrequency of articles such as the above, those written in 
support of the ‘childfree’, largely authored by persons who themselves 
had ‘chosen’ not to procreate, were noticeably defensive.  The fear of 
stigma was plain to see.  In particular, the ‘childfree’ were keen to dispel 
the ‘myth’ that they were selfish ‘child­haters’ (The Guardian 18/10/2003), 
‘single’ and ‘forging ahead in our careers, earning buckets of money and 
dressing head­to­toe in designer gear’ (The Guardian 22/08/2002). 
Intrigued by press coverage on the ‘childfree’, I tried to find out 
more about them.  Attempting to locate them in Hammersmith and 
Fulham or neighbouring boroughs proved futile, however, as they had no 
structured groups or networks in the area, similar to those the NCT and 
other organisations had for parents.  As a result, I turned to the internet 
where I discovered numerous international and British­based social 
clubs, including Kidding Aside: the British Childfree Association, No Kidding, 
and The British Organisation of Non­Parents (BON).  Anxious not to receive 
negative press and for fear that my presence would make members feel 
uncomfortable, all of them rejected my request to join their occasional 
meetings.  The only way to make contact with the ‘childfree’, the clubs’ 
organisers told me, was to place an advert on their websites and wait for 
a response.  In the end, I managed to arrange four interviews, three of 
which I conducted in person, and one over the telephone 36 . 
36 It is worth pointing out that comments by the ‘childfree’ women I 
spoke with may have been more radical than among other ‘voluntarily 
childless’ women who did not belong to these social clubs and networks, 
and who may not even describe themselves as ‘childfree’.
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The first notable difference between the print media’s portrayals of 
the ‘childfree’ and the narratives of the women with whom I spoke 
revolved around the issue of ‘choice’.  All four ‘childfree’ informants 
denied ever having made a conscious ‘decision’ not to reproduce, as Vera 
explained. 
Well,  this  is  the  interesting  thing  because  I  can’t  pinpoint  a  decision 
moment.  It’s just that by the time I was turning thirty, I realised that I had 
never wanted  to have a child and  that  I might as well make  that clear  in 
any form of my life where that was important … For me, it was just a slow 
dawning  of  recognition  …  I  mean  it’s  not  like  I  go  around  saying,  ‘I’m 
childfree,’ you know?  It’s a word I use maybe once in six months but it’s 
something  about  my  life  that  I  know,  just  like  I  know  I  have  a  British 
passport  and  some  day,  you  know,  they  could  take  it  away  from  me, 
somehow, just like some day I could wake up with this huge desire to have 
a baby.   But  they are not  likely;  it’s not something  that  I would expect  to 
happen …  I  don’t  feel  that  I  sat down and made a  choice.    I  came  to a 
realisation of something  that  I had  just been building within me all along 
(Vera, 36, single, full­time teacher). 
In the same way that informants who were mothers did not always claim 
to have made an active decision to have children, Vera reveals that not 
having children can equally be a ‘non­decision’ (Finch and Mason 1993). 
According to Morell (1994, p.69), although ‘commonly constructed as a 
choice or decision,’ few women actually define their status as such, while 
Bartlett (1994) argues that the majority of her female interviewees 
described having no children as a point at which they arrived after a 
lengthy process involving a series of ongoing ‘decisions’ made over the 
course of their lifetime. 
The second of my ‘childfree’ informants, Frances, a 36­year­old 
single woman who worked full­time in PR and marketing, had ‘always 
known’ she did not want to have children.  While ‘being able to do 
whatever you want when you want’ was a major reason for her not 
wishing to become a mother, another more important cause related to 
how she envisioned herself as one.  ‘There is nothing special about me to 
make me a good parent and quite a lot about me that I think would 
probably make me a bad parent,’ she told me.  Vera expressed a similar 
concern. 
Every  child deserves  the best …  I  can’t  really  imagine a  situation under 
which I would want  to have a child but  I can sort of put on a fantasy hat 
and  imagine winning  the  lottery  and having a  big  beautiful  house  in  the 
countryside.    But  it’s  not  just  about  the money;  it’s  a  question  of  social 
support and social structures and stuff as well.  You know, I read Victorian 
novels  where  in  the  wealthy  households  even  the  doting  parents  spent 
quality time with the children for a couple of hours a day and the rest was 
done by paid help … but I don’t have the resources to be a good parent. 
I’ve seen excellent parenting among my friends and extended family and 
that is what children deserve and I know I don’t have it in me.  I don’t think
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that  I could do it well.    I could do it adequately, you know.   I wouldn’t kill 
my child but I would hate it and then I would love it again, and then I would 
feel guilty  and everything,  you  know, not being  the perfect parent  (Vera, 
36, single, full­time teacher). 
While the vast majority of Athenian informants were willing to limit their 
fertility to one child if they perceived the conditions in which they lived 
unfavourable to having more, London­based informants were prepared 
to forego motherhood altogether if they did not deem their circumstances 
suitable for bringing a child into the world.  This is because the ‘cult of 
motherhood’ (Sant Cassia 1992) dictated to middle­class Athenians that 
they ‘ought’ to reproduce at least once in order to be ‘complete’ as 
women, whereas the ‘cult of individualism’ enabled middle­class 
Londoners, like Vera and Frances, to evade motherhood in favour of 
expressing their ‘individuality’. 
While Rich (1976, p.255) claims that throughout history, societies 
have envisioned the childless woman as a ‘failed woman,’ among British 
informants, both parents and non­parents, those who ‘chose’ not to 
procreate were believed to be exercising their ‘choice’.  Contrary to 
suggestions in the press and elsewhere (Houseknecht 1987), it seems that 
‘voluntarily childless’ adults’ impression that they were stigmatised or 
perceived negatively by society were largely unfounded.  Moreover, as 
journalist, Jane Phillimore, pointed out in The Observer (05/05/2002), ‘the 
question is not about why childless women don’t have children, but 
about the honest reasons why some women do.’  By casting doubt on 
dominant conceptions of femininity, which ‘conflate woman with 
mother’ (Gillespie 2003, p.133), the ‘childfree’ exposed the underlying 
cause of the majority of informants’ inclination to mother: the expectation 
that if they did not, they would be foregoing an experience fundamental 
to being a woman. 
I never thought,  ‘I  really,  really want  to have children.’    In the back of my 
mind,  there  was  always  a  question  that  I  would  be  missing  out  on 
something …  a  huge  experience  that  lots  of  other  people  were  having. 
And it wasn’t a burning issue for me but that was always at the back of my 
mind: ‘if I don’t do this, you know, I might be missing out on things without 
realising’ …  that  is absolutely  right  ­  I would have missed out on a huge 
amount.  Um, so yeah … As I say, when I look back I am so glad that I did 
it but if ­ I guess I am quite different to other people ­ but, um, if I had not 
had children it would never have bothered me … if you decide not to have 
them, you will  find fulfilment, you know,  in your  lives  in other ways, and I 
would  never  say  to  people,  ‘oh  yes  you  should  have  a  child.’    I  would 
never say that.  I would say, ‘whatever decision you make will be the right 
decision for you.’  Yes, you will miss out on things by not having them but 
equally you will be able to do things that those of us who do have children 
will not be able to do (Nancy, 41, married, 1 child, not working).
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I mean like I say, I was very much focused on just enjoying life … and very 
much unconsciously, at the back of my mind, I must have thought, ‘oh, I’ll 
probably be like most people.  I probably will have children at some point. 
‘Cause,  I  remember  reading –  this  is probably  later  – but  I  was  reading 
somewhere that 92 per cent of all people do have children and that made 
me  think,  ‘well,  if most  people  do  it,  it  probably  is a good  thing.  I  don’t 
know enough about it to be really anti­it, so I’ll go with the crowd.  If that’s 
what most people do  then  there must a  reason for  it,  you know?    I don’t 
know enough to say, ‘no, I’m not doing it.  To go against the majority you 
must have a good reason (Moira, 33, married, 1 child, not working). 
Unlike Nancy and Moira, the ‘childfree’ women I met problematised the 
idea that motherhood is the ‘sine qua non of womanhood’ (Meyers 2001, 
p.760).  For example, Iris, a married 41­year­old ‘childfree’ woman, 
rejected the notion that motherhood ‘completes’ a woman.  ‘I think you 
are complete when you are born,’ she told me.  ‘I don’t think that 
motherhood defines you.  My job, my family and my friends complete 
me and I think I have a better marriage, in many ways, than people who 
have children.’  While the ‘childfree’ women Gillespie (2003, p.133) 
interviewed partly explained their motivation to remain childless by 
highlighting the ‘pull’ of the freedom and the opportunities associated 
with their lifestyle, they mainly emphasised ‘the push away from 
motherhood as a normative female gender marker.’  ‘These women,’ 
Gillespie (2003, p.133) argues, ‘reflect a radical departure from hegemonic 
understandings that to be a woman is inextricably bound to 
motherhood.’  Iris, and the other ‘childfree’ women I spoke with, 
expressed a similar defiance. 
11.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have attempted to give a comprehensive account of 
British informants’ attitudes towards motherhood and, where 
appropriate, their experiences of it.  While motherhood and mothering 
are often subject to academic scrutiny, researchers rarely consider them in 
order to understand fertility levels.  Yet women’s expectations of 
motherhood and their feelings about mothering play a key role in 
shaping their approaches to childbearing, often in counter­intuitive ways. 
Compared to Athenian informants, the London­based women I 
interviewed, both with and without children, painted a rather negative 
picture of the role of the mother.  Although, to a certain extent, this 
distinction may be due to cultural differences in the manner in which 
each group chose to present itself, it also corresponds to a divergence in 
the value of motherhood attributed by the society to which each cluster of 
women belonged. 
The British mothers with whom I spoke said they felt isolated and 
overwhelmed by the task of looking after their children, as a result of 
which many felt the need to share some of their childcare responsibilities 
with others (nurseries, playgroups, nannies etc).  They also presented a
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radical irreconcilable schism between their identities as mothers and as 
(career­) women and most longed to remain in or return to the workforce 
as quickly as possible in order to regain a sense of control over their lives. 
At the same time, they felt guilty for not living up to the middle­class 
‘ideal’ of the content ‘stay­at­home mother’ or ‘worker’.  The anxiety 
caused by these competing ideologies, seemed to make British informants 
more accepting of the idea of ‘voluntary childlessness’ or the ‘childfree’, 
but also more willing than their Greek counterparts to have an average of 
two or three children in order to offset their feelings of guilt.  In order to 
make sense of these and previous findings, it is necessary to review the 
differences and similarities between Greek and British informants’ 
attitudes towards childbearing and experiences of family­formation in 
relation to their ideas about motherhood and womanhood.  This is the 
aim of the ensuing and concluding chapter in this thesis.
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12 CONCLUSION 
The ethnographies presented in the first and second part of this thesis, 
examined the influences upon the family­formation practices of two 
distinct groups of middle­class women living in contemporary Athens 
and London respectively.  The focus of both investigations was the 
interplay of ideas and experiences relating to motherhood, mothering, 
womanhood and reproduction.  The findings from each research site 
were subject to independent appraisal in a bid to provide a holistic 
picture of the forces operational in each one.  While it is possible to 
discern a great deal about low and ‘lowest­low’ fertility by considering 
the Greek and British interviews separately, at this stage of the analysis a 
more instructive approach is to compare the outcomes of both enquiries. 
Even here, however, the purpose is not to overlook the idiosyncrasies of 
the two groups in favour of the similarities between them.  Instead, the 
aim is to assess why and how the particular meanings that Athenians and 
Londoners attach to such concepts as motherhood and womanhood 
result in distinctive understandings of childbearing, and what lessons 
these distinctions can teach us about fertility behaviour in general and in 
Europe more specifically. 
12.1 A tale of two cities: revisiting the key themes 
A dominant theme throughout this thesis has been that of motherhood. 
As Chapters 6 and 11 demonstrated, ideas and experiences pertaining to 
being a mother differed considerably among Greek and British 
informants, with profound implications upon their attitudes and 
approaches to childbearing.  While female residents of Nea Smyrni and 
neighbouring municipalities, perceived motherhood as a ‘duty’ to their 
families, society, God and the nation, those living in and around 
Hammersmith and Fulham described it as a ‘choice’.  Consequently, 
whereas Athenian mothers deemed the act of childrearing to be of social 
significance, those in London defined it in terms of personal value. 
Accordingly, Greek women experienced anxiety over their mothering 
skills and not, as their British counterparts, guilt.  These differences hint 
at the presence of two distinct ‘cultures of responsibility’.  The London 
study participants appeared to believe that they were only answerable to 
themselves for their actions, and thus blamed themselves for any 
perceived wrongdoing in relation to their conduct as mothers.  In 
contrast, Athenians seemed to feel accountable to others (ranging from 
their family to society to God and the nation) and not to hold themselves 
wholly responsible for any perceived misconduct pertaining to their 
parenting; hence the absence of guilt in their narratives. 
The divergence in British and Greek informants’ sense of 
accountability and, by implication, blameworthiness, seemed to shape 
their perceptions and experiences of reproduction.  Whereas Athenians
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felt a compulsion to have children, they did not blame themselves for the 
difficulties involved in being mothers.  This led to a distinct attitude 
toward childcare and childrearing.  In fact, Athenians, like the 
Andalusians studied by Collier (1997), did not speak of ‘childcare’.  The 
word is actually absent from the Greek language, which suggests that in 
the minds of informants caring for children was not as highly structured 
an activity as it was for the British.  Like the women from Los Olivos, 
Athenians believed that ‘a good mother … kept her children clean, well 
fed, safe from harm, and provided with encouragement to discover and 
develop their abilities.  But she did not have to “rear” them. Children 
grew by themselves’ (Collier 1997, p.175).  Although Greek women felt 
anxious about their children’s upbringing, their duty was to raise as 
many ‘good’ and responsible Greek citizens as their circumstances 
permitted.  Given the lack of state support for families and the absence of 
childcare facilities, as well as the expense involved in raising children, 
they believed that having one or at most two offspring fulfilled their 
duties as ‘good’ Greek mothers.  At the same time, they were reluctant to 
forego childbearing altogether and inclined to frown on the concept of 
‘voluntary’ childlessness because, under the spell of the ‘cult’ of 
motherhood, they felt obliged to procreate at least once.  British women, 
on the contrary, were sympathetic to the idea of and willing to embrace a 
‘childfree’ life because it was not their duty to mother.  The sense of guilt 
that enveloped those who did ‘choose’ to reproduce, however, made 
motherhood a stressful experience and childcare a highly demanding 
undertaking.  At the same time, having one child was ‘wrong’ and most 
strove to have at least two or three children in order to ensure that they, 
as responsible mothers, gave their children the best start in life possible. 
Yet, the distinct ‘cultures of responsibility’ observed between the 
two groups was not the only source of difference in their approaches to 
reproduction.  Ideas relating to gendered personhood and gender 
identity were also influential.  As Chapter 7 showed, for Greek 
informants having children was essential to becoming ‘complete’ 
persons.  Equally important, however, was being a ‘good’ woman ­ 
autonomous, self­sufficient and pleasure­seeking.  Athenians believed 
that motherhood and womanhood were complimentary states of being, at 
least in theory; in other words, being a mother was as fundamental to the 
completion of female personhood and the construction of feminine 
identity as being a self­reliant woman.  Among British informants, on the 
other hand, motherhood was less critical to achieving female personhood; 
that is, being a mother was not central to being ‘complete’ as a person.  A 
much more significant step on the road to fulfilment was becoming 
independent, both emotionally and financially.  The value British middle­ 
class women attached to having a career was an upshot of this conviction, 
as were the negative connotations that informants claimed adhered to
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being ‘just’ mothers.  Nevertheless, on a practical level, motherhood and 
womanhood were more easily reconcilable in London than in Athens. 
In the Greek capital, part­time work or flexible employment was 
hard to obtain in the private sector, and few such positions were available 
in the first place.  Yet, as Maria’s story illustrated in Chapter 5 (Section 
5.7), women of all ages even had trouble getting full­time jobs.  While the 
public sector offered flexible working hours, the pay was considerably 
lower than in private companies and the entry process fiercely 
competitive, and often subject to having a meson (‘contacts’).  In addition, 
voluntary organisations or networks catering for parents and families 
were almost non­existent, presenting few alternatives to state or private 
childcare facilities, of which, in any case, there were only a small number. 
Although British informants were critical of the nature of the labour 
market too, claiming that it continued to discriminate against mothers 
and families by developing few opportunities for flexible and part­time 
work, professional women in London had a greater chance of working 
while their children were in their care than their Athenian counterparts. 
Civil society was also very different in Athens and London with 
organisations such as the National Childbirth Trust and other parenting 
networks, such as mother and toddler groups, providing an invaluable 
source of support for British middle­class mothers, especially straight 
after their transition to motherhood. 
Ideas pertaining to the person in general, also appeared to have an 
effect upon women’s attitudes towards childcare and mothering.  As 
argued in the opening paragraphs of Chapter 11, ‘individualism’ is 
central to the construction of English personhood.  For British mothers, 
therefore, the ideal is to raise self­determining adults.  It is possible to 
hypothesize that partly due to this reason, London informants, contrary 
to those based in Athens, were not as accepting of the idea of stopping 
childbearing after having their first child.  Parents, they feared, were 
much more likely to spoil only children and therefore obstruct their path 
to independence.  In addition, they worried that without siblings children 
would grow up lacking the social skills necessary to cope with society at 
large (Chapter 11, Section 11.4).  In contrast, as the conversation between 
the focus­group participants from Nea Smyrni suggested (Chapter 5, 
Section 5.4), prolonged and intensive childcare was not conceptualised as 
a sign of bad but of good mothering among middle­class Athenians. 
Moreover, the dependence of children on their parents well into their 
twenties and early thirties was not subject to disapproval because it was 
both desirable and a perceived consequence of unfavourable socio­ 
economic conditions – yet another sign of how differently the two groups 
chose to attribute blame.
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In combination, these differences explain variations in informants’ 
attitudes towards having children and family building practices.  That 
motherhood and womanhood were essential components of female 
personhood and, theoretically, compatible aspects of feminine identity 
made ‘voluntary’ childlessness all the more unpopular among Athenians. 
However, the lack of support for mothers and, in particular, those 
fortunate to be working mothers, was a major obstacle to the process of 
family­formation and a constraint upon family size, as were expectations 
of long­term childcare.  Among British informants, the non­compulsory 
character of motherhood, the importance of careers to the construction of 
feminine identity, and the dominant model of personhood, which 
celebrated the ‘individual’, all resulted in a more positive stance towards 
‘child­freedom’.  Ironically, however, the London women had a better 
chance of combining their lives as mothers and workers effectively.  Even 
those who had taken the decision to abandon their careers upon having 
children felt less isolated than their Athenian equals and less pressured 
into providing long­term childcare, although they may not always 
themselves have perceived their lives from this perspective.  This gave 
those willing, the opportunity to consider having a third child – a 
prospect deemed unthinkable by the majority of women in Athens. 
While a family consisting of three or more children was a more 
frequent phenomenon in the past, today only a few Athenians, currently 
known as the polyteknoi, claimed to want or to have more than two 
offspring.  Like the ‘childfree,’ the polyteknoi, provided a window through 
which to assess mainstream perceptions and experiences of reproduction. 
The re­definition, a year after my fieldwork, of a polytekni oikogenia (‘large 
family’) as one with three rather than four or more children, points to the 
rarity of families with high parity births and to mounting government 
fears that ‘underfertility’ was becoming a major national problem.  Yet 
the mixed response to the presence of and concessions to the polyteknoi by 
the non­polyteknoi also alludes to the co­existence of competing notions of 
‘good’ motherhood in contemporary Athenian society, and to two 
different reproductive ideologies.  Although both groups appeared to 
deviate from the principles supposed to inform their actions, the 
polyteknoi claimed to believe that God would provide for them and their 
children, and that family­formation best remained in the hands of God, 
while the non­polyteknoi assumed that each pregnancy had to be wanted 
and, therefore, planned.  Yet if the polyteknoi had truly left reproduction 
up to God’s will, without using any form of contraception, they would 
have had far more than three, four or five children.  Likewise, the non­ 
polyteknoi were not always able to plan their pregnancies, thus not all 
them were ‘wanted.’  In addition, while the former placed less emphasis 
on material goods, the latter did not discard their importance.  Moreover, 
unlike mothers of ‘large families’ for whom motherhood and 
womanhood were synonymous, those with ‘few’ children appeared to
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adhere to the belief that a woman and a mother were separate states of 
being and female sexuality independent from reproduction. 
The polyteknoi and the non­polyteknoi were not altogether different, 
however.  Although the polyteknoi were much more vocal about their 
concern over the loss of the Greek nation (Chapter 6, Section 6.6), it 
seemed likely that the ligoteknoi (‘those with few children’) were also 
driven by the idea that it was better to produce few ‘good’ Greek citizens 
rather than many ‘bad’ ones.  This places a question mark on Kitsa’s 
suggestion (Chapter 5, Section 5.10) that national and private interests in 
relation to reproduction are entirely divorced from each other.  Finally, 
the absence of a term equivalent to the polyteknoi among British 
informants suggests less anxiety about the phenomenon of low fertility as 
well as a greater frequency of families with above two children. 
Irrespective of Greek and British informants’ distinct perceptions 
and experiences of motherhood, mothering and womanhood, their views 
and approaches to reproduction did not always differ.  Both groups 
appeared to agree that everyone ought to try to have two children 
(although this was the maximum number for the Athenians and the 
minimum number for the Londoners).  I could also discern little variation 
in terms of women’s ideal and actual timing of the transition to 
motherhood, as well as the manner in which they deliberated over when 
to enter into the process of family building.  Many of the arguments in 
Chapter 10, in fact apply to both sets of study participants, hence the 
absence of an equivalent chapter in Part 1.  According to female 
informants in Athens and London, the best time for a woman to have 
children was in her late twenties or early thirties, and among those I 
spoke with who already had children those were the age groups at which 
most had initiated the start of childbearing. 
Similarly, both groups of mothers arrived at the process of family­ 
formation with expectations about motherhood but not full control over 
the events leading it up to it.  While Athenian informants were less likely 
to ponder over whether or not to have children, they were as prone to 
hesitation, conflict and uncertainty as regards the ‘right’ time to become 
pregnant and the ‘right’ number of children to have, as those I 
interviewed in London.  Therefore, stories of ‘planned accidents’ and 
‘accidental plans’ were present in equal measure in the narratives I 
gathered from both cities.  Likewise, both Greek and British women’s 
reproductive practices, particularly the timing of the transition to 
motherhood, were subject to influence by their husbands or partners and 
other individuals, mainly friends and family members.  Even a propos 
the conditions necessary to have ready prior to initiating the start of 
family­formation were comparable in each city.  Athenians and 
Londoners alike claimed that the completion of their studies, financial
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security, a steady job, a stable relationship (preferably in the form of a 
marital union), a roof over their head, and a period of living a carefree 
existence, ideally had to have been in place before the creation of a 
family.  While such circumstances were often beyond the control of either 
group, both were equally determined to establish them before becoming 
parents. 
12.2 The Greek and British media debates 
Yet according to the Greek and British print media, plenty of reasons 
were responsible for why individuals were unable to plan for their 
families in the ways that they deemed suitable, and why ultimately they 
ended up having fewer children than they might originally have hoped 
for.  While some reasons presented in the Greek and British press were 
comparable, others were not.  Featuring in Chapters 5 and 9, for example, 
was the cost involved in raising children, the rise in infertility and 
abortions, and changes to the organisation of the family.  In the Greek 
and British print media, as well as Greek popular opinion, the breakdown 
of marriage and the rise in the divorce rate were seen to play a significant 
role in diverting people from having children.  For all three, this was due, 
in turn, to the excessive pursuit of pleasure (see Chapter 5, Section 5.8 
and Chapter 9, Section 9.6).  Yet ‘hyper­consumption’, job insecurity and 
unemployment, the role of the state, as well as the ‘crisis’ in gender and 
sexuality were exclusively Greek concerns, while the rise in female higher 
education, the work­life balance, childlessness and the rise of one­child 
families troubled only the British press.  These disparities are, in part, a 
reflection of the idiosyncratic character of the populations in question and 
of the differences in the socio­economic environment in which each 
debate transpired, but they also reveal differences in disquiet over the 
source and direction of societal and demographic change. 
To begin with, in both countries, press reports regarding fertility 
trends but also the factors associated with them, were largely erroneous if 
compared with the ‘truth’ of academic articles reporting on the same 
issues.  Therefore, rather than a reflection of circumstances pertaining to 
reproduction, they demonstrated a misunderstanding of fertility and 
fertility­related topics.  On the one hand, this highlights the lack of public 
instruction in the reading of demographic data and reports, as well as the 
tendency of the press to exaggerate and distort events and situations to 
suit their interests and to provoke their readers.  On the other hand, it is 
an expression of deep­seated popular trepidations.  For example, both 
‘hyper­consumption’ and the ‘crisis’ in gender and sexuality that the 
Greek press as well as Athenian informants described as being two of the 
main causes of ‘underfertility’, are suggestive of a general fear in the loss 
of ‘tradition’ and the demise of Greek culture in exchange for foreign 
morals.  The idea that ‘underfertility’ was a product of changes in gender 
roles and relations also reflects public anxiety over male homosexuality
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and the sidetracking of females away from their responsibilities as 
mothers and, consequently, as guardians of the family, society and, 
ultimately, the nation. 
Similarly, emphasis on one­child families by the British press was 
unwarranted, exposing a deep­rooted concern by the media in only 
children rather than a growing trend.  Contrary to what newspapers 
assumed (Chapter 9, Section 9.9) one­child families in England and Wales 
are less common among the most recent female cohorts than they were 
among women born in the 1920s.  Yet as mentioned above, only children 
are problematic since they threaten to contravene the principle of English 
‘individualism’.  Ironically, I never came across any articles in the Greek 
press about one child families, even though demographic data reveal that 
only children are on the increase in Greece.  Likewise, the idea that high 
house prices have a negative impact on fertility derives from the print 
media’s and perhaps the public’s angst over the rising cost of housing 
rather than empirical evidence of a relationship between smaller families 
and a booming property market. 
Considerable divergence between the Greek and British print media 
debates was also discernible regarding the extent to which low fertility 
was an outcome of government policies.  Both informants and the press 
in Greece, for instance, believed that the state was largely to blame for the 
country’s ‘underfertility’ (Chapter 5, Section 5.6).  While family­friendly 
policies and assistance with childcare costs of the kind available in France 
received positive press coverage in the UK, I found modest evidence in 
the British press holding the government or its policies responsible for 
the country’s below­replacement fertility.  Although government 
assistance for families appeared to be negligible in Greece in comparison 
to the UK, the disproportionate level of grievance between the British and 
the Greeks was not attributable to differences in state intervention alone. 
To a certain extent, this discrepancy was a further expression of different 
‘cultures of responsibility’.  As the Patricia Hewitt incident discussed in 
Chapter 11 (Section 11.2) demonstrated, in the British print media’s view 
government involvement in reproductive matters was wholly 
unacceptable because it was an infringement upon personal freedom. 
Looked at from a broader perspective, this variance is also a sign of 
unequal degrees of public anguish over the issue of below­replacement 
fertility.  As argued throughout this thesis, low fertility did not appear to 
worry London­based informants to the same extent as it did Athenians. 
In fact, in comparison to the latter, the former lacked awareness of the 
subject, and were disinclined to express an opinion when asked about it. 
The press in either country was also concerned in different ways.  While 
both sets of newspapers reported on the issue, the Greek print media had 
more detailed coverage than did the British.  They were also much more
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inclined to discuss it in terms of its effects on the fate of the nation.  Since 
‘underfertility’ was of disastrous national consequence, according to the 
Greek press and informants it was the responsibility of the state to do 
something about it.  If the Greek government was interested to raise the 
country’s birth rate, Athenians told me, it had to present them with 
enough incentives to reproduce. 
The causes of low fertility or ‘underfertility’ debated in Greek and 
British newspapers diverged not only from each other but also from 
informants’ personal narratives of family­formation.  Not only were 
certain issues absent altogether from the interviews I recorded, but the 
relevance to fertility of those issues present in both informants’ and the 
print media’s accounts differed when discussed in the abstract than when 
placed in the context of individuals’ lives.  For example, the opinions and 
experiences of informants in both cities did not appear to reflect the idea 
that low fertility was a product of a breakdown in the family unit.  The 
majority of middle­class women I met in Athens and London were 
married and believed that a marital union provided the most suitable 
environment in which to raise children.  Moreover, although both sets of 
female interviewees had aspirations beyond motherhood, for most of 
them creating a family was a desirable prospect that they were not 
intending to sacrifice in favour of a hedonistic lifestyle, as the press 
alleged.  Although this is largely because of the nature of my sample, it 
does question the argument that female higher education and women’s 
greater work engagements unavoidably lead to lower fertility. 
Other causes mentioned in the print media debates over low fertility 
did appear to be in evidence in informants’ narratives.  Yet their 
presentation was not identical in both contexts.  Overall, both sets of 
newspapers assumed that deliberations over whether or not to have 
children, and if so, when and how many, were always the outcome of 
conscious and rational decision­making.  As Chapter 10 clearly 
demonstrated this was not always the case among informants based in 
London, and the same applies in Athens.  Consequently, the suggestion 
in both the Greek and the British print media, as well as Athenians’ 
popular opinion, that low fertility was largely a product of the exorbitant 
cost of childcare and childrearing, or to oikonomiko (the ‘economic issue’), 
as Athenians preferred to call it, is partially flawed.  This is because it 
centres on the idea that prior to initiating the start of family­formation 
individuals or couples assess the financial costs they are likely to incur 
upon having children.  As women in both field sites told me, the expense 
involved in raising a family becomes apparent during the course of its 
creation not before.  Moreover, financial considerations did not appear to 
be at the forefront of their minds when considering whether to have 
additional children.  While this is not a sign that economic factors are 
unimportant to the process of family building, it does indicate that the
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cost involved in raising children is in large measure subject to personal 
circumstances and value judgements, not all of which, in turn, depend on 
conscious or rational calculations. 
The notion that low fertility was an outcome of planning and choice 
was also responsible for shaping the print media’s perceptions of 
women’s attitudes towards having children and approaches to 
reproduction.  Yet set against informants’ personal narratives of family­ 
formation they too appeared erroneous.  For example, the dominant view 
in the British press was that the ‘work­life’ balance issue was a major 
cause of low fertility, driven by women ‘opting for careers’ rather than 
motherhood, thus delaying the process of childbearing and ending up 
with fewer children than they might otherwise have done.  As argued in 
Chapter 11 (Section 11.4), postponing motherhood does not necessarily 
lead to lower fertility.  In addition, the obstacles to family formation 
created by having a career were a product of far less ‘choice’ than 
suggested by the British press.  While informants did claim to want to 
fulfil their career aspirations, it was not at the expense of motherhood.  At 
the same time, women’s engagement in the labour market was not the 
sole reason that they delayed having children until their late twenties and 
thirties, or even later.  The lack of suitable partners and the feeling that 
they were simply not ‘ready’ were equally important barriers to family 
building. 
In addition, as cross­cultural evidence cited in Chapter 11 (Section 
11.4) indicates, and as a comparison with Athenian women’s perceptions 
also suggests, the conflict assumed by London­based informants between 
their professional and family lives was not simply a product of their 
struggle to manage two incompatible loads of responsibilities.  Work is 
not by its nature irreconcilable with motherhood.  While some jobs may 
be less accommodating to family life than others, it is often the perceived 
separation between work and home that makes them incongruous.  For 
many of the British women I met, the different values attributed to their 
roles as workers and mothers, and the guilt they suffered from 
attempting to combine the two through childcare, points to the severe 
discord between notions of work and motherhood.  At the same time, few 
Londoners described having a career or a baby as ‘optional’ because for 
most, combining both was important to their identities as women, as well 
as often being economically essential. 
The ‘work­life’ balance issue was absent from the Greek popular 
imagination and the Greek press.  Although women’s ‘emancipation’ was 
a cause of ‘underfertility’, the premise that women’s loyalties were 
divided between work and home was not widely subject to debate. 
Female informants, on the other hand, did talk about the difficulties 
involved in combining work with family life but they did not appear as
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torn about multi­tasking as did their British counterparts.  While Greek 
women expressed feeling worn­out trying to fulfil simultaneously their 
responsibilities to their families and their employers, they did not 
experience guilt on account of the compromises they felt they had to 
make as workers and mothers.  This was partly because grandparents ­ a 
trusted source of support ­ often assisted with childcare, but it also relates 
to Athenians’ perceptions of work and home.  Perhaps due to the low 
proportion of Greek women in the workforce relative to other European 
countries but possibly also because of the high social value attributed to 
motherhood, neither the press nor female informants expressed a sense of 
divided loyalty between work and home.  Women were, above all, 
mothers and their engagement in the labour market was essential as an 
extra source of income at a time when life in the capital had become very 
expensive.  In a way, Athenian women’s labour force participation was 
necessary to being ‘good’ modern­day mothers. 
Far more difficult to reconcile with motherhood were Athenians’ 
roles as consumers.  A common belief among informants and the Greek 
press was that ‘hyper­consumption’ was a major cause of ‘underfertility’. 
Concern with appearance and material goods also emerged as significant 
in my encounters with women in Athens and it did appear to affect their 
attitudes towards reproduction.  Yet, contrary to the Greek print media’s 
belief and Greek popular opinion, consumerism was neither enforced nor 
trivial, and it was not always a source of pleasure but of anxiety.  In 
addition, a fondness for consumption among Athenian women was not 
necessarily at odds with their attempts to be ‘good’ mothers but rather 
with their potential to care for more than one or two children.  As argued 
in Chapter 7 (Section 7.6), looking after their appearance was a means to 
achieving ‘modern’ personhood and a way to display their family’s 
affluence.  It was also a method used to demonstrate their children’s well­ 
being.  However, keeping up appearances was not always easy to do 
whilst also trying to stay on top of their duties as mothers, as Athena 
revealed (Chapter 7, Section 7.6).  In sum, while British mothers claimed 
to lose their identities when having to put their careers on hold, be it 
temporarily, Greek mothers claimed to feel a lack of confidence in their 
abilities and in their selves upon having less time to make themselves 
look attractive. 
12.3 Lessons regarding low and ‘lowest­low’ fertility 
The constraints and opportunities to family­formation faced by 
informants in Athens and London are not the same as those confronted 
by individuals in below­replacement fertility regimes everywhere.  They 
are, above all, dependent on issues specific to their class and gender, and 
the particular meanings attached to them in each setting.  Therefore, 
while it is impossible to explain low and ‘lowest­low’ fertility based on 
the ideas and experiences of the women interviewed in this study, it is
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possible to learn from them.  To begin with, evidence that informants’ 
approaches to childbearing varied because of their educational and 
professional background, suggests that explanations of below­ 
replacement fertility cannot but incorporate such variables as class, 
education and employment status.  Therefore, theories concerning the 
forces that have led to the European fertility decline and that continue to 
result in falling birth rates in some regions of Europe, cannot assume that 
the ideological and practical constraints to childbearing are the same both 
across and within the societies in question. 
Yet even taking into account such broad characteristics as class is 
not enough to account for low fertility differentials.  As the Greek and 
British women demonstrated, though both educated to more or less 
equally high level and in comparable professions (such as doctors, 
lawyers and teachers), they still had relatively different perspectives on 
reproduction.  This is because they continued to face structural 
constraints unique to the context in which they lived, and to hold 
historically­specific ideas concerning motherhood, mothering and 
womanhood, which informed their attitudes towards and experiences of 
family building.  This does not mean, of course, that the two groups of 
women I interviewed in Athens and London did not share certain ideas 
and practices pertaining to childbearing or, for that matter, motherhood, 
mothering and womanhood.  After all, they did have, to a certain extent, 
mutual sources of influence, both in the present and over time, as would 
individuals from other European countries.  Nevertheless, they remained 
attached to locally­developed and locally­interpreted values and 
experiences, as remains the case for most other Europeans. 
A fundamental lesson learnt from this comparative ethnographic 
investigation, therefore, concerns the manner in which demographic 
explanations of low and ‘lowest­low’ fertility treat the variables they 
choose in order to support their hypotheses.  As shown throughout this 
thesis, the same concepts looked at in both field sites contained rather 
different meanings for Greek and British informants, with distinct 
implications upon their attitudes and approaches towards having 
children.  Similar concepts within each group also had a unique 
relationship to each other.  As the previous section argued, for example, 
although work and motherhood were equally important aspects of 
feminine identity in Athens and London, unlike the British women 
interviewed, Greek women did not perceive motherhood as entirely 
opposed to working nor as of inferior social value. 
Finally, due to demographers’ insistence in perceiving variations in 
below­replacement fertility in terms of differences in quantity rather than 
quality, their explanations remain focused on the individual or couple 
and their characteristics.  This is a function of the survey methodology
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intrinsic to demography.  Unlike ethnographic approaches, surveys rely 
on information largely based on their respondents in order to build a 
picture of the environment in which their research is set.  They also 
depend on the more normative level of experience rather than what 
people actually do when observed or what they reveal they do when 
permitted to talk about their lives in an open­ended discussion. 
Anthropologists, in contrast, use evidence stemming from both 
informants’ and their own personal observations, and from other sources 
(such as the media), to understand the context from which certain ideas 
and practices derive.  They are thus able to understand what people 
actually do rather than what they think they ought to do, the latter being 
what surveys typically manage to establish.  Like other processes, 
reproduction does not occur in a vacuum, subject to the whim of 
individuals and their partners.  Childbearing is the outcome of influences 
from a range of persons, including friends, parents and siblings, and of 
numerous structural conditions.  The ethnographic nature of this research 
made it possible to see why and how this occurred in two different urban 
European low fertility settings.  Therefore, while population­level 
patterns remain important to directing research, it is by listening to 
people’s experiences first­hand and by observing their behaviour that 
broad­scale trends can begin to make sense. 
12.4 Future research 
Findings from this study bring to light a series of issues and questions in 
need of further investigation.  While these stem from and, therefore, 
relate specifically to the middle­class informants from Athens and 
London, some of them are relevant to groups other than the two looked 
at in this enquiry. 
1. Men: Absent from this investigation were men.  Although I 
attempted to speak to as many men as possible in each field site, 
the methods I used and the contacts I made in each city resulted in 
this being a predominantly female­centred study.  Yet the 
following questions are of interest:  What are middle­class Greek 
and British men’s perceptions and experiences of reproduction in 
Athens and London respectively?  Do men and women from each 
group have similar attitudes towards having children and 
comparable feelings about parenthood?  To what extent do fertility 
outcomes depend on these men’s attitudes to family­formation? 
What is the link between fatherhood, fathering and reproduction 
among each set of informants?  Do middle­class Athenian men’s 
ideas about and experiences of reproduction differ from those 
based in London?  Are there similar expectations of men in each 
city to become fathers, and does the number of children they have 
matter?  What are men’s thoughts on women’s approaches to 
childbearing?  Finally, what are Greek and British men’s views on
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‘voluntary childlessness’ and are there ‘childfree’ men in each 
place?  What are their views on fatherhood and having children? 
2. Inter­generational differences: Throughout the course of both 
studies, I wondered about the inter­generational differences in the 
attitudes and experiences of reproduction of each group.  Due to 
the nature of this study, I ended up speaking to mothers mainly in 
their 30s and 40s rather than older mothers or women in their 20s 
who did not yet have children.  Are there differences in 
perceptions and experiences of family­formation among middle­ 
class women (and men) belonging to different age groups in 
contemporary Athens and London, and do they show up in the 
fertility behaviour of each?  What aspect of fertility behaviour do 
variations in such opinions affect?  What are young, single and 
childless Greek and British middle­class women’s (and men’s) 
fertility aspirations, if any?  How well thought­out are their 
reproductive ambitions?  Do Athenian and Londoners’ views 
differ considerably?  To what extent is remaining childless 
acceptable among each group?  Do older generations of women 
(and men) appear to influence the reproductive aspirations of their 
children and grandchildren?  If so, in what way do they do so?  Is 
it in a manner encouraging or discouraging of ‘large’ families? 
3. Polyteknoi: Given that I spoke to only a few of the polyteknoi 
(‘those with many children’) in Athens, I would like to know more 
about their history as a group.  When did the term first appear and 
why?  How many different organisations of polyteknoi are there 
and how similar are they?  What are their aims and objectives? 
What do they think about the shift in the definition of the term 
polytekni oikogenia from one that consists of four or more children 
to one containing three and above?  How do families with more 
than two children feel about the label polyteknoi?  Do they all have 
attachments to these formal organisations?  What are the attitudes 
of the polyteknoi towards the ligoteknoi (‘those with few children’)? 
How different are their perceptions and experiences of 
reproduction? 
4. ‘Childfree’: Just as I did not manage to interview many polyteknoi 
in Athens, so I was not able to find and converse with a large 
number of ‘childfree’ Londoners.  Numerous questions therefore 
remain unanswered with respect to the ‘childfree’:  When did the 
term start gaining popularity and how do ‘voluntarily childless’ 
men and women feel about using it?  How do ‘childfree’ 
individuals come to the realisation that they do not want to have 
children?  What are the initial reactions of family, friends and 
work colleagues to that recognition?  How does being ‘childfree’ 
affect their relationships with friends, family, and work 
colleagues?  How far are they willing to go to guarantee that they
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remain ‘childfree’?  What do the ‘childfree’ think about 
representations of themselves in the media? 
5. Media: What are Greek and British mothers and fathers’ reactions 
in general to the media’s suggestions of their respective 
contributions to low fertility?  Do they feel that the constraints to 
childbearing that they face are subject to just representation and 
discussion in the media?  How affected are they by what they read 
in the press regarding matters pertaining to reproduction, such as 
the ‘biological clock’, ‘infertility’, ‘the work­life balance’ and ‘the 
postponement of parenthood’?  How do young, childless women 
and men react to the same stories?  Do they take any notice of 
them?  If so, do they make them feel anxious about their own 
reproductive futures? 
Ethnographic studies inspired by European demographic trends present 
anthropologists with many challenges but also with plenty of 
opportunities to test, re­evaluate and improve the theoretical and 
methodological tools at their disposal.  They also provide them with 
occasions to enrich the field of anthropology at ‘home’ and to 
demonstrate the discipline’s potential to contribute to the assumptions of 
demography.  As this thesis has shown, and as the further questions it 
has generated demonstrate, the anthropological demography of Europe is 
a promising field with endless potential to grow.  Most importantly, it is 
proof of the value of inter­disciplinary research.
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APPENDIX I: INTERVIEW AND INFORMANT CHARACTERISTICS 
Athens London 
Types of interview Total number of interviews 106 79 
Focus groups 1 (0.94%) 1 (1.3%) 
Taped interviews 18 (including focus group) 
(17%) 
21 (including focus group) 
(26.6%) 
Interviews recorded by hand 88 (83%) 58 (73.4%) 
Interviews memorised 1 (0.94%) 1 (1.3%) 
Interviews at home 17 (16%) 27 (including focus group) 
Interviews in playgroups 76 (71.6%) 42 (53.2%) 
Interviews elsewhere 13 (including focus group) 
12.3%) 
11 (14%) 
Interviews with couples 13 (12.3%) 3 (3.8%) 
Informants Total number of informants 127 (excluding focus group) 82 (excluding focus group) 
Sex Female informants 90 (70.9%) 76 (92.7%) 
Male informants 37 (29.1%) 6 (7.3%) 
Age 20­29 8 (6.3%) 7 (8.5%) 
30­35 23 (18.1%) 26 (31.7%) 
36­39 12 (9.4%) 20 (24.4%) 
40­49 37 (29.1%) 15 (18.3%) 
50+ 17 (13.4%) 9 (11%) 
Age unknown 30 (23.6%) 5 (6.1%) 
Marital status Married 97 (76.4%) 66 (80.5%) 
Cohabiting 0 (0%) 8 (9.8%)
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Single 6 (4.7%) 5 (6.1%) 
Divorced 17 (13.4%) 1 (1.2%) 
Remarried 2 (1.6%) 0 (0%) 
Widowed 3 (2.4%) 1 (1.2%) 
Marital status unknown 2 (1.6%) 1 (1.2%) 
Employment status F/T employment 72 (48 of whom women) (56%) 15 (18.3%) 
P/T employment 4 (3 of whom women) (3.1%) 15 (18.3%) 
On maternity leave 1 (0.78%) 10 (12.2%) 
Not employed 9 (7.1%) 35 (42.7%) 
Self­employed 5 (2 of whom women) (3.9%) 1 (1.2%) 
Student 1 (female) (0.78%) 1 (1.2%) 
Retired 5 (4 of whom women) (3.9%) 3 (3.7%) 
Unknown employment status 30 (23.6%) 2 (2.4%) 
Education University degree or above 70 (55.1%) 54 (65.9%) 
No university degree 17 (13.4%) 16 (19.5%) 
Education unknown 40 (31.5%) 12 (14.6%) 
Number of children One child 44 (2 of whom also pregnant) 
(34.6%) 
33 (2 of whom also pregnant) 
(40.2%) 
Two children 62 (1 of whom also pregnant) 
(48.8%) 
36 (5 of whom also pregnant) 
(43.9%) 
Three children 4 (3.1%) 6 (7.3%) 
Four or > children 4 (3.1%) 1 (1.2%) 
No children/‘childfree’ 9 (one of whom pregnant) 
(7%) 
4 (all of whom ‘childfree’) 
4.9%) 
Unknown number of children 4 (3.1%) 2 (2.4%)
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Age of youngest child Five years old and under 22 (17.3%) 60 (73.1%) 
Over five years old 28 (22%) 11 (13.4%) 
Unknown 68 (53.5%) 7 (8.5%) 
No children/‘childfree’ 9 (one of whom pregnant) 
(7%) 
4 (all of whom ‘childfree’) 
(4.9%)
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APPENDIX II: SIZE, AREA AND DENSITY OF THE POPULATION OF GREECE, 
CENSUSES AND ESTIMATIONS 1821­2001 
Year Population 
Surface 
area Density Comments 
1821 938,765 47.516 19.8 Estimate according to population census carried out in 1828 
1828 753,400 47.516 15.9 
1838 752,077 47.516 15.8 
1839 823,773 47.516 17.3 
1840 850,246 47.516 17.9 
1841 861,019 47.516 18.1 
1842 853,005 47.516 18 
1843 915,059 47.516 19.3 
1844 930,295 47.516 19.6 
1845 960,236 47.516 20.2 
1848 986,731 47.516 20.8 
1853 1,035,527 47.516 21.8 
1856 1,062,627 47.516 22.4 
1861 1,096,810 47.516 23.1 
1870 1,457,894 50.211 29 Following the annexation of the Ionian islands in 1864 
1879 1,679,470 50.211 33.4 
1889 2,187,208 63.606 34.4 Following the annexation of Thessaly and Arta in 1881 
1896 2,433,806 63.606 38.3 
1907 2,631,952 63.211 41.6 
Following the annexation of a small piece of land in Thessaly in 
1897 
1920 5,016,889 127 39.5 Following the Lausanne Treaty in 1923.
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1928 6,204,684 129.281 48 
1940 7,344,860 129.281 56.8 
1951 7,632,801 131.957 65.4 Following the annexation of the Dodecanese islands in 1947 
1961 8,338,553 131.957 63.6 
1971 8,768,641 131.957 66.5 
1981 9,740,417 131.957 73.8 
1991 10,259,900 131.957 77.8 
2001 10,964,020 131.957 83.1 
Source: Papadakis and Tsimpos (2004)
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